09 Sep 10
Nice one.
Most recent advances in human knowledge - genetics, psychology, physiology, economics, biology, etc. as well as hard sciences such as physics (accepted, not necessarily at the quantum level), chemistry, etc - point more and more towards something like determinism, or at the very least towards the diminishing of human agency classically and popularly understood as simplistic 'free will'. I'd like to think we can take that as a given, if we know anything about those advances in human knowledge.
Whether for cultural reasons (as an inheritance of a certain strain of Christianity), since not all cultures have or do posit 'free will' in the manner we do, or for some reason connected to the formal structure of our cognitive abilities, or whatever, it is really quite hard to rid ourselves of what is - in its strong form as 'pure' agency or free will - therefore increasingly not much more than a superstition. Worse, we also have arguments as to why we should not believe in any sort of determinism which speak to the purported consequences of such a belief (a curious form of argument, that we should ignore evidence (a growing body of 'fact'😉 because we do not like what this would entail for our understanding of actors and their actions).
(Oooh, dinner! More later 😉)
09 Sep 10
Originally posted by lucifershammerBut isn't then the question of "why" meaningless if you take that view?
If we live in a deterministic universe, then all events within this universe are completely specified by the initial conditions of the universe. There simply cannot be another universe (even conceptually) that is identical to ours up to a point T-deltaT before the "moral" event - so there's no question of "possible worlds" where event E doesn't occur.
Also, one can always argue that the difference is only in the initial condition. Also, unless we assume some discreteness in possible worlds, one can get as arbitrarily close to the other world in every aspect but the relevant one.
09 Sep 10
Originally posted by bbarrThe basic ethical proposition would be of the form "M (a moral agent) ought to X (some morally value-able activity)". If M is going to X or ~X regardless, then the 'ought to' loses all meaning. It's no more meaningful than "the apple ought to fall to the ground (or not)".
These questions can and have been fruitfully asked in moral philosophy independently of worries about determinism. Is there anything about determinism in particular that makes these questions more pressing? I'd figure that the supposed tension between determinism and freedom informs your questions, but then you claim that compatibilism doesn't really add anything to the debate. So, I'm confused. Can you clarify?
Ethics is about the pursuit of goods. If you can't actually pursue or choose (so, yes a freedom-determinism tension does come in) goods - but only appear to do so - then what's the point?
09 Sep 10
Originally posted by PalynkaIf the difference is in the initial condition, then there must be a difference in every subsequent state. Once deterministic universes converge, they cannot diverge again.
But isn't then the question of "why" meaningless if you take that view?
Also, one can always argue that the difference is only in the initial condition. Also, unless we assume some discreteness in possible worlds, one can get as arbitrarily close to the other world in every aspect but the relevant one.
(If U and U' start with different initial conditions but nevertheless reach the same state S then determinism implies that every subsequent state S+n must be identical.)
09 Sep 10
2 edits
Originally posted by lucifershammer[/i]when a person is making a "choice" -- for example, they're looking at a menu and there's a number of appetizing options, each with the same price -- and that person is agonizing over which entree to order before finally making a decision.
The basic ethical proposition would be of the form "M (a moral agent) ought to X (some morally value-able activity)". If M is going to X or ~X regardless, then the 'ought to' loses all meaning. It's no more meaningful than "the apple ought to fall to the ground (or not)".
Ethics is about the pursuit of goods. If you can't actually [i] ...[text shortened]... rminism tension does come in) goods - but only appear to do so - then what's the point?
is it predetermined what it is that the person will order? -- or is there some inherent "coin-flip mechanism" involved in finally choosing one of the entrees.
the same dynamic could be in play when a person has to make a difficult moral decision. Where the decision is simple (should I strangle my noisy child or should I figure out what he wants?), the result is predetermined by the person's inherent value system - almost all parents would never strangle their noisy child. But when both sides of the decision have roughly equal value, a person has the feeling of having to make a choice -- and once again, perhaps a coin-flip mechanism comes in to play that would have the person choosing one action now and the opposite action when the issue comes up again later
09 Sep 10
1 edit
Originally posted by lucifershammerSure, if we agree that 'ought' implies 'can'. But that proposition doesn't always track our ethical intuitions. I can claim rightly of a person that they ought to be compassionate, despite the fact that people don't generally have control over their character traits. But, look, even if we agree that 'ought' implies 'can', and hence that determinism renders false any statements claiming that people ought to have done or be otherwise than they did or are, ethical propositions can be reformulated. Instead of 'M ought to X', we can say 'It would be better if M X's', and this claim does not stand or fall on the basis of 'ought' implying 'can'.
The basic ethical proposition would be of the form "M (a moral agent) ought to X (some morally value-able activity)". If M is going to X or ~X regardless, then the 'ought to' loses all meaning. It's no more meaningful than "the apple ought to fall to the ground (or not)".
Ethics is about the pursuit of goods. If you can't actually rminism tension does come in) goods - but only appear to do so - then what's the point?
09 Sep 10
Originally posted by bbarrI have been wondering whether it comes down to the question of whether ethics is a prescriptive or a descriptive exercise.
Sure, if we agree that 'ought' implies 'can'. But that proposition doesn't always track our ethical intuitions. I can claim rightly of a person that they ought to be compassionate, despite the fact that people don't generally have control over their character traits. But, look, even if we agree that 'ought' implies 'can', and hence that determinism r ...[text shortened]... this[/i] claim does not stand or fall on the basis of 'ought' implying 'can'.
To the statement "It would be better if M X's" I would simply pose the question, "So what?" If you could not respond "Therefore M ought to X," you'd be terribly frustrated!
09 Sep 10
2 edits
Originally posted by lucifershammera law could be passed telling M that if he doesn't do X, he'll be sent to prison. M would then most likely change his behavior and start doing X because he values avoiding prison.
I have been wondering whether it comes down to the question of whether ethics is a prescriptive or a descriptive exercise.
To the statement "It would be better if M X's" I would simply pose the question, "So what?" If you could not respond "Therefore M ought to X," you'd be terribly frustrated!
09 Sep 10
Originally posted by lucifershammerYes, you've said it before. But that doesn't invalidate what I just said that you can get arbitrarily close.
If the difference is in the initial condition, then there must be a difference in every subsequent state. Once deterministic universes converge, they cannot diverge again.
(If U and U' start with different initial conditions but nevertheless reach the same state S then determinism implies that every subsequent state S+n must be identical.)
09 Sep 10
Originally posted by lucifershammerEthics has both descriptive and prescriptive components. Consider the classical aims of normative ethical theories. They are supposed to explain our ethical intuitions, render them consistent, justify them, and offer guidance. That requires having a pretty thorough grasp of what we in fact believe.
I have been wondering whether it comes down to the question of whether ethics is a prescriptive or a descriptive exercise.
To the statement "It would be better if M X's" I would simply pose the question, "So what?" If you could not respond "Therefore M ought to X," you'd be terribly frustrated!
You are arguing as though our moral exhortations do not have causal force. People can be persuaded, even in a deterministic universe, and they can act better in the future. The proper response to "So what?", is "So, stop that!" or "You are acting contrary to your interests", or "You are hurting people you care about", or.... We can give all the normal reasons we give when we try to persuade people to act rightly or be better. People can take these reasons up in their deliberations.
09 Sep 10
Originally posted by lucifershammerThere can only be a non-deterministic universe if true randomness exists. If nothing is random, then every event -- including behaviors -- can eventually be predicted.Neo: Are you saying that I must choose whether Trinity lives or dies?
Oracle: You have already made that choice. Now you must understand it.
The Matrix Reloaded
In a deterministic universe, an act of premeditated murder or saving a person from drowning is no more and no less an event in the system than an apple falling to ...[text shortened]... assigning moral status to the former but not the latter? Why ethics in a deterministic universe?
On the other hand, if there is something that is truely random -- when a particle will decay for example, or whether or not two molecules will combine when they collide -- then randomness does exist.
What we call 'free will' actually rests on this assumption that there is true randomness. So for any given situation, I can decide X -- then change my mind to Y -- then back to X -- then back to Y. But I can only do that an arbitrary (and therefore unpredictable) number of times if one of the inputs to the system is a truly random component.
Suffice it to say that -- for our lifetimes anyway -- it will always "appear" that we have free will no matter whether we actually do or not. Our predictive models of behavior are unlikely to prove us deterministic in the near future.
09 Sep 10
Originally posted by PalynkaCan we? Could you give an example?
Yes, you've said it before. But that doesn't invalidate what I just said that you can get arbitrarily close.
It is true that U and U' differ only in the initial conditions. But that difference completely specifies every subsequent difference between the two - no new information is added.
10 Sep 10
Originally posted by lucifershammerAre you familiar with the term arbitrarily close?
Can we? Could you give an example?
It is true that U and U' differ only in the initial conditions. But that difference completely specifies every subsequent difference between the two - no new information is added.
Example: You have a line (AA) and you want to find another line (BB) which intersects AA at a positive angle. If you give me a point (C) in AA and a positive distance epsilon (no matter how small), I can find an angle for that intersection such that BB's distance to AA is smaller than epsilon. So I can say I can get arbitrarily close to any point in AA.
10 Sep 10
Originally posted by PalynkaI mean an example of two deterministic universes that are arbitrarily close together yet where a moral agent acts differently.
Are you familiar with the term arbitrarily close?
Example: You have a line (AA) and you want to find another line (BB) which intersects AA at a positive angle. If you give me a point (C) in AA and a positive distance epsilon (no matter how small), I can find an angle for that intersection such that BB's distance to AA is smaller than epsilon. So I can say I can get arbitrarily close to any point in AA.