13 Jun 09
3 edits
Originally posted by epiphinehasYikes. Where to begin? I have a problem with your announcing to everyone that this "succinctly frames" anything related to my argument. In fact, this has little to do with my argument (which is something you should have been readily aware of given our previous discussions in this very thread).
I found an article that succinctly frames the debate which FreakyKBH, Lemonjello and I were recently engaged in.
Here are some relevant excerpts for any interested parties:"When the “problem of evil” is presented, it quickly becomes apparent that the term “evil” cannot be used in any meaningful way by an atheist. The tactic, therefore, is to butes to the theist."
Source >>>> http://www.apologeticspress.org/articles/240166
Your excerpt fails to make a distinction between arguments from "evil" that are logical in nature and those that are evidential in nature. The two types of arguments are quite different. Your typical logical argument from evil would attempt to establish that a logical contradiction follows from the conjunction of the propositions that God exists (where God is taken to be omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect) and that evil exists. An argument of the evidential sort would attempt to establish that the proposition that God exists (again, God so defined as before) is implausible, given that evil exists. If you go back and re-read, it should be clear to you that my argument is of the evidential sort (as should be clear from all my talk about plausibility and from, for example, the fact that I conceded to you that it is certainly possible that there exist reasons beyond our attention that would justify God's allowing even seemingly totally gratuitous suffering). In fact, I believe that the typical logical formulation of the problem of evil is clearly unsound; so please desist from bringing up the type of strawman attacks that I dismiss below and erroneously telling everyone that this type of stuff succinctly sums up our preceding discussions.
“[W]e can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another”
This sure seems to be something like the denial that the logical problem of evil succeeds. It doesn't have anything to do with whether or not my evidential argument succeeds. I can fully concede that the logical problem of evil fails (and I just did above) and yet still stick to my argument here.
the fact is that Mackie and others use the term “pointless” to mean that they, themselves cannot see the point of it.
In my argument, I usually refer to "unnecessary" or "gratuitous" suffering or like terminology. I am talking about instances of suffering that are not logically necessary for the greater good. And please don't erroneously construe my talk of logical necessity (such as what I have been discussing Freaky) as somehow meaning that my argument is a logical formulation of the problem of suffering. As I said before, my argument is clearly an evidential one. But, I still have to consider logical possibility when it comes to what God can bring about because he is supposedly omnipotent (logical possibility is after all a central consideration concerning the implications of that attribute as I take it to be defined in my argument).
This reasoning is, of course, fallacious. Just because you can’t see or imagine a good reason why God might allow something to happen doesn’t mean there can’t be one.
This section really makes me laugh. Now, epi, you're either just being disingenuous (which I doubt, since you always seem like a good guy) or you are failing to remember and be faithful to a good chunk of our discussion up to this point and its implications. This is simply a strawman with respect to my argument. I never endorsed the line of reasoning that because there is no reason under my attention that would justify the suffering that means that no reason could serve as justifier. In fact, I implied just the opposite when I stated multiple times that it is certainly possible there exist reasons beyond my attention that would serve as justifiers in just this way. Remember? So, seriously, where do you get off telling everyone that this stuff succinctly frames our discussion? I would much rather you and Freaky stick to my actual argument (and refrain from misrepresenting it beyond all get out).
13 Jun 09
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloThere is not one, single act of suffering that you can prove is not for the "greater good."
In my argument, I usually refer to "unnecessary" or "gratuitous" suffering or like terminology. I am talking about instances of suffering that are not logically necessary for the greater good.
In fact, for every specific, real-life instance you bring up, you actually help instill a "greater good" in it by the fact that it has, among whatever other things, spawned a debate in a public domain viewed by the entire world, that in and of itself could change lives for the "greater good."
Furthermore, as explained in the Bible and remedial Christian doctrine... death--even when accompanied by suffering beforehand--leads to the afterlife which is what is sought by those who believe. Even Jesus Himself eagerly anticipated His death where He would be free from having to endure this place. [Matt 17:17]
13 Jun 09
2 edits
Originally posted by epiphinehasIn the same article I found the best answer I've heard thusfar for the "problem of unabsorbed evil," an answer which I believe makes the concept of the God of the Bible "formally possible" (Mackie).
In the same article I found the best answer I've heard thusfar for the "problem of unabsorbed evil," an answer which I believe makes the concept of the God of the Bible "formally possible" (Mackie)."In his monumental volume, Have Atheists Proved There Is No God?, philosopher Thomas B. Warren undercut completely the atheist’s use of the pr fellowman" (p. 81).
Source >>>> http://www.apologeticspress.org/articles/240166
Offhand, I am not sure I am familiar with the actual content of this argument of Mackie’s. For instance, I am not sure I know what is meant here specifically by "unabsorbed evil"; nor am I confident I know what exactly is meant here by "formally possible". "Formally possible" sure sounds like it would be relevant to a logical formulation of the problem of evil – not necessarily to an evidential one.
God specifically created humans to be immortal, free moral agents, responsible for their own actions, with this earthly life being their one and only probationary period in which their eternal fate is determined by their response to God’s will during earthly life
😵 If God, in all his power and knowledge, specifically created humans to enjoy an earthly life with moral agency, then it should be rather curious why my neonate should suffer and die without ever actually possessing moral agency on earth. Absolutely hilarious!
The physical environment in which humans were to reside was specifically created with the necessary characteristics for achieving that central purpose. This environment would have to be so arranged that it would allow humans to be free moral agents, provide them with their basic physical needs, allow them to be challenged, and enable them to learn those things they most need to learn
Again -- this is a hilarious response with respect to my example of the neonate.
In fact, animal pain, natural calamities, and human suffering are all necessary constituent variables in the overall environment designed for spiritual development.
😵 Animal pain is a necessary constituent for human spiritual development? You have to be joking! How many animals have to experience pain for us to spiritually develop properly? How many suffering neonates does it take for our proper development? How many hurricanes does it take?
Regardless of whether or not you think this is all a good answer to Mackie's argument, it seems like complete nonsense as a response to my argument.
13 Jun 09
Originally posted by LemonJelloHello, LJ. Hope all is well with you.
Yikes. Where to begin? I have a problem with your announcing to everyone that this "succinctly frames" anything related to my argument. In fact, this has little to do with my argument (which is something you should have been readily aware of given our previous discussions in this very thread).
Your excerpt fails to make a distinction between argumen ...[text shortened]... tick to my actual argument (and refrain from misrepresenting it beyond all get out).
I would lay out the problem of evil argument something like this:
Definitions—
Evil refers to gratuitous suffering (as you have outlined it).
Omnipotence entails that God is able to eliminate such evil.
Omniscience entails that God knows if there is such evil (or that such evil would result from a particular divine action, such as world design and creation).
Moral perfection (or omnibenevolence, either) entails that God will act to prevent such evil .
So that—
(1) God is omnipotent;
(2) God is omniscient;
(3) God is morally perfect (or omnibenevolent);
(4) God will act effectively to eliminate evil (gratuitous suffering); [“will act” by (3); “effectively” by (1)]
(5) Evil (gratuitous suffering) exists in the world.
—does seem to me to entail a contradiction, that can only be resolved by denying (5) or denying, or at least constraining, (1), (2), or (3).
As you note, since an omnipotent God could (without logical bar) create a world in which such evil did not exist—without violating free will with regard to moral evil. Am I missing something?
(Got to pack it in; nearly 4:00 am here.)
13 Jun 09
3 edits
Originally posted by sumydidThere is not one, single act of suffering that you can prove is not for the "greater good."
There is not one, single act of suffering that you can prove is not for the "greater good."
In fact, for every specific, real-life instance you bring up, you actually help instill a "greater good" in it by the fact that it has, among whatever other things, spawned a debate in a public domain viewed by the entire world, that in and of itself could change l ted His death where He would be free from having to endure this place. [Matt 17:17]
I am not interesting in "proving" stuff here. I am interested in considerations related to plausibility. If you are saying that there exists no instance of suffering that was not necessary for the greater good, then let's think about what that would commit you to. It would commit you to the idea that if any one instance of, say, rape or murder or theft or cancer or fatal disease or hurricanes or earthquakes or etc; if any one of these instances had not obtained, then the world would have been worse off. You would be committed to the idea that if one fewer person had suffered and died during, say, the Holocaust, then the world would be worse off. Etc, etc.
In fact, for every specific, real-life instance you bring up, you actually help instill a "greater good" in it by the fact that it has, among whatever other things, spawned a debate in a public domain viewed by the entire world, that in and of itself could change lives for the "greater good."
So if you go rape someone and then tell people about the incident, then you have thereby made the world better off? If you go blow up New York City and then related discussion and attention ensues, then the world would be better off?
13 Jun 09
1 edit
Originally posted by vistesdHi, hope you're well too.
Hello, LJ. Hope all is well with you.
I would lay out the problem of evil argument something like this:
Definitions—
[b]Evil refers to gratuitous suffering (as you have outlined it).
Omnipotence entails that God is able to eliminate such evil.
Omniscience entails that God knows if there is such evil (or that such evil would ...[text shortened]... h regard to moral evil. Am I missing something?
(Got to pack it in; nearly 4:00 am here.)[/b]
But what at bottom are you attempting to show with the argument? What I meant above is that the "logical" problem of evil doesn't work. Such arguments are where one attempts to show that the existence of God and the existence of evil logically entails a contradiction (basically that it is a logically impossible state of affairs that both exist). This is an extremely strong thing to want to show! After all, if it is even merely logically possible that God would permit certain evils in order to secure some greater good (perhaps even a greater good which we cannot see or understand), then the general logical problem of evil fails. (By the way, when I talk about the general logical problem of evil, I would have in mind some more general definition of evil than you cite. In truth, I don't really care to use the word 'evil' in these discussions but sometimes there seems no avoiding it. In general, I certainly think gratuitous suffering is obviously bad and morally relevant, which is why I try to use examples that I think instantiate it in my argument. But if I had to put a definition to 'evil' it would be more general than what you cite).
The evidential problem of suffering is much more forceful. Here I am expressly not trying to show that the existence of God and the existence of certain instances of suffering entails a logical contradiction. (Besides, I can readily grant that it is logically possible for God to exist even in the presence of the instances of suffering I cite, and this really grants next to nothing -- and besides, I think it certainly is the case that it is logically possible. Like I mentioned to epi, certainly it is logically possible that reasons outside of my attention would serve to show that such suffering is merely ostensibly gratuitous). Rather, I am trying to show that God's existence is implausible, given the suffering that exists.
13 Jun 09
Originally posted by vistesd—does seem to me to entail a contradiction, that can only be resolved by denying (5) or denying, or at least constraining, (1), (2), or (3).
Hello, LJ. Hope all is well with you.
I would lay out the problem of evil argument something like this:
Definitions—
[b]Evil refers to gratuitous suffering (as you have outlined it).
Omnipotence entails that God is able to eliminate such evil.
Omniscience entails that God knows if there is such evil (or that such evil would ...[text shortened]... h regard to moral evil. Am I missing something?
(Got to pack it in; nearly 4:00 am here.)[/b]
Yes; but, for example, they can exude whatever level of skepticism necessary to claim that it is at least logically possible that, say, the gratuitous suffering you claim exists is merely ostensibly gratuitous. They can claim that it is at least logically possible that the suffering is actually not gratuitous, but is in fact necessary for the greater good. Surely there is room for this type of broad mere possibility? If so, you are not going to be able to demonstrate that the theist is necessarily committed to a contradiction. So I think the best we can do is present a forceful evidential argument.
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13 Jun 09
Originally posted by vistesd
It seems to me that the “Book of Job” defense puts the theist in the same position regarding positive claims about God as well. If I were to say that (a particular version of) God does not display the attributes necessary to be considered just, and the theist responds that I am not in any epistemic position to make that claim—then how can the theist be in any epistemic position to make the counter-claim? (Even assuming that we can agree on some general criteria for determining what “just” means.)
I agree. The philosopher Stephen Law came up with the example of The God of Eth, a totally evil god. He then showed that all of the arguments used by theists to counter the evidential problem of suffering can be reversed to show that what we see is compatible with the existence of Eth. The evidential problem of suffering just becomes the evidential problem of joy.
I haven’t seen many theists willing to stop at the Book of Job defense; even if they put it forth at some point, they generally seem to renege on it by subsequently making claims for God that the Book of Job defense would not allow. (I’m not claiming that that is a deliberate deceit on their part; I’m just saying that what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.)
I also agree that in invoking the Book of Job Defence, theists run the risk of appearing to want things both ways, since they have effectively undermined their own epistemic foundations as well, yet want to make statements like 'god is good'. This is where the concept of 'revelation' usually makes an entrance.
13 Jun 09
Originally posted by LemonJelloOkay, I see it now. Thanks, LJ.
[b]—does seem to me to entail a contradiction, that can only be resolved by denying (5) or denying, or at least constraining, (1), (2), or (3).
Yes; but, for example, they can exude whatever level of skepticism necessary to claim that it is at least logically possible that, say, the gratuitous suffering you claim exists is merely ostensibly gratuit ...[text shortened]... ed to a contradiction. So I think the best we can do is present a forceful evidential argument.[/b]
15 Jun 09
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloI am not interesting in "proving" stuff here. I am interested in considerations related to plausibility. If you are saying that there exists no instance of suffering that was not necessary for the greater good, then let's think about what that would commit you to. It would commit you to the idea that if any one instance of, say, rape or murder or theft or cancer or fatal disease or hurricanes or earthquakes or etc; if any one of these instances had not obtained, then the world would have been worse off. You would be committed to the idea that if one fewer person had suffered and died during, say, the Holocaust, then the world would be worse off. Etc, etc.
I am not interesting in "proving" stuff here. I am interested in considerations related to plausibility. If you are saying that there exists no instance of suffering that was not necessary for the greater good, then let's think about what that would commit you to. It would commit you to the idea that if any one instance of, say, rape or murder or theft ...[text shortened]... rk City and then related discussion and attention ensues, then the world would be better off?
I thought it was obvious that my rebuttal vs. your postulation was and is: Everything--no matter how our limited mind perceives it--works toward the greater good, eventually. Now, you made the first postulation, based on an apparent assumption... (paraphrased I hope correctly) "It is unjust for 'God' to allow tragic events to occur where nothing good comes from them." Instead of trying to defend God's justness, I challenged your assumption that any tragic event can be classified as not contributing toward a greater good. So really, it is up to you to defend your assumption in order for us to proceed to your actual point. And as I stated, you can't defend your assumption because you just don't know. Rape... murder... hurricane... volcano... earthquake... any event can and does, work toward God's greater, just, plan. Please show an example that quantifiably refutes my counterpoint and then we may have something.
So if you go rape someone and then tell people about the incident, then you have thereby made the world better off? If you go blow up New York City and then related discussion and attention ensues, then the world would be better off?
And again, your point was made on an assumption but after I challenged your assumption, you "leap frogged" all the way to making me out to be pro-rape or pro-terrorism as long as someone is told about it.
My point was, that when a tragic event occurs and then later is discussed and debated; there is a greater and greater chance, the longer those discussions go on, that hearts, minds, and policies are changed which as far as we know could save millions of lives.
I'll ask you this. If one person is brutally murdered but the end result is a thousand saved lives... does the single murder go down as merely a senseless tragic event?
Think of all the Christian martyrs... they willingly died--usually in a disgusting, horrible way--because they knew their death would (a) take them to a better place, and (b) affect the rest of the world in a positive way.
15 Jun 09
5 edits
Originally posted by sumydidI challenged your assumption that any tragic event can be classified as not contributing toward a greater good.
I am not interesting in "proving" stuff here. I am interested in considerations related to plausibility. If you are saying that there exists no instance of suffering that was not necessary for the greater good, then let's think about what that would commit you to. It would commit you to the idea that if any one instance of, say, rape or murder or theft ke them to a better place, and (b) affect the rest of the world in a positive way.
I never assumed any such thing. I never claimed that for any tragic event, the event cannot be classified as contributing toward a greater good. For instance, nowhere have I committed myself to the idea that tragic events cannot lead to good; further, nowhere have I committed myself to the idea that a tragic event could not be included in some collection of events that collectively bring about the greater good. What my claim is, is that there are at least some "tragic" events that are not logically necessary for bringing about the greater good. An implication of this is that (even if you are right that all tragic events contribute to some greater good) in at least some cases, God could still bring about the same good without the tragic event. This would be preferable because the tragic event is, well, tragic; and in such cases it is also a gratuitous sort of tragedy because it is not logically necessary for the greater good, and thus an omnipotent God could have brought about the same good without the tragedy. For instance, you can tell me that all the rapes that have occurred have taken part in raising collective awareness about the badness of rapes. So what? If God could not bring about the same level of awareness through means that didn't involve the actual rapes, then he is not omnipotent. So, despite whatever you seem to think, you haven't countered my claims at all because nothing about what you have said shows that even one tragic event was logically necessary for the greater good (again, your simply claiming that tragic events partake in contribution to greater good doesn't show that any of them were actually necessary for bringing about this good).
Rape... murder... hurricane... volcano... earthquake... any event can and does, work toward God's greater, just, plan.
Again, even if true, this doesn't meet my argument. What good does, say, an instance of rape bring about that God in his omnipotence could not bring about by means that wouldn't involve the rape?
Please show an example that quantifiably refutes my counterpoint and then we may have something.
I've already explained that your counterpoint doesn't really have anything to do with refuting my argument because you talk about considerations of sufficiency at points where my argument has to do with necessity (not sufficiency).
you "leap frogged" all the way to making me out to be pro-rape or pro-terrorism as long as someone is told about it.
Yikes. I never made you out to be pro-rape or pro-terrorism. Get a grip. What I was pointing out is that if you want to deny my actual claim (not what you erroneously thought was my claim, but what actually is my claim), it will commit you to a lot of seemingly absurd stuff. This is of course a fair method of debate: you say to your opponent, basically, that if you're actually going to endorse this, then it will thereby commit you to that, where that is something absurd (and there I was trying to draw your attention to such a consistency argument).
So, if you're going to deny my actual claim, then it amounts to denying that there are at least some instances of "tragic" events that are not logically necessary for the greater good. Again, this will basically commit you to the idea that all tragic events are logically necessary for the greater good, and this will commit you to a host of absurd stuff. For instance, it will commit you to the idea that if any one rape that actually occurred had not occurred, then the world would thereby have been worse off. Similar things go for terrorism or illnesses, or climatic disasters, etc, etc.
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15 Jun 09
Lemonjello,
If a theist starts with the premise that god is good, then although, as you point out, they are committed to prima facie absurd stuff, their response must surely be to reply that we cannot be in an epistemic position to assess god's plan. So what is apparently absurd to us might be a convolution in the unfolding of god's plan which eludes our mortal intellect.
This might seem to be a fatuous point, but I don't intend it that way. Truth claims about god are quasi propositions which are systematically immune from disconfirmation. You will have noticed that the claim that any given tragedy serves the greater good is unfalsifiable, and that's no accident.
The problem with omnipotence is that it is impossible for us mortals to come up with a sensible definition. You know the old one 'Can god microwave a bagel so it is too hot for god to eat'? So we introduce the idea that omnipotence is the ability to do anything logically possible.
..and that's all it takes. God can see much further into the logic, all the way in fact, so all this apparently needless suffering is the unfolding of a plan of such profound beauty and symmetry that if only we had god's vantage point we would realise it was all done out of love.
You can see the way the argument runs?
16 Jun 09
Originally posted by Lord SharkI'm afraid I disagree again. It is only because you take the integrity of god as a given that your conclusions follow. But that is precisely what is at issue.
I take God's integrity as a given because there is no evidence to the contrary.
You might be unaware that you have resorted to such arguments but I read what you typed. It was a free will theodicy.
You can call it whatever you wish; just don't be surprised if your definition doesn't line up with everyone else's.
16 Jun 09
Originally posted by vistesdThe contradiction appears only to those who wish to see it. For those seeking the truth, the truth appears beyond the contradiction. It all depends upon what one is looking for.
Some general points in response to these apologetics—
1. The concept of “evil” as used in philosophy (not just by atheists, as the quotes implied) does not strictly refer to “moral evils”, but does include it along with “natural evils”. To dismiss the question because the philosopher is not talking about “sin” would be only to dismiss a strawman. (Lemo ...[text shortened]... onstrate that the premises do not result in contradiction. I do not think that (b) can be done.