"The Funnel"

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Moreover, given God's omniscient perspective, it seems conceivable that there would be ways of acting morally which our understanding may have limited ability to comprehend, given our less than omniscient nature. In which case, trusting God and obeying God on little more than faith in the goodness or wisdom of His commands, may have potentially profound se to be made that one has the moral obligation to obey such a being based entirely on faith.

Moreover, given God's omniscient perspective, it seems conceivable that there would be ways of acting morally which our understanding may have limited ability to comprehend, given our less than omniscient nature.

Yes, that's conceivable. This is trivial, since if by supposition X is omniscient and Y is not, then it will follow that it is conceivable that X will comprehend stuff Y will not. Again, this is trivial.

In which case, trusting God and obeying God on little more than faith in the goodness or wisdom of His commands, may have potentially profounder benefits than acting according to one's limited grasp of God's larger picture. If so, there might even be a case to be made that one has the moral obligation to obey such a being based entirely on faith.

I'd like to see such a case. I am not sure it would survive scrutiny, but I would be interested to hear it.

Of course, if God exists and if there are important moral facts simply beyond our ability to grasp; then God presumably would have only himself to blame for our ignorance of such things.

Originally posted by LemonJello
My charge of incoherency toward KJ's position has nothing to do with such considerations. Sure, there could always be conditions under which one may justifiably defer to the recommendations of a putative expert; or try to emulate someone worthy of being emulated. That is irrelevant to what I see as the inconsistency in KJ's position.

You're missing t Big whoop. This has no meta-ethical implication as far as I can tell.

Relatedly, you do not get to imply on one hand that God is a moral being worthy of being emulated; and then imply on the other hand that morality somehow does not pertain or have relevance to God. Make up your mind! Either God is putatively your moral exemplar, or else morality does not apply to Him. Or neither; but can't be both.

Isn't this a false dichotomy? Take the Christian God, for example. Three persons; one substance. Isn't it possible for a Trinity to be simultaneously transcendent and immanent? Isn't it possible for God the Father to be wholly beyond the moral domain, while God the Son walks among mortal men serving as both Savior and moral exemplar? I'm sure you consider such things ridiculous, but nevertheless you must admit they are, at least, possible. And if they are possible, then there's no reason to think that I must accept the dilemma you pose.

She comes to understand that she ought to do this or that not merely because her parents tell her to, but because there are good, worthy practical reasons that undergird her doing so and align with her own values.

It is a good point and you make it well.

This basically says that God is just really smart and astute at picking out moral facts and is therefore a good source of moral knowledge. Big whoop. This has no meta-ethical implication as far as I can tell.

Not just "really smart" and not just a "good source" of moral knowledge -- the best. And not only "the best" as far as people go, but "the best" due to the fact that God has infinite knowledge. If such a being exists, would it not be in one's best interest to appeal to him above all others? Someone goes to graduate school for a measly four years and writes a dissertation and we appeal to her expertise, right? Wouldn't it be even more appropriate in God's case to appeal to his?

Is there a moral dimension in this scenario: A student is writing a paper defending some political point of view. While doing research he discovers that a recognized authority forcefully and convincingly shows that his viewpoint lacks necessary justification. Unwilling to relinquish his viewpoint because too much of his ego is invested in its being correct, he finds a lesser scholar's work to cite in addition to various other non-experts. Would we agree that the student failed in some fashion morally? In the same way, aren't we morally obligated to consult the highest authority, God, on moral matters, especially when we are tempted to settle for less rigorous or less inspired alternatives?

I get your point regarding the importance of learning how to think critically and make moral judgments with proper justification, but why can't this sort of moral maturity go hand in hand with a cooperative relationship with a Higher Authority? I'm currently taking a course on Shakespeare and my professor asks us our own, non-expert, opinions on the meaning of certain passages. We get some things right, sometimes our answers are quite insightful and laudable, and other times we just get things all wrong (failing to understand contextual cues, the old meanings of certain words and phrases, etc.). Why couldn't someone have a similar relationship with God? God knows the context of every event, beyond the limit of our capacity, so why not appeal to him for the necessary insight?

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Moreover, given God's omniscient perspective, it seems conceivable that there would be ways of acting morally which our understanding may have limited ability to comprehend, given our less than omniscient nature.

Yes, that's conceivable. This is trivial, since if by supposition X is omniscient and Y is not, then it will follow that it is concei ...[text shortened]... asp; then God presumably would have only himself to blame for our ignorance of such things.[/b]

Of course, if God exists and if there are important moral facts simply beyond our ability to grasp; then God presumably would have only himself to blame for our ignorance of such things.

Not necessarily so. For one, if there are facts beyond our ability to grasp, connections and so forth only an infinite being could grasp, why think that God could cure our ignorance of such things even if he desired to? Unless, of course, we are assuming that God has the power to replicate himself... Secondly, it is possible that our ignorance is a by-product of free will, in which case it wouldn't make sense to blame God for it.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Moreover, given God's omniscient perspective, it seems conceivable that there would be ways of acting morally which our understanding may have limited ability to comprehend, given our less than omniscient nature.

Yes, that's conceivable. This is trivial, since if by supposition X is omniscient and Y is not, then it will follow that it is concei asp; then God presumably would have only himself to blame for our ignorance of such things.[/b]

People tend to want to hear what they want to hear, they tend to hang with
those they agree with bad mouth, put down, and dismiss those they do not
agree with. I think having eyes that see and ears that hear is actually a hard
thing since we cloud our vision with our wants, desires, and so on. We do not
hear a lot of things, because we don't want to, it easier that way. So I do not
think God will have Himself to blame for our ignorance, we will run from that
which we don't want to see or hear incase it requires something from us, that
than will be on us not God. Which is why I think God prefers that which is real
over our pretence, pretence because its fake has no part of reality other than
clouding it with lies.
Kelly

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Relatedly, you do not get to imply on one hand that God is a moral being worthy of being emulated; and then imply on the other hand that morality somehow does not pertain or have relevance to God. Make up your mind! Either God is putatively your moral exemplar, or else morality does not apply to Him. Or neither; but can't be both.

Isn't this a limit of our capacity, so why not appeal to him for the necessary insight?[/b]

Isn't this a false dichotomy? Take the Christian God, for example. Three persons; one substance. Isn't it possible for a Trinity to be simultaneously transcendent and immanent? Isn't it possible for God the Father to be wholly beyond the moral domain, while God the Son walks among mortal men serving as both Savior and moral exemplar? I'm sure you consider such things ridiculous, but nevertheless you must admit they are, at least, possible. And if they are possible, then there's no reason to think that I must accept the dilemma you pose.

No, I think you still have a problem. So you claim that the Christian God is in fact 3 distinct persons? What is it exactly; the mereological sum of the three? Whatever floats your boat. But let's be clear, then. You're saying that moral talk applies to Jesus, but not to the Father (and it's not clear if you think it applies to whatever the third person is). Fine. Then by your own lights moral terms such as 'good' can be ascribed to Jesus; but cannot be ascribed to the Father or 'God' taken as the whole 3-layer burrito. I would ask you to remain faithful to this in all our discussions moving forward.

Not just "really smart" and not just a "good source" of moral knowledge -- the best. And not only "the best" as far as people go, but "the best" due to the fact that God has infinite knowledge. If such a being exists, would it not be in one's best interest to appeal to him above all others?

You mean specifically Jesus, right? 'God' generally is beyond moral talk, according to you, remember? I'll overlook this for now.

At any rate, I do not think you have been paying attention, since I already addressed these points explicitly. Again, my problem with divine command (and specifically as it relates to my charge of inconsistency with the associated views KJ has expressed in this forum) does not have anything to do with the claim that one can justifiably defer to the moral judgments of God. It has to do with the claim that the divine will relates materially to the actual determination of moral status. The idea that God has infinite knowledge and others can look to him for moral guidance has NO resemblance to a claim such as that God's judging some act to have some particular moral status is explanatorily prior to that act's having that moral status. You keep going on and on about the former claim, but I have already made it explicitly clear that my problem is with the latter. I am not interested in the former here because it is still compatible with the idea that God is, at the end of the day, totally irrelevant/inessential to the actual constitutive nature of morals. Your claim is no more interesting in this regard than if I claimed that my next door neighbor is really, really smart and hence we have reason to take his judgments very seriously. In the context of my charge against KellyJay: big frickin' deal!

While doing research he discovers that a recognized authority forcefully and convincingly shows that his viewpoint lacks necessary justification. Unwilling to relinquish his viewpoint because too much of his ego is invested in its being correct, he finds a lesser scholar's work to cite in addition to various other non-experts. Would we agree that the student failed in some fashion morally? In the same way, aren't we morally obligated to consult the highest authority, God, on moral matters, especially when we are tempted to settle for less rigorous or less inspired alternatives?

Your example fails to be apt in the current context. The substance of your earlier claim (the one you said a case could potentially be made for) was that one has a moral obligation to obey God on faith, purportedly because it is conceivable that there are ways of acting morally that God comprehends but that we do not, given our limited status as cognizers. This example of yours has absolutely nothing to do with taking anything on faith. When you discover a forceful and convincing demonstration that your view is lacking, exactly what faith is required here to understand that you are obligated to revise your view?

See, this underlines exactly the source of one of your major problems. God, even in His omnipotence, is in no position to forcefully and convincingly demonstrate to you something of which has the property both (1) God can comprehend it and (2) you cannot! (Unless He were to, for example, give us greater ability to comprehend; which He could do, but that simply defeats the point of your argument.) Your earlier claim was that a case could be made that one has an obligation to take stuff on faith. So what's all this crap about forceful and convincing explication?

I get your point regarding the importance of learning how to think critically and make moral judgments with proper justification, but why can't this sort of moral maturity go hand in hand with a cooperative relationship with a Higher Authority?

I never said that it could not. What I implied cannot go hand in hand are (1) a view like divine command, which I take to include a claim that morals depend constitutively on the divine will (not merely your construal that it can be justified for one to defer to the divine judgment, which as an aside I do not find to be a very proper construal) and (2) moral development and autonomous maturation. Again, the reason I claim that these cannot go hand in hand is the following. Moral development and autonomous maturation require one to have more and more understanding and access of substantive reasons and justifiers underlying one's action; and this is precisely something that undermines the view of divine command per above, since it undermines the idea that the divine will is explanatorily prior to the status of those actions. After all, if there are independent reasons that explain the moral status of some action, then that thereby defeats the idea that the moral status of the action is explained by the divine will.

If you jettison the idea that morals depend constitutively on God (recall that your own construal of divine command has nothing to do with such a claim), then this problem dissolves.

To put this in simple terms, I am quite sure that one can mature just fine while holding the view that he can justifiably look to God for moral guidance (after all, children often develop just fine while holding the same view of their parents); but I deny that one can mature just fine while holding the view that the moral status of his actions are determined by the commands of some putative authority.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Of course, if God exists and if there are important moral facts simply beyond our ability to grasp; then God presumably would have only himself to blame for our ignorance of such things.

Not necessarily so. For one, if there are facts beyond our ability to grasp, connections and so forth only an infinite being could grasp, why think that God c ...[text shortened]... norance is a by-product of free will, in which case it wouldn't make sense to blame God for it.[/b]

For one, if there are facts beyond our ability to grasp, connections and so forth only an infinite being could grasp, why think that God could cure our ignorance of such things even if he desired to? Unless, of course, we are assuming that God has the power to replicate himself...

Gee, isn't God supposed to be omnipotent? And I have no idea why you think that in order to give us greater ability to comprehend morality, it would require God to have the power to replicate himself. That's a head-scratcher.

Secondly, it is possible that our ignorance is a by-product of free will, in which case it wouldn't make sense to blame God for it.

Well, I'm pretty sure that even if it were possible, it would still be outrageously implausible. Do you want to flesh this out more to try to convince me otherwise?

Originally posted by KellyJay
People tend to want to hear what they want to hear, they tend to hang with
those they agree with bad mouth, put down, and dismiss those they do not
agree with. I think having eyes that see and ears that hear is actually a hard
thing since we cloud our vision with our wants, desires, and so on. We do not
hear a lot of things, because we don't want to, it ...[text shortened]... ce, pretence because its fake has no part of reality other than
clouding it with lies.
Kelly

This argument does not make sense to me.

You claim that we run from things that we do not want to face up to. And that's why, you claim, God is not responsible for our ignorance. Well, that doesn't make any sense because people who run from things they do not want to face are not ignorant in this context: they have the knowledge of those things, they just do not want to own up to it. My claim to epiphinehas about God's being responsible for our ignorance was in regards to things that we would be truly ignorant of (because of our putative inability to comprehend them in the first place), not things that we know about but from which we run.

Originally posted by LemonJello
This argument does not make sense to me.

You claim that we run from things that we do not want to face up to. And that's why, you claim, God is not responsible for our ignorance. Well, that doesn't make any sense because people who run from things they do not want to face are not ignorant in this context: they have the knowledge of those things, they ...[text shortened]... to comprehend them in the first place), not things that we know about but from which we run.

I never said God was responsible for our ignorance, I said we tend to look at
what we want the way we want to, that is on us. You can look at people who want
to think their views are the majority or the only ones that are correct...simply
reject all views that do not line up with yours as some how less than, so you can with
out a doubt avoid all possible arguments that would show you as wrong. If you
don't want to accept the guy you want to vote in office is the wrong guy, only
believe those that speak highly of him and reject those that do not. It isn't that
the truth isn't all around it is that we tend to put on our rose colored stain glass,
glasses to view it. If we see ourselves for what we are, we can write that off as
to being tired, they asked for it, or justify ourselves in some other fashion other
than accept we are indeed someone who will act out badly from time to time.
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
I never said God was responsible for our ignorance, I said we tend to look at
what we want the way we want to, that is on us. You can look at people who want
to think their views are the majority or the only ones that are correct...simply
reject all views that do not line up with yours as some how less than, so you can with
out a doubt avoid all possibl ion other
than accept we are indeed someone who will act out badly from time to time.
Kelly

I never said God was responsible for our ignorance

I know. Where did I claim you did? 🙄 In fact, what I claimed is that you argued for just the opposite! But I also claimed that your argument didn't make any sense in context.

Again, the claim I made to epiphinehas (that if there are important moral facts that we are simply incapable of comprehending then God should have no one to blame for that but Himself) was in regards to things about which we are truly ignorant, because of our putative inability to comprehend them in the first place. What you are talking about is not relevant to this case. You're talking about cases in which a person comprehends some argument that is countervailing toward his own view, and then chooses (perhaps with some irresponsibility on his part) to ignore or reject that view so that he can cling to his own view. These cases have nothing to do with my claim toward epiphinehas. To be perfectly clear: I am not claiming that God is responsible for our actions in such cases as what you bring up. They are irrelevant with respect to my earlier claim.

Originally posted by KellyJay
I never said God was responsible for our ignorance, I said we tend to look at
what we want the way we want to, that is on us. You can look at people who want
to think their views are the majority or the only ones that are correct...simply
reject all views that do not line up with yours as some how less than, so you can with
out a doubt avoid all possibl ...[text shortened]... ion other
than accept we are indeed someone who will act out badly from time to time.
Kelly

By the way, it appears that our friend epiphinehas made the same basic error as yourself. If you look closely, he also tried to justify his arguments by citing an example in which one is presented with a "forceful" and "convincing" demonstration of the need to amend his views and then willfully refuses to do so because, basically, his "ego" is too big. As I already pointed out, this example has NOTHING to do with his previous claims, so you guys are both confused big time. Seriously, is this how you guys view the human race? Is this how you view atheists? Do you think we are all just balls of throbbing ego, beating our chest at the skies? You guys need to wake up.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Isn't this a false dichotomy? Take the Christian God, for example. Three persons; one substance. Isn't it possible for a Trinity to be simultaneously transcendent and immanent? Isn't it possible for God the Father to be wholly beyond the moral domain, while God the Son walks among mortal men serving as both Savior and moral exemplar? I'm sure you tions are determined by the commands of some putative authority.

Then by your own lights moral terms such as 'good' can be ascribed to Jesus; but cannot be ascribed to the Father or 'God' taken as the whole 3-layer burrito. I would ask you to remain faithful to this in all our discussions moving forward.

God is ineffable. I suppose there are many words that we might use to describe him. I also suppose that not one of those words would be found sufficient. I have no problem remaining faithful to the idea that God is beyond comprehending. Frankly, I'd be disappointed if he weren't.

I am not interested in the former here because it is still compatible with the idea that God is, at the end of the day, totally irrelevant/inessential to the actual constitutive nature of morals.

What about the obligation to act morally? Yes, we can determine what is right and wrong without the help of a Higher Power, but once we determine the right course of action, what establishes the obligation to act accordingly? Why shouldn't I just pursue my own selfish ends? Can God play any part in this aspect of the moral life?

When you discover a forceful and convincing demonstration that your view is lacking, exactly what faith is required here to understand that you are obligated to revise your view?

I was making an analogy based on the scholarly practice of appealing to the judgment of an expert. If God's mind puts Einstein and Newton to shame, wasn't Abraham justified in obeying, even though he couldn't understand what possible good would come of it? The Lord of the Universe, the creator of light and the laws of physics, should be a title of some import...

I have in mind someone like Abraham, who didn't understand God's plan, but nevertheless obeyed on faith. God asked him to slay his own son. He obeyed, even though it meant doing something he didn't understand the significance of. In the end, of course, Abraham's act prophesied the future Messiah and God blessed his descendants.

The revision of one's view must precede the act of faith; namely, the view that you must be or can be privy to all knowledge, and the view that your own judgments are adequate without, or superior to, God's. Obviously, if Abraham didn't trust God, he wouldn't have gone through with the killing of his beloved son.

So, practically speaking, what is the difference between my view and the divine command theory KellyJay is championing? I'm probably wrong, but it doesn't seem like there's a whole lot of difference. If I trust God because of his credentials, and do whatever he tells me to do because God said so, am I doing anything different than KellyJay would do, who imagines that God is the one who determines right and wrong? In both cases, aren't we acting on God's authority?

Originally posted by epiphinehas
What about the obligation to act morally? Yes, we can determine what is right and wrong without the help of a Higher Power, but once we determine the right course of action, what establishes the obligation to act accordingly? Why shouldn't I just pursue my own selfish ends? Can God play any part in this aspect of the moral life?

I see this as one of the most popular mistakes by theists. The answer is simple. What you do is up to you. If you really want to be good, you can be. You don't need to invent reasons for doing so. However it seems many theist feel the need to have a reason for being good - even though they want to be good in the first place.
More commonly though theists feel the need for a reason for others to be good. ie they need God to keep others under control. This is also one of the reasons theists are feel threatened by atheists more than they do by members of other religions.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
I was making an analogy based on the scholarly practice of appealing to the judgment of an expert.

The problem is this contradicts the claim that our own judgement is guaranteed to be flawed. If an expert is escapable of at least some unflawed judgement then we too should to a lesser degree be capable of some unflawed judgement.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Then by your own lights moral terms such as 'good' can be ascribed to Jesus; but cannot be ascribed to the Father or 'God' taken as the whole 3-layer burrito. I would ask you to remain faithful to this in all our discussions moving forward.

God is ineffable. I suppose there are many words that we might use to describe him. I also suppose that ...[text shortened]... nes right and wrong? In both cases, aren't we acting on God's authority?[/b]

God is ineffable.

Then the worst disservice you can do to him is to try to describe him any further than that. If you feed me any more lines that purport to describe him (as loving or good or morally exemplary or anything else for that matter), then I will know to assign them no actual propositional content. I will take such utterances to function only in some conative, affective capacity, and nothing more. Which is fine.

Surely you do understand why the idea that you have as your moral exemplar an entity that is beyond your comprehension is, prima facie, incoherent. You can release the tension, but only if you dig much, much deeper. I recall some past thread where Conrau K articulated such a hypothetical position very effectively, but I have no idea where that thread is off the top of my head.

once we determine the right course of action, what establishes the obligation to act accordingly? Why shouldn't I just pursue my own selfish ends? Can God play any part in this aspect of the moral life?

I do not really understand your question. If, suppose, there is a very good or even overwhelming set of reasons, R, that dictates to us that the right course of action is A; then, supposing that we have an obligation to A, why would the thing that "establishes" this obligation be anything other than R?

At first pass, I would also say that what you bring up here has to do with rationality. Do you agree that a person who is fully rational would upon judging some course of action to be the correct or warranted one, form the intention to act accordingly; and upon judging some course of action to be the incorrect or unwarranted one, not form the intention to so act? If one understands that a particular course of action is called for and yet fails to form the intention to so act, then that signals irrationality. Same goes for the person who forms the intention to act in a manner that contradicts what he judges to be the right course of action. To attend to your own selfish ends when this contradicts what you know to be the right course of action is an exercise in irrationality.

I would suppose that 'God', even an ineffable one, could play many parts here in fortifying your ability to act rationally. But what God certainly cannot do is "establish" your moral obligations through fiat. Obligations cannot really arise through fiat. For one thing, it contradicts the idea that obligations bind agents regardless of their attitudes toward those obligations. For two, it reduces obligations to arbitrarity. Consider the following dilemma. Suppose that God declares that we have the obligation to A. Either there are reasons, in virtue of which we ought to A, that undergird this declaration; or not. If so, then it is those reasons that explain why our A-ing is morally obligatory, not the incidental fact that God declared it to be so; if not, then God's declaration is simply arbitrary, and there are no good reasons for it and he may as well have not made the declaration in the first place.

I have in mind someone like Abraham, who didn't understand God's plan, but nevertheless obeyed on faith. God asked him to slay his own son. He obeyed, even though it meant doing something he didn't understand the significance of. In the end, of course, Abraham's act prophesied the future Messiah and God blessed his descendants.

You're telling me that Abraham didn't understand the significance of taking the life of another person? Most adults I know can understand the significance of murdering another person, in the form of the mountain of reasons and considerations that recommend against doing that kind of thing. There are generally a host of reasons why murdering another person is not a right course of action, so it's hard for me to believe that Abraham would be ignorant of them all. Face it, you cannot say that it meant his doing something he didn't understand the significance of. On the contrary, it meant his doing something he had mountains of good reasons against. No wonder, then, that God in his infinite wisdom didn't let Abraham actually go through with it.

I have seen countless different interpretations of this story. They differ in many respects, including about what was actually the content of Abraham's intention that he formed. If you're claiming that on the basis of God's command, Abraham formed the actual intention to slay his son, then I think it's a relatively simple case. Emphatically in that case, no Abraham was not justified; and he acted irrationally. That is just a stunning example of the stunted moral development that goes hand-in-hand with divine command. The idea that your reasons are strictly determined by the commands of a putative authority, in spite of your own basic intuitions and obvious considerations otherwise at your disposal, is as utterly puerile as it gets.

At this point, let's take stock of this argument of yours. You started with the thesis that a potential case can be made for the idea that one can be morally obligated to obey God on faith alone, putatively because it is conceivable that there are things God comprehends but that you do not. In defense of this, you have presented two examples. Both examples are shockingly terrible in defense of the original thesis. Regarding the first example (that of an egoistic scholar who comprehends some countervailing account and yet refuses to amend his view), it has absolutely nothing to do with taking something on faith when you otherwise cannot comprehend it. On the contrary, it has to do with revising (of failure thereof) your position when you know you have good reasons to do so. The second example (that of Abraham) shows absolutely nothing about one being morally obligated to take anything on faith. It only shows that there are conceivable instances where one can take something on faith that amounts to forming the intention to do something he knows is wrong in a stunning example of moral impairment and irrationality. What exactly are you claiming was the moral obligation on the part of Abraham here?

The revision of one's view must precede the act of faith; namely, the view that you must be or can be privy to all knowledge, and the view that your own judgments are adequate without, or superior to, God's.

I'm not sure I understand. You're claiming that abandoning the idea that your judgments are adequate is requisite for faith?

Obviously, if Abraham didn't trust God, he wouldn't have gone through with the killing of his beloved son.

Again, if you're claiming that Abraham formed the actual intention to slay his son, then it can only be deemed a good thing that Abraham wasn't successful in that regard. What about this is supposed to help your claim that one can have a moral obligation to take stuff on faith? All the example shows is that faith promotes irrationality.

So, practically speaking, what is the difference between my view and the divine command theory KellyJay is championing?

I guess you just keep missing this point over and over: I wasn't objecting to the practical dimensions of KJ's view (in fact, I was not presuming to address them at all); I was objecting to the meta-ethical dimensions. I apologize if this was not clear in my post to KJ, but I have mentioned this point of clarification several times since then. Not sure how many ways I can make the point.