God and Random Events

Originally posted by SwissGambit
Heh, I'm letting the pros do battle while I carry on a layman-to-layman conversation.

Yeah, I agree - if the situation S is exactly the same, there is no basis for coming to a different decision.

Would the principle "if the situation S is exactly the same, the outcome is the same" limit the options available to any ?

Originally posted by JS357
Would the principle "if the situation S is exactly the same, the outcome is the same" limit the options available to any ?

Please ignore the post from me above this one.

Originally posted by Rajk999
Im leaning in that direction because I cannot think of an event which has no cause. Is the existance of God the only example of an uncaused event you can think of?

As I stated earlier, one can never know for sure that an event has no cause. But the vast majority of events in the universe are not known to have a cause, so I wonder why you are having trouble thinking of one.

Originally posted by vistesd
This is not a rewording of your first formulation. Your first formulation included the premise that "it is possible that ~X", whereas this formulation includes the premise that ~X, which is quite a difference. In this formulation, 1 & 3 are directly contradictory, totally regardless of premise 2. This formulation is not relevant to the subject of the fata knows P)”—well, as I note, that seems to be, not a translation but a different construal.

you explain why, if I kept the original wording for 3. in the formulation with “G cannot be wrong”, the reductio still fails as it is construed, i.e. keeping "3. it is possible that ~X"

In this case, the triad at issue is the following:

(1) G knows X.
(2) G cannot be wrong.
(3) Possibly ~X.

This triad is not inconsistent because it does not entail any contradiction of the form Q & ~Q. I can give you a thoroughly coherent scenario where (1) & (2) & (3) all hold. The scenario is as follows. Suppose that X is contingently true: this entails that X is true in the actual world, but also that ~X is true in at least some possible world. Suppose also that G is a perfect cognizer, such that there are no possible worlds wherein G is mistaken in any of his doxastic states. This means that for any possible world wherein X is true, it is also true that G knows X (to the extent that G holds any doxastic state regarding X in that world); and for any possible world wherein ~X is true, it is also true that G knows ~X (to the extent that G holds any doxastic state regarding ~X in that world). Suppose further that G does hold a doxastic state regarding X in the actual world. All of (1) & (2) & (3) hold in this scenario, and yet the scenario does not entail any contradiction. Do you agree? If you still do not agree, then what is the contradiction entailed by the conjunction of (1) & (2) & (3); what is Q, specifically?


I.

Necessarily,
if P
then G knows P.
.
.
.
The first one seems to me to be indefeasible simply because it is analogous to saying that “By definition of G, if P, then G knows P.” I might be wrong, but I don’t see how else to treat it; the theist can just say, “Well, that is the definition of an omniscient G.” This construal might be masked as if it were a logical inference, but it really is not.

If the theist holds that G is an infallible knower, then we can ask what that means, what does the infallibility condition on G actually amount to? It seems rather clear to me that for G to be an infallible knower, it is not good enough simply that G never errs in his judgments. Rather, G needs to be immune from even the possibility of epistemic error. There should be no possible worlds wherein G is mistaken about anything. Also, I think we can assume that this theist typically also means to imply that G's knowledge is comprehensive (thus ruling out trivial cases where it is not the case that S is mistaken about P but only because S does not hold any doxastic state regarding P to begin with). It seems to me that the most concise way for the theist to state the infallibility condition is I: Necessarily, if P then G knows P. This is simple but quite powerful. It means that the conditional "If P, then G knows P" is true in every possible world. Note that if P is false in some possible world, then this conditional is trivially true in that world. But, no matter, because in that case "If ~P, then G knows ~P" is also true in that world, and since ~P is true in that world, this means that G knows ~P in that world. So, in those worlds where P is true, G knows P; in those where ~P is true, G knows ~P. That sounds like pretty much everything the libertarian theist needs. And the good thing for the libertarian theist is that it seems rather immune to fatalist objections. Note that bbarr's objection, which was mostly captured in the critical premise that "Necessarily, G knows P" does NOT follow from this infallibility condition; and you also canNOT validly infer to this premise from the conjunction of P and the infallibility condition. This is why we judged it to be that bbarr's argument fails.

II.

Necessarily,
if G knows P (and G cannot be wrong)
then P.
.
.
.
The second construal seems different: here ~P would result in a contradiction similar to the one that I proffered. II. really can be put in terms of a logical inference, one that leads to reductio if one removes the “necessarily” to allow for the possibility of ~P, including ~P as a result of effective agency.

II is just trivial, since P follows with necessity from G knows P, since the truth of P is analytic to knowledge of P. II holds completely regardless of the inclusion "and G cannot be wrong". That "G cannot be wrong" is irrelevant in this case: P follows with necessity from "S knows P", totally regardless of whether S can be wrong at times or not.

At any rate, I agree that (1) & (2) above are clearly inconsistent with ~X (actually, as I tried to mention before, (1) alone is clearly inconsistent with ~X, and (2) is not needed at all to give rise to the contradiction here); but this result is of no consequence to the libertarian theist's position. What a fatalist objector would want to show is that (1) & (2) (or if not (2), then however the libertarian theist's infallibility condition is to be unpacked and imported) is inconsistent with "Possibly ~X". And, per my discussion above, this is something I do not think the fatalist objector can achieve.

I hope this post makes some sense. 😕

Originally posted by SwissGambit
If you are never going to throw out the idea, would it be fair to say that there is no possibility of choosing otherwise - and thus your refusal to throw it out is not a free choice?

Ahh, but we are not talking about a 'yet to be made' choice.
I have already made the choice not to throw out that idea, so the question was whether that choice was
'free'... 😉


I don't necessarily think that such a thing as free will exists... Depending on quite how you define free will.

However, I am certain [as much as I am ever certain about anything] that free will Definitely cannot exist in
a deterministic universe under any acceptable [to me] definition of free will.


My original point was that the existence of 'free will' and the ability to make a free choice whether or not to
believe in god is rather important to various theologies including Christianity.

And whether or not free will does in fact exist, which is a different argument and requires actual data, free will
cannot exist in a deterministic universe.

If god can foresee exactly and precisely the outcome of all events in the universe before hand, then that universe
must be deterministic, otherwise it would be impossible for god to know what was going to happen next.

Thus for god to be (as was claimed) able to tell exactly what is going to happen the theist has to give up the idea
of free will.

Which of course leads the theist into a host of problems that free will was supposed to solve.

Originally posted by twhitehead
As I stated earlier, one can never know for sure that an event has no cause. But the vast majority of events in the universe are not known to have a cause, so I wonder why you are having trouble thinking of one.

Can we ever know for sure that a singular event has a cause?

We can infer cause from repetition; maybe that's what cause is -- dependency inferred from repetition. We look for similarities in E1->E2 relationships that allow us to group them, and sufficient repetitions lead to reliability, but that reliability is actually a result of our grouping. Examples of E1/->E2 are excluded precisely for the reason that the dependency fails, so the grouping criteria are adjusted to produce the result.

Also, if we thusly infer that an event E2 is caused, but it is caused by an uncaused event, E1, does the fact that E1 is uncaused, mean that we must infer that E2 is ultimately uncaused?

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]you explain why, if I kept the original wording for 3. in the formulation with “G cannot be wrong”, the reductio still fails as it is construed, i.e. keeping "3. it is possible that ~X"

In this case, the triad at issue is the following:

(1) G knows X.
(2) G cannot be wrong.
(3) Possibly ~X.

This triad is not inconsistent be ...[text shortened]... talist objector can achieve.

I hope this post makes some sense. 😕[/b]

This triad is not inconsistent because it does not entail any contradiction of the form Q & ~Q.

Gotcha. My whole error (and one that I sadly repeat) is to confuse “language games”: I make what appears to be a logical argument (in “logical space”, for all possible worlds), when in fact I am still thinking in “nomological space” (this or “any given” world). You can’t read my mind, and so have difficulty unraveling my error—which, in the logical space (or logical domain of discourse) where you are properly operating, appears obvious. And I repeat the error (or its mirror-error) with different formulations. I am going to have to be doggedly (self-) pedantic by making clear those distinctions, even if redundant, until I get my habit of thought in order. 😳

Once again, thanks for your patience, LJ.

Originally posted by googlefudge
Ahh, but we are not talking about a 'yet to be made' choice.
I have already made the choice not to throw out that idea, so the question was whether that choice was
'free'... 😉


I don't necessarily think that such a thing as free will exists... Depending on quite how you define free will.

However, I am certain [as much as I am ever certain ab ...[text shortened]... of course leads the theist into a host of problems that free will was supposed to solve.

It doesn't really matter whether the choice was made in the past, present or future.

Let's say you were given a chance to make that choice over again. The only rub is that the situation is exactly the same as before. Your mental state is the same, the positioning of all things in the room is the same, etc. However, this time you choose to reject the idea that free choices are those that could be otherwise.

The question is - on what basis was this alternate choice made?