31 Jul 05
2 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungNothing more than the conjunction of two propositions, X, and X. It's a logical construction, not an experimental one.
I don't understand what (X and X) means, to be honest.
For example, let X be "God exists."
The conjunction is "God exists AND God exists."
It has nothing to do with multiple events. The die rolling example is unrelated. There the proper analysis is the proposition "This roll will be less than 16" and the conjuction would be "This roll will be less than 16 AND This roll will be less than 16." There is no sequence of rolls; we are addressing a single state of affairs which dictate the propositions' truth values.
31 Jul 05
Originally posted by AThousandYoungIn a fallacious manner.
[b]Using our formerly defined propositions, given that you hold D, A, and B to be more likely true than false, from that it is derivable that C is more likely false than true. Agreed? If so, then C must be denied, by definition of belief.
I don't think I agree with this:
from that it is derivable that C is more likely false than true.
How did you determine that?[/b]
01 Aug 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesOh. Well then of course P(X) = P(X and X) = 0.8.
Nothing more than the conjunction of two propositions, X, and X. It's a logical construction, not an experimental one.
For example, let X be "God exists."
The conjunction is "God exists AND God exists."
It has nothing to do with multiple events. The die rolling example is unrelated. There the proper analysis is the proposition "This r ...[text shortened]... olls; we are addressing a single state of affairs which dictate the propositions' truth values.
01 Aug 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesIf we are dealing with independent propositions, then belief in X is justified, while belief in (X and X and X and X) is not justified!
Here is yet another argument aiming to demonstrate a flaw in our (definition of belief, justification criterion) pair.
Consider some proposition X whose probability of being true is .8
Consider these other propositions, and their associated probabilities, depending on whether you think we are dealing with independence:
X and X, .64 or .8
X an ...[text shortened]... hen I will concede this debate to you. It's been a pleasurable one and I have learned from it.
You talk about independent propositions, but then you only describe one proposition, X. No matter whether X is dependent or independent of other propositions, X is dependent on itself. Therefore belief in (X and X and X and...) is justified.
01 Aug 05
3 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungBut my point was that, just as {X, X, X} is a non-independent set, so is {A, B, C, D}, and you should analyze their conditional probabilities similarly.
[b]If we are dealing with independent propositions, then belief in X is justified, while belief in (X and X and X and X) is not justified!
You talk about independent propositions, but then you only describe one proposition, X. ...[text shortened]... itself. Therefore belief in (X and X and X and...) is justified.[/b]
My fallacy was in mixing and matching prior and conditional probabilities.
It is true that P(C | A and B and D) < .5 . But I was equating belief in (A and B and D) with asserting the truth, rather than likelihood, of (A and B and D), which is wrong, but needed in order for that condition to fire. If it wasn't wrong, my argument would hold. I think you see why it was in fact wrong, though.
01 Aug 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesI don't understand this post.
But my point was that, just as {X, X, X} is a non-independent set, so is {A, B, C, D}, and you should analyze their conditional probabilities similarly.
My fallacy was in mixing and matching prior and conditional probabilities.
It is true that P(C | A and B and D) < .5 . But I was equating belief in (A and B and D) with asserting the truth, rath ...[text shortened]... If it wasn't wrong, my argument would hold. I think you see why it was in fact wrong, though.
There are interactions/mutual dependencies between A, B, C and D. I think I agree with you on that.
I don't know what a "conditional probability" is or how to analyze it vs. how to analyze a non-conditional probability (prior probability?)
I don't know what this means: P(C | A and B and D)
01 Aug 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesP(C|A and B and D) = 0
But my point was that, just as {X, X, X} is a non-independent set, so is {A, B, C, D}, and you should analyze their conditional probabilities similarly.
My fallacy was in mixing and matching prior and conditional probabilities.
It is true that P(C | A and B and D) < .5 . But I was equating belief in (A and B and D) with asserting the truth, rath ...[text shortened]... If it wasn't wrong, my argument would hold. I think you see why it was in fact wrong, though.
The probability of the ball being not blue, given that the ball is not red AND the ball is not green AND the ball is either blue, red or green is 0, not merely <.5.
01 Aug 05
9 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungThat expresses a conditional probability, namely, the probability that C is true given that (A and B and D) is true.
I don't know what this means: P(C | A and B and D)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conditional_probability
For example, suppose I roll a die. Define these two events:
S: The die rolls 6.
E: The die rolls even.
P(S) = 1/6
P(E) = 1/2
P(S | E) = (1/6)/(1/2) = 1/3
Simple enough. Let's confuse things now. Take a 7 sided die with
numbers 1 through 7. Define these two events:
S: The die rolls 6.
O: The die rolls odd.
P(S) = 1/6
P(O) = 4/7
P(S | O) = 0, and not (1/6)/(4/7) because P(S intersect O) = 0.
Now for our ball example:
P(A) = 2/3
P(B) = 2/3
P(C) = 2/3
P(D) = 1
P(C | A and B and D) = P( A and B and C and D)/P(A and B and D) = 0
Herein lied my fallacy. I was analyzing belief in (A and B and D) to be the same as asserting (A and B and D)'s truth, and from that wrong assertion, validly concluding that P(C | D and A and B) < .5 and thus that C should not be believed.
My confusion stemmed from the fact that our working definition of belief does not lie in great accord with what I think is the typical connotation of belief. Said another way, I would prefer a defintion of beleif that allowed me to disbelieve C whenever I believe that both (A and B and D) and ( P(C | A and B and D) < .5) .
Just as the Weak Atheist likes to "act as though" a claim that he disbelieves were false, in my fallacy I was "acting as though" a claim that I believed were true, and applied a conditional probability based on that which I was "acting as though" were true.
02 Aug 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesGood doctor, I am still trying to understand, with my limited intellect, what the purpose of the thread is...I am more than willing to grant that as a weak atheist, a theists point of view is valid. It doesn't make god or jesus any more real than Xenu. Before this thread continues down a path of logistical numerology, please describe in layman's what are you attempting to demonstrate? That weak atheists suck, or what?
That expresses a conditional probability, namely, the probability that C is true given that (A and B and D) is true.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conditional_probability
For example, suppose I roll a die. Define these two events:
S: The die rolls 6.
E: The die rolls even.
P(S) = 1/6
P(E) = 1/2
P(S | E) = (1/6)/(1/2) = 1/3
Simple eno ...[text shortened]... and applied a conditional probability based on that which I was "acting as though" were true.
02 Aug 05
6 edits
Originally posted by David CI didn't really have anything to demonstrate upon starting this thread. I wanted to get some clarification about a couple aspects of the Weak Atheistic viewpoint. You'll note that my original post was primarily interrogatory rather than declarative.
Before this thread continues down a path of logistical numerology, please describe in layman's what are you attempting to demonstrate? That weak atheists suck, or what?
As the thread evolved, I attempted and failed to demonstrate that the Weak Atheist's belief justification criterion could yield absurd states of affairs. Upon acknowledging that failure, I have reduced my claim to a subjective one that the Weak Atheistic belief justification criterion is aesthetically displeasing because it appears to yield absurdities (e.g. "I believe the ball is not red. I believe the ball is not green. I believe the ball is not blue. I believe the ball is red or green or blue." ) even though that appearance is deceiving, and because it is paired with an unnatural definition of belief.
I made no attempt to demonstrate that Weak Atheists suck. I don't even know if I believe that about Weak Atheists, because I don't even know if that is more likely true than false.
02 Aug 05
it is interesting to scrutinise the position of weak athiests. However, they really fade into agnostisism. More convincing in my view is the strong position... i.e. 'we can't prove or disprove the existence of God, but I choose to disbelieve. OK, there are many things I may believe, or not believe, based on faulty and unreliable evidence etc, and of course, i may be wrong... but i simply don't believe in God'.
02 Aug 05
let me just clarify. i weak athiest, so you say, does not believe in anything without compelling evidence. A strong atheist may say "I am human and make mistakes. I am willing to admit I have believed in things, ideas, concepts in the absence of compelling evidence. However god is not one of them. I don't believe in God."
02 Aug 05
1 edit
Originally posted by paulrNonsense. Weak atheists choose to disbelieve because they feel there is no sufficient proof to prove it, that's not agnosticism at all.
it is interesting to scrutinise the position of weak athiests. However, they really fade into agnostisism. More convincing in my view is the strong position... i.e. 'we can't prove or disprove the existence of God, but I choose to disbeli ...[text shortened]... of course, i may be wrong... but i simply don't believe in God'.
If I say I don't believe in pink elephants because there is no evidence for it, does it mean I'm not choosing a belief?
02 Aug 05
agnostics say they don't know. In other words, there is insufficient evidence to prove it. I don't know about pink elephants. But it is a fine line between choosing to say i don't believe because there is insufficient proof and saying we can't know.
On the other hand, a strong athiest would say people created the idea of God. It can't be proved, disproved and there is no point basing argument on evidence of the existence or non-existence of God. They have no need of formal logic. They don't believe. If anything there arguments derive from history rather than philosophy
02 Aug 05
One more thing. formal logic really isn't a useful tool for discussing atheism, weak or strong. God, whether or not you believe in such an entity, manifests itself as an idea in peoples heads, and as a material force through organised religion, moral codes governing behaviour etc. Formal logic can't really say anything useful about that...in my opinion. Applying formal logic to the idea of god will leave you revolving in circles.