06 Dec 06
Originally posted by knightmeisterUnless you believe in parallel universes then the universe has only one time line. Are you claiming this is not the case?
And it is precisely the idea that universe is absolutely predestined that I am challenging. Your argument is logical if you assume, without question , that the ONLY way God can know the future is that it is predestined to be that way .
HOWEVER , it is precisely this premise I dispute becuase I think an eternal being doesn't have to rely on pre des ...[text shortened]... and if he does it may look radically different from ours , but he would still be free of ours.
I am not making any premises about how God knows the universes time line but only that he does.
If God is external to the universe (a requirement if he created it), then when he created it he would have known the full history of the universe. He therefore preordained that history by the act of creating it, thus predestination.
I know I am probably using the phrase 'time line' incorrectly but I think you get my meaning.
06 Dec 06
Originally posted by bbarrYour argument disproves free will in a libertarian sense given God's omniscience, not so?
Not that I agree with it, but here is an argument that (I think) captures the point:
1) Suppose God is omniscient.
2) Then, necessarily, God knows all true propositions.
3) The following proposition (P) is either true or false: "bbarr will make coffee at time T".
4) Suppose P is true.
5) Then, necessarily, God knows that bbarr will make coffee at ...[text shortened]... e a theist and a compatibilist about free will you have nothing to fear from this argument.
That much I would concede (although there could be something said about how God's omniscience may be derived from his transcendence of time, rather than His prediction of a given action). However, as you’ve shown, this is not a dilemma of either purely libertarian free will or predestination in the hyper-Calvinistic sense that twhitehead seems to be implying here.
06 Dec 06
Originally posted by MoritsuneThe fact that one possibility MUST be chosen by all-knowing predetermination, cancelling all other possible options doesn't seem that hard to understand.
The fact that one possibility MUST be chosen by all-knowing predetermination, cancelling all other possible options doesn't seem that hard to understand.
I don't know if an equation is needed but, correct me if I'm wrong Halitose.
You're missing the nuance; and therein lies the rub:
…one possibility WILL be chosen.
Foreknowledge does not necessitate determinism and is consistent with compatibilism.
06 Dec 06
1 edit
Originally posted by spruce112358I think the weakness in my argument (and hence in yours) is that it assumes a temporally-bound omniscient agent, i.e. a God who predicts.
How about this:
God is said to have created man and given him free will. But what is free will? I claim that free will is the ability to take an action X such that the probability that I will take that action is not 100%. This means that there is always the chance that I will not act as predicted. The proof is this that if the probability that I take f these concepts are MAN's speculation about God -- not what God has revealed about himself.
Edit: Point taken, though.
06 Dec 06
Originally posted by twhiteheadNot quite. Essentially the thrust of my argument was that the prediction didn't restrain the choice, but purely reflected it (almost in a tautological fashion).
So you are claiming that even though it has been predicted that A will do X at time T and the prediction is correct that A might still do Y or Z?
"Prediction" is being reconsidered as it entails temporal baggage.
06 Dec 06
2 edits
Originally posted by bbarr1) Suppose God is omniscient.
Not that I agree with it, but here is an argument that (I think) captures the point:
1) Suppose God is omniscient.
2) Then, necessarily, God knows all true propositions.
3) The following proposition (P) is either true or false: "bbarr will make coffee at time T".
4) Suppose P is true.
5) Then, necessarily, God knows that bbarr will make coffee at e a theist and a compatibilist about free will you have nothing to fear from this argument.
2) Then, necessarily, God knows all true propositions.
Not that I agree with that (e.g. what about propositions of the type, "God does not know this proposition is false" etc.), but let's go on.
3) The following proposition (P) is either true or false: "bbarr will make coffee at time T".
Okay.
4) Suppose P is true.
5) Then, necessarily, God knows that bbarr will make coffee at time T.
Okay. But all this means is that
(5) = AND(P,C2,C3)
C2: God believes P is true
C3: God has good justification for believing P is true
6) Hence, it is logically impossible for it not to be the case that bbarr will make coffee at time T.
Now this is where I think something's wrong.
First of all, (6) depends only on (4) and not (5) (clearly neither C2 nor C3 listed above has any impact on the truth of (6) -- indeed, causally, one can see it's the other way around). So, one could just take out all the propositions relating to God out of your argument:
3) The following proposition (P) is either true or false: "bbarr will make coffee at time T".
4) Suppose P is true.
6) Hence, it is logically impossible for it not to be the case that bbarr will make coffee at time T.
7) Hence, it is logically impossible for bbarr to choose not to make coffee at time T.
8) But if it is not within bbarr's power to choose not to make coffee at time T, then bbarr's choice to make coffee at time T is not truly free.
9) So, bbarr's choice to make coffee at time T is not truly free.
It has nothing to do with God or predestination.
Second, you're essentially saying that, given P1 and P2:
(P1) P is true
(P2) It is 'logically impossible' that P is false
(C) P1 => P2
or P is true => ~P is logically impossible
Do you see the problem here? If (C) were true, then (C'😉 below should also be true:
(C'😉 ~P2 => ~P1
or Q is logically possible => Q is false
which, I think, is not what you wanted to say.
06 Dec 06
Originally posted by twhiteheadwhen he created it he would have known the full history of the universe. He therefore preordained that history by the act of creating it, thus predestination.
Unless you believe in parallel universes then the universe has only one time line. Are you claiming this is not the case?
I am not making any premises about how God knows the universes time line but only that he does.
If God is external to the universe (a requirement if he created it), then when he created it he would have known the full history of the ...[text shortened]...
I know I am probably using the phrase 'time line' incorrectly but I think you get my meaning.
NOT if the way he knew the history is because he could watch it unfold from the future and the past simultaneously and NOT if he created it with some free will in it. He doesn't have to "preordain" anything to know , it's not essential. He knows the timeline alright just like you know the timeline of world war 2 , but how does that prove that the outcome of ww2 was inevitable?
09 Dec 06
god is the collective and we as individuals are parts of the whole (god), hence we are made in his image and likeness and have his ability to create / manifest, just look around and see what we have created and can create, even life. God does not judge he merely observes, and the entire creation has guiding principles which even god adheres to ie cause and effect, as our scientist look at it " Each and every action has an equal and opposite reaction" eastern religions look at it as "kharma" western religions look at it as " Do unto others what you would have them do unto you" so on and so on.
nothing in this world is either good or bad, it just is, its you thinking on the topic that determines if it is good or bad ie a couple hundred years ago, given certain circumstances it was considered the right thing to do to burn a woman at the stake, today no circumstance justifies such and act, yet nothing has change with the actual act just our thinking on it has changed. hence the biblical phrase " as you believe so shall it be"
09 Dec 06
Originally posted by lucifershammer3) The following proposition (P) is either true or false: "bbarr will make coffee at time T".
[b]1) Suppose God is omniscient.
2) Then, necessarily, God knows all true propositions.
Not that I agree with that (e.g. what about propositions of the type, "God does not know this proposition is false" etc.), but let's go on.
3) The following proposition (P) is either true or false: "bbarr will make coffee at time T".
Okay. ...[text shortened]... ly possible => Q is false[/b]
which, I think, is not what you wanted to say.[/b]
How about the proposition that" bbarr WILL/HAS make/made coffee at time T ?
But how , you may ask , can something know someone's future but know it as their past all at the same time? For that you need eternity and a non time trapped God.
06 Jan 07
Originally posted by lucifershammerNice post, LH. I agree with your objections in total. However, many similar formulations of fatalism try to establish a sort of necessity that is not logical necessity (even though the formulations may be referred to as 'logical fatalism'😉. For example, see ** near the beginning where the author argues for an "inevitability" that is related to the correspondence theory of truth. The idea being roughly that if P (which is temporally indexed to the future) is true now, then the world is already as such; and that what is, necessarily is when it is; together, these are thought by some to establish a sort of necessity that precludes libertarian free will.
[b]1) Suppose God is omniscient.
2) Then, necessarily, God knows all true propositions.
Not that I agree with that (e.g. what about propositions of the type, "God does not know this proposition is false" etc.), but let's go on.
3) The following proposition (P) is either true or false: "bbarr will make coffee at time T".
Okay. ...[text shortened]... ly possible => Q is false[/b]
which, I think, is not what you wanted to say.[/b]
But, also, check out Thread 59719, where I outline another different form of fatalism. I'd be interested in what you think about it.
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** http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/#1
06 Jan 07
Originally posted by lucifershammerThe biggest problem with bbarr's formula is its perspective. While his 'logically impossibility' is presumed to be prior to the coffee making, in actuality, his perspective is decidedly after the event.
1) Suppose God is omniscient.
2) Then, necessarily, God knows all true propositions.
Not that I agree with that (e.g. what about propositions of the type, "God does not know this proposition is false" etc.), but let's go on.
3) The following proposition (P) is either true or false: "bbarr will make coffee at time T".
Okay.
...[text shortened]... ly possible => Q is false[/b]
which, I think, is not what you wanted to say.[/b]
Seeing time in a linear fashion (like we have much of a choice), makes it problematic to conceptualize God's perspective of time (all actualities as certain). In bbarr's formula, the only ingredient that makes P true is its actual occurance in time... at least as far as we can see. God knows the actual and the possible prior to even the beginning of time. His knowledge is not subject to development as is ours.
He cannot both characterize the event as 'going to happen,' and 'already happened.' It is either one or the other. In the case of 'going to happen,' bbarr is free to act or not. Once he has acted, his freedom for that act has been selected, unable to be selected again--- except in the future again. What makes it free is the tense, which bbarr's formula has mixed around to such a degree as to render the proposition meaningless.
07 Jan 07
Originally posted by lucifershammerIsn't the crux of the theological argument for fatalism something like the following?
[b]1) Suppose God is omniscient.
2) Then, necessarily, God knows all true propositions.
Not that I agree with that (e.g. what about propositions of the type, "God does not know this proposition is false" etc.), but let's go on.
3) The following proposition (P) is either true or false: "bbarr will make coffee at time T".
Okay. ...[text shortened]... ly possible => Q is false[/b]
which, I think, is not what you wanted to say.[/b]
If a future voluntary act can be known to occur with certainty--a cognizance that God is supposed to have--then the only way for this to be true is if that act cannot possibly not occur. Otherwise, how could the voluntary act be known to occur with certainty? Only the inevitability of the act's occurrence guarantees the possibility of zero doubt on God's part as regards its future occurrence. But if the act is inevitable, then although the agent has a feeling that they can, if they so wish, not perform that act, they must in fact perform it; hence, the agent's feeling of having more than one choice of act available to them is illusory.
08 Jan 07
5 edits
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeI think LH before was partly just making the following observation. Considering the two statements:
Isn't the crux of the theological argument for fatalism something like the following?
If a future voluntary act can be known to occur with certainty--a cognizance that God is supposed to have--then the only way for this to be true is if that act cannot possibly not occur. Otherwise, how could the voluntary act be known to occur with cer n ce, the agent's feeling of having more than one choice of act available to them is illusory.
A. Necessarily, if God knows bbarr will make coffee at time T, then bbarr will make coffee at time T.
B. If God knows bbarr will make coffee at time T, then it is necessary that bbarr will make coffee at time T.
I think LH was saying that the previous argument rests not on A (which is true), but on B (which generally isn't true). (Well, LH was also pointing out that, in B, it would not be accurate to say that this necessity is 'logical necessity'.)
--------------------------------
However, I think you're right here. If God's foreknowledge is infallible, then I think there's a problem. I would argue that B' below then holds:
B'. If God infallibly knows bbarr will make coffee at time T, then it is necessary that bbarr will make coffee at time T.
bbarr's making coffee would be necessary in the sense that it is not possible for bbarr to do otherwise (because in this case, God's knowing occurs in a way that cannot possibly be mistaken).
08 Jan 07
Originally posted by LemonJelloFirst of all, what does 'infallible foreknowledge' mean?
However, I think you're right here. If God's foreknowledge is infallible, then I think there's a problem. I would argue that B' below then holds:
B'. If God infallibly knows bbarr will make coffee at time T, then it is necessary that bbarr will make coffee at time T.
bbarr's making coffee would be necessary in the sense that it is n ...[text shortened]... e (because in this case, God's knowing occurs in a way that cannot possibly be mistaken).
If X knows P then P is true. As I said earlier, the statement
(C) X knows P
is just the conjunction of
(C1) P is true
(C2) X believes P
(C3) X is justified in believing P
Now, infallibility generally means something like "free from error". How does it apply to C1--C3 above?
08 Jan 07
1 edit
Originally posted by lucifershammer"Free from error" is too ambiguous I think. As you correctly point out, propositional truth is necessary for knowledge. In that sense, all knowledge is "free from error", and yet probably very little, if any, of that knowledge is infallible. I would say that infallibility is far stronger than freedom from error – it's more like freedom from even the possibility of error.
First of all, what does 'infallible foreknowledge' mean?
If X knows P then P is true. As I said earlier, the statement
(C) X knows P
is just the conjunction of
(C1) P is true
(C2) X believes P
(C3) X is justified in believing P
Now, infallibility generally means something like "free from error". How does it apply to C1--C3 above?
But, OK, I think I see now where my earlier thinking (at the end of my previous post) is wrong:
I would say infallibility only directly affects (C3). I think (C3) would need to be modified something like the following:
(C3). X is justified in believing P and this justification is such that it precludes the possibility of epistemic error.
It's hard for me to figure out what such justification would be like (apart from knowledge of propositions that are logically necessary in the first place, like tautologies or analytic truths). But I think I see now why I was mistaken. Before, I was arguing essentially that if God infallibly knows P, then in all possible worlds it is true that P. But now I see this is false, since infallibility here does not say anything about the content of P beyond that it is true (it doesn't alter your C1); rather it just says something about the epistemic process.
So – after all – I think I'm inclined to agree with an earlier thesis of yours that fatalist arguments are essentially smoke and mirrors (even if I were to agree with the idea that alternate possibilities are necessary for free action). I think arguments for logical fatalism fail predominantly for the reason you cited (the move from P is true to P is necessary). Concerning the argument for theological fatalism that I posted in the other thread, I see it as a fundamentally different argument, but I think it fails too (for reasons I cite in that thread).