10 Sep 10
1 edit
Originally posted by lucifershammerYou want me to give you examples of alternative universes that are arbitrarily close and yet a moral agent acts diffently? Ok, universe A is arbitrarily close to universe B and a moral agent acts differently.
I mean an example of two deterministic universes that are arbitrarily close together yet where a moral agent acts differently.
What else do you expect as an example?
10 Sep 10
Originally posted by PalynkaA concrete example. Something like, "M/M' is a husband who walks in on his wife and best friend having an affair. In U, M picks up his shotgun and shoots them both; in U', M' just walks out the door. M and M' have identical histories, genetic codes etc. till that point - they are 'arbitrarily close' in every relevant way."
You want me to give you examples of alternative universes that are arbitrarily close and yet a moral agent acts diffently? Ok, universe A is arbitrarily close to universe B and a moral agent acts differently.
What else do you expect as an example?
To give you advance warning of what I'll do next: I'm going to argue that they were not, in fact, close enough in every relevant way (or their choices would've been similar). To do this, I'm going to quiz you on what causal influence(s) determined the difference and then do my best Socrates-impression to show that the differences are significant enough (possibly even to say that M and M' aren't even the same moral agent).
10 Sep 10
Originally posted by bbarrI am not denying the causal force of moral exhortations (whether the universe is deterministic or otherwise). I am questioning the (for want of a better term) honesty or integrity of those exhortations.
Ethics has both descriptive and prescriptive components. Consider the classical aims of normative ethical theories. They are supposed to explain our ethical intuitions, render them consistent, justify them, and offer guidance. That requires having a pretty thorough grasp of what we in fact believe.
You are arguing as though our moral exhortations do no ...[text shortened]... e to act rightly or be better. People can take these reasons up in their deliberations.
For instance, "So, stop that!" implies "You ought to stop that," (which is where the other responses also end up, methinks). Our ethical intuitions do not normally hold that the person is an automaton, subject completely to external causal influences - but that is exactly what a person must be in a deterministic universe.
11 Sep 10
Originally posted by lucifershammerO.K., but you began this thread with a particular question concerning the point of moral discourse in a deterministic universe. A plausible answer is that it serves a causal role by influencing people's evaluative attitudes, deliberations, and actions. Suppose I act cruelly, and am told 'You ought not have acted cruelly'. I can take this a metaphysical impossibility, and hence simply false. Alternatively, I can try to understand why my action my action was cruel. I can look towards my motivations, the practical reasons that obtained in the case, the effects of my action on others, etc. I can use this sort of introspection and analysis to guide my future practical deliberations, and I can use it to reform, and thereby render coherent and reasonable, from my point of view, those evaluative judgments and attitudes that I antecedently possess. None of this strikes me as particularly mysterious. In any case, I just don't share the intuition that moral exhortations or assessments carry 'ought' implications of necessity. They certainly may, and sometimes they do. But they need not be construed this way; they can be recasted so that they carry implications about what is better or worse, virtuous or vicious, and these implications can be taken up from the deliberative standpoint of agents irrespective of whether determinism is true.
I am not denying the causal force of moral exhortations (whether the universe is deterministic or otherwise). I am questioning the (for want of a better term) honesty or integrity of those exhortations.
For instance, "So, stop that!" implies "You ought to stop that," (which is where the other responses also end up, methinks). Our ethical int ...[text shortened]... l causal influences - but that is exactly what a person must be in a deterministic universe.
Further, from the supposed truth of determinism you do not get the conclusion that persons are automata. Not all the causal forces will be external, if by 'external' you mean 'originating outside the agent, or outside the cognitive ken of the agent'. My actions may be caused by my character, because my character determines what I take to be my reasons and, hence, the train of my practical deliberations. But my character is not something external to me. In a deep sense, my character is me. So, my actions may be proximally determined by who I am, and I may have little control over who I am, but that isn't particularly worrisome. Nobody gets to create themselves, ex nihilo, on the fly. Yes, there will be ultimate causes outside of me. But moral discourse is compatible with is, as I argue above.
11 Sep 10
Originally posted by bbarrLOL good one!🙂
You want a game?
Edit: Also, do you realize I have only posted twice as much as you, but I've been on this site about six times as long?
But, do you realize I have made 87,261 moves more than you?
Wait let me guess before you say it..quality over quantity!🙂
11 Sep 10
Originally posted by bbarrYou appear to be suffering from verbal diarrhoea as well as gobbldegookitis.
O.K., but you began this thread with a particular question concerning the point of moral discourse in a deterministic universe. A plausible answer is that it serves a causal role by influencing people's evaluative attitudes, deliberations, and actions. Suppose I act cruelly, and am told 'You ought not have acted cruelly'. I can take this a metaphysical impo ...[text shortened]... e causes outside of me. But moral discourse is compatible with is, as I argue above.
You really should make a determined effort to express what you want to say more concisely and without resorting to jargon.
I suggest that, for a start, you study the published works of Bertrand Russell and Karl Popper who were able to discuss and write about the most abstruse subjects in that manner.
11 Sep 10
Originally posted by bbarrSomething valuable is lost in the recasting.
O.K., but you began this thread with a particular question concerning the point of moral discourse in a deterministic universe. A plausible answer is that it serves a causal role by influencing people's evaluative attitudes, deliberations, and actions. Suppose I act cruelly, and am told 'You ought not have acted cruelly'. I can take this a metaphysical impo ...[text shortened]... e causes outside of me. But moral discourse is compatible with is, as I argue above.
Sure, the implications of moral exhortations may (or may not) be taken up by deliberative agents in the absence of free will.
However, those agents would not be metaphysically responsible for whether they take up those implications or not if either determinism or haphazardism were true. This is because those agents either wouldn't be able to act otherwise, or wouldn't be authors of their own acts, respectively. They would just be expressing a part of implacable universe unfolding itself, either inevitably or capriciously.
So, in response too exhortations, they would be like dumb animals being admonished or praised: it might affect how they behave later, but they still wouldn't be responsible for it. They would just be doing what they do, in response to inducements and threats. Sure, human beings would think about things explicitly in addition: but those thoughts would be just as determined as animals' implicit conditioned responses.
So, moral exhortation would still exert useful effects. And there are certainly alternative meanings to "should have" and "could have" that are viable. But none of the would mean people were not fundamentally automatons trapped in a causal web, and that morality was anything other than a perverse puppet show.
Having said this, I find myself wholly unable to characterize free will coherently, as an alternative to determinism or haphazardism. This may either mean that it really is incoherent, or that my mind can't grasp it. I hope the latter possibility is true. But I wouldn't blame you if you weren't convinced, as I have provided no reason to convince you, or indeed myself.
Also, you may are psychologically satisfied by some version of compatibilism, that doesn't entail imponderable counter-causal action. Good for you. But I am not. Bad for me.
11 Sep 10
Originally posted by Sartor ResartusOh, be quiet. He's smart and articulate, and just being thorough. If he can't be concise too, it's hardly the end of the world.
You appear to be suffering from verbal diarrhoea as well as gobbldegookitis.
You really should make a determined effort to express what you want to say more concisely and without resorting to jargon.
I suggest that, for a start, you study the published works of Bertrand Russell and Karl Popper who were able to discuss and write about the most abstruse subjects in that manner.