How can it be the same?

Originally posted by Palynka
I'm not contradicting you with all these questions, I'm trying to learn.

How would a reductive physicalist reduce language?
Is what we call logic in any way different than a language?
Wouldn't a physicalist (not necessarily reductive) also defend your example of love being identical to some pattern of neural activity?

I'm not sure what you mean by "reduce language". I'm not even sure why you're bringing language into this conversation.

Well, some logical systems are systematic, productive, and compositional. So, they have the formal properties of public languages. It may be better to think of logical systems as the form that public languages must have in order to be coherent.

Some would, some wouldn't. This was the point of the distinction above between type-physicalism and a minimal physicalism merely committed to supervenience.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
I can, but for each such example, I can formulate an analogous one for which your alternate criterion is inadequate.

Now it's a criterion?

Originally posted by bbarr
Now it's a criterion?

Criterion is a technical term meaning something like primary moral principle.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Criterion is a technical term meaning something like primary moral principle.

O.K., good.

So, do your counterexamples to this injunction rely on failure to apply the injunction to one's self?

Originally posted by bbarr
O.K., good.

So, do your counterexamples to this injunction rely on failure to apply the injunction to one's self?

Not primarily, in the same way that all examples I can think of in favor of demonstrating the inadequacy of "love your neighbor as yourself" don't rely on failure to primarily apply it to your neighbor. We're only discussing primary principles yielding starting points of deliberation, after all.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Not primarily, in the same way that all examples I can think of in favor of demonstrating the inadequacy of "love your neighbor as yourself" don't primarily rely on failure to apply it to your neighbor. We're only discussing primary principles corresponding to starting points of deliberation, after all.

Well, I'm not sure what that means. Counterexamples to the general injunction 'love your neighbor as yourself" often start with the assumption that one's psychology may be such that what would be an instance of treating one's self lovingly would fail to qualify as treating one's neighbor lovingly. The revised general injunction doesn't have this weakness.

Originally posted by bbarr
Well, I'm not sure what that means. Counterexamples to the general injunction 'love your neighbor as yourself" often start with the assumption that one's psychology may be such that what would be an instance of treating one's self lovingly would fail to qualify as treating one's neighbor lovingly. The revised general injunction doesn't have this weakness.

It has a similar weakness, namely that your neighbor's psychology may be such that treating him as he wishes to be treated would fail to qualify as treating him lovingly.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
It has a similar weakness, namely that your neighbor's psychology may be such that treating him as he wishes to be treated would fail to qualify as treating him lovingly.

You are confused. The injunction doesn't say, "treat your neighbor as he wishes to be treated". It says "love your neighbor". Although you start with considerations about how your neighbor wants to be treated (as this shows a proper respect for their autonomy, and avoids unnecessary paternalism), that doesn't mean you end there. The point here is simple: The Golden Rule takes as its standard for X treating Y appropriately considerations of what would qualify as X's treating himself lovingly. The revised injunction takes as its standard for X treating Y appropriately considerations of what would qualify as X's treating Y lovingly. This is why the revised injunction is, unlike the Golden Rule, not egoistic.

Originally posted by bbarr
You are confused. The injunction doesn't say, "treat your neighbor as he wishes to be treated". It says "love your neighbor". Although you start with considerations about how your neighbor wants to be treated (as this shows a proper respect for their autonomy, and avoids unnecessary paternalism), that doesn't mean you end there.

Similarly, treat your neighbor as yourself doesn't mean you consider how you want to be treated and end there. You begin with yourself as your best approximation to your neighbor's psychology, as we're all human beings with the same sort of essence, and from that primary position, you may revise your approximation according to the evidence.

Jesus' injunction isn't indicating that the reason you ought not punch somebody in the face is because you wouldn't want to be punched. That is, it's not saying that to punch is bad because you wouldn't want to be punched. Rather, it's giving a method for figuring out what is good or bad, using yourself as an approximation for another. Your personal pain isn't the reason an action would be bad; it's an evidentiary guideline that it would be bad, without speaking to the reason why it is bad.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Similarly, treat your neighbor as yourself doesn't mean you consider how you want to be treated and end there. You begin with yourself as your best approximation to your neighbor's psychology, as we're all human beings with the same sort of essence, and from that primary position, you may revise your approximation according to the evidence.

Jesus ...[text shortened]... guideline that it would be bad, without speaking to the reason [b]why it is bad.[/b]

Then the injunction ought to read "love your neighbor, and if you're not sure how to go about doing that, then love your neighbor as you would yourself", oughtn't it?

Originally posted by bbarr
Then the injunction ought to read "love your neighbor, and if you're not sure how to go about doing that, then love your neighbor as you would yourself", oughtn't it?

Yes. If Jesus returns, he will come here, if it be his will, and I will get him to revise accordingly.

One of the main motives of his lesson is that people didn't in fact know how to go about treating each other lovingly, so the special case clause in your reformulation is the presumed case, given the context of his lesson.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Yes. If Jesus returns, he will come here, if it be his will, and I will get him to revise accordingly.

One of the main motives of his lesson is that people didn't in fact know how to go about treating each other lovingly, so the special case clause in your reformulation is the presumed case given the context of his lesson.

Fair enough. I hereby call out Jesus to revise his original formulation of the Golden Rule.

Originally posted by bbarr
Fair enough. I hereby call out Jesus to revise his original formulation of the Golden Rule.

Alternatively, we could add it to the agenda for Vatican III, since the Pope speaks on behalf of God.

Originally posted by bbarr
No, that is false. Just as the theist postulates a God and then derives moral claims from what he takes to be God's will, so the atheist postulates conditions on a flourishing human life, or categorical norms of practical reason, or intrinsically valuable states of affairs, or a priori accessible moral truths, or hypothetical negotiations between ideally rati ...[text shortened]... itarianism, intuitionism, contractarianism [or contractualism], respectively) are relativistic.

However , do atheists see existence as 1) having a basically moral grounding (morality being an actual reality) or do they see existence as basically 2) ammoral or neutral upon which we place human constructs and meaning.

If its 1) then it takes some explaining if it's 2) then all morals have to be ultimately relative because there is no ultimate existing moral truth to refer to.

So which is it facts or opinions? Subjective or objective? Moral law to a Christian is as real as the law of gravity , it exists. I'm clear about morality being objective. Make yourself clear too.

Originally posted by dottewell


They are certainly not "subjective perceptions", but I'd be careful with the expression "real things". What I am saying is that beauty, for example, is a property of an object. It is, if you like, a "real" property, whatever "real" means in that use. It is obviously not a property like (for example) height and weight. It is not a "real thing" in the same way as (for example) a tree or water.

So here's the rub...

You are saying that these things do not belong to the category of the subjective world and human perceptions and also they do not belong to the real world of physical external reality. They are neither objective nor subjective. neither real or imaginary? (DUH? ) so where are they then? You need to create some third category to accommodate these things , but since you have no such category then you continue to wander around in some nebulus grey area between the two. Are they real or subjective, make your mind up! Either have your cake or eat it!

I remember going through this dilemma when I was an Atheist but it was only when I realised that there could be only one of two options that I stopped kidding myself and decided to make a choice. Something within me would not allow me to concieve of these things as merely 'human perceptions' but I knew that to see them as real was a implying a moral reality to existence (God makes a heck of a lot of sense in this context). I also knew I couldn't live in a world where there was no moral law and meaning was a made up thing we did for ourselves, it just didn't feel right , ultimately I knew I would be on the way to Nihilism. This is a massive assumption but I think you can't quite let go of the idea of these things being real but you know unconsciously what saying 'they are real' might mean for your world view.