Atheism and logic

Originally posted by vistesd
My “patchwork” thoughts on the matter—

A fact is whatever is the case. Something is either a fact or it is not. A true statement (a truth) is one that corresponds to the facts—e.g., “It is the case that A.” To add the qualifier of “absoluteness”—i.e., “It is absolutely the case that A”—adds nothing to the truth or falsity of the statement, thoug ...[text shortened]... nnot imagine A never being the case (nothing else considered)”—not be seen as sufficient?

You are advocating tolerance while Fetchmyjunk is advocating intolerance. The answer to your closing question:

Why would just that response—i.e., “I cannot imagine A never being the case (nothing else considered)”—not be seen as sufficient?[/b]

is this - because there is an agenda behind the [spurious] notion of absolute truth, which is set out for us in the link kindly supplied by Fetchmyjunk a few posts back. I will pick out the key passage:

What about religious pluralism? This line of thought maintains that all religions are equally valid ways to God. In the name of 'tolerance' it says, for example, "your way through Jesus is true", and "my way through meditation is true". Is this true? As they stand, these two statements are not contradictory and so do not violate the law of non-contradiction. Pluralism seems to avoid conflict with this law simply because it has nothing of substance to say re the way to God. It has no confidence in the concept of truth. But the statement "all religions are equally valid ways to God" can be proved false if we can establish that 'absolute' truth exists and that this truth contradicts the statement. This follows since two contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time.

So to be absolutely clear and explicit, this religious source argues against religious tolerance. The conflict between religious bigotry and secular tolerance is emphasised in a later passage from his source (which he says sets out his opinions - it is not my choice but his)

It could be argued that the Christian should then obey the law and "be in subjection to the authorities" (Romans 13.1). He or she should not say or write anything which could be construed as insulting. To obey the law of the land is absolutely correct and true. But Jesus called His followers to be salt and light in society and to go into all the nations and preach the gospel (Matthew 28.19). For a Christian this is also absolutely true and correct. This is another example where man has to choose between two truths. When placed in an identical situation the response of the followers of Jesus was to choose the higher truth:
"We must obey God rather than men." (Acts 5.29)

Think of priests and child abuse before commenting on that last passage.

By and large, however, the examples in his source display a confusion about what sort of statement can even have the property of being true or false. Because the terms are used in a peculiar way they actually have no real connection with epistemology [ the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope, and the distinction between justified belief and opinion] at all, and much of our debate is at complete cross purposes. Wittgenstein - eat your heart out.

This does not mean that we must simply tolerate their use of language in a religious context that is different to that in a secular context, because that deal is not reciprocal. They are distorting the meaning of language in order to confuse and deceive and that has to be challenged. I do not see why I have to tolerate intolerance!

Originally posted by finnegan
You are advocating tolerance while Fetchmyjunk is advocating intolerance. The answer to your closing question:

Why would just that response—i.e., “I cannot imagine A never being the case (nothing else considered)”—not be seen as sufficient?

is this - because there is an agenda behind the [spurious] notion of absolute truth, wh ...[text shortened]... use and deceive and that has to be challenged. I do not see why I have to tolerate intolerance![/b]

Yes, that is clearly where Wittgenstein is not applicable—when there is a deceit involved (not something that I recall W. ever tackling; he likely found it banal and uninteresting—and simply condemnable). However, Wittgenstein (and analytical philosophy generally) can at least be called upon to force the issue.

___________________________________________

EDIT:

What about religious pluralism? This line of thought maintains that all religions are equally valid ways to God.

Well, that is just a false statement as to what religious pluralism entails.

Originally posted by vistesd
My “patchwork” thoughts on the matter—

A fact is whatever is the case. Something is either a fact or it is not. A true statement (a truth) is one that corresponds to the facts—e.g., “It is the case that A.” To add the qualifier of “absoluteness”—i.e., “It is absolutely the case that A”—adds nothing to the truth or falsity of the statement, thoug ...[text shortened]... nnot imagine A never being the case (nothing else considered)”—not be seen as sufficient?

A fact is whatever is the case.

Can a fact ever change?

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
[b]A fact is whatever is the case.

Can a fact ever change?[/b]

It is currently a fact that dogs can't fly.

If tomorrow a dog is discovered in the remote forests of the Amazon that it turns out can actually fly, it would not longer be factual to say dogs can't fly.

A fact is based on evidence that substantiates it as a fact. If however that evidence should later prove to be incorrect, a readjustment would have to be made. As we never have absolute knowledge, a fact can never be absolute. The most we can muster is 'almost certain.'

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
[b]A fact is whatever is the case.

Can a fact ever change?[/b]

It is right now the case that it is raining where I live. Tomorrow it may or may not be raining here. But it will not be the case tomorrow that it did not rain here today.

One may, of course, be mistaken about what the facts are/were—and if one discovers that one is mistaken, one simply takes that discovery as a matter of course. One may also just not know what the facts are in a given case. I am suggesting that there are also case where one does not have sufficient information to properly form a belief, one way or the other (even to an objective probability)—in such cases, one may speculate or simply withhold judgment.

Originally posted by vistesd
It is right now the case that it is raining where I live. Tomorrow it may or may not be raining here. But it will not be the case tomorrow that it did not rain here today.

One may, of course, be mistaken about what the facts are/were—and if one discovers that one is mistaken, one simply takes that discovery as a matter of course. One may also just no ...[text shortened]... (even to an objective probability)—in such cases, one may speculate or simply withhold judgment.

Who decides whether or not there is sufficient information to 'properly' form a belief?

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
Who decides whether or not there is sufficient information to 'properly' form a belief?

Good question.

First, let me say that I am “thinking out loud” a bit here, as I explore my own interest in such questions.

Second, I just want to mention the notion of epistemic honesty: that I believe that I honestly have enough information to form a belief/disbelief.

A corollary to that is my willingness (or unwillingness) to consider new facts/evidence/reasoned arguments. This does not mean that I am bound by epistemic honesty to accept any evidence that might be proffered (I might simply dismiss the Buddhist Pure Land Sutras as reasonable evidentiary accounts—but I ought to be able to give a reasoned account as to why).

Which means: willingness to acknowledge, at any point, that I might be wrong.

Third, “knowledge” is normally defined as (a) a belief, that is (b) justified, and (c) turns out to be true [“justified true belief”]. Almost all the arguments seem to revolve around justification. Just what constitutes justification for a given belief/disbelief?

I doubt that question is universally resolvable.

Now, while I think that there are some “universal” criteria for “proper” belief formation—e.g., that the belief in question be coherently stated (without internal contradiction), and that whatever evidence (reason) offered for that belief/disbelief is also logically coherent—I suspect that there remains a lot of room for dispute over “epistemic standards” (for lack of a better term just now).

[NOTE: All of that goes against, by the way, any notion that all opinions are somehow equal—or should be seen, a priori, as having equal potency (equipollence). Justification, I think, is a legitimate question.]

Now, I think that the best hedge against (perhaps unconscious) epistemic dishonesty (not to mention narcissism) is the simple willingness to challenge ones’ own beliefs, and continual investigation. Without end. This seems to me to entail a willingness to live with a certain amount of insecurity—as opposed to clinging (“for dear life!” ) to whatever seems to provide some existential surety.

Maybe I know some stuff; maybe I don’t. Maybe all that I think I know is wrong. Socrates was a dogmatist when he said, “I know that I know nothing”. This dogmatic skepticism infected the later Academy.

So— The answer seems to be two-fold: (1) be constantly vigilant about your own epistemic honesty, and (2) always be open to argument with the willingness to be shown wrong (that is, that your information may have been insufficient).

NOTE: For me, the question of primary interest is not whether or not you have sufficient information to properly form a belief—it is whether or not I have sufficient information to properly (that is, with epistemic honesty) form a belief. My experience indicates that people seem to be far more willing to address the former question than the latter.

Originally posted by vistesd
Good question.

First, let me say that I am “thinking out loud” a bit here, as I explore my own interest in such questions.

Second, I just want to mention the notion of epistemic honesty: that I believe that I honestly have enough information to form a belief/disbelief.

A corollary to that is my willingness (or unwillingness) to consider new facts/e ...[text shortened]... ndicates that people seem to be far more willing to address the former question than the latter.

Would you say there is an objective method to establish whether or not a belief is true?

Originally posted by vistesd
Good question.

First, let me say that I am “thinking out loud” a bit here, as I explore my own interest in such questions.

Second, I just want to mention the notion of epistemic honesty: that I believe that I honestly have enough information to form a belief/disbelief.

A corollary to that is my willingness (or unwillingness) to consider new facts/e ...[text shortened]... ndicates that people seem to be far more willing to address the former question than the latter.

So— The answer seems to be two-fold: (1) be constantly vigilant about your own epistemic honesty, and (2) always be open to argument with the willingness to be shown wrong (that is, that your information may have been insufficient).

Your solution refers to an attitude, summed up by Richard Feynman - If you care about the truth you cannot care who is right or wrong. It implies that, at any level, the measure of epistemic honesty is associated with the personal integrity or virtue of the individual.

I agree that for the individual seeking truth, these are essential qualities. I do not see see how my subjective attitude can become a measure of objectivity.

More critical, I suggest, is the phrase " always be open to argument." It is a moot point whether I personally have the capacity to arrive at "the Truth." I suggest that, with my own resources as a solitary individual, it is impossible. I can approach truth only by entering into a social process of truth seeking, and whatever my individual attainments in this search, the social nature of the search is my assurance of objectivity, which I define to mean - measured by an external standard which is not a product of my own subjective wishes and not a private standard.

Scientific Realism already describes the idea of successive approximations to truth - we arrive at continually improved models of the real world and we have grasped at least some reasonable beliefs that we can be confident are true. I would suggest that, in the same way, over millennia of social intercourse and debate, we are arriving at improved methodologies for truth seeking.

For example, we [humanity] once imagined that we could arrive at truth by pure reason and careful logic. Experience shows this approach is capable of constructing one house of cards after another without really solving any important questions. We also considered the idea that we could rely instead on pure, empirical facts (not a new idea - an ancient one). That also proves hopelessly inadequate.

The social standards for truth seeking are not arbitrary then, but the product of many generations of exploration and serious endeavour. If anyone wishes to debate the value of the different methods for truth seeking, then as a minimum they are obgligated to study the history at some level. The obligation arises not out of arrogance, but precisely because truth seeking is a social process. The arrogance arises in refusing to consider what has been learned by others and instead hoping to arrive at a serious propositon without knowing what other proposals have been expored,how they have fared in practice, and how they have been evaluated by peoople who took the trouble to examine them.

The inevitable cliche applies - we see further because we stand on the shoulders of giants. Remember, they may be giants, but we do indeed see further. Why would anyone prefer to stand at the ankles in a crowd of giants and see only their hairy legs?

I think an additional point applies. Truth seeking is a social enterprise - Truth is a collective goal. It would be delusional for any individual to imagine that I can accomplish in my own tiny, egotistic mind all that is implied by the search for Truth. We can each contribute to a social aspiration and a collective achievement but we must each perish and be forgotten, hoping that humanity persists in its search and that our values (which we learned by being taught) survive us (because we teach them in our turn).

Originally posted by vistesd
It is right now the case that it is raining where I live. Tomorrow it may or may not be raining here. But it will not be the case tomorrow that it did not rain here today.

One may, of course, be mistaken about what the facts are/were—and if one discovers that one is mistaken, one simply takes that discovery as a matter of course. One may also just no ...[text shortened]... (even to an objective probability)—in such cases, one may speculate or simply withhold judgment.

Bro! You weren't supposed to answer that question. You were supposed to ask for [much-needed] clarification.

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
Would you say there is an objective method to establish whether or not a belief is true?

Adherence to logical coherency (as I stated) and examination of the facts (empiricism). A fact is objective—i.e., what is the case. One may, of course, be mistaken as to what the facts actually are; then one corrects oneself. There may be facts that one cannot know. There may be facts about which one can not even know whether one can ever know about them.

If you are asking for omniscience—or some (objective) source that will render you omniscient as to any and all claims of fact—then I cannot help you.

Originally posted by BigDoggProblem
Bro! You weren't supposed to answer that question. You were supposed to ask for [much-needed] clarification.

Oh. :'(