Originally posted by bbarrYou imply some sort of separation between "acquaintance with perceptions" and perceptions themselves. I am not familiar with this concept. I don't understand your post at all actually. Perceptions are self evident. I perceive the image of a computer screen in front of me. Now, there may not be a computer screen, but I absolutely know I am seeing the image of one.
Not even that is certain. It is a possibility that unbeknownst to you, you are irremediably conceptually confused, and that your apparently rational faculties are actually systematically unreliable. Hence, there is no way you can infer with certainty from your direct acquaintance with your perceptions to the proposition that those perceptions exist.
Originally posted by KellyJayThat's because you're ignorant. I generally read what you write and go "he makes no sense" - but that's because your ability to use the English language is apparently limited.
People from time to time cannot see the forest for all the trees.
and
From time to time when I read bbarr, I have to go, 'What did he say?"
🙂
Kelly
Originally posted by AThousandYoungSorry if I wasn't clear. Let us distinguish between perceptions and sensations. Perceptions are factive and sensations are not. If you perceive that P, then it is the case that P. If you merely have a sensation of P, then you may thereby have evidence that P, but the sensation itself doesn't entail that P. Now, it certainly seems that when we have a sensation, we are directly acquainted with something mental (e.g., some phenomenal or qualitative character, an expanse of color or a pain, or...), but being directly acquainted with P is not the same as believing that P (or, hence, knowing that P). You want to say, I think, that if you have a sensation of P then you thereby are certain that you have such a sensation, that is, that you thereby come to know that it seems to you as if P. But sensations are not propositions, and hence can't be objects of belief or knowledge. To get from sensings of P to beliefs that it seems that P you must conceptualize the sensations, at least demonstratively (i.e., you must at least conceptualize the sensation as "I'm sensing something like that", where the "that" is something like internally pointing to the sensation). In short, there has to an act of cognition, perhaps implicit, that gets you from the sensing to the basic belief that something appears to you in a particular way. But where there are acts of cognition, there are opportunities for error. So, you could have a sensation of P and fail to conceptualize it properly by being conceptually confused about the proper description of the non-propositional or qualitative content of the sensation.
You imply some sort of separation between "acquaintance with perceptions" and perceptions themselves. I am not familiar with this concept. I don't understand your post at all actually. Perceptions are self evident. I perceive the image of a computer screen in front of me. Now, there may not be a computer screen, but I absolutely know I am seeing the image of one.
Originally posted by bbarrJust to be clear. If I dream I am seeing something then is that a sensation or is it a simulation of a sensation or a sensation of a sensation? Clearly the sensation in a dream is generated internally so it is not even an input into the brain as would be implied by the standard usage of the word sensation but rather an input into part of the brain that is generated by another part.
Let us distinguish between perceptions and sensations. Perceptions are factive and sensations are not.
Originally posted by bbarrI think my "perception" is your "sensation".
Sorry if I wasn't clear. Let us distinguish between perceptions and sensations. Perceptions are factive and sensations are not. If you perceive that P, then it is the case that P. If you merely have a sensation of P, then you may thereby have evidence that P, but the sensation itself doesn't entail that P. Now, it certainly seems that when we have a sensa the proper description of the non-propositional or qualitative content of the sensation.
Are you claiming I could have a sensation and not know it at the same exact time in which I am sensing it? Or that I could not sense something and yet believe that I am not sensing what I am actually sensing at the same time? What you are suggesting seems to me to be conceptually impossible. There's room for trickery, deceit or poor reasoning about what a sensation means or implies, but the existence of a sensation is self evident. In fact it's a tautology; if I sense S, then I sense S. If I don't sense S then I don't sense S.
EDIT - According to this wiki article, a sensation is a biophysical event, while a perception is what the person actually experiences. Therefore I think my use of the term is correct, and sensation is not the word I am looking for. The word sensation assumes certain things about the physical world that cannot be known. A perception is simply an experience; the term assumes nothing about the biological mechanisms.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensation
Originally posted by AThousandYoungYea, out of the way, sort of reminds me of when I was answering
Could be better, could be much worse.
Now that that's out of the way, are you planning on taking some English grammar classes any time soon? You need to work on your ability to communicate via language.
a general question and got a criticism sort of out of the blue.
Well, any way, I hope your life goes well and stays that way.
Kelly
Originally posted by StarrmanBy nature I meant merely to objectify self-being, not to give it any characteristics. Saying I exists as a starting point from whence to hold a claim to perception (or in Descartes' way; thought) is jumping the gun on the question of what one can know with certainty. You're using a characteristic of an undefined thing to assume its existence.
By nature I meant merely to objectify self-being, not to give it any characteristics. Saying I exists as a starting point from whence to hold a claim to perception (or in Descartes' way; thought) is jumping the gun on the question of what one can know with certainty. You're using a characteristic of an undefined thing to assume its existence.
I don't b ...[text shortened]... s a perceived, it requires either a substrate sensory apparatus and an object of attention.
No; I am giving a name to something which is self-evident. The claim about perception is that it is also self-evident, not that it follows from my existence. The two are tied together, because in order to perceive there must be a perceiver.
Originally posted by KellyJayYou answered this question:
Yea, out of the way, sort of reminds me of when I was answering
a general question and got a criticism sort of out of the blue.
Well, any way, I hope your life goes well and stays that way.
Kelly
What else do you know for certain?
With this?
People from time to time cannot see the forest for all the trees.
and
From time to time when I read bbarr, I have to go, 'What did he say?"
I suppose I misunderstood your post. I thought you were insulting bbarr out of the blue and simultaneously making some random, nonsensical comment.
On rereading your post I believe I made a mistake, so I apologize for the attack.
Now then, you know for certain that
People from time to time cannot see the forest for all the trees.
Does this mean you know that people and trees exist? You are mistaken if you think this. You may know that you are perceiving something, but it's an assumption - or "faith" as I suppose you'd call it - that the image you're seeing is in fact a tree with all the associated assumptions (e.g. it has mass, it reproduces, it absorbs sunlight and uses it in photosynthesis, etc).
You know that you exist, but not that anyone else does. All you can know is that you are seeing an image that you assume is a person with all the characteristics of one - or even that you remember seeing such an image.
Originally posted by AThousandYoung"On rereading your post I believe I made a mistake, so I apologize for the attack."
You answered this question:
[b]What else do you know for certain?
With this?
People from time to time cannot see the forest for all the trees.
and
From time to time when I read bbarr, I have to go, 'What did he say?"
I suppose I misunderstood your post. I thought you were insulting bbarr out of the blue and simultaneously m ...[text shortened]... h all the characteristics of one - or even that you remember seeing such an image.[/b]
Accepted, no worries.
Kelly
Originally posted by AThousandYoungWe live our lives in the beliefs we do have, and those beliefs paint
You answered this question:
[b]What else do you know for certain?
With this?
People from time to time cannot see the forest for all the trees.
and
From time to time when I read bbarr, I have to go, 'What did he say?"
I suppose I misunderstood your post. I thought you were insulting bbarr out of the blue and simultaneously m h all the characteristics of one - or even that you remember seeing such an image.[/b]
reality as we think it is, we could be wrong, but we act according to our
beliefs nonetheless. Reality is what it is; it does not change with our
beliefs.
Kelly