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Originally posted by moonbusBayesian reasoning tells us that if Julius Caesar did have two heads [a very low probability occurrence
If I may add a small proviso to that: just because a theory or conjectire has't been conclusively refuted, doesn't mean it is advisable to hold it. It hasn't been clusively proven that Julius Ceasar did not have two heads, but it would be silly to believe it.
a-priori] then there should be evidence that this was the case [two headed statues, writings
from contemporaries [especially enemies] etc etc]. Given that this evidence has not been found when
we should have been able to find it, coupled with the very low probability of both this condition occurring
in the first place and then his survival and success as a general and then [essentially] emperor while
having this condition we can conclude that the probability given the information we have that Julius Caesar
had two heads is vanishingly small and improbable beyond reasonable doubt. And as such we can safely
believe that Julius Caesar had but one head.
Such reasoning does in fact refute the idea that Julius Caesar had two heads beyond any reasonable doubt
which is what is required.
Falsification is simply the special case that observed evidence directly and strongly contradicts the proposed
hypothesis. However as an absence of evidence is evidence of absence [albeit typically weak evidence] where
evidence should be expected to exist and is not found [Particularly when dealing with propositions with low
prior probabilities] we can reach the point where the proposition/hypothesis is so improbable [particularly with
respect to alternate propositions/hypotheses] that we can justifiably regard it as being false without having
observed evidence that directly contradicts/falsifies the proposition/hypothesis.
This explains why it is 'silly to believe' that Julius Caesar had two heads, or that [for example] the Christian god exists.
There is no evidence we could possibly observe that would falsify the Christian god claim because it is always
possible that that god could be deliberately hiding it's existence from us. [this does pretty much preclude a morally
good god, but then the proposed Christian god is clearly not morally good]
However, we can still justifiably claim to know that such a god does not exist because the prior probability of such a
god is infinitesimal, and there is NO evidence FOR it's existence, and plenty of evidence FOR the competing hypothesis
that [like all other proposed gods] it was simply invented by primitive peoples looking for psychological comfort in the
face of a bewildering world. [We can track the development and evolution of the ideas that would become the Christian
religion over time].
This shows that just because a claim is unfalsifiable, that doesn't put that claim beyond the reach of rational or scientific
enquiry, nor does it mean we cannot justifiably claim to know the truth value of that claim.
Which is why I am a gnostic atheist with respect to the Christian god.
Originally posted by googlefudgeAll his statues have one head. Further Romans practised infanticide of newborns when it was deformed in some way, they were believed to be cursed by the gods. So there isn't an absence of evidence, there is evidence against the conjecture.
Bayesian reasoning tells us that if Julius Caesar did have two heads [a very low probability occurrence
a-priori] then there should be evidence that this was the case [two headed statues, writings
from contemporaries [especially enemies] etc etc]. Given that this evidence has not been found when
we should have been able to find it, coupled with the ...[text shortened]... h value of that claim.
Which is why I am a gnostic atheist with respect to the Christian god.
Edit: Adding a bit, hang on.
Originally posted by vistesdGenerally, I think fallibilism is best viewed as a negation of infallibilism, and in turn infallibilism is a thesis regarding specific requirement for knowledge. Generically, the infallibilist will hold that for S to know P it requires satisfaction of some condition on S’s basis for belief that P, such that it is not possible for both the condition to be satisfied and for P to be false. But what is this condition exactly, and what does it mean for the condition to be satisfied, and how to deal with the modal interpretation of ‘not possible’, etc, etc? Let the infallibilist figure that stuff out, since he is the one insisting on the requirement. The fallibilist will simply deny that all this hullabaloo is required for knowledge. The fallibilist notion or intuition, then, is basically that we can have knowledge that P even when our grounds for belief that P is less than perfect in regards to guaranteeing the truth of P, or something along those lines. I believe there are also infallibilists with regard to justification (vice knowledge), and that is even a more vicious sort of skepticism. Fallibilism will deny any of these as well.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallibilism
From the first cited wiki page: “Advocates of fallibilism, though, point out that while it is indeed correct that a theory cannot be proven universally true, it can be proven false (test method) or it can be deemed unnecessary (Occam's razor). [b]Thus, c ...[text shortened]... ents about what can properly be claimed as “truth” or “knowledge”, I wondered what others think.
I do not agree that such a claim as the one you bolded follows from fallibilism. Fallibilism basically denies that we need perfect grounds for holding something for it to be justified or be knowledge, or some such (basically a denial of whatever the infallibilist thesis is). But that does not mean that the grounds for holding something can be so minimal as that the something has just not been refuted. That seems consistent with fallibilism, but I would deny that it follows from fallibilism.
Originally posted by DeepThoughtSorry, the storm took down a power line and I was in the dark for a while. I was going to say:
All his statues have one head. Further Romans practised infanticide of newborns when it was deformed in some way, they were believed to be cursed by the gods. So there isn't an absence of evidence, there is evidence against the conjecture.
Edit: Adding a bit, hang on.
I've started reading the Golden Bough, by J.G. Frazer, the abridged version. I'm only on the second chapter, which is about sympathetic magic. He insists on explaining how irrational it is and does so several times, I'm left wondering who he is trying to convince as if a reader believed in such things it is quite unlikely they'd be persuaded otherwise and if they don't then they don't need to be told. I suppose he wanted to point out that he didn't. Anyway the object of the book is to understand the ancient Italian tradition of the priests of Diana at Nemi.
The priest was referred to as the King of the Wood. To become priest one had to break a bough off the tree, which entitled one to fight the incumbent in single combat. It was a fight to the death and the survivor would be the priest. It was a very precarious life for that particular priest.
Frazer claims that the origin of this practice was ancient even from the point of view of Classical Rome. It is atypical even in the Classical world, which could be brutal. Even though he claims to have found its roots, he admits in his preface that he could be entirely wrong. The full book runs to twelve volumes. I don't think that the origins of these beliefs are trivial to unravel.
09 Feb 16
Originally posted by googlefudgeMy statement about Julius Ceasar having had two heads was a rhetorical placeholder for any number (potentially limitless) of statements which no one has ever bothered to refute, because they are too silly to even bother refuting.
Bayesian reasoning tells us that if Julius Caesar did have two heads [a very low probability occurrence
a-priori] then there should be evidence that this was the case [two headed statues, writings
from contemporaries [especially enemies] etc etc]. Given that this evidence has not been found when
we should have been able to find it, coupled with the ...[text shortened]... h value of that claim.
Which is why I am a gnostic atheist with respect to the Christian god.
The tabloid press is full of silly claims which no sane person should believe: they print stories about alien abductions and "Elvis is alive" and "Hitler was cloned" and conspiracy theories surrounding the death of JFK and such like. One does not need a Baysian analysis to see that such claims and conjectures are so silly as not even to merit refutation.
The point being that lack of refutation is no reason to believe something.
I agree that "that just because a claim is unfalsifiable, that doesn't put that claim beyond the reach of rational or scientific enquiry, nor does it mean we cannot justifiably claim to know the truth value of that claim." If a claim is unfalsifiable, then that's the whole ball of wax right there: a claim which is unfalsifiable is either a tautology or unverifiable.
09 Feb 16
Originally posted by vistesdIf we can be wrong about any piece of belief no matter how sure we are, shouldn't we always
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallibilism
From the first cited wiki page: “Advocates of fallibilism, though, point out that while it is indeed correct that a theory cannot be proven universally true, it can be proven false (test method) or it can be deemed unnecessary (Occam's razor). [b]Thus, c ...[text shortened]... ents about what can properly be claimed as “truth” or “knowledge”, I wondered what others think.
look at everything with a grain of skepticism? Only a fool would believe themselves beyond
error.
09 Feb 16
Originally posted by moonbusYes, although I think that googlefudge could produce an argument that such a blanket rejection is a sort of intuitive Bayesianism. I don't think he'd quite be right, but it is an intriguing possibility. Why do we think such arguments are ridiculous? I think some sort of coherentist argument makes sense - we reject such claims because they don't fit with our view of the world. But where his argument (if he would make such an argument) possibly has some strength is with a claim along the lines that we may have evolved this type of view and evolution is just a brutal form of Bayesian reasoning.
My statement about Julius Ceasar having had two heads was a rhetorical placeholder for any number (potentially limitless) of statements which no one has ever bothered to refute, because they are too silly to even bother refuting.
The tabloid press is full of silly claims which no sane person should believe: they print stories about alien abduction ...[text shortened]... e ball of wax right there: a claim which is unfalsifiable is either a tautology or unverifiable.
09 Feb 16
Originally posted by DeepThoughtNo doubt some sort of argument could be produced on demand, but I'm skeptical that Baysian or any other sort of reasoning is what is going on in evolutionary terms. I rather suppose some sort of instinctive filter is operating. As Nietzsche wrote somewhere, the function of consciousness is to ignore 90 % of what is going on.
Yes, although I think that googlefudge could produce an argument that such a blanket rejection is a sort of intuitive Bayesianism. I don't think he'd quite be right, but it is an intriguing possibility. Why do we think such arguments are ridiculous? I think some sort of coherentist argument makes sense - we reject such claims because they don't fit wi ...[text shortened]... we may have evolved this type of view and evolution is just a brutal form of Bayesian reasoning.
09 Feb 16
Originally posted by DeepThoughtAfter you've had a look through Frazer (the abridged edition will suffice), you might want to read a short piece by Wittgenstein on Frazer's Golden Bough.
I've started reading the Golden Bough, by J.G. Frazer, the abridged version. I'm only on the second chapter, which is about sympathetic magic. He insists on explaining how irrational it is and does so several times, I'm left wondering who he is trying to convince as if a reader believed in such things it is quite unlikely they'd be persuaded otherwise ...[text shortened]... runs to twelve volumes. I don't think that the origins of these beliefs are trivial to unravel.
10 Feb 16
Originally posted by moonbusYes, I read his Wikipedia page which gave a summary of Wittgenstein's comments. Frazer's a bit painful to read, as he hammers the square pegs of facts into the round holes of his theory. It's the abridged version I'm reading which is quite long enough, I doubt I could get through 12 volumes of that. My purpose in bringing it up was just to illustrate that the origins of religious ideas are not simple.
After you've had a look through Frazer (the abridged edition will suffice), you might want to read a short piece by Wittgenstein on Frazer's Golden Bough.