Almost a year ago, the US Supreme Court upheld Obamacare's Individual Mandate as a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power. NFIB v. Sebelius. The Supreme Court's holding, however, has raised a new question. Because the Individual Mandate is a tax, did Congress follow the necessary Constitutional procedures required before certain tax bills can become law? Plaintiffs are saying no arguing that Congress violated the Origination Clause when it enacted Obamacare. The Origination Clause states:
All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.
US Const. Art. I, Sec. 7
The plaintiffs argue that Obamacare is a bill for raising revenue because of NFIB's holding that the Individual Mandate is a tax. Assuming that they are right, the next question is whether Obamacare originated in the House.
The Service Members Ownership Tax Act, the bill that eventually became Obamacare, was first passed in the House. The Senate, however, completely gutted the Service Members Ownership Tax Act and replaced the text with Obamacare. The plaintiffs argue that Obamacare didn't originate in the House because of the Senate's switch-a-roo maneuver. Since Obamacare didn't originate in the House, plaintiffs argue it is unconstitutional.
Of course, the government is going to argue that Obamacare originated in the House and the good ole' fashion switch-a-roo tactic is completely constitutional. But even if Obamacare originated in the Senate, the government will argue that the Origination Clause isn't violated because Obamacare isn't a "bill for raising revenue," a la its not a tax part III.
Let's say the plaintiffs are right, can Obamacare really be invalidated for a technicality? That seems retarded, in the parlance of our times. The Supreme Court says yes, Congress must comply with the Origination Clause:
Although Justice STEVENS agrees with the Solicitor General that this Court should not entertain Origination Clause challenges, he relies on a novel theory that the Government does not advance. He notes that the Constitution is silent as to the consequences of a violation of the Origination Clause, but that it provides by implication that any bill that passes both Houses and is signed by the President becomes a law. See Art. I, § 7, cl. 2; post at 495 U. S. 401-403, and n. 1. From this, Justice STEVENS infers the proposition that "some bills may become law even if they are improperly originated." Post at 495 U. S. 403.
We cannot agree with Justice STEVENS' approach. The better reading of § 7 gives effect to all of its clauses in determining what procedures the legislative and executive branches must follow to enact a law. In the case of "Bills for raising Revenue," § 7 requires that they originate in the House before they can be properly passed by the two Houses and presented to the President. The Origination Clause is no less a requirement than the rest of the section because "it does not specify what consequences follow from an improper origination," post at 495 U. S. 402. None of the Constitution's commands explicitly sets out a remedy for its violation. Nevertheless, the principle that the courts will strike down a law when Congress has passed it in violation of such a command has been well settled for almost two centuries. See, e.g., 5 U. S. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 176-180 (1803). That principle applies whether or not the constitutional provision expressly describes the effects that follow from its violation.
Even were we to accept Justice STEVENS' contrary view -- that § 7 provides that a bill becomes a "law" even if it is improperly originated -- we would not agree with his conclusion that no remedy is available for a violation of the Origination Clause. Rather, the logical consequence of his view is that the Origination Clause would most appropriately be treated as a constitutional requirement separate from the provisions of § 7 that govern when a bill becomes a "law." Of course, saying that a bill becomes a "law" within the meaning of the second clause does not answer the question whether that "law" is constitutional. To survive this Court's scrutiny, the "law" must comply with all relevant constitutional limits. A law passed in violation of the Origination Clause would thus be no more immune from judicial scrutiny because it was passed by both Houses and signed by the President than would be a law passed in violation of the First Amendment.
United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 396-397 (1990)
^ As a side note, Stevens also tried to gut the Second Amendment in Heller and McDonald. Sorry Stevens, the Constitution means what it says!
Originally posted by MoneyManMikeOne thing I've realized is that the rule of law is meaningless, unless their is the will to enforce it. There is no will to overturn Obamacare anywhere in Washington, despite what the GOP may say.
Almost a year ago, the US Supreme Court upheld Obamacare's Individual Mandate as a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power. NFIB v. Sebelius. The Supreme Court's holding, however, has raised a new question. Because the Individual Mandate is a tax, did Congress follow the necessary Constitutional procedures required before certain tax bills c onald[/i]. Sorry Stevens, the Constitution means what it says!
From the GOP's point of view, Obamacare is good for one thing, mudslinging. The legislation is an obvious train wreck and will be good for years to come making mud pies. In addition, it will enrich their corporate cronies as they set our tax rates.
Originally posted by MoneyManMikeAs usual, you completely misread a precedent. From its Syllabus:
Almost a year ago, the US Supreme Court upheld Obamacare's Individual Mandate as a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power. NFIB v. Sebelius. The Supreme Court's holding, however, has raised a new question. Because the Individual Mandate is a tax, did Congress follow the necessary Constitutional procedures required before certain tax bills c onald[/i]. Sorry Stevens, the Constitution means what it says!
The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196,
Page 495 U. S. 387
and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue."
Same as the "tax" on persons who don't purchase health insurance.
Originally posted by no1marauderSo if they want a tax bill to not be challenged on constitutional grounds, all they have to do is add some spending to the bill?
As usual, you completely misread a precedent. From its Syllabus:
The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. [b]This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196,
Page 495 U. S. 387
and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, t ...[text shortened]... "
Same as the "tax" on persons who don't purchase health insurance.[/b]
Originally posted by KazetNagorraWhat many voters want is irrelevant. All you need is a simple majority of the vote (electoral for President).
It's relevant in the sense that many voters appear to have a Constitution fetish.
Even so, how can you get a good person elected if you only have choices that will promote the status quo?
Originally posted by KazetNagorraNo, a tax bill can be challenged on constitutional grounds for numerous reasons.
So if they want a tax bill to not be challenged on constitutional grounds, all they have to do is add some spending to the bill?
The relevant language regarding this particular ground is in Article I, Section 7:
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives
The logic of the precedents is that a bill which contains a tax which merely pays for spending in the bill that did not otherwise exist does not "raise revenue". That seems reasonable to me.
EDIT: The two cases cited were decided in 1897 and 1906 and both cite ex-Chief Justice Story's massive Commentaries on the Constitution written in 1833:
"that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue."
1 Story on Constitution § 880.
There isn't any doubt that the PPACA is a "bill for other purposes" which "incidentally creates revenue" the same as the two bills in the cases cited.
Originally posted by EladarYes, maybe the Constitution should be changed as to provide the voter with more choices, won't you agree?
What many voters want is irrelevant. All you need is a simple majority of the vote (electoral for President).
Even so, how can you get a good person elected if you only have choices that will promote the status quo?
Originally posted by EladarThere are plenty of choices available that do not "promote the status quo" if people look past the first two columns on the ballot.
What many voters want is irrelevant. All you need is a simple majority of the vote (electoral for President).
Even so, how can you get a good person elected if you only have choices that will promote the status quo?
Originally posted by no1marauderCan you provide some analysis next time rather than copying and pasting a court's opinion out of context and then providing a snarky conclusion?
As usual, you completely misread a precedent. From its Syllabus:
The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. [b]This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196,
Page 495 U. S. 387
and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, t ...[text shortened]... "
Same as the "tax" on persons who don't purchase health insurance.[/b]
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Obamacare falls outside of US v. Munoz-Flores because the Shared Responsibility Payment is paid directly into the Treasury rather than to some other government fund or program.
A statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a “Bil[l] for raising Revenue” within the meaning of the Origination Clause. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 398 (1990). The statute at issue in Munoz-Flores, 18 U.S.C. § 3013, assessed fines to convicted persons to be paid directly into the Crimes Victim Fund, which was used to support programs that compensate and support victims. See 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (1982 ed., Supp. II) (Crimes Victim Fund). However, Congress specified that if the total income to the Fund from all sources exceeded $100 million in any one year, the excess would be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury. § 10601(c)(1). The defendant challenging § 3013 argued that it was a revenue raising bill because some of the penalties that it imposed ended up in the general fund of the Treasury pursuant to § 10601(c)(1). The Supreme Court held that § 3013 wasn't revenue raising bill because the purpose of § 3013 was to support the Crime Victims Fund and not the Federal Government generally. That is to say, any revenue for the general Treasury was incidental to the provision's primary purpose.
Obamacare's Shared Responsibility Payment stands in stark contrast to § 3013 from Munoz-Flores. The Shared Responsibility Payment is assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes; thus, the payment goes directly to the Treasury rather than to some other fund or government program. See 26 U.S.C § 5000A(g)(1) ("The penalty...shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as an assessable penalty under subchapter B of chapter 68" ); 26 U.S.C. § 6671(a) ("The penalties and liabilities provided by this subchapter shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes" ). Because the Shared Responsibility Payment goes directly to the Treasury rather than to a specific government program, the Shared Responsibility Payment raises revenue to support the Federal Government generally. Thus, Obamacare constitutes a "bill for raising revenue" for purposes of the Origination Clause.
Originally posted by MoneyManMikeObama care is under attack, not only by Republicans, but by many groups like labor unions which have typically been supporters of Obama.
Can you provide some analysis next time rather than copying and pasting a court's opinion out of context and then providing a snarky conclusion?
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Obamacare falls outside of US v. Munoz-Flores because the Shared Responsibility Payment is paid directly into the Treasury rather than to some other government fund or program.
...[text shortened]... acare constitutes a "bill for raising revenue" for purposes of the Origination Clause.
There are huge numbers of opt outs, and attempts for exemption. The administration of this thing is an impossible task. Was it meant to fail?
I believe, yes it was. And it will, the question is when it does, will the alternative be a single payer system, or reverting to at least a semi market version.
The promises of lower costs, increased coverage, no more uninsureds, no more limitations on coverage are all pie in the sky lies, which can never happen under any system.
I've always been under the impression that both taxing and spending originate in the House, specifically in the Ways and Means committee. Of course, SCOTUS has always been accommodating to maneuvers around the Constitution.
Originally posted by MoneyManMikeSorry but neither Justice Story nor the two vintage cases engaged in such hair splitting and Munoz-Flores made no such assertion that the revenue couldn't go to the US Treasury.
Can you provide some analysis next time rather than copying and pasting a court's opinion out of context and then providing a snarky conclusion?
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Obamacare falls outside of US v. Munoz-Flores because the Shared Responsibility Payment is paid directly into the Treasury rather than to some other government fund or program.
acare constitutes a "bill for raising revenue" for purposes of the Origination Clause.
From Twin City:
"The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose, by the act or by any of its provisions, to raise revenue to be applied
Page 202 U. S. 437
in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government."
From Millard:
This language is applicable to the acts of Congress in the case at bar. Whatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act.
Moreover in Munoz-Flores the statute specifically declared that amounts over a certain threshold would go directly to Treasury!
EDIT" "Out of context"??? LMFAO!!!!!
Originally posted by MoneyManMikeIn any event, plaintiffs did not raise this issue in any Court in the litigation and the government did argue the "tax" rationale. Thus, any such objection was waived.
Almost a year ago, the US Supreme Court upheld Obamacare's Individual Mandate as a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power. NFIB v. Sebelius. The Supreme Court's holding, however, has raised a new question. Because the Individual Mandate is a tax, did Congress follow the necessary Constitutional procedures required before certain tax bills c ...[text shortened]... onald[/i]. Sorry Stevens, the Constitution means what it says!
Civil Pro 101, MMM.