01 Mar 12
Originally posted by FreakyKBHBecause each category of will is sovereign, there are bound to be differences.
[b]Well, if they are perfect, then why the problem?
Will of God and the will of His creatures are running conterminously.
"Existence is good"? I do not know what that means.
Creature seek to remain existent.
"God's intent for each creature is life and happiness."
Because each category of will is sovereign, there are bound to be ...[text shortened]... [/b]
In what way was it a good strategy to allow the other team to score?[/b]
Taken as a response to my question about the neonate, this should be insulting to anyone's intelligence. Not only does the neonate not possess a will in the relevant sense or the sovereignty that goes along with moral agency; but, even if it did, creatures do not will that it be such that they suffer horribly and die painful deaths. Suffering hurts, and to the extent that a creature has the capacities to suffer and have interests, it has abiding interests not to suffer; it has abiding interests to live characteristically free from pain and suffering and the like. So how is this response in any way coherent?
You state that all creatures have a will; you conflate having a will with the desire to be; so, according to your own commitments, the neonate has a desire to be. Also according to your own commitments, God wills for the neonate to have life and happiness. So where is the relevant difference in volition here that putatively explains the suffering and death of the neonate?
While I concede that some creatures fail to reach a level of conscious accountability, the same still possess a will, a desire to be.
Okay, so you maintain that every creature has a will. That claim is patently false, but whatever….
Originally, yes. But when some of the creatures chose against His system, the state became less than perfect. All other creatures since then have been born into the less than perfect state.
I'm still not sure how this is coherent. If choosing against His system is supposed to represent an imperfect will, how can such be carried out by a creature in a perfect state? Under your view something must have polluted the creature's will subsequent to its creation, and this something could not be at the ushering of the creature's own volition (lest you run into contradiction). You still haven't explained how this eventuation is consistent with God's supposed attributes, so you still haven't really explained anything here.
I don't have all the facts, but I have enough of the pertinent ones to surmise this: He thought the argument presented was compelling enough to warrant discovery of the issue.
I'm not sure what that means. So you do not know how God's allowance of evil is consistent with His being all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good? You do not understand what God's reasons are for allowing evil to play out?
Within the system of good and evil, there is no redeeming significance for either. There is great significance in His allowance of the system to be played out, however.
What is this great significance you talk about? And could God achieve the same significance with less evil? As far as I can tell so far, there is no actual content to your theodicy.
He could also do the same with less good, presumably.
That's not the problematic part for you, remember? It's not called the problem of good; it's called the problem of evil. A general issue with the types of evil at issue here (such as apparently gratuitous suffering) is that agents who know about such evil and have the power to avoid or alleviate such evil, have prima facie obligation to do so. This problem does not transfer to the subject of goods, obviously. Of course, even if God would have prima facie obligation not to allow evil, it leaves open questions, such as of whether some evils may be, for some non-obvious reasons, necessary for some greater good or whether God may have overriding justifying reasons for allowing some evils to play out. That's where you are supposed to provide some insight, but honestly I see zero substance to your theodicy.
The good that is in the system isn't intrinsic good, but rather, a facsimile or poor substitute of the good of intrinsic value outside of the system.
Not trying to be dense, but I still do not understand what you are trying to say here.
In what way was it a good strategy to allow the other team to score?
I asked if you could explain how the suffering and death of the neonate glorifies God; after all, you are committed by your very own words to the stance that it does exactly this. Here, you have provided no explanation. Am I to assume, then, that you have none?
By the way, you do understand that you're not committed to the claim that the Patriots are all-knowing & all-powerful, right?
10 Mar 12
Originally posted by FreakyKBHGod gives us evil so that we appreciate good. He gives us pain so that we appreciate pleasure. If he exists.
Small scuttlebutt surrounding the Patriot's decision to allow the Giants to score in the final minutes of Sunday's Super Bowl got me to thinking how similar the situation is to the existence of evil in the world. Namely, how such a thing can be allowed to exist by a perfect God.
Any takers?