Spirituality
01 Jun 10
04 Jun 10
Originally posted by AgergGiven an information input (x) you make a choice (y). So f(x) is your choice function, x is the information input and y is the outcome.
I argue that there is a determining agency. As an example consider two variables x y, related (for simplicity) by the equation y=f(x) (where f is some function like sin(.) or (.)^2, etc...), and suppose the domain of x (the values it can take) is (again, for simplicity) the set of integers. As x varies, the dependent variable y takes on it's value based upon t ...[text shortened]... God that y = 5, how is the set of things I can choose to do not constrained by this knowledge?
If I know x and know that your choice function is f(.) then I can find out y. This does not impose an ex-ante constraint on choice, but it's simply a determination of an outcome. Simply knowledge of your choice function and inputs implies knowledge of y without constraining f(.) which is your how you choose effectively.
04 Jun 10
1 edit
Originally posted by PalynkaBut god's knowledge of what I choose to do (y) determines the function f (given that f is the choose to do blah function), which in turn restricts the domain of x
Given an information input (x) you make a choice (y). So f(x) is your choice function, x is the information input and y is the outcome.
If I know x and know that your choice function is f(.) then I can find out y. This does not impose an ex-ante constraint on choice, but it's simply a determination of an outcome. Simply knowledge of your choice function a ...[text shortened]... puts implies knowledge of y without constraining f(.) which is your how you choose effectively.
04 Jun 10
1 edit
Originally posted by AgergWhy is it necessary that yours is the correct ordering and not mine? If I want to assert consistency all I need is one possible consistent way, while you need to deny all of them.
But god's knowledge of what I choose to do (y) determines the function f (given that f is the choose to do blah function), which in turn restricts the domain of x
In my view the domain is not restricted at all. For some x' not equal to x then the outcome would be different. But the input is x so all God requires is the knowledge of x and f(x), not that f(x'😉 = y, for all x'.
04 Jun 10
5 edits
Originally posted by PalynkaLet me put it another way, let the range of values of x be {chocolate biscuit, fish and chips, cup of coffee, ride bicycle} Now suppose y is specified as {x| x can be chosen to be eaten} . This determines the function f, ie: f(x) = choose to eat x
Why is it necessary that yours is the correct ordering and not mine? If I want to assert consistency all I need is one possible consistent way, while you need to deny all of them.
In my view the domain is not restricted at all. For some x' not equal to x then the outcome would be different. But the input is x so all God requires is the knowledge of x and f(x), not that f(x'😉 = y, for all x'.
The domain of f has now been restricted to {chocolate biscuit, fish and chips}, now suppose y is specified by {x| x can be chosen to be eaten, and is fish and chips}, this further restricts the domain of f to {fish and chips}
04 Jun 10
2 edits
Originally posted by AgergWhy are those restrictions akin to knowledge of the image? I don't understand where you make this link.
Let me put it another way, let the range of values of x be {chocolate biscuit, fish and chips, cup of coffee, ride bicycle} Now suppose y is specified as {x| x can be chosen to be eaten} . This determines the function f, ie: f(x) = choose to eat x
The domain of f has now been restricted to {chocolate biscuit, fish and chips}, now suppose y is specified by { ...[text shortened]... to be eaten, and is fish and chips}, this further restricts the domain of f to {fish and chips}
I'm saying that it is sufficient for the knowledge of y that I know f() and x. Knowledge of these two things in no way restricts the domain of f().
Of course, if I compress f() such that f(x'😉=y for all x', then I also know that the outcome must be y. I agree, but I'm saying this is not the only possibility.
04 Jun 10
3 edits
Originally posted by PalynkaWhen you talk about y do you refer to the entire range of y or do you focus on one specific value of y? Back in omniscient God speak, I accept it is possible for some God to know all the anctions I could possibly make and for me to still be free. the problem arises when a particular outcome is known to your god. The others become irrelevant to the discussion.
Why are those restrictions akin to knowledge of the image? I don't understand where you make this link.
I'm saying that it is sufficient for the knowledge of y that I know f() and x. Knowledge of these two things in no way restricts the domain of f().
Of course, if I compress f() such that f(x'😉=y for all x', then I also know that the outcome must be y. I agree, but I'm saying this is not the only possibility.
The link I'm trying to make is that if it is infallibly known that I will choose to eat fish at time t = T, the set of things I can do at time T is suppressed, in particular, not eat fish is removed. That is to say, God infallibly knowing I will choose to do some action X explicitly denies my choice to do some other action Y which results in ~X.
Furthermore, if god knows I will choose to do U\{Y_1,...Y_m} (U some universal set) then the set of things I can choose to do is no longer freely determined by myself, it is forced so as to make the statement about god's inerrant knowledge true.
04 Jun 10
Originally posted by AgergAgain, this is not necessarily true. Infallible knowledge of your choice function and the inputs is enough to infallibly know that you'll eat fish.
The link I'm trying to make is that if it is infallibly known that I will choose to eat fish at time t = T, the set of things I can do at time T is suppressed, in particular, not eat fish is removed. That is to say, God infallibly knowing I will choose to do some action X explicitly denies my choice to do some other action Y which results in ~X.
Furthermore, ...[text shortened]... _1,...Y_m} (U some universal set) then the set of things I can choose to do is no longer free.
Do you disagree with the above statement? Can you comment on this?
When your dog is very hungry and you drop his favourite food in front of him then you know he'll eat it. Are you restricting his free will? No, you just know he's hungry and that's he's favourite food. You know the input x = (he's hungry, he has his favourite food in front of him) and you know that f((he's hungry, he has his favourite food in front of him)) = he's going to eat it.
Of course there are dimensions of information that you personally do not know (maybe he's sick) or parts of his choice function that you also are unaware of, but it's a question you knowing how he chooses, not restricting how he chooses it.
04 Jun 10
4 edits
Originally posted by PalynkaAgain, this is not necessarily true. Infallible knowledge of your choice function and the inputs is enough to infallibly know that you'll eat fish.
Again, this is not necessarily true. Infallible knowledge of your choice function and the inputs is enough to infallibly know that you'll eat fish.
Do you disagree with the above statement? Can you comment on this?
When your dog is very hungry and you drop his favourite food in front of him then you know he'll eat it. Are you restricting his free will? of, but it's a question you knowing how he chooses, not restricting how he chooses it.
Do you disagree with the above statement? Can you comment on this?
We may be operating at crossed purposes. One can feed in values of x into f to get an output y, and the value y takes differs depending on the x, I don't argue that. The claim of omniscience however is that y is already known, with the values of x and choice of f required to satisfy the relation. Other values of y (and corresponding f, x to satisfy them) are irrelevant to the discussion once y is fixed.
When your dog is very hungry and you drop his favourite food in front of him then you know he'll eat it. Are you restricting his free will? No, you just know he's hungry and that's he's favourite food. You know the input x = (he's hungry, he has his favourite food in front of him) and you know that f((he's hungry, he has his favourite food in front of him)) = he's going to eat it.
Of course there are dimensions of information that you personally do not know (maybe he's sick) or parts of his choice function that you also are unaware of, but it's a question you knowing how he chooses, not restricting how he chooses it.
If I infallibly know that my dog (let's suppose I have one) will eat dog food brand X at 18:32 (and spend 60 contiguous seconds on the eating process) then I also infallibly know it isn't going to freely choose to run off at 18:31 for a duration of 2 minutes, I infallibly know it isn't going to spend it's time eating someone else's food at any interval of time when it is 18:32, I infallibly know it isn't going to spend only 38 seconds eating it, chase it's tail for 15 seconds then resume eating X for a further 22 seconds, I infallibly know it will not respond to any coaxing by my brother to go for a walkies until the 60 seconds is up, I infallibly know etc...
The things that dog can do are restricted so as to satisfy my infallible knowledge (it may be able to freely choose other things like wag it's tail whilst eating though because I've only specified a subset of the things that dog will do). However if I infallibly know the entire collection of things that dog will do (and therefore what it will not do), the dog is no longer free.
04 Jun 10
1 edit
Originally posted by Agergthe claim of omniscience however is that y is already known, with the values of x and choice of f required to satisfy the relation.
Again, this is not necessarily true. [b]Infallible knowledge of your choice function and the inputs is enough to infallibly know that you'll eat fish.
Do you disagree with the above statement? Can you comment on this?
We may be operating at crossed purposes. One can feed in values of x into f to get an output y, and the value y takes differs dep dog will do (and therefore what it will not do), the dog is no longer free.[/b]
Again you avoid the answer and go back to your confort zone.
The quote above is false and portrays your misunderstanding of what omniscience entails. Again,give me a x and and f() and I'll tell you y. It is absolutely false that I require to restrict x or f() to know y or that x and f() are restricted to satisfy y.
Again, give me x and f() and I'll tell you y. Under no circumstance does this ability of me to tell you y restrict x or f().
04 Jun 10
5 edits
Originally posted by PalynkaI did answer your question...all of it. Moreover, what you quoted me on I didn't word correctly perhaps. I should have said "the claim of omniscience however is that y is already known. [end claim] The values of x and choice of f are then required to satisfy the relation (otherwise it fails to be true)."
[b]the claim of omniscience however is that y is already known, with the values of x and choice of f required to satisfy the relation.
Again you avoid the answer and go back to your confort zone.
The quote above is false and portrays your misunderstanding of what omniscience entails. Again,give me a x and and f() and I'll tell you y. It is absolut ...[text shortened]... 'll tell you y. Under no circumstance does this ability of me to tell you y restrict x or f().[/b]
As I understand it, "X is omniscient", that being X has knowledge of all things, is a statement that for all things possible to be known those things are known to X. The theist claim is not only that all possible choices are known, it is also a claim that a particular choice from that set is also known. If you assert some other definition then please, feel free to correct me and look over the assertions made by theists to see if there is a correlation.
Your statement "give me x and f() and I'll tell you y" fails to be an accurate reflection of this form of omniscience since there is no implication of prior knowledge of y. To answer your contention:
"It is absolutely false that I require to restrict x or f() to know y or that x and f() are restricted to satisfy y"
I am interested only in the latter part (since I agree with the first). Consider y = I will eat fish at 18:01, then with no restriction on f or x I can choose f to be the kill x at 18:00 function, and x to be myself. Is infallible knowledge of me eating fish at 18:01 satisfied by I kill myself at 18:00??? 😕
04 Jun 10
Originally posted by AgergIf you kill yourself and I predicted you'd eat fish then I would have fallible knowledge of your choice function.
As I understand it, "X is omniscient", that being X has knowledge of all things, is a statement that for all things possible to be known those things are known to X. The theist claim is not only that all possible choices are known, it is also a claim that a particular choice from that set is also known.
Your statement "give me x and f() and I'll tell you y" ...[text shortened]... infallible knowledge of me eating fish at 18:01 satisfied by I kill myself at 18:00??? 😕
Think about two worlds with a limited time span. Free will exists in the first world and it runs before the second one starts. Everything else is exactly alike. People go about in this world and make their choices because free will still requires to effectively make choices. At 12:30 of day 12, year 5 you eat some fish.
Between the two worlds I am given all the information that happened in the first world.
The second world starts, runs its course and ends. At the end of this world I am asked what happened at 12:30 of day 12, year 5. Does my knowledge that you ate fish constrain your decision in the second world? How?
04 Jun 10
1 edit
Originally posted by PalynkaIf you kill yourself and I predicted you'd eat fish then I would have fallible knowledge of your choice function.
If you kill yourself and I predicted you'd eat fish then I would have fallible knowledge of your choice function.
Think about two worlds with a limited time span. Free will exists in the first world and it runs before the second one starts. Everything else is exactly alike. People go about in this world and make their choices because free will still requi ...[text shortened]... , year 5. Does my knowledge that you ate fish constrain your decision in the second world? How?
So will you not in this instance concede, at the very least, that if it is known (infallibly) I will eat fish at 18:01, then my collection of things to choose (whether or whether not that knowledge is unknown to me) is restricted to those things that do not result in failure to eat fish at 18:01?
Think about two worlds with a limited time span. Free will exists in the first world and it runs before the second one starts. Everything else is exactly alike. People go about in this world and make their choices because free will still requires to effectively make choices. At 12:30 of day 12, year 5 you eat some fish.
Between the two worlds I am given all the information that happened in the first world.
The second world starts, runs its course and ends. At the end of this world I am asked what happened at 12:30 of day 12, year 5. Does my knowledge that you ate fish constrain your decision in the second world? How?
If I understand you correctly (correct me if I'm wrong as opposed to accusing me of dodging the question please), the second world is an identical copy of the first world (albeit running at a different time). I suppose further you talk about two identical instantiations of myself also. I refer to myself as instance 2 in world 2.
Assuming I'm understanding you so far, suppose you have information in the first world that instance 1 of me ate fish 12:30 of day 12, year 5. the choice on the part of instance 1 is free since you knew of it's fish eating after the event. As for me however, I have to satisfy the condition that both worlds are equal. If instance 1 ate fish at 12:30 of day 12, year 5 then I must also eat fish at 12:30 of day 12, year 5. When that specific time arrives I am not free to do any activity that results in failing to eat fish at 12:30 of day 12, year 5. In that sense I am not free.
04 Jun 10
2 edits
Originally posted by PalynkaHow is a choice free if not random? Where I mean non random to be there exists some invariant correlation between an action and a set of parameters (not necessarily known to anything not omniscient). If for some seed parameters, there is a corresponding action associated with it at any time t then how is there any freedom of action at t?
You see, you're not just arguing against omniscience, you're arguing that there must be randomness in choice for it to be free will. But how does free will mean if choices are ultimately random?
04 Jun 10
Originally posted by PalynkaLibertarian only; most of our theist friends don't seem to accept compatibilism.
I've missed the thread, can you tell me if you're talking about libertarian or compatibilistic free will?
I don't see omniscience being incompatible with compatibilism.
Thanks for your choice-function approach; I think that adds clarity (and brings back some distant, dim memories).