Aggravating is it not ?

Originally posted by whodey
Of course, why "innocent" people suffer is a rather complex state of affairs that I don't think is easily asnwered, but I will give it a try from the way I perceive things. There is no question in my mind that on one would have ever suffered had sin not entered the world, however, once it did all bets are off. At this point, when sin entered the world, you ar beyond our ability to fully comprehend it in terms of the implications surrounding it.

Then once this occured, there was little God could do to change this fact and liek it or not those who came from them are still apart of them in some way and will take part in their curse.

But it doesn't make any sense that something like the neonate should suffer for the choices and actions of its forbears. As I said before, there is nothing about sin (or free will) that logically necessitates that, say, this neonate should be afflicted with illness. So, of course, God could simply prevent this affliction even if there are other reasons why he must permit sin (or preserve free will). So, "like it or not" this sort of suffering obtains despite the fact that a being such as your God would have the knowledge and power to prevent it while still providing for principal goods, such as free will. So, supposing he exists, is he just callous, or what?

does the death or suffering of the neonate have to do with God's utlimate plan or does God want to intervene but is impeded by the lack of faith in and around that situation? For example, does God require the consent of others even though the neonate is incapable of consenting itself or must it die to fulfill some purpose that we are unaware?

Again, it doesn't make any sense that the neonate should suffer because others fail in some regard (such as failing to exhibit the faith that God minimally requires or some such). Again, the neonate itself is not even capable of "consenting" or exhibiting faith in God. And why should I think it is plausible that this neonate must suffer and die in order that God's ultimate plans for humanity be fulfilled?

free will is a complex phenomenon that is far beyond our ability to fully comprehend it in terms of the implications surrounding it.

If it really is the case that the existence of human free will necessitates such things as hurricanes and cancers and neonatal illnesses, etc, then, yes, free will has some very bizarre implications. But you've given us absolutely no reasons to take this talk of yours very seriously. I really doubt the implications of free will are all that confounding. It seems like you just want to play the "free will card" and then act like you don't have any more arguing to do, or something. The fact is, there is absolutely nothing about providing for free will that would logically necessitate, say, the suffering of this neonate.

Originally posted by LemonJello
We cannot arrive at dependably accurate judgments about God based merely on observation and the subsequent aid of reason.

I thought God was supposed to be some sort of moral exemplar. Does this mean that I cannot come to any accurate judgments about how I ought to live by, say, observing and reasoning on the life of Jesus?

Whether or no So, you have done nothing more than introduce a naive and vicious sort of skepticism.

I thought God was supposed to be some sort of moral exemplar. Does this mean that I cannot come to any accurate judgments about how I ought to live by, say, observing and reasoning on the life of Jesus?

Of course you can come to accurate judgments about how you ought to live by observing and reasoning on the life of Jesus, but whatever you glean from the life of Jesus is revelatory knowledge, i.e., knowledge based on faith. This is quite different than observing and reasoning on what persists in the natural world alone (accidents, catastrophies, etc.).

Start being consistent: if I had to doubt my judgments any time there existed the mere possibility that there exist reasons beyond my attention or comprehension that could prove me wrong, then I would have to doubt virtually everything.

Shouldn't you doubt your own judgments whenever there is something important at risk? For instance, if it is the case that God exists, and yet you refuse to believe that God exists based on the limited data at your disposal, doubting your own judgments might have been extremely beneficial.

I should have to doubt virtually all of my judgments on nearly all matters because all of these judgments represent at least implicit claims about what an omniscient being would understand to be correct.

Not necessarily, when you consider that your understanding of any given event or object may be correct, yet remain far from complete. I may be able to accurately determine whether it is raining or not, yet be unable to tell you when it will stop, or the exact atmospheric conditions which led to the rainfall itself. Or, perhaps I possess the most up to date, cutting edge knowledge of the sun, yet I remain ignorant of what exactly goes on inside of the sun, simply because the center of the sun is an environment which it is impossible to observe. In each case my knowledge is correct, yet there remains an even greater understanding which I am not privy to; a more complete understanding which need not negate what I've already determined is correct.

Originally posted by LemonJello

But it doesn't make any sense that something like the neonate should suffer for the choices and actions of its forbears.

Of course, this is an assumption. For example, a woman who makes the choice to do crack cocaine before giving birth will carry with it implications for the child. Like it or not, what we do in the here and now will effect future generations even though they had nothing to do with the choices we made. This can happen for the better or the worse. For example, through Abrahams faith God was able to work through him and subsequently bless future generations of his as well as ending up being a blessing upon the entire world...or so says scripture. For offspring to be completly free of our choices and decisions would necessitate offspring that is completly independent of us. In such a scenerio, could they even be considered offspring? Perhaps the whole reproductive scenerio is unfair? After all, our offsrping is apart of us in various ways. Perhaps God should just create anew instead of letting us reproduce, no?

Originally posted by LemonJello
If it really is the case that the existence of human free will necessitates such things as hurricanes and cancers and neonatal illnesses, etc, then, yes, free will has some very bizarre implications. But you've given us absolutely no reasons to take this talk of yours very seriously. I really doubt the implications of free will are all that confounding. I ...[text shortened]... roviding for free will that would logically necessitate, say, the suffering of this neonate.[/b]

As I have said earlier, I believe that when God first made the earth it was a paradise. However, after man fell and, specifically, after God destroyed mankind via the flood this all changed. After the flood I believe the environment changed significantly, so much so that men only lived a little over a hundred years of age instead of a thousand before the flood. Why? I believe it was to prevent men from living to such a ripe old age which gave them more time to be increasingly wicked. Perhaps cancer is caused by the similar phenomenon of paradise lost or at least contributary to it. Not fair you say? Well what is fair, is it fair to let mankind become so wicked that they verge on destruction or is it fair to limit their ability to become wicked or act wickedly thus sparing the human race from destruction?

As for free will being complex, of course it is. Even if you don't believe in God I would presume that you would have believed it to be so.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]I thought God was supposed to be some sort of moral exemplar. Does this mean that I cannot come to any accurate judgments about how I ought to live by, say, observing and reasoning on the life of Jesus?

Of course you can come to accurate judgments about how you ought to live by observing and reasoning on the life of Jesus, but whatever you glea ; a more complete understanding which need not negate what I've already determined is correct.[/b]

Of course you can come to accurate judgments about how you ought to live by observing and reasoning on the life of Jesus, but whatever you glean from the life of Jesus is revelatory knowledge, i.e., knowledge based on faith. This is quite different than observing and reasoning on what persists in the natural world alone (accidents, catastrophies, etc.).

Your claim keeps changing as you go. First you said that we cannot come to accurate judgments since we are not omniscient. Then you said we cannot come to accurate judgments about God's ways in particular. Then you said we cannot come to dependably accurate judgments about God on the basis of observation and reason. Now your claim is that we cannot come to accurate judgments about God on the basis of observation and reasoning on natural phenomena alone. I am not sure what you mean when you say that such knowledge would be "revelatory" and based "on faith". I remember you had some interesting discussions with bbarr, and if I recall correctly, you endorsed some view under which faith is like provisional acceptance to treat the world a certain way and act accordingly.

At any rate, I think there is some confusion here. If we postulate some entity 'God' with certain properties, then there's no reason in principle why we could not make reasonable predictions regarding how such an entity, if it existed, should impact our world and observations. More to the point, there's no reason why we could not specify some conditions that would basically serve as falsification conditions -- that is, conditions that would serve to effectively falsify or cast sufficient doubt on the idea that such an entity as 'God' exists. That is really all my argument rests on here, and your selective skepticism notwithstanding, I don't see why we cannot come to accurate judgment on such matters. Simply the fact that there exists the possibility of reasons beyond our attention or comprehension that would serve to prove us wrong doesn't mean squat: again, this possibility is something that will exist in virtually any inquiry we could possibly take on.

Shouldn't you doubt your own judgments whenever there is something important at risk?

If I understand what you are asking, the answer is no. Presumably, when you talk about "something important at risk", you mean that the question of whether or not the proposition at issue is true carries pragmatic importance for us. For instance, this would be the case if the truth of theism carried the promise of benefit or desirable consequences (like the possibility of immortality or reward or whatever). Further, it could be that if theism is true and yet I fail to believe it, then I would face undesirable consequences (such as punishment or whatever). So, your claim as I understand it is basically that since the proposition carries pragmatic importance, I should take that to weigh on the question of its truth (to at least some degree). But, unfortunately, that is just a very simple fallacy (in the vein of appeals to consequences) where one takes the (un)desirability of consequences to weigh on the truth of the proposition. The fact remains that there is no way for you to epistemologically justify this approach because it rests on a simple fallacy, and because the (un)desirability of the consequences of the proposition has really nothing to do with the actual evidence that bears on the question of whether or not the proposition is, in fact, true. So, no, this is not the way one should be brought into doubt: doubt should grow or diminish naturally as our level of confidence comes to fit our evidential considerations.

Furthermore, this is NOT a way that one can go about reliably influencing deliberative belief formation because it provides only pragmatic reasons, not evidential reasons. If you recall, this was discussed in Thread 83831. You seem to want to appeal to a volitional aspect of belief that just doesn't exist. This volitional aspect may be much more relevant to faith. The question of whether or not I should have faith that God exists is perhaps a very different one than the question of whether or not I should believe that God exists. However, on a reading of faith as above (where for S to take P on faith means roughly for S to provisionally accept that P, or to hypothetically posit that P, and to treat the world as such and act accordingly, etc), I certainly think the two questions can be linked. In particular, if it is not the case that there is sufficient evidence to bring me into belief that P, then I think in general it would be epistemologically irresponsible of me to take P on faith.

For instance, if it is the case that God exists, and yet you refuse to believe that God exists based on the limited data at your disposal, doubting your own judgments might have been extremely beneficial.

Again, it is simply not the case that I "refuse to believe" that God exists, just as it is generally not the case that I choose to believe this or that based on anything. I have been brought into the belief that 'God' (as previously defined) doesn't exist because of the evidence. If it is the case that the same evidence doesn't bring you into the same belief or the same level of confidence, then that seems fair enough: that would just presumably mean that our interpretations and understanding of the evidence and how it bears on the topic differ. That is where it is worthwhile for us to engage in the practices of justification, each offering evidential reasons for and against. Even so, it could still well be the case that one or more of us is not being appropriately responsive to the actual evidence at our disposal. Regardless, the point here is that I am not comfortable with how you try to draw volitional aspects (and pragmatic considerations) into the subject of belief.

I may be able to accurately determine whether it is raining or not, yet be unable to tell you when it will stop, or the exact atmospheric conditions which led to the rainfall itself. Or, perhaps I possess the most up to date, cutting edge knowledge of the sun, yet I remain ignorant of what exactly goes on inside of the sun, simply because the center of the sun is an environment which it is impossible to observe. In each case my knowledge is correct, yet there remains an even greater understanding which I am not privy to; a more complete understanding which need not negate what I've already determined is correct.

What does any of this have to do with my points regarding your selective skepticism? You brought up the point that, basically, even though it seems reasonable enough for me to think that such a being as 'God' would prevent seemingly gratuitous suffering; I cannot trust such a judgment. And, in defense of why I cannot trust such judgments you only offered the reason that there exists the mere possibility that there would exist adequate reasons for allowing the suffering that an omniscient being would have access to but that would be beyond my comprehension. Yet again, I concede that such a possibility exists (after all, our evidence is virtually never such that it would logically preclude such a mere possibility that there would exist reasons beyond our attention that would prove us wrong). But, I claim that such a reason in no way justifies your claim that I cannot trust my judgment. Again, all it does is introduce a vicious sort of skepticism. I don't know how else I can try to explain this: consider virtually any judgment you might make on virtually any matter, and it will virtually always be the case that there exists the possibility that there exist reasons beyond your attention or comprehension that would prove you wrong (such that an omniscient being would have access to them and yet you wouldn't). I only hear you complaining about this in this particular case when the evidence bears on your theism. So, start being consistent, and spiral into radical doubt in virtually every aspect of your life. Or maybe it's possible that you are failing to meet this particular inquiry with the appropriate amount of objectivity. Otherwise, why do you bring up this point of skepticism here and not elsewhere on other inquiries?

How else can I explain this? Bottom line, you cannot give me sufficient cause to doubt just by pointing out the mere possibility that I am mistaken. If you could, that would just lead to radical doubt because the mere possibility that I am mistaken exists in virtually any judgment I make (again, our basis for belief is virtually never such that it logically precludes this mere possibility that I am mistaken). So, what you need to do is actually offer evidential reasons that actually bear on the truth or falsity of my judgment. For instance, if I judge it to be the case that an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being would have prevented the suffering of the neonate, then what evidential reasons can you offer that would suggest that I am mistaken? If you cannot offer any, then how could you possibly expect to give me sufficient cause to revise or really doubt my judgment?

Originally posted by whodey
Of course, this is an assumption. For example, a woman who makes the choice to do crack cocaine before giving birth will carry with it implications for the child. Like it or not, what we do in the here and now will effect future generations even though they had nothing to do with the choices we made. This can happen for the better or the worse. For exampl ...[text shortened]... of us in various ways. Perhaps God should just create anew instead of letting us reproduce, no?

Why do you keep simply failing to address the actual issue? Even if it is the case that our choices affect future generations in undesirable ways, an omnipotent being would have the ability to make sure that this doesn't lead to unfair or unnecessary instances of suffering. Even if you were correct that the choices and actions of our forbears could precipitate in some genuine way things like hurricanes or cancers or neonatal illnesses, that wouldn't change the fact that an omnipotent, omniscient being could simply disallow these unfortunate things while still preserving all the seemingly necessary and integral aspects of human free will. Does it strike you as unfair that a neonate should suffer because of the choices its forbears made? Do you honestly believe that if God prevented the suffering of this neonate that would somehow mean free will doesn't exist on the level necessary for God's plans of love?

Originally posted by whodey
As I have said earlier, I believe that when God first made the earth it was a paradise. However, after man fell and, specifically, after God destroyed mankind via the flood this all changed. After the flood I believe the environment changed significantly, so much so that men only lived a little over a hundred years of age instead of a thousand before the fl ...[text shortened]... is. Even if you don't believe in God I would presume that you would have believed it to be so.

I never denied that free will is "complex" (whatever that means here exactly); I just deny that the existence of free will logically necessitates things like hurricanes and cancers and neonatal illnesses, etc. Yes, I deny that the implications of free will are that confounding. It's unseemly the way you cling to free will defense when it so obviously doesn't account for any number of sources of suffering.

Originally posted by LemonJello
It is unclear how you would do such a thing. In the Garden, there was but one forbidden action, rendering the situation pretty much pass/fail. I fail to see how degrees could have been established in such a proposition.

I meant that God could have simply created a world with agents that have more beneficent characters than in this world, such tha ou are trying to get at, then I don’t understand what you are trying to get at.[/b]

I meant that God could have simply created a world with agents that have more beneficent characters than in this world, such that less suffering would result from their autonomous actions.
There are two incorrect inferrences here. One is the implication that God somehow created a less-than situation: less-than desirable, less-than perfect. He did not. The creation--- when complete--- was deemed 'good' by God... not 'pretty close,' or the equivalent. Man was not lacking in any way, shape or form; was at no disadvantage whatsoever.

The second implication is that less suffering could have been the result of the assumed superior creation. Question begging, that. Had such an impossibility occured, one can imagine the voices from that alternative universe complaining about even the assume decreased level of suffering resulting from the actions of their "more benefiecent" forbears.

The point, of course, is that the actions themselves are nearly insignificant in comparison to what the actions represent, i.e., rejection of God's system. No matter the mechanics or specifics which lead to the same, a rejection of God's system will invariably lead to all manner of undesirable suffering.

Are you honestly trying to tell me that you ultimately determined your character?
Absolutely: just as you are the final arbiter of yours. No one is saying that we pull ourselves up from our own bootstraps, as it were. There is no end to outside suggestions about how one ought to live one's life. However, we are nonetheless and ultimately the product of our own choices. Decisions may be influenced and/or informed by external input, but the final say--- determined by an individual's own standard of values--- is up to each individual. Choices simply mirror character.

So I have good reasons to think the problem of suffering makes for a forceful argument; whereas the "problem of joy", not so much.
The issue I am countering with is that of necessity. That suffering would ensue from a rejection of God's system is no small surprise, nor is it shocking, given the perfection of God's complete character. However, those who attempt to use suffering as a problematic argument to God's integrity, typically do so by claiming that even one instance of 'needless' suffering is enough to represent a snag, as it were.

The argument of suffering as a problem--- to be effective--- need work in opposition, as well, to work at all. The opposite sides cancel each other out leaving one central issue, pertinent to both and relative to all: necessity.

Namely, why is anything--- favorable or unfavorable--- necessary at all?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Why do you keep simply failing to address the actual issue? Even if it is the case that our choices affect future generations in undesirable ways, an omnipotent being would have the ability to make sure that this doesn't lead to unfair or unnecessary instances of suffering. Even if you were correct that the choices and actions of our forbears could prec t would somehow mean free will doesn't exist on the level necessary for God's plans of love?

Show me love that is devoid of risk of suffering and/or pain and I will show you a loveless situation. With love their is ALWAYS the risk of loss/suffering. The best you can do is argue that God could have gone against this principle that we all find true in our own lives or that he should have been able to go against this principle.

I suppose that either position of saying love need not be devoid of risk or must include risk resides in pure speculation. However, all we know is what we know and that is what we know about love......you know?

Originally posted by whodey
Show me love that is devoid of risk of suffering and/or pain and I will show you a loveless situation. With love their is ALWAYS the risk of loss/suffering. The best you can do is argue that God could have gone against this principle that we all find true in our own lives or that he should have been able to go against this principle.

I suppose that eit ...[text shortened]... lation. However, all we know is what we know and that is what we know about love......you know?

Show me love that is devoid of risk of suffering and/or pain and I will show you a loveless situation.
How about the love that each member of the Godhead has for every other member of the Godhead, for starters.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]Show me love that is devoid of risk of suffering and/or pain and I will show you a loveless situation.
How about the love that each member of the Godhead has for every other member of the Godhead, for starters.[/b]

Fair enough. Take Christ for example, was he tempted or wasn't he? Was there a risk of temptation or wasn't there? If not, there was no real temptation in the first place.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]I meant that God could have simply created a world with agents that have more beneficent characters than in this world, such that less suffering would result from their autonomous actions.
There are two incorrect inferrences here. One is the implication that God somehow created a less-than situation: less-than desirable, less-than perfect. He did ty.

Namely, why is anything--- favorable or unfavorable--- necessary at all?[/b]

There are two incorrect inferrences here. One is the implication that God somehow created a less-than situation: less-than desirable, less-than perfect.

What on earth are you talking about? My claim supposes no such thing; in fact, it is silent on whether or not there even is such a thing as "perfectness" in this sense. It only relies on the fact that it is logically possible that God could have created a world with agents that possess more beneficent characters than what exists in our world. This creation would still enjoy the existence of free will, but less suffering would obtain from their autonomous actions because the agents would be less predisposed toward violence and the like.

The creation--- when complete--- was deemed 'good' by God... not 'pretty close,' or the equivalent. Man was not lacking in any way, shape or form; was at no disadvantage whatsoever.

So, what are you saying? That the Christian God deemed this world to be perfect, the best of all possibles? Why would he do something like that? Doesn't he know that there are any number of seemingly gratuitous instances of suffering in this world brought on by, for example, climatic disasters and cancers and accidents, and the like?

The fact is, my above free will scenario entails no logical contradiction. So if God couldn't bring about a race of humans with more beneficent characters on the whole than what we have, then he's not omnipotent. Further, if he couldn't bring about a world that didn't involve, say, climatic disasters and cancers and other such sources of suffering, then he's not omnipotent.

The second implication is that less suffering could have been the result of the assumed superior creation. Question begging, that.

Yes, my claim implies that less suffering could have been the result. That is in no way "question begging". It simply follows from his supposed omnipotence that God would have the ability to bring about a world with less suffering than ours, which happens to contain a lot of suffering (because, again, it would entail no contradiction; it is a logically possible state of affairs).

No matter the mechanics or specifics which lead to the same, a rejection of God's system will invariably lead to all manner of undesirable suffering.

Well, why don't you present some argument that actually demonstrates that a rejection of God's system logically necessitates that, say, the offspring of those that sinned suffer through climatic disasters and painful illnesses and cancers and the like. What's premise 1 of your argument?

However, we are nonetheless and ultimately the product of our own choices.

Are you sure you know what 'ultimately' means? To claim that who you are is ultimately the product of your own choices is also to deny the causal antecedents that have helped shape who you are. It would be to deny that who you are has been causally influenced by such things as your upbringing, environment, genetic endowment, etc.

Decisions may be influenced and/or informed by external input, but the final say--- determined by an individual's own standard of values--- is up to each individual. Choices simply mirror character.

Yes, I have never denied any of this: when we act autonomously, we make choices that reflect our characters. In case I have to remind you, the claim you initially responded to was my claim that we don't ultimately determine our own characters. I never said that we do not make decisions that mirror our characters – I said we do not ultimately determine our own characters. If you still want to deny my claim, then explain to me exactly how you ultimately determined your own character. All the people I know have characters that were causally influenced by things like their parents and teachers and environmental and cultural circumstances, genetics, etc. That means they didn't ultimately determine their own characters, although they may still claim some controlling input to their own characters which may grow with maturity and introspection.

The argument of suffering as a problem--- to be effective--- need work in opposition, as well, to work at all. The opposite sides cancel each other out leaving one central issue, pertinent to both and relative to all: necessity.

Namely, why is anything--- favorable or unfavorable--- necessary at all?

I have absolutely no idea what you are talking about. What does it mean to say that the problem of suffering "needs to work in opposition…to work at all"? What "opposite sides" are there and what does it mean for them to "cancel"? And I don't understand your last question either. "Why is anything necessary at all" for what?

Why don't you try just telling me exactly what parts or premises of my argument you disagree with and why.

Originally posted by whodey
Show me love that is devoid of risk of suffering and/or pain and I will show you a loveless situation. With love their is ALWAYS the risk of loss/suffering. The best you can do is argue that God could have gone against this principle that we all find true in our own lives or that he should have been able to go against this principle.

I suppose that eit ...[text shortened]... lation. However, all we know is what we know and that is what we know about love......you know?

Yikes. Please go re-read my posts. If you don't start addressing the actual content of my posts, then there is no point in my continuing with this discussion. Please try to get this through your head: nowhere have I stated that God doesn't exist because the mere "risk of suffering and/or pain" exists. For the last time, my claim is that there exist instances of suffering that are not logically necessary for God's plans for humanity. There exist instances of suffering that are not logically necessitated by things like free will or sin or love. Take my example of the suffering neonate. That this neonate should suffer with painful illness is not logically necessitated by the existence of things like free will or sin or love. So, God could have simply made it such that the suffering did not obtain and yet it would still be possible for him to achieve his plans for humanity. So why didn't he then? Is he just callous?

Originally posted by whodey
Fair enough. Take Christ for example, was he tempted or wasn't he? Was there a risk of temptation or wasn't there? If not, there was no real temptation in the first place.

As man, He was able to be tempted; as God, He was not. Though tempted as man, He kept Himself in God's plan by refusing any and all temptations, instead sticking to the plan.

Originally posted by LemonJello
There are two incorrect inferrences here. One is the implication that God somehow created a less-than situation: less-than desirable, less-than perfect.

What on earth are you talking about? My claim supposes no such thing; in fact, it is silent on whether or not there even is such a thing as "perfectness" in this sense. It only relies on the fact ...[text shortened]... hat parts or premises of my argument you disagree with and why.[/b]

It only relies on the fact that it is logically possible that God could have created a world with agents that possess more beneficent characters than what exists in our world.
This is where you imply that God's creation is less-than what it possibly could have been. As the world stands now, it is entirely less than what it could have been, but its current state is not a reflection of Him.
The way God created it in the first place--- and man as its pivotal player--- was the best of all possible scenarios. Anything less than following God's plan would (and did) result in all kinds of turmoil... emphatically because of man's decision, not any inability on the part of God.

This creation would still enjoy the existence of free will, but less suffering would obtain from their autonomous actions because the agents would be less predisposed toward violence and the like.
Now you're saying that man's delf-destruction is on account of God's wiring: that once off His path, He still determines the route man will take.

It is true that once a plant is taken out of the dirt, it dies. Its death, however, cannot be considered part of the plan of life.

Doesn't he know that there are any number of seemingly gratuitous instances of suffering in this world brought on by, for example, climatic disasters and cancers and accidents, and the like?
That sounds very close to one of those questions like "Are you still beating your wife?" There is nothing unwarranted about any suffering. We are all going through some form of it on one plane or another--- and as quick as we might be to bemoan the initial trespassers--- yet we all would have made the same decision.

God knew perfectly the entire scope of tragedy which would befall man, were he to imprudently step off the path of design. This is why He warned the man, the day that you eat of that fruit, dying, you will die.

The fact is, my above free will scenario entails no logical contradiction.
Perhaps no logical contradiction, given that logic deals with arguments which are not required to be based on reality. However, were logic limited to truth, then your scenario is at fault because it omits critical data. Namely, free will invariably leads to opposition. You admit this each and every day, demonstrated here in these forums by you and countless others like you.

Also demonstrated in these forums is the deference to a final authority. You make your arguments appealing to logic, reason, opinion or ridicule. Any one and all of them are your efforts to lend credibility to your position, and are designed to (essentially) shut the other person up.

In creating angels and man, God created an inviolable free will which set up inevitable opposition... possibly fatal. To follow Him as the final authority, both angels and man would be recepients of overflowing life and love. To reject His authority would lead to all manner of death and suffering--- just like pulling a plant out of the dirt.

Well, why don't you present some argument that actually demonstrates that a rejection of God's system logically necessitates that, say, the offspring of those that sinned suffer through climatic disasters and painful illnesses and cancers and the like.
Among a plant's requirements for life includes its placement in dirt. Removing a plant from dirt will result in the plants decay and eventual death. Said decay can take on many forms; whereas its death is fairly one-dimensional.

Among a man's requirements for life includes his abiding in God. Removing himself from God's system will result in man's immediate spiritual death and eventual physical death. Said spiritual death can take on many forms; whereas his death is two-dimensional: the soul remains forever in destruction for that man who dies prior to accepting the work done on the cross on his behalf by the Lord Jesus Christ.

All the people I know have characters that were causally influenced by things like their parents and teachers and environmental and cultural circumstances, genetics, etc.
Again, regardless of these outside influences, we and we alone make the final decision about the person we choose to be. These choices are our characters.

What "opposite sides" are there and what does it mean for them to "cancel"?
This argument you have been promoting questions God's integrity by demonstration of even one "needless" act of suffering. The same argument could be put forth for even one "needless" moment of joy. Why would an omnipotent, omniscient God allow even one "needless" moment of anything, favorable or unfavorable?

"Why is anything necessary at all" for what?
The better question to ask. Why did God create (and allow) anything other than Himself at all?