Originally posted by PawnokeyholeFree will is the ability to act as one wills, which has nothing to do with
I am not sure what your "why?" refers to. Is it to free will being a precondition for moral agency, or to free will being relevant to moral agency?
I accept that an angel irresistibly inclined towards good both does good and is good. If on judges goodness in terms of dispositions and effects, then one could justly call such an angel and her actions m hook or by crook, that could have been avoided if an anlternative design had been followed.
regard to the moral fiber of the one acting when we look at just that
term alone. Animals and insects I don't believe carry with them any
moral debates or discussions within their realm, and yet they act as
they will.
The free moral agent is just that; one who does indeed understand
morals and that their actions are then weighted by what they perceive
is right or wrong. This does not mean; however, that as a result the
moral fiber or core within the person that they will not act out doing
something they know is wrong. More times than not, it isn’t a random
choice for people to act in spite of some moral thought or knowing the
possible consequences to themselves or others, but they may choose
to act out of purely selfish needs or desires. Where we see people
doing this, for the most part we judge them as being selfish and
depending on the severity of their actions we some times punish
them them for it.
For one to have both moral knowledge and a free will leaves them in
the position to do what is right or to do what isn’t. If one wants robots,
there isn’t a moral discussion to be had, simply plug in what you want
your robot to do, they will do it. If you have a robot that does not do
what you tell it to, it is a design issue.
Kelly
Originally posted by KellyJaywhat about sentient robots?
Free will is the ability to act as one wills, which has nothing to do with
regard to the moral fiber of the one acting when we look at just that
term alone. Animals and insects I don't believe carry with them any
moral debates or discussions within their realm, and yet they act as
they will.
The free moral agent is just that; one who does indeed unde ...[text shortened]... do it. If you have a robot that does not do
what you tell it to, it is a design issue.
Kelly
Originally posted by KellyJayWhether you are right or wrong about all these points, you are not addressing the argument I am raising.
Free will is the ability to act as one wills, which has nothing to do with
regard to the moral fiber of the one acting when we look at just that
term alone. Animals and insects I don't believe carry with them any
moral debates or discussions within their realm, and yet they act as
they will.
The free moral agent is just that; one who does indeed unde ...[text shortened]... do it. If you have a robot that does not do
what you tell it to, it is a design issue.
Kelly
Originally posted by KellyJay*sighs*
Your points seem to be shifting, so what do you want to be addressed?
Kelly
Note: The below differs slightly from the version.
Okay, suppose I make beings--robots if you like, something else if you don't--with roughly equally balanced natural tendencies to be nasty or nice. Some people might think this approximates humans.
I leave these being to interact with humans in significant ways.
But they also have some significant differences.
Some of the being, the Determinos, I design such that, with causal inevitably, half of them behave more nicely than nastily, and half behave more nastily than nicely.
Some others, the Randos, I design such that chance fluctations, on average, will make half of them behave more nicely than nastily, and half behave more nastily than nicely.
Still other, the Libertos, I design with free will. But given that free will is as unpredictable as chance, again on average, half of them will behave more nicely than nastily, and half will behave more nastily than nicely--by, in each case, either voluntarily going with their nice instincts and inhibiting their nasty ones, or voluntarily going with their nasty instincts and inhibiting their nice ones.
Now, in all cases, one would expect the beings--Determinos, Randos, and Libertos--to do the same amount of nasty things (and nice things). So the amount of harm they do is the same.
Further suppose one Determino, one Rando, and one Liberto--each of them bad--commit some particular grave act. Suppose too it's the same act in all relevant respects. The victim of the act, in each case, wants to press charges.
I think she would only be justified in doing so against a Liberto, but not against a Rando or a Determino. (Note: This in an incompatibalist stance. A compatibilist might also hold a Rando responsible if it showed some responsivity to correction or to reason. However, this complication need not detain us in the present instance.)
Now here's the question I am interested in.
Suppose the victims of the Determino, Rando, and the Liberto also want to press charges against me, the designer, who unleashed these beings on the public. After all, I could have made beings with only nice instincts, or being who would only choose to do nice things, that is, the angelic sort. But no: I chose to create beings who were defective, in the sense of not being only 50% nice as they could be.
In which cases would the victims be justified in pressing charges against me, on the grounds that I, at last in part, partly responsible for their injuries?
If your answer differ in each of the three cases, please say why.
I think, when you reflect about, you will conclude that I am equally liable in all three cases.
That's the sort of liability God faces for creating beings with free will, with conflicting instincts towards good and evil. There may be other reasons that eliminate that liability. But, all else equal, He would be liable.
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeGod, is God he created it all and He will end it all and judge all
*sighs*
Note: The below differs slightly from the version.
Okay, suppose I make beings--robots if you like, something else if you don't--with roughly equally balanced natural tendencies to be nasty or nice. Some people might think this approximates humans.
I leave these being to interact with humans in significant ways.
But they also have s ...[text shortened]... other reasons that eliminate that liability. But, all else equal, He would be liable.
things properly. If you have the ability to do as you will, you will
do as you will and either take heat for your choices or recieve
the good for what you have done. Now there was something that
occured that did not have too, and because of that much evil
entered into the human life, and God restored our relationship
with Him while keeping our abilities to choice and keep our abilities
to make moral judgments intact. What the end result of that is
I don't know. Do you want to say God must be held into account
for all of creation, find by me hold Him to it.
Kelly
Originally posted by KellyJayYour inability to answer straight questions with straight answers is remarkable.
God, is God he created it all and He will end it all and judge all
things properly. If you have the ability to do as you will, you will
do as you will and either take heat for your choices or recieve
the good for what you have done. Now there was something that
occured that did not have too, and because of that much evil
entered into the human life, an ...[text shortened]... nt to say God must be held into account
for all of creation, find by me hold Him to it.
Kelly
Nonetheless, I salute your appropriate humble final statement that you don't know.
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeImpressive argument.
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Okay, suppose I make beings.... That's the sort of liability God faces for creating beings with free will, with conflicting instincts towards good and evil. There may be other reasons that eliminate that liability. But, all else equal, He would be liable.[/b]