Christianity is blind.

Originally posted by RJHinds
Obviously the answer is NO. 😏

You are not in a position to answer on Grampy Bobby's behalf; you are convinced the earth is a few thousand years old while he apparently entertains the possibility that the earth might be trillions of years old.

Originally posted by bbarr
I didn't see anything in twhitehead's post that implicated anything about faith. He was making a point about the concept of observation.

Even observing requires faith.

Faith in one's ability to perceive accurately.
Faith in one's analysis of that perception.

Faith runs the gamut, really.

Originally posted by LemonJello
'Faith perception' is a gobbledygook phrase you use that has no coherent content. We've been over this several times. Here is some history to jog your lazy memory on this:

Thread 153483
Thread 153656
Thread 154159

What you don't understand ought not be despised.

The fault is likely your own.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
What you don't understand ought not be despised.

If you look at those three threads, Grampy Bobby was pointedly unable to make his notion of "faith perception" understandable. He contradicted himself repeatedly and didn't even seem to understand the notion himself.

Originally posted by FMF
If you look at those three threads, Grampy Bobby was pointedly unable to make his notion of "faith perception" understandable. He contradicted himself repeatedly and didn't even seem to understand the notion himself.

By my reading, the only things muddling the topic were the self-important drilling conducted by LJ.

His penchant for dulling up the topic with his attempt at brilliant sleight of hand and minutia fools some folks, but doesn't convince the rest of us.

We can readily examine the needles, but why lose sight of the many trees?

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
By my reading, the only things muddling the topic were the self-important drilling conducted by LJ.

His penchant for dulling up the topic with his attempt at brilliant sleight of hand and minutia fools some folks, but doesn't convince the rest of us.

We can readily examine the needles, but why lose sight of the many trees?

Well people can just go and read it for themselves. I didn't see Lemonjello "muddling" anything; indeed, the crystal clarity and to-the-heart-of-the-matter thrust of his critique of Grampy Bobby's ever-shifting "faith perception" waffle on those threads is refreshing to read.

Originally posted by bbarr
There is a causal chain that proceeds from the actual construction of the Eiffel Tower to this encyclopedia entry by virtue of which I come to know various things about the construction of the Eiffel Tower. But that doesn't entail that I have, in any way, observed the construction of the Eiffel Tower. On the other hand, if I were to see a video of the constr ...[text shortened]... of the sort that constitute observation. This is actually a very complex epistemological issue.

Without having watched the video, would you say that you have 'observed that the Eiffel Tower was constructed'? Would you say that you have 'observed that construction started in 1887'?

Originally posted by Grampy Bobby
"I believe" rather than 'I know on the basis of empiricism or rationalism'.
If you're familiar with Facebook, it was merely a friendly "Poke". -Bob

What does the phrase 'I believe I am human' have to do with 'faith perception'? Please explain what you mean by 'faith perception'.
Why do you think the phrase 'I believe' is not equivalent to (and a polite way of saying) 'I know on the basis of empiricism or rationalism'?

Originally posted by twhitehead
What does the phrase 'I believe I am human' have to do with 'faith perception'? Please explain what you mean by 'faith perception'.
Why do you think the phrase 'I believe' is not equivalent to (and a polite way of saying) 'I know on the basis of empiricism or rationalism'?

Please explain what you mean by 'faith perception'.

Here we go...this will be fun, folks.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Even observing requires faith.

Faith in one's ability to perceive accurately.
Faith in one's analysis of that perception.

Faith runs the gamut, really.

I think you're running together two different things: 1) S observing P and, 2) S being justified in believing that he is observing P.

There is no plausible construal of 'faith' such that it's required for (1). If P is the case and S is (appropriately) causally connected to the fact that P, then S observes P. The heavy lifting here is spelling out what constitutes an appropriate causal connection between S and the fact that P.

There is certainly a case to be made, however, that for S to be justified in believing he observes P, S must also have the justified beliefs that his perceptual systems are reliable, that the world is at least roughly as it seems to him in perception, that he is not conceptually confused, etc. But note that these are only requirements if Internalism about epistemic justification is correct. If Externalism is correct, then S doesn't need these further, supporting reasons. Rather, S simply needs to be a reliable observer in fact.

But suppose we grant your tacit assumption that Internalism about epistemic justification is correct. Even then, you don't get your conclusion that faith is required; all that's required is justified belief...

I think you might reply that we simply can't have justified beliefs of the sort mentioned above. After all, there is always a chance that our perceptual systems have gone awry, that we're in anomalous circumstances, confused or whatever. Because these supporting beliefs are always epistemically uncertain, we can't be justified in holding them. If, at bottom, that's your view, then you'll have to be prepared to admit that almost none of our beliefs are epistemically justified. It's logically possible you're wrong about your name, address, etc., so since there's a chance you're wrong, your beliefs about your name and address can't be justified. But that's absurd. You know your name and address. Knowing that P, like justifiably believing P, doesn't require epistemic certainty.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Without having watched the video, would you say that you have 'observed that the Eiffel Tower was constructed'? Would you say that you have 'observed that construction started in 1887'?

Huh? You claimed that observation simply requires a causal chain proceeding from P (that which is observed) to S (the observer) that presumably eventuates in S having the belief that P. My example shows that your claim is too simple. Here's another example: Suppose there is no beer in my fridge. Suppose my wife observes that there is no beer in the fridge. Suppose my wife calls me and tells me so. Now, there is a causal chain the begins with the fact that there is no beer in the fridge and eventually connects to me causing in me the belief that there is no beer in the fridge. In this case, I have not observed that there is no beer in the fridge. Rather, I inferred it based on testimony. So, not all causal chains are sufficient for observation to occur. Observation requires certain types of causal chains. They have to be, in some sense, direct. They can't run through other agents. Roughly, the primary and secondary features of the objects and their relations; the very things that constitute a fact, have to causally interact with those perceptual systems of an observer that have the function of detecting those features and relations. This is my Aristotelianism showing, but I think you won't be able to analyze 'observation' without some teleological account of the function of our particular perceptual systems. It's the only way to distinguish between the causal chains that suffice for observation and those that are too roundabout or indirect for observation. This is why, for instance, you can observe the ancient birth of stars by looking through a powerful telescope but not by hearing about it second-hand from an astronomer looking through a powerful telescope.

Originally posted by bbarr
Huh? You claimed that observation simply requires a causal chain proceeding from P (that which is observed) to S (the observer) that presumably eventuates in S having the belief that P. My example shows that your claim is too simple. Here's another example: Suppose there is no beer in my fridge. Suppose my wife observes that there is no beer in the fridge ...[text shortened]... but not by hearing about it second-hand from an astronomer looking through a powerful telescope.

But modern astronomers don't 'look' through telescopes any more. That is so 19th century. They use light detectors thousands of times more sensitive than human eyes. That data then gets digitized, put on a computer in millions of separate numbers and can then be turned into images, a lot of which end up on 'Astronomy picture of the day'. So are THOSE astronomers seeing what they think they are seeing and if they send you an image put together by a computer are they then not to trust that image is the representation of the real thing, that is to say IF you were looking through a powerful telescope which had human eyepieces allowing humans to see directly, would then the person seeing the image as put together by a computer be less valid than the image viewed through human eyepieces?

Originally posted by sonhouse
But modern astronomers don't 'look' through telescopes any more. That is so 19th century. They use light detectors thousands of times more sensitive than human eyes. That data then gets digitized, put on a computer in millions of separate numbers and can then be turned into images, a lot of which end up on 'Astronomy picture of the day'. So are THOSE astron ...[text shortened]... image as put together by a computer be less valid than the image viewed through human eyepieces?

I'm not making any claims about the conditions under which we're justified in believing that the results of scientific investigation accurately reveal how things are. I am making claims about the conditions under which it is appropriate to say that somebody has observed something. Consider a few cases:

(1) S observes, via unaided eyesight, a ship on the horizon.
(2) S observes, via a powerful telescope, a ship on the horizon.
(3) S observes, via distant light detectors that transmit digital information to a computer that reconstructs images, a ship on the horizon.

I believe in each of these three cases S can come to know that there is a ship on the horizon. Each of these are 'valid', in that each describes a way S can come to be justified in believing that there is a ship on the horizon.

However, it is an open question whether each of the three cases above describe an instance of observation. The first obviously does and I think the second does as well. About the third, I'm not as sure. How indirect can the transmission of information get before it's no longer appropriate to say that observation occurs? That's what I'm wondering about above.

Originally posted by bbarr
I'm not making any claims about the conditions under which we're justified in believing that the results of scientific investigation accurately reveal how things are. I am making claims about the conditions under which it is appropriate to say that somebody has observed something. Consider a few cases:

(1) S observes, via unaided eyesight, a ship o ...[text shortened]... 's no longer appropriate to say that observation occurs? That's what I'm wondering about above.

in fact, even direct observation is not direct. Light travels at a speed of about 6 microseconds per mile and a ship on the horizon would be about 6 or so miles or about 36 microseconds from the observation in time. That means if something happens on that ship after the light has reached you, you would not see the results for another 36 microseconds. So suppose you look at it, quickly close the shutter on the telescope and look away you would think, there is a ship on the horizon. But you didn't see the giant laser beam vaporize the ship and would have no way of knowing that happened for another 36 microseconds. So did you see the ship?

It could have been in the process of being blown up by the giant laser beam but you would have had no way of knowing that the instant you closed the shutters.

I know 36 microseconds is a very short time but when you even look at the sun, it is about 9 light minutes away, so if you observe the sun with a telescope on Earth, say you see a coronal blast on the sun, if after that observation, some super weapon teleports the sun 50 light years away in one microsecond, you would continue to view the sun through your telescope, totally unaware the sun has gone bye bye. The planets would move just as they are now for that 9 minutes also and you wouldn't be able to even predict the sun was gone by viewing ANYTHING in the solar system, planetary motion, meters, asteroids, all of those things would continue to orbit of that 9 minutes because changes in gravity also moves at the speed of light so everything in the solar system would think everything is honky dory and would not know something is amiss for 9 minutes. Jupiter wouldn't find out for an hour and Pluto wouldn't hear the news for 4 hours, but after 9 minutes the Earth would notice a total lack of sunlight and whatever path the Earth was on will continue in a straight line forever, much to the detriment of the human race and most life forms on Earth. So do you really even observe ANYTHING?

Originally posted by bbarr
I'm not making any claims about the conditions under which we're justified in believing that the results of scientific investigation accurately reveal how things are. I am making claims about the conditions under which it is appropriate to say that somebody has observed something.

Would you say that the Higgs Boson was observed at Cern?