28 Jul 05
3 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungThen you're no Weak Atheist.
If there are not two or more possible claims that are inconsistent with the original claims and which are not probably wrong, then I would simply accept that I didn't know.
The Weak Atheist must accept that there are no such alternative claims, for to suggest that there are is an existential claim subject to the tenet of Weak Atheism, and he would encounter infinite recursion trying to decide their existence. Since he couldn't escape the recursion, he'd have no evidence for their existence, and must deny their existence. But the Weak Atheist doesn't simply accept that he doesn't know; he denies the existence of God pending further evidence.
28 Jul 05
2 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungThat's right.
What is "belief" anyway? If I remember correctly, Bbarr said to believe X means to hold that X is more likely true than false.
God certainly exists.
God probably exists.
God exists with probability .09
are all examples of such beliefs.
To believe them means to hold that
"God certainly exists" is more likely true than false.
"God probably exists" is more likely true than false.
"God exists with proability .09" is more likely true than false.
Additionally, " 'God exists with proability .09' is more likely true than false. " could be a belief. To believe it would be to hold that " 'God exists with proability .09' is more likely true than false. " is more likely true than false.
Think of inferential statistics. You can construct estimators of estimators of estimators of estimators...
28 Jul 05
Originally posted by AThousandYoungThat is the flaw of that system of belief justification.
So, I can believe the ball is not red, believe the ball is not blue, and believe the ball is not green, and believe the ball is either red, green, or blue, and not be inconsistent, right?
Under that system, the union of one's justified beliefs is not necessarily justified itself.
28 Jul 05
2 edits
Why not? Belief is simply a statement about probabilities. These are equivalent:
I believe the ball is not red. I believe the ball is not blue. I believe the ball is not green. I believe the ball is red, green, or blue.
The ball is more likely not red than red. It's more likely not blue than blue, and more likely not green than green. It is more likely one of these three colors than not one of these three colors.
I think you're equivocating on "to believe". If it's just a probabalistic statement, there is no inconsistency. If there's inconsistency, then belief is more than a probabalistic statement, it's about definites.
28 Jul 05
10 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungYou're right and your analysis of that is correct.
Why not? Belief is simply a statement about probabilities. These are equivalent:
I believe the ball is not red. I believe the ball is not blue. I believe the ball is not green. I believe the ball is red, green, or blue.
The ...[text shortened]... e three colors.
I think you're equivocating on "to believe".
What I should have said is that under that system of belief justification, the conjunction of the propositions in which one has justified beliefs may be a contradiction, and belief in that conjunction cannot be justified.
You would believe the propositions Not-R, Not-G, Not-B, and (R or G or B), severally. Jointly, the conjunciton of those propositions is a contradiction.
What I should have said is that the flaw of the system is that given a justified belief in several propositions, you are not necessarily justified in believing the conjunction of those propositions. (Why not? Call that conjunction C. C is tautologically false and thus it cannot be the case that C is more likely true than false, and thus it cannot be believed.)
I think it is a flaw that you can have some propositions that you may believe severally but not jointly. It should be OK to believe some on Monday and others on Tuesday, but never all of them on Wednesday? That is not aesthetically satisfying.
It means that you cannot derive new beliefs from existing beliefs via deduction on the underlying propositions.
28 Jul 05
4 edits
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesTo be honest, I don't follow your post entirely because I've never studied formal logic. I'd like to in the future but at this time I have not.
You're right and your analysis of that is correct.
What I should have said is that under that system of belief justification, the conjunction of the propositions in which one has justified beliefs may be a contradiction, and bel ...[text shortened]... rom existing beliefs via deduction on the underlying propositions.
I don't see how the conjunction of those four beliefs is a contradiction. This would be a contradiction:
The ball is not red. The ball is not blue. The ball is not green. The ball is one of the following: red, green, or blue.
However the conjunction of those four beliefs - that is, statements of probability - is not a contradiction, unless you are saying that to say one believes something is the same as saying it is true. Either belief is about trueness, or it is about the likelihood of trueness; in the latter case there is no contradiction.
It's true that there is a two thirds chance that the ball is not blue, so it's true that the ball is probably not blue. Anyone who knows this and does not think they have additional information and who is rational must believe the ball is not blue. Likewise for the other colors. It's also true that the ball must be one of those three colors, and anyone who knows this must believe that the ball is one of those three colors.
Therefore, there is no contradiction in this conjuction of beliefs:
I believe the ball is not red. I believe the ball is not blue. I believe the ball is not green. I believe the ball is red, green, or blue.
EDIT - You said this:
According to you...
Is belief that it's red justified? No.
Is belief that it's green justified? No.
Is belief that it's blue justified? No.
According to Weak Atheism, you must deny every possibility!
Saying that belief that the ball is red is not justified does not deny the possibility that the ball is red. This seems to be your error.
28 Jul 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesDoc, Doc, Doc...
I would like to engage in a brief epistemological exercise.
Weak atheists don't believe things in the absence of compelling evidence for their existence. So I ask them:
Are you conscious?
What evidence do you have for it?
Are other people conscious?
What evidence do you have for that?
If the evidence justifying your belief in your cons ...[text shortened]... of others' consciousness, as you have never experienced anybody else's consciousness?
Dr. S
My evidence for my own conciousness? It's already been pointed out. ITTIA.
My evidence for your conciousness? I'm reading your thoughts right now. Unless you are a conduit for some other conciousness, then you think therefore you are. Yes?
mustn't you also accept the theist's personal experience of God as justifying evidence (that is, justified to the theist) of his belief?
Of course. That doesn't mean god isn't an artifical construct...quite the opposite, actually. Should it not also hold true, by this axiom, that my experience of learning that "god" is a mushroom also be true?
28 Jul 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesYou're entire line of reasoning is absurd. You may have been able to befuddle AThousandYoung with your sophistries, but I reject them completely.
You're right and your analysis of that is correct.
What I should have said is that under that system of belief justification, the conjunction of the propositions in which one has justified beliefs may be a contradiction, and belief in that conjunction cannot be justified.
You would believe the propositions Not-R, Not-G, Not-B, and (R or G or B ...[text shortened]... ou cannot derive new beliefs from existing beliefs via deduction on the underlying propositions.
If there were two red balls and one blue ball in the bag, then it is more likely to be red than blue. But I do NOT believe the ball will be red when you pull one out. I also do not believe the ball is not red. I have no belief about the color of the ball. I will merely observe that it has a 2/3 probability of being red.
I reject your claim that because I observe that the ball is more likely to be red than blue, that I therefore believe the ball will be red. I deny this in the most strenuous terms possible. If you had 99 red balls and one blue one, I would still not “believe” a red one would be chosen. Although I think it would be highly likely.
With your hypothetical proposition “C”, I do not at any time claim NOT C. I will fight this false assertion until my dying day. I merely observe that there is insufficient justification for claiming that C is true. C could be true, or C could not be true. I have no way of knowing for sure. That is as far as an agnostic will go. Or he would observe that C is unintelligible and therefore proposition C is meaningless.
The weak atheist, on the other hand, will treat C as though it is false. I steadfastly refuse to be boxed into claiming that C IS false. I would be unjustified in making such a sweeping claim. But given that the advocates of C have completely and persistently failed to demonstrate any truth value for C, I will continue to treat their claim as though it was false.
28 Jul 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesNot exactly, since epistemology is the rational investigation of the origin, nature, methods, and limits of human knowledge and doesn't assume all knowlege is rationally acquired.
It should be emphasized that since this is a discussion of epistemology, what is at issue is the justification of beliefs, not the correctness of beliefs, or the sureness that one's beliefs are correct. (By 'correct', I mean a belief in proposition P is correct iff P is true; I don't mean it in the sense that it's correct to have ...[text shortened]... heir existence are justified according to the Weak Atheistic belief justification criterion.
Your "weak atheism" is aproaching agnostic territory which also can be viewed as weak theism. You have implied, by the use of the term "atheist", that there is no evidence tending toward theism that the weak atheist has discerned. Unless, of course, the basic premise requires rationality which would take it out of the range of epistemology.
28 Jul 05
Originally posted by rwingettI think Rob has put it well, it is important to note that there is a process of time here. A weak atheist makes their claims based on a passage of time and function which may or may not eventually yield a decisive proof. Until such a time they are justified in their position that such do not exist. I always think of my atheistic view as a null hypothesis, I will pursue the claim that god does not exist until such evidence is presented to show this null hypothesis is untrue. As long as the null hypothesis is not overturned I continue to treat it as though it is correct and retain my atheism.
You're entire line of reasoning is absurd. You may have been able to befuddle AThousandYoung with your sophistries, but I reject them completely.
If there were two red balls and one blue ball in the bag, then it is more likely to be red than blue. But I do NOT believe the ball will be red when you pull one out. I also do not believe the ball is not red ...[text shortened]... trate any truth value for C, I will continue to treat their claim [b]as though it was false.[/b]
I also do not hold the view that probability of truth can be equated with truth itself. As in your scenarios the potential that your claimed statistical truth can be shown to be false, (when I pull out a blue ball instead of a red one) showsit was not truth at all, merely a high degree of likelyhood, these must be distinguished from one another.
28 Jul 05
6 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungI don't make that claim. It's your error if you think what I do say entails that.
Saying that belief that the ball is red is not justified does not deny the possibility that the ball is red. This seems to be your error.
Proposition R: The ball is red.
I say:
Belief that the ball is not red is the same as to hold that "The Ball is red" is more likely false than true. (By def. of belief)
To hold that "The Ball is red" is more likely false than true is to hold that NOT-("The Ball is red" ) is more likely true than false. (By def. of NOT)
But to hold that is to hold that Not-(R) is more likely true than false. (By substitution)
Which is to hold that Not-R is more likely true than false. (By the truth table for NOT)
Which is to believe Not-R. (By def. of believe)
This demonstrates that believing a proposition to be false is the very same thing as believing its negation to be true. Do you follow?
I don't speak to "possibility" in the formulated proposition regarding the ball. But I could. I could formulate a new proposition
R': The ball is possibly red.
The Weak Atheists would believe this proposition because there is evidence for it. He would hold that "The ball is possibly red" is more likely true than false. I don't claim that the Weak Atheist would deny P', so I don't claim that the Weak Atheist denies the possibily that the ball is red.
Similary the mystic does not claim R'': The ball is certainly red.
He merely believes that R is true,, which by definition means nothing more than that he holds that the ball is more likely red than not red.
For the mystic to accept R'' would be as absurd as the Weak Atheist denying R' - I don't claim that either one makes this egregious error, and you cannot derive that claim from my analysis.
28 Jul 05
Originally posted by AThousandYoungThe reason I suggested that we consider the rest of Descartes work is because he begins his 'Meditations' with universal doubt. He has a few doubt-generating argument I won't go into. This is the best attempt I know of to establish undeniable knowledge. It is only through this type of global skepticism that he arrives at the famous 'I think, therefore I am'. So if we accept that, we accept the arguments that go along with it. The rest of Descartes' work continues in the same tone of skepticism. It is clear that he is only able to procede beyond the cogito by establishing a god, as I explained earlier.
I don't really understand your post.
[b]If we should accept the cogito as true, we should consider the rest of his "Meditations," seeing as how they all are based on his skepticism.
Not necessarily. A person can be correct in one thing and incorrect in another.
[p] His establishment of an all-powerful being is necessary for him to pro ...[text shortened]... ccam's Razor is the only way we can bring this down to a manageable level as far as I can tell.[/b]
The mal genie is the idea that it is possible for everything we sense can be a dream or a simulation of some sort. There is no way to escape this possibility beyond doubt, especially through senses, experience, etc. Descartes sidesteps this problem by simply claiming that there is a god who is good-natured. The god's existence would not allow such a deception.
I am aware that this is a large assumption, and not necessarily justified. However, atheistic alternatives, like Occam's Razor, are equally unjustifiable under the scrutiny of Descartes.
28 Jul 05
Originally posted by rwingettYes, despite my initial attraction to the neatness of the formulation, it seems that belief does not reduce neatly to the expectation that some state of affairs is more likely than unlikely. As Bob points out, you can expect something without believing it, or not expect something without disbelieving it: belief need not necessarily be involved.
You're entire line of reasoning is absurd. You may have been able to befuddle AThousandYoung with your sophistries, but I reject them completely.
If there were two red balls and one blue ball in the bag, then it is more likely to be red than blue. But I do NOT believe the ball will be red when you pull one out. I also do not believe the ball is not red ...[text shortened]... trate any truth value for C, I will continue to treat their claim [b]as though it was false.[/b]
Moreover, the converse also holds true: you can believe something without expecting it, or disbelieve something while expecting it, at least to a degree. For example, I may not expect God to exist, but may choose (or find myself choosing) to believe in spite of the evidence--essentially the fideist position.
Belief, then, seems to involve, not merely a positive expectation that some proposition P is true, but some sort of psychological commitment to proposition P being true, a commitment that is only partially grounded in expectation.
It also seems to me that, to the extent that the commitment to P is strong, the expectation that P will increase, for reasons unrelated to evidence, so that the two come into alignment. To the extent that commitment to P is weak, expectations that P and beliefs in P can vary independently.