Originally posted by no1marauderWell, the SPB wouldn't really be supreme if there was an independent appeals process, or if it could be overturned at any point by the people, now would it? Even a SPB can be consistent with democratic ideals if it is suitably constrained by other powers.
In my view, no. Your example is clearly inapplicable to the present case; it is absolutely obvious that the vagueness of the provision that the Mayor was punished under doesn't "clearly outlaw such behavior" as he engaged in.
Anyone who believes that anything like the Supreme Power Board Act could be law and that the State in which it was could still be said to be a democracy has a flawed concept of the latter term.
Originally posted by bbarrI really don't see how. The wording of the statute would make nugatory any truly independent appeal process, just as the wording of the Standards in the Livingstone case makes any appeal worthless. Appellate courts are constrained from overturning administrative panels by rules which give deference to the board's findings and may overturn only when the original decision is "clearly erroneous" or some such exacting standard ("arbitrary and capricious" is another standard used in such cases). Since the wording of the standard is so vague, no appellate court could make such a finding unless it acted in a arbitrary maner itself.
Well, the SPB wouldn't really be supreme if there was an independent appeals process, or if it could be overturned at any point by the people, now would it? Even a SPB can be consistent with democratic ideals if it is suitably constrained by other powers.
Originally posted by no1marauderNo, your SPB statute is perfectly consistent with an independent appeals process, as long as the appellate officers are appointed. This point generalizes. What seem to be unjust abridgments of personal freedom of elected officials may be permissible if they arise from or are constrained by democratic processes.
I really don't see how. The wording of the statute would make nugatory any truly independent appeal process, just as the wording of the Standards in the Livingstone case makes any appeal worthless. Appellate courts are constrained from overturning administrative panels by rules which give deference to the board's findings and may overturn only when the o ...[text shortened]... no appellate court could make such a finding unless it acted in a arbitrary maner itself.
Originally posted by bbarrIt's pointless to have elected officials who can be removed from office any time an unelected body deems it a good idea to do so. That is what the SPB and the vague standards in this case make possible. You're confusing the trappings of democracy with the reality of democracy.
No, your SPB statute is perfectly consistent with an independent appeals process, as long as the appellate officers are appointed. This point generalizes. What seem to be unjust abridgments of personal freedom of elected officials may be permissible if they arise from or are constrained by democratic processes.
http://www.adjudicationpanel.co.uk/documents/notice_of_decision.pdf
On a point of fact (you may know this already), Mr Livingstone was suspended for breaching the Greater London Authority code of conduct which he had voluntarily signed (as all members do). The Standards Board referred the matter to the Adjudication Panel which had to consider whether he had breached the GLA code. (The Standards Board can also refer a case back to the internal standards committee of the relevant authority.)
The test used by the Adjudication Panel was whether "a reasonable onlooker in possession of relevant facts WOULD find that he had caused damage to the reputation of the office" (my caps - see para 16 of the notice of decision). I guess this is a balance of probabilities matter. And as an objective test it is pretty much identical to that used in libel cases.
I mention this mainly because I too find "could" an odd choice of word.
Members of the Adjudication Panel are appointed by the Lord Chancellor in consultation with the deputy prime minister. The idea is that many members have legal expertise and so are qualified to rule on matters of law in a way that the Standards Board, or a local authority committee of elected members, may not be.
Originally posted by no1marauderThe test they actually applied used "would", not "could". Does this make you feel better about it?
No. I already directly quoted the provision that was used and discussed the vagueness and uselessness of it as a "code of conduct". What else do you want?
Do you have a problem with using what a "reasonable person" would think, on the balance of probabilities? Or is it just the specific provision of the code?