18 May 10
1 edit
Originally posted by no1marauderObviously, the Supreme Court agrees with you; so I guess the law of the land is what it is.
I'll make you happy:
The person in question was arrested for possessing child pornography which is presumably "interstate commerce". Since he's still a "threat" to purchase child pornography, civilly committing him has an "effect" on interstate commerce and is thus a legitimate use of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.
...[text shortened]... civilly committing them for the same purposes raises no real separation of power issue.
To me though, allowing the federal government to civilly commit people for the safety of the general public with no real nexus to interstate commerce makes a mockery of the concept of enumerated powers and federalism.
So, either we should just admit that federalism is a defunct concept and take the Lopez and Morrisson shackles off of Congress or we should be consistent about it.
How is it consistent to allow these civil commitments while striking down the federal gun free school zones act and federal cause of action in the Violence Against Women's act (which were struck down as being beyond Congress' power to regulate commerce)?
Seems like the Supremes are making this stuff up as they go along.
18 May 10
Originally posted by no1marauderwhy does Congress need to do it if the power is already delegated to the States?
This type of argument has been rejected consistently by the Supreme Court since McCullough v. Maryland (that's about 200 years ago) and was rejected again today.
The idea that Congress is barred from "acting to protect the general welfare of the people" would have been found amusing by the Framers.
18 May 10
Originally posted by sh76It is consistent with allowing the Feds to imprison sexual predators to allow the Feds to civilly commit them if the latter practice is allowed at all. Other than parroting a few right wing talking points, you've yet to come up with a single reason why it shouldn't be.
Obviously, the Supreme Court agrees with you; so I guess the law of the land is what it is.
To me though, allowing the federal government to civilly commit people for the safety of the general public with no real nexus to interstate commerce makes a mockery of the concept of enumerated powers and federalism.
So, either we should just admit that federalism ...[text shortened]... r to regulate commerce)?
Seems like the Supremes are making this stuff up as they go along.
18 May 10
Originally posted by no1marauderWhat does this have to do with right wing? If anything, Thomas' position is the liberal position.
It is consistent with allowing the Feds to imprison sexual predators to allow the Feds to civilly commit them if the latter practice is allowed at all. Other than parroting a few right wing talking points, you've yet to come up with a single reason why it shouldn't be.
In any case, let's try this once more:
- Criminalizing sexual abuse that has a nexus to interstate commerce is arguably regulating commerce. Keeping offenders in prison is necessary and proper to regulate commerce because effective way to regulate this aspect of commerce is to punish the offense. Keeping them in prison is punishing the offense. The offense impacted interstate commerce. Ergo, the imprisonment is a regulation of interstate commerce.
- Keeping the offenders in civil confinement bears no relationship to the original crime. Therefore, it bears no nexus to interstate commerce. It is merely keeping them locked up to protect society. It is not within Congress' enumerated power.
18 May 10
Originally posted by MelanerpesI agree. People can belch while crossing a state line, but that doesn't imply that the Constitution puts indigestion within the scope of Federal government regulation.
In today's world of modern electronics and tansportation, is there any aspect of life that is NOT in some way connected with "interstate commerce"? Seems like that clause could be (and has been) used to justify almost any federal action.
18 May 10
Originally posted by sh76In what possible way is Thomas' position a "liberal" one? He approves of civil commitment and was in the 5 judge majority OKing it in 1997. And attempts to limit the application of the Commerce Clause to favor economic elites were the hallmarks of ultraconservatives judges like Sutherland and Butler. Plus he is trying to do so by using a method of parsing Constitutional text in a cramped and crabbed way which has been rejected by "liberal" judges for about 200 years.
What does this have to do with right wing? If anything, Thomas' position is the liberal position.
In any case, let's try this once more:
- Criminalizing sexual abuse that has a nexus to interstate commerce is arguably regulating commerce. Keeping offenders in prison is necessary and proper to regulate commerce because effective way to regulate this aspec ...[text shortened]... erely keeping them locked up to protect society. It is not within Congress' enumerated power.
Your argument is incoherent and logically faulty. Your assertion that "Keeping the offenders in civil confinement bears no relationship to the original crime" is factually incorrect. And surely it is just as effective a regulation of commerce to keep people imprisoned who are likely to commit a crime effecting interstate commerce as it to imprison them for doing the proscribed act in the first place. Of course, an attempt to draw an impassable line between what is a "regulation of interstate commerce" and what is "for the welfare of society" is senseless; surely a policy can (and should be) both.
18 May 10
1 edit
Originally posted by no1marauderWhat is the purpose of the commitment beyond the end of the sentence?
In what possible way is Thomas' position a "liberal" one? He approves of civil commitment and was in the 5 judge majority OKing it in 1997. And attempts to limit the application of the Commerce Clause to favor economic elites were the hallmarks of ultraconservatives judges like Sutherland and Butler. Plus he is trying to do so by using a method of parsin "for the welfare of society" is senseless; surely a policy can (and should be) both.
If it's continued punishment for the original crime, it's unconstitutional. You can't punish someone for a crime when he's already served his sentence; especially if the commitment goes beyond the statutory maximum.
If it's not continued punishment for the original crime, then it bears no relationship to the original crime. It's to protect society in general. That is not a goal the is a regulation of interstate commerce. As to whether a criminal statute bears a substantial enough nexus to commerce, that's what Lopez was about.
Of course, an attempt to draw an impassable line between what is a "regulation of interstate commerce" and what is "for the welfare of society" is senseless; surely a policy can (and should be) both.
Yes, it can be both. And if it's both, that's fine. But if it's ONLY for the welfare of society and NOT for a purpose enumerated in the Constitution, then it's beyond Congress' authority and is unconstitutional.
Edit: Thomas' position is the liberal one because it inhibits the ability of government to arbitrarily hold people prisoner beyond the duration of their sentence. You seemingly took the position earlier that this was the correct outcome, even if for the wrong reason.
18 May 10
2 edits
Originally posted by sh76The purpose of committment would be to prevent the person committed from again adversely effecting interstate commerce by doing the same proscribed act he was orginally imprisoned for. How does that " bear[s] no relationship to the original crime" in your mind?
What is the purpose of the commitment beyond the end of the sentence?
If it's continued punishment for the original crime, it's unconstitutional. You can't punish someone for a crime when he's already served his sentence; especially if the commitment goes beyond the statutory maximum.
If it's not continued punishment for the original crime, then it bears sition earlier that this was the correct outcome, even if for the wrong reason.
Lopez is inapposite; this isn't a criminal statute.
EDIT: To your edit: BS. It was Thomas who cast the deciding vote in 1997 to OK civil committment in the first place. In fact, he wrote the majority opinion.
18 May 10
3 edits
Originally posted by no1marauderBecause it's too highly speculative to say holding people in prison regulates interstate commerce because otherwise they might be out interfering with commerce. In Lopez, the government made a similar argument: Guns in schools interferes with education; poor education leads to poor producers in the future which hurts commerce. The Court rejected it. It's too speculative and too attenuated.
The purpose of committment would be to prevent the person committed from again adversely effecting interstate commerce by doing the same proscribed act he was orginally imprisoned for. How does that " bear[s] no relationship to the original crime" in your mind?
Lopez is inapposite; this isn't a criminal statute.
Punishing a crime that, in itself, had a connection to commerce or federal property, is a different story. Notice that the federal criminal sexual abuse statutes are all limited to crimes on federal jurisdictions or those involving commerce.
Obviously anything could be stretched to fit the definition of a commerce regulation. The question is what's reasonable and what has a direct enough relationship to commerce.
Morisson wasn't about a criminal statute either. The Court applied the Lopez analysis (with some twists, of course) just the same.
18 May 10
1 edit
Originally posted by sh76How is it "speculative" under the particular facts of this case? Because you and Thomas say so?
Because it's too highly speculative to say holding people in prison regulates interstate commerce because otherwise they might be out interfering with commerce. In Lopez, the government made a similar argument: Guns in schools interferes with education; poor education leads to poor producers in the future which hurts commerce. The Court rejected it. It's too sp te either. The Court applied the Lopez analysis (with some twists, of course) just the same.
We have a prior sex offender convicted of possessing child pornography. We have findings that he has a mental disorder which will almost inevitably lead to him committing such acts again. The government's reasoning here isn't anything like that in Lopez and it is disingenuous or ignorant to assert otherwise.