Faith and reason are intrinsically non-violent ...

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Maybe standards should be set universally, but how do you go about doing that?

There are many ways. The current legal system and democracy prevailing in some countries isn't too bad.

You are allowed to slaughter animals if they belong to you; Yengeni's method, not the act itself, was the focus of attention. Supposedly traditional slaughtering methods are 'cruel', while 'modern' (ie. Western) techniques are 'humane'. Yet the opposite could be argued, for a variety of reasons.
I realize that. The issue however is not whether it is right or wrong but whether he should get away with something simply based on the 'tradition' card. If it is judged 'cruel' then it should apply to all, if it is judged 'humane' then that should apply to all. But in this case, it was probably not illegal and many things that are judged 'cruel' or 'inhumane' are often still legal.

Originally posted by twhitehead
There are many ways. The current legal system and democracy prevailing in some countries isn't too bad.

Secular legal systems don't legislate morality, last I heard. Laws can be moral, immoral or morally neutral. Morally informed laws must be derived from some system of ethics that exists prior to the foundation of law. Democracy can also be used to sanction immoral practices.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Secular legal systems don't legislate morality, last I heard. Laws can be moral, immoral or morally neutral. Morally informed laws must be derived from some system of ethics that exists prior to the foundation of law. Democracy can also be used to sanction immoral practices.

Its not clear though whether we are talking about morals or laws or even something else. The initial issue was 'tolerance'. What behavior should we tolerate from others and why. Should we tolerate behavior from others based on whether or not that person claims it is part of their belief system? Depending on the case, the behavior in question may be considered illegal, unethical or simply undesirable.
For example, a girl in school decides to wear a headscarf that covers her face. It may be legal to do so, and I may not see anything immoral about it, but I may still decide whether or not to tolerate it.

As for laws, I believe that many laws are in fact morally informed to a certain degree whether or not they are formally so.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Its not clear though whether we are talking about morals or laws or even something else. The initial issue was 'tolerance'. What behavior should we tolerate from others and why.

Yes. Well, it seems reasonable to tolerate any behaviour that isn't offensive, provided that there is a rational basis for taking offence.

Yes, laws tend to reflect the values of the cultures that generate them, surprisingly enough.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I realize that. The issue however is not whether it is right or wrong but whether he should get away with something simply based on the 'tradition' card. If it is judged 'cruel' then it should apply to all, if it is judged 'humane' then that should apply to all. But in this case, it was probably not illegal and many things that are judged 'cruel' or 'inhumane' are often still legal.

I fully agree. Tradition does not justify any form of act in my opinion. If that act is reprehensible under a moral standard, I fail to see how repeatedly doing it for a certain amount of time exonerates that action.

Originally posted by ivanhoe
FAITH AND REASON ARE INTRINSICALLY NON-VIOLENT


VATICAN CITY, 30 APR 2008 (VIS) - Following today's general audience, Benedict XVI received participants in the sixth meeting of the Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue and the Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation of Tehran, Iran. They have been meeting to study the theme of: "Faith and R ...[text shortened]... erstanding of them".

OP/ISLAM CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE/TAURAN:MOSTAFAVI VIS 080430 (290)

It brings me great joy to see political correctness infecting the very heart of the Vatican. The eventual collapse is now inevitable.

Originally posted by scottishinnz
It does sound like a major hand-washing exercise. And, hey, I wasn't the one who generalised about not generalising!

I think hand wringing is the term you were looking for

[i]Originally posted by Bosse de N

Setting faith aside for a minute -- in terms of ethics, is reason 'intrinsically non violent'?[/b]

No. There is an intrinsic (though not all-pervasive) violence in reason. At its worst it leads to torture and violent experimentation. Simply put, if you want to know whats inside an egg, you have to crack it open. Therefore, we have to corrupt our reason with values if we want to resist the violence intrinsic to reason.

Originally posted by bjohnson407
No. There is an intrinsic (though not all-pervasive) violence in reason. At its worst it leads to torture and violent experimentation. Simply put, if you want to know whats inside an egg, you have to crack it open. Therefore, we have to corrupt our reason with values if we want to resist the violence intrinsic to reason.

Hence the spectacularly violent outcomes of the Enlightenment.

Could you elaborate on what you mean by corrupting reason with ethics (values)?

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Hence the spectacularly violent outcomes of the Enlightenment.

Could you elaborate on what you mean by corrupting reason with ethics (values)?

Basically, I think that we need to draw the line on how far we will go to know something. I'm not sure how far to take this. To a certain extent we already do it I can see a multiple directions....

We could prohibit violence in the pursuit of knowledge. Ban torture, experiments on humans, possibly security cameras etc. Or we could adopt an attitude that respects what we don't know and let's it be.

Since knowing is a practice, it makes perfect sense to me that we would have an ethics about it. This would have huge implications for biomedical ethics. Perhaps, instead of looking for ways to prolong life, we would try to make the transition into death more peaceful and pleasant for the dying person.

On the downside, this attitude, makes one less eager to support stem cell research. But on the upside, it treats the mentally ill hospitably rather than as test subjects.

Originally posted by bjohnson407
Basically, I think that we need to draw the line on how far we will go to know something.

I think you have made a mistake in assuming that reason leads to the desire for knowledge.
A similar mistake is often made by theists when contemplating atheism and assuming that it will lead to not only selfish behavior but also all out violence such as mass murder. Similarly some people think reason should lead to the desire to improve society by selective breading and culling of all 'undesirables'.
The mistake in all the above cases is to assume without question that there is a single particular desirable goal, without actually justifying that goal. For example, if the good of society is more important than the rights of an individual then reason does lead to the conclusion that killing may in fact be necessary - possibly to an extreme degree. However it is not 'reason' that is at fault but the initial assumption.

Originally posted by twhitehead
...[text shortened]... For example, if the good of society is more important than the rights of an individual then reason does lead to the conclusion that killing may in fact be necessary - possibly to an extreme degree. However it is not 'reason' that is at fault but the initial assumption.

Without making the ethical judgement of what's a "good," reason has no reason to prefer one thing/act over another. I think it makes sense to say that reason's primary object is knowledge. Are you saying that reason can't do anything purely on it's own? Without some sorts of desires or values? If so, I think that's right, but I think that the natural tendancy of reason is toward the acquisition of knowledge.

Originally posted by bjohnson407
No. There is an intrinsic (though not all-pervasive) violence in reason. At its worst it leads to torture and violent experimentation. Simply put, if you want to know whats inside an egg, you have to crack it open. Therefore, we have to corrupt our reason with values if we want to resist the violence intrinsic to reason.

This whole conversation is confused because fundamental distinctions are being run over roughshod. Does 'reason' here refer to theoretical or practical reason? When we talk of reasons to believe this or that, we are talking about theoretical reason. When we talk of reasons to act we are talking about practical reason. If, as seems likely, we are talking about practical reason, then the claim at issue is whether there are always reasons not to engage in violent action. But this question cannot be answered independently of an investigation into the nature of practical reason itself, and there are many options here. One could be an Aristotelian about practical reason, and claim that our reasons for action are determined by the recommendations of virtuous traits of character. One could be a Humean about practical reason, and claim that our reasons for action are determined by our antecedent motivational states and constrained only by means-ends efficiency. One could be a Kantian about practical reason, and claim that at least some of our reasons for action have categorical force in that acting contrary to them constitutes contradictory willing. These positions only scratch the surface of current debates about the nature of reasons for action. There are, additionally, debates about whether reasons for action must, if they are appropriately predicated of an agent, be capable of motivating that agent. This claim is called "reasons/motives internalism" and its denial "reasons/motives externalism". There are debates about the relation between explanatory and justificatory reasons, where the former are the reasons that an agent acts on and the latter are the reasons that serve to justify an act of an agent.

Get your house in order.

Originally posted by bbarr
This whole conversation is confused because fundamental distinctions are being run over roughshod. Does 'reason' here refer to theoretical or practical reason? When we talk of reasons to believe this or that, we are talking about theoretical reason. When we talk of reasons to act we are talking about practical reason. If, as seems likely, we are talking ab ...[text shortened]... er are the reasons that serve to justify an act of an agent.

Get your house in order.

bbarr, nice to see you again.

Originally posted by LemonJello
bbarr, nice to see you again.

Nice to see you too, I hope you're well.