Originally posted by AmauroteJust to keep things in perspective, every month in Iraq is appalling, not just June. As for a monthly spike, there's a couple of very good reasons.
Defined simply, I think a surge is a rapid increase in troop numbers. Since this is primarily a concentrated increase in a limited area (Baghdad and its environs), I don't think classifying 3000 in the first few days as a surge is stretching the terminology particularly..
As for the Surge being successful, I'm very puzzled by the tautology implied in you ...[text shortened]... ince they're living there and we aren't, I'd tend to trust them more than General Petraeus.
1) Everybody knows, including insurgents, that Petraeus is due in front of the American al-Qongress in September. This gives the insugents a limited amount of time to make maximum impact on congress and the American voting public.
Which is not as big a reason as,
2) More troops and increased tempo means more soldiers out baiting for and engaging in combat. More combat = more deaths. Civilian casualties come with combat, especially when dealing with a group of murderous thugs like AQ.
A spike here and there is the very minimum of what we should expect.
As for the surge being a success, it depends on how you define the word I suppose. If we want to be unrealistic and give it a definition that has something to do with immediate reconciliation, then no, the surge is not a success. With a definition like that, nothing could be seen as a success. This is a 10-20 year countersinsurgency operation. If we define in reasonable term though, the surge has been a success. If there is one key metric in COIN ops, it's intel from locals, and that's way up. Any counterinsurgency needs cooperation from locals, and the surge has produced a profound increase in cooperation.
Not that reconciliation isn't happening though. Here's an article from WSJ:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118800616417608640.html
Subscription required, so here's the text.
Last week, I participated in a three day meeting here that included six of the most senior Iraqi Sunni and Shia religious leaders. At the meeting, held at a Marriott hotel in a Cairo suburb, they formally agreed to "end terrorist violence, and to disband militia activity in order to build a civilized country and work within the framework of law."
This gathering was a truly historic event, given the authority of the participants -- including Sheikh Ahmed al Kubaisi, acknowledged by all Iraqis as the senior Sunni religious authority (the weekly audience for his Friday sermons, broadcast from Dubai, number 20 million), and Ayatollah Sayyid Ammar Abu Ragheef, chief of staff for Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the acknowledged leader of the Shia community in Iraq and beyond. One has only to consider the power of these specific religious leaders, and the instruments at their disposal for getting results, to grasp the gathering's enormous potential importance.
Going well beyond traditional rhetoric in their closing statement late last week, they stated their intention to work for the early issuance of a joint Sunni-Shia fatwa to the Iraqi people. A fatwa such as this will carry the force of law for all followers. Think about that. After more than four years of brutal warfare and untold suffering, the leading religious authorities in Iraq have joined hands and said "Enough," and have committed to use their authority to bring peace to their country.
How does this relate to the Iraqi government and coalition forces? Can these clerics achieve anything concrete? If so how soon? And will it be enforceable?
Simply stated, these men -- all self-interested stewards of their separate Sunni and Shia constituencies -- have seen that their government's failure to act could lead Iraq into an irretrievable situation. They feel a moral imperative to fill the power vacuum. As for whether their actions will be taken seriously and be enforceable, the affirmative answer lies in the acknowledged role of the mosque, and of the grand ayatollahs and imams of the seniority represented here in Arab societies.
As additional evidence that Iraq's most senior religious leaders see the potential for catastrophe in prolonged violence unabated by government action, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani has reached out to the most senior Sunni Imams and asked that they meet with him as soon as possible in Najaf, Iraq, to focus on peacemaking. Such an invitation by the most senior Shia for a meeting with the most senior Sunni is unprecedented in Iraq's history.
It was also noteworthy that these leaders included Sheikh Abdul Lateef Humayeem, the former personal iman to Saddam Hussein. Welcoming Mr. Humayeem to this very elite circle -- a religious board of directors in Iraq -- is a clear signal to former Baath civil servants and military officers that they will be welcome in the new Iraq.
Here in the West we tend to discount the role of religion in resolving disputes. Indeed our diplomatic tradition eschews involving religion -- or even mentioning it -- in diplomatic discourse. Clearly, however, its role is central in underpinning the sectarian violence in Iraq. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, understands that, as well as the powerful role that religious leaders could play if they chose to do so. He has been a strong supporter -- as has the U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus -- of the painstaking process that preceded this meeting in Cairo. Nothing like this has ever occurred in Iraq's history -- and yet it is happening.
Going forward, the key leaders have agreed to a calendar of concrete actions starting with the unprecedented meeting with Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani in Najaf within two weeks. If that meeting goes well, it could lend momentum to the early development of the planned joint Sunni-Shia fatwa. Such a fatwa would stand as a historic milestone with profound meaning and effect on the Iraqi people.
To be fair, it was clear that one of the factors which motivated these very senior leaders to come together was their common goal of getting the U.S. out of Iraq -- obviously a goal we share, assuming we can achieve an acceptable degree of security before leaving. Just as important, however, was their alarm over growing Iranian influence in southern Iraq and the common sentiment among them that they do not want to be dominated by Iran.
This process of nurturing reconciliation by bringing Iraq's religious leaders together -- gradually in small groups leading to a conference this past June involving over 70 leaders, and devolving now here in Cairo to the six most senior clerics in all Iraq -- has been led by Canon Andrew White, an Anglican priest who has established his contacts and credibility with Iraqi leaders during more than nine years of service in Baghdad. Mr. White is a commanding presence and a man who deserves our prayers and support. The process he has organized and set in motion could mark a turning point in the wretched history of Iraq.
Yeah, I know, the writer stroked the Anglican.
Here's but one example of the a success fo the surge.
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/7-rules-1-oath.htm
19 July 2007
Today marks D+30 since the start of Operation Arrowhead Ripper. The initial goal of Arrowhead Ripper was to clear Baqubah of al Qaeda, and then attempt to “jump start” the city back into civic life, which had all but ceased while the terrorists were in control. Though relatively minor clearing operations are still underway, there is little combat in the city.
Today Colonel Steve Townsend, the American commander of the 3-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, presided over a meeting with Iraqi Army officers and former insurgent leaders. The insurgent leaders who seem to be sincerely working toward peace are now collectively referred to as “the Baqubah Guardians.” I was allowed to attend the meeting, but was—understandably—not permitted to photograph or videotape the proceedings.
Colonel Townsend clarified the purpose of the meeting; it was not to formalize relations or to establish a chain of command, but to work out ways of cooperating to bring better days to Baqubah.
Colonel Townsend’s staff had prepared a slideshow that started off with a draft of “7 Rules.” The final version of the 7 Rules were open to discussion and suggestions from those in attendance. The rules were followed by an Oath, also still in draft.
First Colonel Townsend reviewed the 7 Rules, presented here verbatim from the slides:
1) Protect your community from AQI, JAM and other terrorist militia.
2) Accept both peaceful Sunni, Shia and others.
3) Stay in your neighborhood/AO [area of operations] for your safety.
4) Take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of Iraq.
5) Register with Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces [biometrics for CF].
6) For your safety, wear a standard uniform and markings [an example was proposed].
7) Receive hiring preference for Iraqi Police and Army.
Then came the Oath, also presented here verbatim from the slides:
1) I will support and defend the Constitution of Iraq.
2) I will cooperate fully with the Iraqi government.
3) I will guard my neighborhood, community and city.
4) I will bear no arms outside my home without coordination of Iraqi Security Forces or Coalition Forces
5) I will bear no arms against the Government of Iraq, Iraqi Security Forces or Coalition Forces.
6) I will not support sectarian agendas.
After the proposal for the 7 Rules and the Oath were presented, the most interesting—fascinating, really—part of the meeting unfolded.
The Iraqi Army commanders and “Baqubah Guardians” then gave their input, and some of that input was as follows:
1) Protect your community from AQI, JAM and other terrorist militia.
Some attendees did not like that AQI and JAM were singled out, citing that this only validated those organizations, while not fully recognizing the problems from terrorist groups such as the Badr or IAI. Other attendees disagreed and thought the groups should be named, but finally it was decided to strike the names AQI and JAM.
2) Accept both peaceful Sunni, Shia and others.
After some intelligent discussion, the Iraqis wanted this changed to “Accept all peaceful Iraqi citizens without discrimination.”
3) Stay in your neighborhood/AO [area of operations] for your safety.
This needed clarification: Colonel Townsend was not saying they should not travel from their neighborhoods, but that they should not operate out of their neighborhoods, and the attendees agreed.
4) Take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of Iraq.
Now it got interesting. One Iraqi said that even under the Saddam regime, bad as it was, the constitution still kept them together. He made no mention of the wars against the Kurds or Shia. But he went on to say that the current constitution tended to divide Iraq. No serious arguments were put forth on this today, but it was clear that fourth rule could lead to months or years of debate. After all, our own Constitution remains a work in progress, having been amended more than two dozen times. Each time that Americans bring this fact to forefront, it seems to assuage some of the “Constitutional-angst” among Iraqis, but that doesn’t change the fact that their government is about as solid as fog.
5) Register with Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces [biometrics for CF].
The “biometrics” part of #5 was an issue partly because Coalition Forces do not share biometrics with the ISF, and so in fact we are asking Iraqis to submit to photographing, fingerprinting and retinal scans for our use. The Iraqis politely offered their consensus that this was not a good idea, and Colonel Townsend chuckled, saying even Americans wouldn’t go for that. [Can’t blame him for trying.]
6) For your safety, wear a standard uniform and markings [an example was proposed].
The uniform idea was fine with the Iraqis, especially so since we killed at least six of their militia members in the last 30 days. I saw our guys shoot four 1920s guys a few days ago on Sunday, killing two of them. The shooting was the fault of the 1920s guys: had they been wearing uniforms, they would be alive today. The Iraqis agreed that uniforms are a good idea.
7) Receive hiring preference for Iraqi Police and Army.
Point number seven received nods of approval.
On the Oath, the matter was more interesting:
1) I will support and defend the Constitution of Iraq.
Discussion around Point One of the Oath was similar to that around Point Four of the 7 Rules.
2) I will cooperate fully with the Iraqi government.
Point two received some pushback, but again, imagine asking all Americans to swear that “I will comply fully with the American Government.” It would be un-American to agree to that! And here in Iraq, if I were an Iraqi, I would never agree to “I will cooperate fully with the Government of Iraq.” What government? The one in Baghdad that refuses to send legal food shipments to Diyala Province? I saw this with my own eyes and videotaped officials in the “Iraqi government” refusing to help the Diyala Government, calling Diyala (verbatim) a “terrorist province.” Even though Diyala has been a province riddled by terrorists lately, that still doesn’t change the fact that people here went without food because of the government people in Baghdad they are now supposed to pledge allegiance to. No smart person was likely to sign that line.
The other points were subject to briefer discussion and easier agreement, although the easiest of all parts of the Oath was point Six—I will not support sectarian agendas. Every Iraqi in the room immediately was aboard on this one, and they even seemed enthusiastic about it.
I’ve saved an unmentioned point for last. The Iraqi flag appeared on some of the slides. But the graphic showed an Iraqi flag without the traditional words “God is Great.” This was clearly a potential flash point. In fact, one of the Iraqi interpreters nearly recused himself from the conversation. LT David Wallach, whose native tongue is Arabic, told me after the meeting that Saddam had put “God is Great” on the flags so that Iraqis would stop grinding the flags into the dirt with their feet. He said that Iraqis would never trample on anything that had those words written on it.
But other than the interpreter’s sudden jitters, I detected no overt emotion among the Iraqis. In fact, they were all calm, professional, and very polite. An Iraqi Colonel was generous enough to offer that he believed it to be just a mistake that “God is Great” was left off the flag that was used on the slides. But the Iraqis all agreed that nobody was going to sign anything that displayed an Iraqi flag without the phrase “God is Great.”
This might seem ominous to us. “Allah u Akbar!” are, after all, words that we have become accustomed to hearing when someone is doing something bad, like burning an American flag, or blowing up Americans. But these issues are more like the intense legal and media battles over the words “In God We Trust” on the money in our pockets, or the ongoing furor in some sectors over the phrase “One Nation, Under God, Indivisible . . . ” in the Pledge of Allegiance. (Not to mention the dust storms kicked up by the Pledge itself.)
Seeing “God is Great” written on the Iraqi flag might provoke some to protest “Why did we come here just to stand up a country who would write such things on their flag?” But I sat there in that meeting, which was completely civil and professional, and I thought about another flag, the one flying over South Carolina. Some people call that flag “heritage,” while others call it “hateful,” “painful” and “demeaning.” And today in that meeting, I thought about the descendants of slaves who are now top military commanders in the American Army, and in that moment I knew that Iraq could make it.
Not that this war isn't without problems. Michael Yon has an article on his site about the Mayor of Het. He was a hero for cleaning out the AQ thugs, but he was a crooked cop with his own gang of thugs and the local leaders couldn't do anything about it.
And here's a great example of a problem.
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/19232.html
BAGHDAD — Iraq's deadly insurgent groups have financed their war against U.S. troops in part with hundreds of thousands of dollars in U.S. rebuilding funds that they've extorted from Iraqi contractors in Anbar province.
The payments, in return for the insurgents' allowing supplies to move and construction work to begin, have taken place since the earliest projects in 2003, Iraqi contractors, politicians and interpreters involved with reconstruction efforts said.
A fresh round of rebuilding spurred by the U.S. military's recent alliance with some Anbar tribes — 200 new projects are scheduled — provides another opportunity for militant groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq to siphon off more U.S. money, contractors and politicians warn.
"Now we're back to the same old story in Anbar. The Americans are handing out contracts and jobs to terrorists, bandits and gangsters," said Sheik Ali Hatem Ali Suleiman, the deputy leader of the Dulaim, the largest and most powerful tribe in Anbar. He was involved in several U.S. rebuilding contracts in the early days of the war, but is now a harsh critic of the U.S. presence.
The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad declined to provide anyone to discuss the allegations. An embassy spokesman, Noah Miller, said in an e-mailed statement that, "in terms of contracting practices, we have checks and balances in our contract awarding system to prevent any irregularities from occurring. Each contracted company is responsible for providing security for the project."
Providing that security is the source of the extortion, Iraqi contractors say. A U.S. company with a reconstruction contract hires an Iraqi sub-contractor to haul supplies along insurgent-ridden roads. The Iraqi contractor sets his price at up to four times the going rate because he'll be forced to give 50 percent or more to gun-toting insurgents who demand cash payments in exchange for the supply convoys' safe passage.
One Iraqi official said the arrangement makes sense for insurgents. By granting safe passage to a truck loaded with $10,000 in goods, they receive a "protection fee" that can buy more weapons and vehicles. Sometimes the insurgents take the goods, too.
"The violence in Iraq has developed a political economy of its own that sustains it and keeps some of these terrorist groups afloat," said Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh, who recently asked the U.S.-led coalition to match the Iraqi government's pledge of $230 million for Anbar projects.
Despite several devastating U.S. military offensives to rout insurgents, the militants - or, in some cases, tribes with insurgent connections - still control the supply routes of the province, making reconstruction all but impossible without their protection.
One senior Iraqi politician with personal knowledge of the contracting system said the insurgents also use their cuts to pay border police in Syria "to look the other way" as they smuggle weapons and foot soldiers into Iraq.
"Every contractor in Anbar who works for the U.S. military and survives for more than a month is paying the insurgency," the politician said, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter. "The contracts are inflated, all of them. The insurgents get half."
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said he was aware of the "insurgent tax" that U.S.-allied contractors are forced to pay in Anbar, though he said it wasn't clear how much money was going to militant groups and how much to opportunistic tribesmen operating on their own.
"It's part of a taxation they put on trucks through all these territories, but it's very difficult to establish if it's going directly to insurgents," Zebari said.
As of July, the U.S. government had completed 3,300 projects in Anbar with a total value of $363 million, the U.S. embassy said. Another 250 projects with a total price tag of $353 million are under way.
Saleh, the deputy prime minister, said dealing with such huge amounts of money in such a volatile place means corruption is inevitable and that some projects cost far more than they should. But despite qualms, he believes the effort is worth it.
"I'm a realist," he said. "When I look at my options, will I have a 100 percent clean process? No. But will this force me to hold back? Absolutely not."
Suleiman, the Dulaimi sheikh and onetime U.S. ally, speaks more bitterly. Sitting in his Baghdad office, he displayed a stack of photos and status updates for projects that included two schools, a clinic and a water purification center. The photos showed crumbling, half-finished structures surrounded by overgrown weeds and patchworks of electrical wires. He blamed such failures on "the terrorists" who work under the noses of U.S. and Iraqi officials.
"Those responsible for these projects had to give money to al Qaida. Frankly, gunmen control contracting in Anbar," he said. "Even now, the thefts are unbelievable, and I have no idea where those millions are going."
None of the Iraqi contractors agreed to speak on the record - they risk losing future U.S. contracts and face retaliation from insurgent groups. Some of the Iraqis interviewed remain in Fallujah or Ramadi on the U.S. payroll; others had fled to Arab countries and Europe after they deemed the business too risky.
"I put it right in my contracts as a line item for 'logistics and security,'" said one Iraqi contractor who is still working for a major American company with several long-term projects in Anbar. "The Americans think you're hiring a security company, but how you execute it is something else entirely. This is how it's been working since Day 1."
One Iraqi contractor who is working on an American-funded rebuilding project in the provincial capital of Ramadi said he faced two choices when he wanted to bring in a crane, heavy machinery and workers from Baghdad: either hire a private security company to escort the supplies for up to $6,000 a truck, or pay off locals with insurgent connections.
He chose the latter, and got $120,000 for a U.S. contract he estimates to be worth no more than $20,000. The contractor asked that specific details of the project not be disclosed for fear he'll be identified and lose the job.
"The insurgents always remind us they're there," the contractor said. "Sometimes they hijack a truck or kidnap a driver and then we pay and, if we're lucky, we get our goods returned. It's just to make sure we know how it works.
"Insurgents control the roads," he added. "Americans don't control the roads - and everything from Syria and Jordan goes through there."
Another Iraqi contractor with several U.S. rebuilding contracts said he's been trying to avoid paying off insurgents by strengthening his relationship with reputable tribal leaders in Anbar.
In one contract for a major U.S. company, the contractor said, he gave cash payments to tribal leaders and trusted them to buy the goods in Anbar instead of having to pay insurgents to bring the goods in from Baghdad. He said the tribesmen took photos as proof that they used the money properly and had to hide the supplies in their homes for fear insurgents would find out they'd been left out of the deal.
The contractor said such scenarios are extremely rare and very dangerous. More typical, he said, was a recent order he took to haul gravel to U.S. bases in Anbar.
"If I do it in the Green Zone, it's just putting gravel in Hesco bags and it would be about $16,000," the contractor said. "But they needed it for Ramadi and Fallujah. I submitted an invoice for $120,000 and I'd say about $100,000 of that went to the mujahideen," as Iraqis sometimes call Sunni insurgents.
An Iraqi who used to work as an interpreter for Titan Corp., the U.S. company that supplies local interpreters to U.S. forces in Iraq, said he witnessed countless incidents of insurgents shaking down contractors during the two years he spent as a translator in the "Engineering Operations Room" on a U.S. military base in Anbar. The man, a Fallujah native who has since fled to the United Arab Emirates, spoke on condition of anonymity because he hasn't ruled out returning to Iraq now that Anbar construction is on the upswing.
He said he was stunned when, from early 2004 to his departure in summer 2006, a parade of sheikhs with known insurgent connections were awarded contracts worth hundreds of thousands of dollars.
The interpreter said that on several occasions contractors pleaded with American officials for protection and told them that gunmen were shaking them down for large sums of cash.
In a project to rebuild Dam Street in Fallujah, the interpreter said, insurgents forced the local contractor to pay for protection on three or four separate occasions. Work would stop for a few days until the contractor paid up. In the end, the interpreter said, the contractor grew so terrified that he walked off the unfinished project and fled Iraq.
On another project for a water treatment plant in the insurgent stronghold of Zoba, the interpreter said, the local contractor was summoned to meet with militant leaders who threatened his life if he didn't give them at least half the contract's value.
Fawzi Hariri, a member of the Iraqi cabinet and head of the government's Anbar Reconstruction Committee, said some U.S. rebuilding funds "absolutely" have gone into insurgents' pockets. The exception is where construction sites were guarded around-the-clock by U.S. or Iraqi troops.
(continued)
"If you're on your own, you certainly would have to pay somebody," Hariri said.
Hariri said the Iraqi government's Anbar committee checks contractors' permits and references, withholds payment until the work is reviewed and only hires workers who are familiar enough with Anbar's deep-rooted tribes to arrange for security. On the parallel U.S. reconstruction effort, however, American contracting officials rarely consult their Iraqi counterparts about how much they spent or who was paid on specific projects.
"The Americans are accountable only to themselves," Hariri said. "It's their money."
Do you know who Dave Kilcullen is?
He's the senior COIN advisor to MNF-I. Basically one of the 4 stars right hand men.
Check him out over at Small Wars Journal.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/authors/dave-kilcullen/
His latest entry: June 26th.
I’ve spent much of the last six weeks out on the ground, working with Iraqi and U.S. combat units, civilian reconstruction teams, Iraqi administrators and tribal and community leaders. I’ve been away from e-mail a lot, so unable to post here at SWJ: but I’d like to make up for that now by providing colleagues with a basic understanding of what’s happening, right now, in Iraq.
This post is not about whether current ops are “working” — for us, here on the ground, time will tell, though some observers elsewhere seem to have already made up their minds (on the basis of what evidence, I’m not really sure). But for professional counterinsurgency operators such as our SWJ community, the thing to understand at this point is the intention and concept behind current ops in Iraq: if you grasp this, you can tell for yourself how the operations are going, without relying on armchair pundits. So in the interests of self-education (and cutting out the commentariat middlemen—sorry, guys) here is a field perspective on current operations.
Ten days ago, speaking with Austin Bay, I made the following comment:
“I know some people in the media are already starting to sort of write off the “surge” and say ‘Hey, hang on: we’ve been going since January, we haven’t seen a massive turnaround; it mustn’t be working’. What we’ve been doing to date is putting forces into position. We haven’t actually started what I would call the “surge” yet. All we’ve been doing is building up forces and trying to secure the population. And what I would say to people who say that it’s already failed is “watch this space”. Because you’re going to see, in fairly short order, some changes in the way we’re operating that will make what’s been happening over the past few months look like what it is—just a preliminary build up.”
The meaning of that comment should be clear by now to anyone tracking what is happening in Iraq. On June 15th we kicked off a major series of division-sized operations in Baghdad and the surrounding provinces. As General Odierno said, we have finished the build-up phase and are now beginning the actual “surge of operations”. I have often said that we need to give this time. That is still true. But this is the end of the beginning: we are now starting to put things onto a viable long-term footing.
These operations are qualitatively different from what we have done before. Our concept is to knock over several insurgent safe havens simultaneously, in order to prevent terrorists relocating their infrastructure from one to another, and to create an operational synergy between what we're doing in Baghdad and what's happening outside. Unlike on previous occasions, we don't plan to leave these areas once they’re secured. These ops will run over months, and the key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them. The really decisive activity will be police work, registration of the population and counterintelligence in these areas, to comb out the insurgent sleeper cells and political cells that have "gone quiet" as we moved in, but which will try to survive through the op and emerge later. This will take operational patience, and it will be intelligence-led, and Iraqi government-led. It will probably not make the news (the really important stuff rarely does) but it will be the truly decisive action.
When we speak of "clearing" an enemy safe haven, we are not talking about destroying the enemy in it; we are talking about rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation. If we don't get every enemy cell in the initial operation, that's OK. The point of the operations is to lift the pall of fear from population groups that have been intimidated and exploited by terrorists to date, then win them over and work with them in partnership to clean out the cells that remain – as has happened in Al Anbar Province and can happen elsewhere in Iraq as well.
The "terrain" we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on. This is why claims that “80% of AQ leadership have fled” don’t overly disturb us: the aim is not to kill every last AQ leader, but rather to drive them off the population and keep them off, so that we can work with the community to prevent their return.
(continued)
This is not some sort of kind-hearted, soft approach, as some fire-breathing polemicists have claimed (funnily enough, those who urge us to “just kill more bad guys” usually do so from a safe distance). It is not about being “nice” to the population and hoping they will somehow see us as the “good guys” and stop supporting insurgents. On the contrary, it is based on a hard-headed recognition of certain basic facts, to wit:
(a.) The enemy needs the people to act in certain ways (sympathy, acquiescence, silence, reaction to provocation) in order to survive and further his strategy. Unless the population acts in these ways, both insurgents and terrorists will wither, and the cycle of provocation and backlash that drives the sectarian conflict in Iraq will fail.
(b.) The enemy is fluid, but the population is fixed. (The enemy is fluid because he has no permanent installations he needs to defend, and can always run away to fight another day. But the population is fixed, because people are tied to their homes, businesses, farms, tribal areas, relatives etc). Therefore—and this is the major change in our strategy this year—protecting and controlling the population is do-able, but destroying the enemy is not. We can drive him off from the population, then introduce local security forces, population control, and economic and political development, and thereby "hard-wire" the enemy out of the environment, preventing his return. But chasing enemy cells around the countryside is not only a waste of time, it is precisely the sort of action he wants to provoke us into. That’s why AQ cells leaving an area are not the main game—they are a distraction. We played the enemy’s game for too long: not any more. Now it is time for him to play our game.
(c.) Being fluid, the enemy can control his loss rate and therefore can never be eradicated by purely enemy-centric means: he can just go to ground if the pressure becomes too much. BUT, because he needs the population to act in certain ways in order to survive, we can asphyxiate him by cutting him off from the people. And he can't just "go quiet" to avoid that threat. He has either to come out of the woodwork, fight us and be destroyed, or stay quiet and accept permanent marginalization from his former population base. That puts him on the horns of a lethal dilemma (which warms my heart, quite frankly, after the cynical obscenities these irhabi gang members have inflicted on the innocent Iraqi non-combatant population). That's the intent here.
(d.) The enemy may not be identifiable, but the population is. In any given area in Iraq, there are multiple threat groups but only one, or sometimes two main local population groups. We could do (and have done, in the past) enormous damage to potential supporters, "destroying the haystack to find the needle", but we don't need to: we know who the population is that we need to protect, we know where they live, and we can protect them without unbearable disruption to their lives. And more to the point, we can help them protect themselves, with our forces and ISF in overwatch.
Of course, we still go after all the terrorist and extremist leaders we can target and find, and life has become increasingly “nasty, brutish, and short” for this crowd. But we realize that this is just a shaping activity in support of the main effort, which is securing the Iraqi people from the terrorists, extremist militias, and insurgents who need them to survive.
Is there a strategic risk involved in this series of operations? Absolutely. Nothing in war is risk-free. We have chosen to accept and manage this risk, primarily because a low-risk option simply will not get us the operational effects that the strategic situation demands. We have to play the hand we have been dealt as intelligently as possible, so we're doing what has to be done. It still might not work, but "it is what it is" at this point.
So much for theory. The practice, as always, has been mixed. Personally, I think we are doing reasonably well and casualties have been lower so far than I feared. Every single loss is a tragedy. But so far, thank God, the loss rate has not been too terrible: casualties are up in absolute terms, but down as a proportion of troops deployed (in the fourth quarter of 2006 we had about 100,000 troops in country and casualties averaged 90 deaths a month; now we have almost 160,000 troops in country but deaths are under 120 per month, much less than a proportionate increase, which would have been around 150 a month). And last year we patrolled rarely, mainly in vehicles, and got hit almost every time we went out. Now we patrol all the time, on foot, by day and night with Iraqi units normally present as partners, and the chances of getting hit are much lower on each patrol. We are finally coming out of the "defensive crouch" with which we used to approach the environment, and it is starting to pay off.
(continued)
It will be a long, hard summer, with much pain and loss to come, and things could still go either way. But the population-centric approach is the beginning of a process that aims to put the overall campaign onto a sustainable long-term footing. The politics of the matter then can be decisive, provided the Iraqis use the time we have bought for them to reach the essential accommodation. The Embassy and MNF-I continue to work on these issues at the highest levels but fundamentally, this is something that only Iraqis can resolve: our role is to provide an environment in which it becomes possible.
All this may change. These are long-term operations: the enemy will adapt and we'll have to adjust what we're doing over time. Baq’ubah, Arab Jabour and the western operations are progressing well, and additional security measures in place in Baghdad have successfully tamped down some of the spill-over of violence from other places. The relatively muted response (so far) to the second Samarra bombing is evidence of this. Time will tell, though....
Once again, none of this is intended to tell you “what to think” or “whether it’s working”. We’re all professional adults, and you can work that out for yourself. But this does, I hope, explain some of the thinking behind what we are doing, and it may therefore make it easier for people to come to their own judgment.
David Kilcullen is Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser, Multi-National Force—Iraq. These are his personal views only
Interesting, and there may be a kind of sorites here, in that you can debate without conclusion when the surge started based on whether you think the substance of surge is a general increase or the totality of the 30000 in Baghdad. What is not in doubt is that daily deaths in Iraq under Surge are now double what they were a year ago before Surge, and that Surge will do nothing to resolve that, because it's not really "Iraqi Surge" at all - it's "Baghdad Surge". You need more than a sticking plaster to stop a haemorrhage like the 15,000 lives already lost to the war this year alone.
Originally posted by MerkAs I understand it, moves to "reclaim" areas of Baghdad actually began in February: surge is a staged operation. The reinforcements weren't standing around like statues waiting until they hit the magic 30,000 figure before being used as part of the operation.
I don't think it's up for debate at all. It's pretty clearly stated above when surge ops began.
One thing that is definitely up for debate is what can be expected from it.
It's quite funny that all the talk is now of several years, because the surge itself was sold by the administration as a temporary measure.
I'm sure we'll be able to come back in two or three months and judge whether Surge is a success without controversy. For now, it's enough to note that the indicators in the country as a whole are all worse than ever, Iraqis in general feel more insecure than ever, and that average daily attacks by the insurgency are at their highest since their peak in 2003. Additionally, if the goal was to contain the violence while a political solution is worked out, the current destabilization of the Iraqi Prime Minister (egged on by Mr Allawi's Republican backers) would not appear to be the most brilliant of tactics.
Originally posted by Amaurotedepends on how you word it. Even by your statement it can easily be claimed that even with the increase combat tempo, insurgent attacks are still lower than they were in 2003.
As I understand it, moves to "reclaim" areas of Baghdad actually began in February: surge is a staged operation. The reinforcements weren't standing around like statues waiting until they hit the magic 30,000 figure before being used as part of the operation.
It's quite funny that all the talk is now of several years, because the surge itself was sold by ...[text shortened]... by Mr Allawi's Republican backers) would not appear to be the most brilliant of tactics.
Also, the administration did say that the surge is temporary, but I don't recall them ever saying that it was supposed to put an end to the violence.
The simple fact remains that you're talking about a civilian death number that isn't all that significant in the big picture. Again, We are looking at a 10-20 year counterinsurgency and we're only 4 years in and trying to call it a success or failure.
You're getting the cart in front of the horse. The death toll can't be brought down in any significant way without the civilian population working with the authorities. And there's no way a civilian population is going to work with the authorities unless they can provide security. I've stated it on here multiple times that security has to be provided or nothing can ever be accomplished. That American politicians didn't understand this is beyond my tiny brains ability to understand.
It looks like you're judging the surge on it's ability to end the counterinsurgency by itself. That's an impossibility and to judge the surge by its ability to accomplish the impossible is either not fair, or displays ingorance of the nature of COIN operations. The surges sucess can only reasonably be judged on whether or not it provides enough security to increase civilian cooperation (a real, tangible, effective increase, not some guy came and talked to us). This is the most that can be expected and the only fair way to judge it IMO.
Gotta run, have a good one.
Originally posted by MerkI don't see how. These are attacks, not engagements, and they're sky-high in real terms.
depends on how you word it. Even by your statement it can easily be claimed that even with the increase combat tempo, insurgent attacks are still lower than they were in 2003.
I've never said that Surge's plot is to defeat the insurgency militarily, but both militarily and politically its indicators are so far woebegotten with the increasingly desperate state of the Iraqi administration and the alienation of the people since January. Time and time again we've seen that
If the goal of the military is 10-15 years of this, they're working against both national sentiment and domestic opinion in the US. The American taxpayer isn't going to sanction anything like ten to fifteen years of the armed forces coming under increasing attack from an Iraqi public which believes it is morally acceptable to attack foreign occupiers and in poll after poll indicates that it believes foreign armies are actually worsening the security situation in Iraq as a whole.