01 Jun 09
3 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloYour claim keeps changing as you go. First you said that we cannot come to accurate judgments since we are not omniscient. Then you said we cannot come to accurate judgments about God's ways in particular. Then you said we cannot come to dependably accurate judgments about God on the basis of observation and reason. Now your claim is that we cannot come to accurate judgments about God on the basis of observation and reasoning on natural phenomena alone.
Of course you can come to accurate judgments about how you ought to live by observing and reasoning on the life of Jesus, but whatever you glean from the life of Jesus is revelatory knowledge, i.e., knowledge based on faith. This is quite different than observing and reasoning on what persists in the natural world alone (accidents, catastrophie to give me sufficient cause to revise or really doubt my judgment?
I apologize that my thoughts are incomplete; I am not a scholar. As long as you understand what I'm trying to say, which I think you do, then it's all good. The variations listed above are not mutually exclusive, but add to each other. They can be summed up, I suppose, as follows: We cannot come to reliably accurate judgments about an infinitely wise, infinitely intelligent, and infinitely knowledgable God and/or his ways on the basis of observation and reasoning on natural phenomenon alone.
I am not sure what you mean when you say that such knowledge would be "revelatory" and based "on faith". I remember you had some interesting discussions with bbarr, and if I recall correctly, you endorsed some view under which faith is like provisional acceptance to treat the world a certain way and act accordingly.
I honestly can't recall what I endorsed. It is possible that I endorsed more than one of bbarr's definitions. However, faith as it is defined biblically is much more than a "provisional acceptance." Whatever I endorsed, please don't put a great deal of stock in its accuracy; my knowledge of biblical truths is far from complete. What I can do is tell you what I know now, now that I've studied this subject more extensively since my last discussion with Bennett.
First of all, an individual may study the relevant historical and archeological evidence, investigate the reliability of the scriptural documents themselves and the authorship of the various NT books, etc., and come to a conceivably high degree of plausibility that the testimony found in the NT is, in fact, true. But this is not the faith spoken of in scripture. Faith, as it is portrayed biblically, is simply not possible without the inward instigation of the Holy Spirit.
John Calvin writes, "True faith is not only a knowledge and conviction that everything God reveals in his word is true; it is also a deep-rooted assurance, created in me by the Holy Spirit... [faith is] a firm and certain knowledge of God's benevelence toward us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit."
It is possible, of course, to provisionally accept the great truths of the Gospel without arriving at something like 'true faith.' True faith, i.e., faith defined biblically, cannot be provisional. To accept the truths of scripture provisionally would be more along the lines of coming to an acceptable degree of plausibility about the truth of scripture and tentatively or temporarily treating the contents as true and acting accordingly. However, the faith which is inwardly instigated by the Holy Spirit is, as Calvin described, revealed to the mind, giving full assurance. It (true faith) is therefore knowledge (i.e., revelatory knowledge).
We may accept the contents of scripture provisionally, but a merely provisional acceptance, I'm pretty sure, cannot be considered knowledge. And if it is not knowledge, then it cannot be the type of faith which is inwardly instigated by the Holy Spirit.
But, unfortunately, that is just a very simple fallacy (in the vein of appeals to consequences) where one takes the (un)desirability of consequences to weigh on the truth of the proposition.... So, no, this is not the way one should be brought into doubt: doubt should grow or diminish naturally as our level of confidence comes to fit our evidential considerations.
OK, I agree. Good point. I withdraw that aspect of my argument where I introduced pragmatic considerations.
In particular, if it is not the case that there is sufficient evidence to bring me into belief that P, then I think in general it would be epistemologically irresponsible of me to take P on faith.
It would be, yes. Unless, of course, the truth value of P is revealed to you by the inward instigation of the Holy Spirit, sufficiently enough to bring you into belief that P. In which case, you may lack any evidential basis for belief that P, and yet believe that P, and still remain epistemologically responsible.
If it is the case that the same evidence doesn't bring you into the same belief or the same level of confidence, then that seems fair enough: that would just presumably mean that our interpretations and understanding of the evidence and how it bears on the topic differ. That is where it is worthwhile for us to engage in the practices of justification, each offering evidential reasons for and against. Even so, it could still well be the case that one or more of us is not being appropriately responsive to the actual evidence at our disposal.
I agree.
Bottom line, you cannot give me sufficient cause to doubt just by pointing out the mere possibility that I am mistaken. If you could, that would just lead to radical doubt because the mere possibility that I am mistaken exists in virtually any judgment I make (again, our basis for belief is virtually never such that it logically precludes this mere possibility that I am mistaken). So, what you need to do is actually offer evidential reasons that actually bear on the truth or falsity of my judgment.
Alright, I will accede to your argument that the suffering of innocents gives sufficient reason to doubt the existence of God. Unfortunately, I don't have any evidential reasons to offer that bear on the falsity of your judgment based on the problem of suffering, except, of course, the testimony of the scriptural documents regarding the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
04 Jun 09
2 edits
Originally posted by FreakyKBHThis is where you imply that God's creation is less-than what it possibly could have been.
[b]It only relies on the fact that it is logically possible that God could have created a world with agents that possess more beneficent characters than what exists in our world.
This is where you imply that God's creation is less-than what it possibly could have been. As the world stands now, it is entirely less than what it could have been, Why did God create (and allow) anything other than Himself at all?[/b]
That statement of mine entails no such thing. I don't know where you are getting this "less-than" idea, but presumably you are talking about some sort of normative evaluation. My statement simply entails no such thing. As I keep pointing out, it only entails that it is logically possible that God could have created a world with agents that possess on the whole more beneficent characters than what actually exists. Now, I leave it up to you whether such a logically possible states of affairs would be "less-than" or "more-than" whatever-have-you. In case you just don't understand why I made that particular statement, it was only to show that the existence of free will simply does not logically necessitate the degree of suffering that actually exists even when we restrict our attention to suffering that directly results from the autonomy of man, such as suffering due to willfully violent acts. That is, my statement is meant to counter the idea that the existence of free will somehow necessitates the suffering that actually obtains from free will in our world.
Now you're saying that man's delf-destruction is on account of God's wiring: that once off His path, He still determines the route man will take.
No. There I am saying that under the logically possible states of affairs mentioned above, it is certainly possible that less suffering would ensue from the autonomous actions of agents than what actually obtains -- because agents would be on the whole more beneficent and therefore less disposed toward willful acts that visit suffering on others. Again, this is meant to counter the idea that the existence of free will somehow necessitates the suffering that exists: it simply doesn't logically necessitate the suffering that exists because there are logically possible scenarios under which free will exists and yet less suffering would issue from it.
We are all going through some form of [suffering] on one plane or another--- and as quick as we might be to bemoan the initial trespassers--- yet we all would have made the same decision.
Well, take the neonate for example. She suffers, but if you somehow transported the neonate back through time, she wouldn't (and couldn't) make the same moral choices as some of her forbears because she doesn't even have the capacity to make any moral judgments; in her case, she doesn't even live long enough to develop the capacity to act from reasons necessary to make any sort of decision on that kind of level. As yet, you have not provided any reasons that make any sense of the notion that something like this neonate should suffer because of the choices of some of its forbears -- which happen to be choices that something like a neonate doesn't even possess the capacity to make (a neonate is not a moral agent).
Perhaps no logical contradiction, given that logic deals with arguments which are not required to be based on reality. However, were logic limited to truth, then your scenario is at fault because it omits critical data.
There is nothing "at fault" about what I have claimed about the scenario, and all I have claimed about the scenario (and all that I need to claim) is exactly what you just agreed with! Namely, that it is logically possible. That is all I need to show in order to show that God could have brought it about, because 'God' is supposed to be an omnipotent being. It doesn't bother me if you want to keep on claiming that there is some bizarre, circuitous connection (of a causal or nomological sort or whatever) between the choices of a bunch of dead people and present instances of suffering such as those involving, say, natural disasters or cancers or the illness of the neonate; it suffices for my argument to show that whatever this connection is, it is not something regarding logical necessity.
Among a plant's requirements for life includes its placement in dirt. Removing a plant from dirt will result in the plants decay and eventual death. Said decay can take on many forms; whereas its death is fairly one-dimensional....
I asked specifically if you had an argument that shows that rejection of God's system logically necessitates instances of suffering such as those caused by climatic disasters, cancers, illnesses, etc. So, I take it you have no such argument since nothing in your response deals with logical necessity?
Again, regardless of these outside influences, we and we alone make the final decision about the person we choose to be.
Yes, you can come to decisions regarding what sort of person you choose to be. But, in no way does that entail that you ultimately determine your character because there could be limitations regarding to what degree you succeed in shaping your character. Persons could of course choose to have such and such a character and then simply fail to bring that about because they do not or cannot possess that level of active control over their complex dispositional sets. As I have pointed out numerous times, there are several causal antecedents beyond your active control that have been material in shaping your character, and in many cases this involves integral and abiding aspects of your character. I do not deny that we can come through introspection to have some control in shaping our characters. And of course you can come to decisions about what sort of person you want to be, and this may be an important step that can effect some level of personal transformation. But absolutely none of this demonstrates that you ultimately determined your character.
The same argument could be put forth for even one "needless" moment of joy. Why would an omnipotent, omniscient God allow even one "needless" moment of anything, favorable or unfavorable?
Go ahead and formulate a "problem of joy", then. Don't expect for the argument to be very forceful against the proposition that 'God' exists, though, because (as I pointed out already) not too many people would take 'joy' as characteristically something one has prima facie obligation to minimize within his abilities. Suffering is different from many, many things in this regard; so I really don't understand why you cannot grasp why suffering is the thing at issue (as opposed to, say, joy).
04 Jun 09
4 edits
Originally posted by epiphinehasUnless, of course, the truth value of P is revealed to you by the inward instigation of the Holy Spirit, sufficiently enough to bring you into belief that P. In which case, you may lack any evidential basis for belief that P, and yet believe that P, and still remain epistemologically responsible.
Your claim keeps changing as you go. First you said that we cannot come to accurate judgments since we are not omniscient. Then you said we cannot come to accurate judgments about God's ways in particular. Then you said we cannot come to dependably accurate judgments about God on the basis of observation and reason. Now your claim is that we canno tural documents regarding the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
I am not entirely sure what you mean by "inward instigation" or exactly how the belief you talk about is formed. I know that Plantinga has argued something more or less exactly along these lines: he argues that even in the lack of evidence for theistic belief, theistic belief can still be grounded in justification conferring conditions, under an externalist epistemology. I know one of his arguments where he claims that theistic belief can be properly basic (and thus based on no evidence and yet still epistemologically responsible); and as a model of how such belief could be formed, he presents Calvin's sensus divinitatis as a broad mechanism for the belief formation, and then gives reasons why he thinks such belief could be externally justified. Of course, this is very interesting stuff, and if you have ideas on a model of warrant for beliefs formed through such inward instigation, then that would make for great discussion.
But, in the context of this particular discussion, if your theistic belief came about in the complete absence of evidential basis through some sort of divine sensorium (or some other such mechanism), then where would that leave you in debates such as this? It would leave you without any evidential basis from which to actually argue for your theism; it would leave you basically impotent when it comes to making any sort of case or bringing others to theistic belief in debates such as this.
05 Jun 09
Originally posted by LemonJelloAs I keep pointing out, it only entails that it is logically possible that God could have created a world with agents that possess on the whole more beneficent characters than what actually exists.
This is where you imply that God's creation is less-than what it possibly could have been.
That statement of mine entails no such thing. I don't know where you are getting this "less-than" idea, but presumably you are talking about some sort of normative evaluation. My statement simply entails no such thing. As I keep pointing out, it onl ...[text shortened]... suffering is the thing at issue (as opposed to, say, joy).[/b]
Right. So either God could (according to you) have made man to either make only the right decision about the fruit (thus rendering him an externally-controlled, yet somehow autonomous creature--- almost like he’s breathing whether he wants to or not) or, leaving the decision as truly a matter of free will, make man in such a way as to limit the amount of destruction (read: suffering) which would ensue as a result of the same.
If it’s the first scenario, had God made the decision an auto-reflex, free will is out the window no matter which way you slice it.
If it’s the second scenario, man minus God is the current state of the world. A better world could not have been made, a better man could not have been made. Your argument is really kind of silly. You may as well be saying: make a cup that will hold water if its bottom and sides are intact, but--- just in case--- make the cup in such a way that, should the bottom and sides fail, it will still hold some water.
That is, my statement is meant to counter the idea that the existence of free will somehow necessitates the suffering that actually obtains from free will in our world.
You’ll find no argument from me on this. Neither will you find an argument from God. As you recall, the man and the woman were in the Garden enjoying the fruits thereof for an undetermined amount of time in part based upon their collective free wills.
She suffers, but if you somehow transported the neonate back through time, she wouldn't (and couldn't) make the same moral choices as some of her forbears because she doesn't even have the capacity to make any moral judgments; in her case, she doesn't even live long enough to develop the capacity to act from reasons necessary to make any sort of decision on that kind of level.
I suffered coming through the canal. Glad I am for it. She suffers (presumably) temporarily and is immediately transferred to heaven. Lucky her. Had it not been for the decision of her forbearers, she wouldn’t ever suffer. Instead, she would have been born into paradise without pain. However, given man’s track record throughout this short history of time, someone was bound to flub it up: the overwhelming majority of us do so on daily, nearly minute-by-minute basis. This is what gives me the confidence to say if it hadn’t been the man and the woman, it was going to be one of us.
Namely, that it is logically possible.
Apparently you missed the point. Logic is not what we need; truth is. Any number of false statements can be made that are logically true. This you know. If we are after truth, then you have, as I pointed out, failed.
I asked specifically if you had an argument that shows that rejection of God's system logically necessitates instances of suffering such as those caused by climatic disasters, cancers, illnesses, etc. So, I take it you have no such argument since nothing in your response deals with logical necessity.
You asked, I gave. The analogy of the plant’s dependence upon dirt for its life carries with it the downside of decay and death--- just like man without God.
I do not deny that we can come through introspection to have some control in shaping our characters. And of course you can come to decisions about what sort of person you want to be, and this may be an important step that can effect some level of personal transformation. But absolutely none of this demonstrates that you ultimately determined your character.
Regardless the obstacles; regardless the setbacks, regardless our original intents; regardless our talents or lack thereof; we are who we choose to be in light of all realities facing us.
You can say whatever you want about the supposed exceptions, and you could yourself find thousands of exceptions to those examples. The fact remains: people are responsible for their own behavior. Behavior is the indication of character.
… so I really don't understand why you cannot grasp why suffering is the thing at issue (as opposed to, say, joy).
Because the problem of suffering is easily explained when first considering the integrity of God. In fact, given our status of separation from God, one should be more perplexed by any amount of joy on the planet at all. Not that I am asking that here, but it remains a compelling question, nonetheless.
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10 Jun 09
Because the problem of suffering is easily explained when first considering the integrity of God.I disagree, I don't think it is easily explained at all. I have seen attempts at a free will theodicy many times, and lots of other conteplations of divine virtues that attempt to solve the problem of suffering. They all fail in my view and your arguments seem no better.
11 Jun 09
Originally posted by Lord SharkI disagree, I don't think it is easily explained at all.
I disagree, I don't think it is easily explained at all. I have seen attempts at a free will theodicy many times, and lots of other conteplations of divine virtues that attempt to solve the problem of suffering. seem no better.They all fail in my view and your arguments
This is only because you are not first considering the integrity of God.
They all fail in my view and your arguments seem no better.
They fail in my view as well. That is why I have not resorted to their use.
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12 Jun 09
3 edits
I'm afraid I disagree again. It is only because you take the integrity of god as a given that your conclusions follow. But that is precisely what is at issue.
You might be unaware that you have resorted to such arguments but I read what you typed. It was a free will theodicy.
12 Jun 09
1 edit
I found an article that succinctly frames the debate which FreakyKBH, Lemonjello and I were recently engaged in.
Here are some relevant excerpts for any interested parties:
"When the “problem of evil” is presented, it quickly becomes apparent that the term “evil” cannot be used in any meaningful way by an atheist. The tactic, therefore, is to swap the terms “suffering,” “pain,” or “harm” for the word “evil,” and contend that the world is filled with too much pain, harm, and suffering. Since it is evident that countless people suffer physical, emotional, and psychological harm, the atheist contends that, even though there is no real “evil,” a loving God would not allow such suffering....
"Since the skeptic knows that some suffering could be morally justified, he is forced to argue against the biblical concept of God by claiming that at least some of the suffering in this world is pointless or unnecessary. The skeptic then maintains that any being that allows pointless suffering cannot be loving or moral. In his book The Miracle of Theism, J.L. Mackie noted that if the theist could legitimately show that the suffering in the world is in some way useful, then the concept of the God of the Bible “is formally possible, and its principle involves no real abandonment of our ordinary view of the opposition between good and evil” (1982, p. 154). In light of this fact, Mackie admitted: “[W]e can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another” (p. 154). Did Mackie throw in the proverbial towel and admit that the “problem” of evil and suffering does not militate against God? On the contrary, he contended that even though some suffering or evil might be necessary or useful, there is far too much pointless evil (he terms it “unabsorbed evil&rdquo😉 in the world for the traditional God of the Bible to exist. He then concluded: “The problem, therefore, now recurs as the problem of unabsorbed evils, and we have as yet no way of reconciling their existence with that of a god of the traditional sort” (p. 155, emp. added). Notice how Mackie was forced to change the “problem of evil” to the “problem of unabsorbed evil.”
"The next question that must be asked is: What would classify as “pointless,” “unnecessary,” or “unabsorbed” suffering? The simple answer that the atheistic position must suggest is that any suffering that the atheist does not deem necessary is pointless. As Timothy Keller points out, the fact is that Mackie and others use the term “pointless” to mean that they, themselves cannot see the point of it. Keller stated: “Tucked away within the assertion that the world is filled with pointless evil is a hidden premise, namely that if evil appears pointless to me, then it must be pointless” (2008, p. 23, italics in orig.). Keller further noted:
"This reasoning is, of course, fallacious. Just because you can’t see or imagine a good reason why God might allow something to happen doesn’t mean there can’t be one. Again we see lurking within supposedly hard-nosed skepticism an enormous faith in one’s own cognitive faculties. If our minds can’t plumb the depths of the universe for good answers to suffering, well, then, there can’t be any! This is blind faith of a high order (p. 23).
"Indeed, it is the atheist who lives by the blind faith that he mistakenly attributes to the theist."
Source >>>> http://www.apologeticspress.org/articles/240166
12 Jun 09
Originally posted by LemonJelloIn the same article I found the best answer I've heard thusfar for the "problem of unabsorbed evil," an answer which I believe makes the concept of the God of the Bible "formally possible" (Mackie).
[b]Unless, of course, the truth value of P is revealed to you by the inward instigation of the Holy Spirit, sufficiently enough to bring you into belief that P. In which case, you may lack any evidential basis for belief that P, and yet believe that P, and still remain epistemologically responsible.
I am not entirely sure what you mean by "inward ...[text shortened]... mes to making any sort of case or bringing others to theistic belief in debates such as this.[/b]
"In his monumental volume, Have Atheists Proved There Is No God?, philosopher Thomas B. Warren undercut completely the atheist’s use of the problem of evil. He insightfully demonstrated that the Bible teaches that “God has a morally justifiable reason for having created the world...in which evil can (and does) occur” (1972, p. 16). What is that reason? God created the planet to be “the ideal environment for soul-making” (p. 16). God specifically created humans to be immortal, free moral agents, responsible for their own actions, with this earthly life being their one and only probationary period in which their eternal fate is determined by their response to God’s will during earthly life (p. 19). Hence, the world “is as good (for the purpose God had in creating it) as any possible world” since it was designed to function as man’s “vale of soul-making” (p. 19). The physical environment in which humans were to reside was specifically created with the necessary characteristics for achieving that central purpose. This environment would have to be so arranged that it would allow humans to be free moral agents, provide them with their basic physical needs, allow them to be challenged, and enable them to learn those things they most need to learn (p. 47).
"Whereas the atheist typically defines “evil” as physical pain and suffering, the Bible, quite logically, defines evil as violation of God’s law (1 John 3:4). Observe, therefore, that the only intrinsic evil is sin, i.e., disobeying or transgressing the laws of God. Hence, pain and suffering are not intrinsically evil. (“[I]ntrinsic evil on the purely physical level does not exist” [p. 93]). In fact, animal pain, natural calamities, and human suffering are all necessary constituent variables in the overall environment designed for spiritual development. Such variables, for example, impress upon humans the very critical realizations that life on Earth is uncertain, precarious, and temporary. They also demonstrate that life on Earth is brief—that it will soon end (p. 58). Such realizations not only propel people to consider their spiritual condition, and the necessity of using this life to prepare for the afterlife, they prod people to contemplate God! Suffering, pain, and hardship encourage people to cultivate their spirits and to grow in moral character—acquiring virtuous attributes such as courage, patience, humility, and fortitude. Suffering can serve as discipline and motivation to spur spiritual growth and strength. It literally stimulates people to develop compassion, sympathy, love, and empathy for their fellowman" (p. 81).
Source >>>> http://www.apologeticspress.org/articles/240166
12 Jun 09
Originally posted by epiphinehasHe makes two basic claims:
"Whereas the atheist typically defines “evil” as physical pain and suffering, the Bible, quite logically, defines evil as violation of God’s law (1 John 3:4). Observe, therefore, that the only intrinsic evil is sin, i.e., disobeying or transgressing the laws of God. Hence, pain and suffering are not intrinsically evil. (“[I]ntrinsic evil on the purely ph ...[text shortened]... ulates people to develop compassion, sympathy, love, and empathy for their fellowman" (p. 81).
1. Suffering is necessary for good soul making.
2. Because good soul making is desirable and good, suffering is not inherently evil.
What he doesn't address is the fact that there seems to be a vast amount of suffering (possibly the majority) which does not obviously achieve good soul making.
It has already been argued in this thread that suffering is good for us or necessary for free will etc, but the question which has not been answered and is not answered in what you quote is "why is the suffering necessary?". Specific examples have been given where nobody seems to be able to give a plausible reason why the suffering is beneficial to anyone.
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12 Jun 09
epiphinehas,
That is a good summary in the sense that it shows the inadequacy of the free will argument to disprove the existence of god, whilst at the same time illustrating the weakness of free will theodicies.
Again as with FreakyKBH's argument above, we see that the theist's case has a forced endgame leading to stalemate. These arguments basically resolve to The Book of Job Defence.
12 Jun 09
Some general points in response to these apologetics—
1. The concept of “evil” as used in philosophy (not just by atheists, as the quotes implied) does not strictly refer to “moral evils”, but does include it along with “natural evils”. To dismiss the question because the philosopher is not talking about “sin” would be only to dismiss a strawman. (LemonJello has been very clear about defining “evil”, consistent with longstanding philosophical usage.)
2. The problem of evil argument is not aimed at disproving the existence of god (or gods) per se: that is another strawman. It is aimed at showing contradictions that arise when one posits specific attributes of such a god: i.e., omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection (or, sometimes, omnibenevolence), along with the premise that there is unnecessary pain and suffering in the world. Relinquishing any of these attributes relieves the “trilemma”.
3. The atheist does not need to specify which evils s/he thinks are unnecessary (even for some greater good); that there are such unnecessary evils (unnecessary pain and suffering) is a premise of the problem of evil argument.
—If the theist wants to challenge this premise, s/he has to argue that there are no such unnecessary evils that an OOO god could not prevent. That is tantamount to saying that this is, indeed, as it is, the best of all possible worlds.
4. The “soul-making” argument (a version of “all pain and suffering in the world is necessary for some greater good” type of argument, it seems to me) seems absurd in the face of, say, LemonJello’s neonate. At any rate, it seems to be a bald claim (sans logical argument) that all pain and suffering is necessary for some ultimate good (as twhitehead points out).
5. The “God could have reasons that we can’t know” argument seems, to me, akin to an “argument from ignorance” (only in reverse): it basically seeks to claim that a belief is justifiable based on a sufficient number of (or sufficiently general) unfalsifiable “what ifs”.
If the theist wants to challenge the problem of evil argument, s/he must either (a) challenge one or more of the premises, or (b) demonstrate that the premises do not result in contradiction. I do not think that (b) can be done.
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12 Jun 09
vistesd,
I agree with your summary there. It seems to me that the theist takes the OOO god as a premise and attempts to show that the possibility that this is the best of all possible worlds avoids a contradiction.
Leaving aside the matter of problems with avoiding internal contradictions in the specification of the OOO god, any evidence offered by atheists is countered by pointing out that we are in a poor epistemic position to judge such a god. Which is The Book of Job defence.
13 Jun 09
1 edit
Originally posted by Lord SharkIt seems to me that the “Book of Job” defense puts the theist in the same position regarding positive claims about God as well.
vistesd,
I agree with your summary there. It seems to me that the theist takes the OOO god as a premise and attempts to show that the possibility that this is the best of all possible worlds avoids a contradiction.
Leaving aside the matter of problems with avoiding internal contradictions in the specification of the OOO god, any evidence offe ...[text shortened]... that we are in a poor epistemic position to judge such a god. Which is The Book of Job defence.
If I were to say that (a particular version of) God does not display the attributes necessary to be considered just, and the theist responds that I am not in any epistemic position to make that claim—then how can the theist be in any epistemic position to make the counter-claim? (Even assuming that we can agree on some general criteria for determining what “just” means.)
I haven’t seen many theists willing to stop at the Book of Job defense; even if they put it forth at some point, they generally seem to renege on it by subsequently making claims for God that the Book of Job defense would not allow. (I’m not claiming that that is a deliberate deceit on their part; I’m just saying that what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.)
13 Jun 09
Originally posted by FreakyKBHRight. So either God could (according to you) have made man to either make only the right decision about the fruit (thus rendering him an externally-controlled, yet somehow autonomous creature--- almost like he’s breathing whether he wants to or not) or, leaving the decision as truly a matter of free will, make man in such a way as to limit the amount of destruction (read: suffering) which would ensue as a result of the same.
[b]As I keep pointing out, it only entails that it is logically possible that God could have created a world with agents that possess on the whole more beneficent characters than what actually exists.
Right. So either God could (according to you) have made man to either make only the right decision about the fruit (thus rendering him an externally-c ...[text shortened]... t all. Not that I am asking that here, but it remains a compelling question, nonetheless.[/b]
No. For the last time, the claim I made is that God, being supposedly omnipotent, could have created a world with agents that possess on the whole more beneficent characters than what actually exists. These agents would still be free, but less suffering would ensue from their autonomous actions because they would be naturally less predisposed towards violence and the like. Now, you'll see that absolutely nothing about what I just claimed entails that these agents would be "externally-controlled" or that they wouldn't have "truly" free will. Again for the last time, this claim is meant to counter the idea that the existence of free will somehow necessitates the amount of suffering that exists in our world.
If it’s the first scenario, had God made the decision an auto-reflex, free will is out the window no matter which way you slice it.
No. Persons are free when their actions flow from who they are – when their actions flow from their abiding character traits, knowledge of the situation, values, evaluative commitments, etc. There is no reason why these hypothetical agents would not be "truly" free. Again, God can supposedly bring about any logically possible state of affairs. Well, it's a logically possible state of affairs that there exist such hypothetical agents (with very beneficent dispositional sets) who possess free will. If you're going to deny that, then show us the demonstration of how such a scenario is logically impossible (that is, show that it entails a logical contradiction).
You may as well be saying: make a cup that will hold water if its bottom and sides are intact, but--- just in case--- make the cup in such a way that, should the bottom and sides fail, it will still hold some water.
Yikes.
I suffered coming through the canal. Glad I am for it. She suffers (presumably) temporarily and is immediately transferred to heaven.
Well, God could have simply transported her to heaven without the suffering.
Apparently you missed the point. Logic is not what we need; truth is. Any number of false statements can be made that are logically true. This you know. If we are after truth, then you have, as I pointed out, failed.
No, you're the one who keeps missing the point here. God is supposedly omnipotent. Thus in order to show that he could have brought about a certain state of affairs, it suffices for me to show that the state of affairs is logically possible. Seriously now, what don't you understand about this?
You asked, I gave.
So, you have no such argument as what I inquired about then?
You can say whatever you want about the supposed exceptions, and you could yourself find thousands of exceptions to those examples. The fact remains: people are responsible for their own behavior. Behavior is the indication of character.
I don't recall saying anything about "exceptions". My claim is, and throughout this whole exchange has been, that we do not ultimately determine our own characters (where by character I mean to first-order our inner consortium of dispositions). This is true since, for example, there are chief causal antecedents and conditions beyond active control that helped mold our integral and abiding aspects of character (such as genetics, environment, upbringing, cultural conditions, etc).
Yes, people are responsible for their own behavior. They are responsible for their autonomous actions. Yes, when they act autonomously, their actions will reflect their character. What does any of this have to do with the question of whether or not we ultimately determine our own characters?
one should be more perplexed by any amount of joy on the planet at all. Not that I am asking that here, but it remains a compelling question, nonetheless.
How is it a compelling question? Joy and happiness and such states are often naturally conducive toward a flourishing way of life. And there are plenty of practical reasons that would recommend such states to the wise in many types of dealings. And, as I keep pointing out to you, joy and happiness (unlike suffering) are not things that we have prima facie obligation to minimize within the limits of our powers. So, how would the "problem of joy" in any way make for a compelling argument against the existence of 'God'?