08 Nov 13
Originally posted by vistesdIt's not a physical object, of course. Maybe my idea of 'real' is a little more expansive.
Well, lay this reality out here for us then, so that we can consider it directly, and not just trade
notions about notions
and words about words—
While we’re at it, I’d like to see an actual libido, too. (Anybody’s will do.)
08 Nov 13
Originally posted by JS357Ha! Good.
Heh.
Is the coffee warm or cold?
No.
Commentary sometimes takes away the directness, but here is a bit of one anyway: Walk in the snow in your barefeet. Then step directly into bathwater that I say (honestly) is just lukewarm. How much of your existential experience is not just as relative?
You are right about usefulness.
08 Nov 13
8 edits
Originally posted by SwissGambitUnderstood (and physical objects on an internet forum are a bit difficult; though visual metaphors always seem easiest). Nobody thinks the libido is a physical object—is it a “thing” of any kind? (An entity, a being, a substance?)
It's not a physical object, of course. Maybe my idea of 'real' is a little more expansive.
Does your idea of reality include “tree” (Plato), or just “that tree (e.g., a Norwegian Spruce) over there” (Aristotle). Is “redness” real? Is “red” a useful term for a range of visible wavelengths? Is “self” real, or is “self” just a useful term for a complex of psycho-physical processes? (Rather the way that "tree", “red”, or “libido” are useful terms for conceptual generalizations?)
I don’t think that you can (problems of an internet forum aside) show me “red” or “tree” or “self”. I don’t think that you can demonstrate to me “sound” or “silence” or “dream” or “love”—only particular manifestations to which we apply such terms for purposes of conceptual generalization. I don’t think that you can demonstrate to me something called “self”. You might demonstrate to me your ability to recall (memory); you might be able to demonstrate to me what forms of “somebody-ness” training you have undergone since childhood to generate the “somebody self” that you think you are (as well as aspects of such training that you have subsequently rejected); you can demonstrate to me your intelligence and reasoning skills (which you have on here, amply and often); etc., etc., etc. But the “self” that does all those things—that there is a separate entity that does all those things? I don’t think that you can find that for “yourself” (or experience that for "yourself" ), let alone demonstrate it.Strip away all the re-membering (hyphen deliberate), all the thinking, all the imagining, all the doing, all the feeling—all the going-on—and I think you’ll be hard-pressed to experience a “self” doing all those doings.
And then you can glimpse the Zen notion of “emptiness” (which is also not “something” ).
Substance versus Process
Perhaps, forget substance categories. Think of processes. There are goings-on—not “things” going on, nor "things" behind the clustered goings-on (you can get an idea here how our subject-predicate (subject-verb-object) language is so difficult here). So “you” are just stuff going on—including consciousness going-on about other stuff going on (the inherent reflexivity/recursiveness also makes language difficult). There is no “self” that is doing all that going-on that is your life.
So, self can be a handy fiction—just like “libido”. And the goings-on are real (from a Zen point of view): happening is happening. But there are no inherently existential substances to which anything is happening (to borrow from blackbeetle). There is no inherent existent “self” to which happenings happen.
08 Nov 13
Originally posted by vistesdWhy am I stripping away the thinking, the doing, and the feeling, etc., again?
Understood (and physical objects on an internet forum are a bit difficult; though visual metaphors always seem easiest). Nobody thinks the libido is a physical object—is it a “thing” of any kind? (An entity, a being, a substance?)
Does your idea of reality include “tree” (Plato), or just “that tree (e.g., a Norwegian Spruce) over there” (Aristotle). ...[text shortened]... row from blackbeetle). There is no inherent existent “self” to which happenings happen.
08 Nov 13
3 edits
Originally posted by SwissGambitTo see if you actually experience a "self" that is doing all that. Or if you are just experiencing all that (those various goings-on of which you are conscious—and the being-conscious as its own going-on), and then speculating that there must be a something (a separate self, an “I” ) that is doing all that. [Really, see what it actually is that you experience that leads you to conclude there is an actuality that can be called a "self".]
Why am I stripping away the thinking, the doing, and the feeling, etc., again?
Again, language presents difficulties; and I am doing some preliminary research into Native American languages that consist only of verb forms, with no nouns—that is, no substantives. (That will take me into tomorrow anyway, as I’ve got to pack it in for tonight.)
I am not arguing that there is something wrong with thinking (!), with conceptualizing, with imagining, with generalizing. I am arguing that we can be bewitched by our language (Wittgenstein) into believing that reality conforms to our conceptual—and grammatical—categories. For example: If all this thinking, conceptualizing, feeling, remembering, etc., is going on—then there must be a somebody-something (a “self” ) that is doing it: a subject that is predicating.
In a way, I am exploring the possible connections between the (perhaps intuitive) conclusions of Zen (no-self) and more modern process philosophy.
I really don’t think there is any such actuality as a self. Myself, yourself. There may be—again, I don’t know how to use language without nouns, so I am improvising as best I can—being-conscious of various goings-on from a perspective of identifying; and that perspective-of-identifying is what we label the “self”. And I agree that that can be a useful fiction.
08 Nov 13
Originally posted by vistesdThe Dispeller of Disputes
To see if you actually experience a "self" that is doing all that. Or if you are just experiencing all that (those various goings-on of which you are conscious—and the being-conscious as its own going-on), and then speculating that there must be a something (a separate self, an “I” ) that is doing all that. [Really, see what it actually is that you ...[text shortened]... tive-of-identifying is what we label the “self”. And I agree that that can be a useful fiction.
smiles😵
08 Nov 13
Originally posted by SwissGambitMethinks the case is simply that when you speak of an individual "self" having a property you nominalize the predicate expressing the property you take to be constituve and you ascribe the instantiating properties to that individual thus created -but there is no ontological reason why you could not alternate your view of what the constituve and what the instantiating properties are, and then on this basis describe that exact situation in terms of a different individual and properties; then, when you go on with this approach, you are not forced anymore to infer the existence of an individual from the existence of a specific quality.
It's not a physical object, of course. Maybe my idea of 'real' is a little more expansive.
Now, since there is indeed a variety of sensory and mental events that take place and happen in close temporal and causal connection, the ascription of all of these to a "self" does not commit you anymore to the existence of such a "self" at the ontological level. This is the reason why the "reality" of such a "self" and its properties in terms of a substratum is acceptable (in fact, because of this I told you earlier at this thread that the "self" from a specific perspective is "real" etc), as long as you don't assume that such a "self" is inherenlty existent (ie based on a distinction with an ontological grounding).
So the self is merely a conceptually constructed epistemic object that has to be regarded as a sequence of events that stand in close temporal and causal relation; the self cannot be seen as a cognitive core which stays constant amidst the everchanging stream of sensory impressions and mental deliberations, since it is merely the entire set of those sensory and mental events that are interconnected on differ levels. And of course, in this case, such a "self" is merely a handy notion that we are using for our convenience, and as such it surely lacks of inherent existence -so methinks over here your idea of "real" is not expansive but simply untenable😵
Originally posted by black beetleah young beetle and young vistesd, my two greatest prodigies! remember my sons, there is no I in chess!
Methinks the case is simply that when you speak of an individual "self" having a property you nominalize the predicate expressing the property you take to be constituve and you ascribe the instantiating properties to that individual thus created -but there is no ontological reason why you could not alternate your view of what the constituve and what the ...[text shortened]... ent existence -so methinks over here your idea of "real" is not expansive but simply untenable😵
Zen master
08 Nov 13
1 edit
Originally posted by robbie carrobieproperknob was a disciple that turned to the darkside, m...m..materialism, he must be brought to justice
ah young beetle and young vistesd, my two greatest prodigies! remember my sons, there is no I in chess!
Zen master
The Zen master
08 Nov 13
2 edits
Originally posted by black beetleThe force which animates the universe my son based upon the inherent qualities of the position, static or dynamic, strategic or tactical. The chess player must be formless, shapeless, with style and without style, simply ready to meet the specific criteria of the position, to be and not to be, like water taking the form that is required. When struck yielding, yet returning with constancy! Be water my son.
And who is making the moves then, my dearest Zen master?
😵
The Zen master 😵
08 Nov 13
Originally posted by robbie carrobieOh the wetness of this scarab will get the wetnes of some a'bunadh batch 8 right now😵
The force which animates the universe my son based upon the inherent qualities of the position, static or dynamic, strategic or tactical. The chess player must be formless, shapeless, with style and without style, simply ready to meet the specific criteria of the position, to be and not to be, like water taking the form that is required. When struck yielding, yet returning with constancy! Be water my son.
The Zen master 😵
