i wonder why no1m is so down on Truman.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_S._Truman#Recognition_of_Israel
"Recognition of Israel
Truman, who had been a supporter of the Zionist movement as early as 1939, was a key figure in the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.
In 1946, an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommended the gradual establishment of two states in Palestine, with neither Jews nor Arabs dominating. However, there was little public support for the two-state proposal, and Britain, its empire in rapid decline, was under pressure to withdraw from Palestine quickly because of attacks on British forces by armed Zionist groups. At the urging of the British, a special U.N. committee recommended the immediate partitioning of Palestine into two states, and with Truman's support, this initiative was approved by the General Assembly in 1947.
The British announced that they would leave Palestine by May 15, 1948, and the Arab League Council nations began moving troops to Palestine's borders. The idea of a Jewish state in the Middle East was popular in the U.S., and particularly so among one of Truman's key constituencies, urban Jewish voters.
Truman and Chaim Weizmann, May 25, 1948The State Department, however, was another matter. Secretary of State George Marshall, and most of the foreign service experts, strongly opposed the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Thus, when Truman agreed to meet with Chaim Weizmann, he found himself overruling his own Secretary of State. In the end, Marshall did not publicly dispute the President's decision, as Truman feared he might. Truman recognized the State of Israel 11 minutes after it declared itself a nation on May 14, 1948.
"
Originally posted by zeeblebotYes, it is only my extreme anti-Semitism that causes me to point out the false statements that Truman made in the letter you cited. I'm busted.😞
i wonder why no1m is so down on Truman.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_S._Truman#Recognition_of_Israel
"Recognition of Israel
Truman, who had been a supporter of the Zionist movement as early as 1939, was a key figure in the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.
In 1946, an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommended the gradual e ...[text shortened]... nized the State of Israel 11 minutes after it declared itself a nation on May 14, 1948.
"
http://www.mbe.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/debate.htm
"In late May, the committee of scientists and Army Air Force officers listed Kokura Arsenal, Hiroshima, Niigata, and Kyoto as the four best targets, believing that attacks on these cities would make a profound psychological impression on the Japanese and weaken military resistance. (None of these cities had yet been bombed by Curtis LeMay's Twentieth Air Force, which planned to eliminate all major Japanese cities by January 1, 1946.) Stimson vetoed Kyoto, Japan's most cherished cultural center, and Nagasaki replaced Kyoto on the target list. Now all that was left was for Truman to give his final approval, and then it would be up to the weather to determine which of these four cities would be the first struck by an atomic bomb.
"
from the DOE's "The Manhattan Project":
http://www.mbe.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/surrender.htm
"JAPAN SURRENDERS
(August 10-15, 1945)
Events: Dawn of the Atomic Era, 1945
Prior to the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, elements existed within the Japanese government that were trying to find a way to end the war. In June and July 1945, Japan attempted to enlist the help of the Soviet Union to serve as an intermediary in negotiations. No direct communication occurred with the United States about peace talks, but American leaders knew of these maneuvers because the United States for a long time had been intercepting and decoding many internal Japanese diplomatic communications. From these intercepts, the United States learned that some within the Japanese government advocated outright surrender. A few diplomats overseas cabled home to urge just that.
From the replies these diplomats received from Tokyo, the United States learned that anything Japan might agree to would not be a surrender so much as a "negotiated peace" involving numerous conditions. These conditions probably would require, at a minimum, that the Japanese home islands remain unoccupied by foreign forces and even allow Japan to retain some of its wartime conquests in East Asia. Many within the Japanese government were extremely reluctant to discuss any concessions, which would mean that a "negotiated peace" to them would only amount to little more than a truce where the Allies agreed to stop attacking Japan. After twelve years of Japanese military aggression against China and over three and one-half years of war with the United States (begun with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor), American leaders were reluctant to accept anything less than a complete Japanese surrender.
...
Following the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 (right), the Japanese government met to consider what to do next. The emperor had been urging since June that Japan find some way to end the war, but the Japanese Minister of War and the heads of both the Army and the Navy held to their position that Japan should wait and see if arbitration via the Soviet Union might still produce something less than a surrender. Military leaders also hoped that if they could hold out until the ground invasion of Japan began, they would be able to inflict so many casualties on the Allies that Japan still might win some sort of negotiated settlement. Next came the virtually simultaneous arrival of news of the Soviet declaration of war on Japan of August 8, 1945, and the atomic bombing of Nagasaki of the following day. Another Imperial Council was held the night of August 9-10, and this time the vote on surrender was a tie, 3-to-3. For the first time in a generation, the emperor (right) stepped forward from his normally ceremonial-only role and personally broke the tie, ordering Japan to surrender. On August 10, 1945, Japan offered to surrender to the Allies, the only condition being that the emperor be allowed to remain the nominal head of state.
Planning for the use of additional nuclear weapons continued even as these deliberations were ongoing. On August 10, Leslie Groves reported to the War Department that the next bomb, another plutonium weapon, would be "ready for delivery on the first suitable weather after 17 or 18 August." Following the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, only two targets remained from the original list: Kokura Arsenal and the city of Niigata. Groves therefore requested that additional targets be added to the target list. His deputy, General Kenneth Nichols, suggested Tokyo. Truman, however, ordered an immediate halt to atomic attacks while surrender negotiations were ongoing. As the Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace recorded in his diary, Truman remarked that he did not like the idea of killing "all those kids."
..."
http://www.mbe.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/surrender.htm
"The only question remaining now was if Japan's military leaders would allow the emperor to surrender. Loyalty to the emperor was an absolute in the Japanese military, but so was the refusal to surrender, and now that the two had come into conflict, open rebellion was a possible result. The emperor recorded a message in which he personally accepted the Allied surrender terms, to be broadcast over Japanese radio the following day. This way everyone in Japan would know that surrender was the emperor's personal will. Some within the Japanese military actually attempted to steal this recording before it could be broadcast, while others attempted a more general military coup in order to seize power and continue the war. Other elements of the Japanese military remained loyal to the emperor. The Minister of War, General Anami Korechika, personally supported continuing the war, but he also could not bring himself to openly rebel against his emperor. The strength of his dilemma was such that he opted for suicide as the only honorable way out. In the end, his refusal to assist the coup plotters was instrumental in their defeat by elements within the military that remained loyal to the emperor.
"
Originally posted by zeeblebotlet's reiterate this part:
http://www.mbe.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/debate.htm
"In late May, the committee of scientists and Army Air Force officers listed Kokura Arsenal, Hiroshima, Niigata, and Kyoto as the four best targets, believing that attacks on these cities would make a profound psychological impression on the Japanese and weaken military resistance. (None of these cities er to determine which of these four cities would be the first struck by an atomic bomb.
"
"None of these cities had yet been bombed by Curtis LeMay's Twentieth Air Force, which planned to eliminate all major Japanese cities by January 1, 1946."
two cities, or all cities. take your pick.
"In late May, the committee of scientists and Army Air Force officers listed Kokura Arsenal, Hiroshima, Niigata, and Kyoto as the four best targets, believing that attacks on these cities would make a profound psychological impression on the Japanese and weaken military resistance.
"
In one of the books I read, in the target selection committee (made up of military, State Dept, and scientists from Los Alamos) when the subject of bombing Kyoto was raised, the State Dep't guy said that would be like bombing Florence...The military guy asked "Florence who?"