10 Jun 07
3 edits
Originally posted by ivanhoeIvanhoe, the person who needs to answer this is you, and that's why bbarr asked you essentially the same thing first. The questions of clarification were meant to understand what you think your original proposition boils down to because your original proposition is not very clear as stated.
Are there any substantial or fundamental differences in this proposition compaired to my original proposition?
10 Jun 07
2 edits
Originally posted by ivanhoeWell, I'm not trying to fool you or trap you by getting you to be specific about the content of your orginal proposition. I just want to know what claim it is I'm being accused of holding. Anyway, we can start with the proposition above, and then later you can disavow it and accuse me of endorsing some other proposition if you want (though that gets tiresome quickly).
Are there any substantial or fundamental differences in this proposition compaired to my original proposition, according to you ?
As it stands, I do not endorse the following proposition:
It is always permissible to kill a disabled human (DH) when (i) DH continually experiences pain and discomfort, (ii) there is agreement between representatives of DH and recognized medical authorities that it is permissible to kill DH, and (iii) DH has left no living will nor is there any way to determine whether DH would want to remain living under the circumstances.
My reasons are as follows (and please assume in the following that DH is meets my minimal conditions for personhood):
1) Neither this proposition nor your unclarified original proposition makes clear just what sort of pain and suffering could warrant killing as a compassionate response. I've claimed elsewhere that killing may be a compassionate response when the pain experienced is severe and unrelenting. A severe and unrelenting pain would be one that was untreatable by pain-management techniques and that made it impossible for the patient to pursue other ends, carry on a train of thought, or really do much of anything other than suffer.
2) The proposition above makes no reference to the motivations of the representatives of DH or those of the medical authorities, but simply to conditions under which they agree. If the representatives of DH are merely tired of caring for DH, the medical staff thinks it too expensive to continue treatment, etc., then these are generally insufficient reasons to warrant killing DH. There are any number of callous or egoistic motivations that representatives of DH could have, and having these vicious motivations is sufficient to make the killing of DH wrong. This is a point I should stress, since I want you to understand where I'm coming from. I don't think it makes sense to talk about the moral status of an act in isolation from the motivations of the agent performing that act. This is why, in our discussion in one of your threads in the Debates forum, I made clear that the people who make these sorts of life and death decisions need to have the best interests of the DH at heart. They need to sincerely care about doing what is best for DH. They same goes for those medical personnel charged with approving or denying petitions for euthanasia.
3) Finally, as I have repeatedly attempted to make clear to you, I think that we ought to err on the side of caution in making life and death decisions. In the absence of a living will, or in the absence of the other sorts of information that would justify us in believing that the DH in question would not want to continue living, we ought to presume that the DH would want to continue living and refrain from euthanizing. In those cases where we do not know whether the DH has the sort of mentality necessary for having interests, we ought to presume that the DH does have such interests. So, the lack of information about the condition of DH or about what DH wants or would want can render impermissible the decision to euthanize (despite the conditions mentioned above having been met).
14 Jun 07
Originally posted by ivanhoeNo, I was simply curious if you were ready to withdraw your allegation, or if you would prefer to search around for some other proposition with which to make your case. Anyway, take your time. Of course I would never expect you to apologize for likening people to Nazis. Without such rhetoric, you'd have to actually present and defend a position.
Being arrogant again, Bbarr ?
I was thinking about your previous post. I wonder why you are making things as complicated as you do. Smokescreens, Bbarr ?
Apologise ? Are you kidding ?
14 Jun 07
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrBased on your negative formulation, I would take your positive formulation to be something like:
Well, I'm not trying to fool you or trap you by getting you to be specific about the content of your orginal proposition. I just want to know what claim it is I'm being accused of holding. Anyway, we can start with the proposition above, and then later you can disavow it and accuse me of endorsing some other proposition if you want (though that gets t issible the decision to euthanize (despite the conditions mentioned above having been met).
It is possible, depending on individual circumstances, that sometimes it is morally permissible to end the life of a DH when (i) such DH continually experiences pain or suffering, (ii) there is agreement between recognized medical authorities and representatives of said DH that it is morally permissible to kill said DH, and (iii) said DH has left no living will nor is there any way to determine with certainty whether DH would want to remain living under the circumstances.
Further, based on this and your prior posts, I would assume that moral permissibility would depend upon said representatives of the DH being (a) intimately familiar with the DH as a person, and (b) having no interest except a compassionate concern for the DH in mind.
Is this fairly accurate?
14 Jun 07
Originally posted by vistesdWith the following modifications, you will have an accurate account of my position:
Based on your negative formulation, I would take your positive formulation to be something like:
It is possible, depending on individual circumstances, that sometimes it is morally permissible to end the life of a DH when (i) such DH continually experiences pain or suffering, (ii) there is agreement between recognized medical authorit ...[text shortened]... o interest except a compassionate concern for the DH in mind.
Is this fairly accurate?
1) There is no need for the modal operator "possible", since I think there are actual cases where the circumstances are such that euthanizing a DH is the compassionate thing to do.
2) The pain and suffering you mention in condition (i) must be severe and unrelenting, untreatable or unmanageable by medical means.
3) The pain and suffering condition is conditional upon the satisfaction of (iii). There may certainly be cases where we know very well what the DH would want, and have an obligation to abide by their wishes despite the absence of severe and unrelenting suffering.
14 Jun 07
Originally posted by bbarrThank you. Understood.
With the following modifications, you will have an accurate account of my position:
1) There is no need for the modal operator "possible", since I think there are actual cases where the circumstances are such that euthanizing a DH is the compassionate thing to do.
2) The pain and suffering you mention in condition (i) must be severe and unrelenting, u ...[text shortened]... n obligation to abide by their wishes despite the absence of severe and unrelenting suffering.
When my father died, our choice was whether to prolong his life (not indefinitely in this case, since he had terminal cancer) in increasing physical pain via ever-increasing doses of medication—or allow him to just die. We (my mother, brother and I) in consultation with the attending physicians, chose the latter course. He had fallen into a coma from which we were assured he would not recover, and had not left a living will. I can assure anyone that it was not an easy, nor callous, decision.
Moral decisions almost always seem to me to be more difficult in practice than in theory—whatever one’s moral theory. Frankly, I just try to do what seems right and compassionate in the circumstance. I’m probably a bit closer to folks like Buber and Levinas (though perhaps not as strict as Levinas, as I understand him, in terms of always subordinating my own well-being to consideration of the other). I tend to act out of sympathy/empathy for the other (including non-human others), recognizing in them a Thou that is like my I. With those with whom I have formed a “We,” the recognition goes deeper.
I’ve always liked Hillel’s questions:
If I am not for myself, who will be?
If I am only for myself, what am I?
If not now, when?
Okay, I’m rambling now—but all of this seems to me to be a far cry from state-mandated elimination of those whose life is seen as not sufficiently contributing to the collective well-being.
14 Jun 07
Originally posted by vistesdI'm sorry about your father. My father has been battling lymphoma for a few years now, and has made clear the circumstances under which he would prefer to die. These decisions are so personal, and have much to do with how the patient and family views life and what makes it worth living. I doubt there are specifiable conditions that would be individually necessary and jointly sufficient for permissible euthanasia. This, like most real-life ethical decisions, is so context-dependent that it seems absurd to even try specifying such conditions, though it is fruitful to specify heuristics; to point out ranges of morally salient reasons that should inform our judgement in particular cases.
Thank you. Understood.
When my father died, our choice was whether to prolong his life (not indefinitely in this case, since he had terminal cancer) in increasing physical pain via ever-increasing doses of medication—or allow him to just die. We (my mother, brother and I) in consultation with the attending physicians, chose the latter course. He had fa ...[text shortened]... ation of those whose life is seen as not sufficiently contributing to the collective well-being.
14 Jun 07
Originally posted by bbarrI'm sorry about your father.
I'm sorry about your father. My father has been battling lymphoma for a few years now, and has made clear the circumstances under which he would prefer to die. These decisions are so personal, and have much to do with how the patient and family views life and what makes it worth living. I doubt there are specifiable conditions that would be individually nec ...[text shortened]... int out ranges of morally salient reasons that should inform our judgement in particular cases.
Thank you for that. He died, from my perspective, quite young—I am now only three years away from the age of his death.
My father has been battling lymphoma for a few years now..
I am sorry to hear that—and all I can do is wish you, he, and your family, well.
This, like most real-life ethical decisions, is so context-dependent that it seems absurd to even try specifying such conditions, though it is fruitful to specify heuristics; to point out ranges of morally salient reasons that should inform our judgement in particular cases.
Yes, I agree. Which is why I ponder such things much, but debate morality on here very little.