10 Nov 03
Originally posted by bbarrBbarr, you write: "They cannot consent to the decision .... etc"
But this assumes that the only relevant moral consideration is the balance of pain vs. pleasure in the suicidal subject's life. It almost seems that you are assuming that the value of a life is a function of the happiness in it? Is that correct?
But it is clearly not the case that the future pain or pleasure in a subject's life is the only relevant mora ...[text shortened]... e is such cases would be similar to allowing a person to be hit by a car, or fall off a cliff.
I'm probably wrong but can I conclude from your post here that you do not agree with ending Terri Chiavo's life because she cannot consent to the decision and she has not written a living will ?
or are the criteria different in the Terri Case because this is not a case of assisted suicide ?
10 Nov 03
Originally posted by PyrrhoPyrrho: "It seems to me that the real starting point therefore shoud be the question of active euthanasia." Pyrrho
The slippery slope argument suggests that accepting something that is in itself reasonable and good will inevitably lead into something objectionable. Looking at your description of the process in the Netherlands there, first, it seems to start from a position that is non-controversial; very few would object to passive euthanasia. It seems to me that the real ...[text shortened]... so it can be used as a scare tactic to further just about any resistance to any idea.
-Jarno
The starting point of what ?
10 Nov 03
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrIn your view, bbarr, suicide can be reasonable, assisted suicide can be reasonable .....
Well that seems to be the difference here then. You were engaged in an explanatory project, confronting the mistakes in reasoning that had brought about what, in your opinion, is an unjust state of affairs. I'm more interested in the norma ...[text shortened]... roject here is theoretical, as philosophical projects tend to be.
Your moral views are relative, pragmatic, formal, burocratic, seemingly objective and above all wrong. I doubt whether they have anything to do with the authority you are presenting to us, Emmanuel Kant. He is not around anymore to contradict you ...
If you want people to have the right to kill, then you want what every totalitarian movement wants.
Did Emmanuel Kant want that too ?
10 Nov 03
Ivanhoe,
I've been a bit too occupied for the last few days to comment, but here goes:
First, you say:
Your words Pyrrho, are witnesses to me that you look at these very complicated processes from a very theoretical point of view and I'm not sure that you will be able to resist their "arguments". I've seen al lot of my friends "crack". Partly because if they oppose these thoughts, they are no longer considered to be progressive or liberal. They will be labelled conservative, old fashioned, square or even fundamentalist or even worse. The image of progressive liberal people is worth a lot to them.
Don't worry Ivanhoe, I've never been one to get attached to lables. 🙂 In fact, in a debate, I should be so lucky that someone try to argue against my views by calling me conservative or old fashioned, or any other dismissive lable for that matter. Anyone with basic debating skills, and who can keep their cool, would absolutely dismantle the poor debate opponent who tried a tactic as flawed as that.
In my opinion you look at these things from a very theoretical and therefore formal point of view. From a theoretical, "reasonable" and logical point of view the second Worl War could never have happened, let alone the tragic events that lead to and form the historical entity of what we now know as the Shoah.
In your theoretical reasoning there cannot be a place for manipulation or lies. How do you incorparate lies in your logical reasoning ?
Call me an idealist but I do believe that whether wisely with foresight, or the hard way with blood and tears, societies eventually learn to promote the most reasonable and least harmful policies. If by deceit and manipulation a harmful policy gets adopted, then society has, unfortunately just chosen the "blood and tears" way. Eventually the harmful policies, due to the harm they are found in practice to cause, will be reversed, the political fallout handled, and new lines drawn where they should have, by foresight, been drawn.
The only question is that is the benefit of the new policy important enough to risk having to learn the hard way, if that's what it takes. In this case, I think it clearly is - especially since I don't think that the risk that society will take the hard way is very great at all. With reasonable arguments so squarely on one side, it would be a sign of inexcusable incompetence on the side of the opponents of "the right to die for all" not to be able to refute the arguments of the proponents.
You of course wouldn't agree with me, because if I understand correctly, even if it could be absolutely guaranteed that the euthanasia laws would never be altered to include people beyond the terminally ill, you would still opose active euthanasia. In other words, for you it's not a slippery slope from a good state of affairs to a bad one, but rather from a bad state of affairs to worse.
And this may be part of the problem - if you try to argue against two cases at once, one reasonable and in line with public perception of justice, and one objectionable and on shaky grounds whereas reason goes, then you may be giving the perception that there's two camps that the public must chose from; the people who oppose euthanasia and the right to die for all, and the people for are in favour of both.
If you perceive the "right to die for all" as a danger to society, then why not argue alone against it? I and others here have given quite strong reasonable grounds for a completely secular opposition to the idea - why alienate the non-relegious part of the society by using religious arguments, when reasonable arguments apeal to the people that most need convincing?
What I find so distasteful about most religions is that they promote values which have no reasonable basis without the specific metaphysical beliefs that they hold. This often is at the expence of compassion, and what reason would tell us to be good.
What if you're wrong? What if there is no god to value the individual life? In that case, your opposition to euthanasia would be greatly injust would it not?
What if you're wrong to a lesser extent - what if there is a god, and he values life, but allows dying people to suffer simply to test the compassion of people around them? To see whether they would harden their hearts and minds to the pleads of the dying based on what they perceive to be god's will, or trust their compassion, conscience and reason to guide them? Then too you'd be arguing the injust position.
So what if, on the other hand, I am wrong? If there is a god that values life, and for some strange reason wants people to suffer inhumanely at the end of their lives? Then what would I have done wrong? I would have followed my (god given) conscience to argue what I genuinely believed to be right. How could that offend an omnipotent god? Indeed, how can an omnipotent god be offended, if he specifically doesn't want to be offended? And if God had decreed that he shall be offended by people euthanising suffering dying people pleading for euthanasia, then what is that rule based on but God's arbitrary decision?
And if God makes arbitrary decisions that go against our conscionces, and against reason, then how can he be just or good? Or alternatively, why did he give us concionces that go against his view of justice? And can God's self-imposed offence at our actions justly weigh more in the scale than the unbearable suffering of any sentient beeing, no matter how "unworthy"? After all, God has a choise of whether to be offended or not, the dying do not have the choise of whether to suffer or not - not at least if we don't choose to grant it.
-Jarno
10 Nov 03
Originally posted by ivanhoeThis is a difficult case. If it could be shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Terri Schiavo wouldn't have wanted to live as she now does, then I think we have an obligation to allow her to die. But in order to come to any determination on the subject, it is necessary to figure out what type of mental life Terri Schiavo now has. We can't try to infer as to what Terrri herself would have wanted unless we can accurately describe her current state. If there is not enough information to come to such a determination, then we must err on the side of caution and prolong her life. The fact that Terrri Schiavo cannot actually consent to anything anymore forces caution upon us.
Bbarr, you write: "They cannot consent to the decision .... etc"
I'm probably wrong but can I conclude from your post here that you do not agree with ending Terri Chiavo's life because she cannot consent to the decision and she has not written a living will ?
or are the criteria different in the Terri Case because this is not a case of assisted suicide ?
10 Nov 03
Originally posted by ivanhoeA run down of the attributes of my moral view:
In your view, bbarr, suicide can be reasonable, assisted suicide can be reasonable .....
Your moral views are relative, pragmatic, formal, burocratic, seemingly objective and above all wrong. I doubt whether they have anything to do with the authority you are presenting to us, Emmanuel Kant. He is not around anymore to contradict you ...
If you want ...[text shortened]... , then you want what every totalitarian movement wants.
Did Emmanuel Kant want that too ?
Relative: No (Moral obligations don't vary between persons, every person has the same moral obligations just in virtue of their rational nature.)
Pragmatic: No (Moral obligations aren't based on consequences like in utilitarianism.)
Formal: Yes (Immoral actions are a specied of irrational actions, and determining whther an action is irrational requires the use of formal principles, i.e., the categorical imperative)
Beaurocratic: No (No committees required)
Objective: Yes (Value arises from an objective fact about us, namely that we are reflective creatures capable of setting our own ends. Moral obligation arises from an internal consistency requirement. We can't both conceive of ourself as a locus is value and fail to extend this to other creatures; making exceptions of ourself is fundamentally irrational.)
Since you've obviously never read Kant, or any neo-Kantian moral philosophy, I'll forgive the name calling. But you really should study more before you come up with allegations such as these, as they make you look like an idiot.
10 Nov 03
Originally posted by bbarrRelative: because you pretend not having any dogma's. Anything goes, as long as it is reasonable and what ever is reasonable is what you and your "Logical Thinking Machine" decide. Anything else is dismissed as being dogmatic religious rubbish. Your thinking is intolerant towards other ways of perceiving things.
A run down of the attributes of my moral view:
Relative: No (Moral obligations don't vary between persons, every person has the same moral obligations just in virtue of their rational nature.)
Pragmatic: No (Moral obligations aren't based on consequences like in utilitarianism.)
Formal: Yes (Immoral actions are a specied of irrational actions, a ...[text shortened]... udy more before you come up with allegations such as these, as they make you look like an idiot.
I insist on calling your reasoning as being pragmatic, it differs from case to case, only the method of your "Logical Thinking Machine" remains the same, though you're trying hard to disguise that by throwing Mr. Kant into the ring.
I call your reasoning burocratic because you emphasize the procedures of your "Logical Thinking Machine". You just keep on talking about the procedures [See your faulty ( yes, I dare to disagree with you) reasoning or should I say misleading reasoning] regarding the "Just Case Bag".
Isn't the Categorical Imperative religious rubbish ? I hope you do not think that your teacher Mr.Kant invented that dogma. Of course you do not call this a dogma because you have integrated this into your own thinking and therefore it cannot be a dogma. It's all a matter of definition, isn't it bbarr.
Objective; I mean that you know, you just know, if you use the method correctly, that you are right. You're an "objective burocrat" in your thinking.The procedures count. The procedure is responsible, not you.
I'm not a philosopher, so ...
If you cannot make yourself clear in normal English, maybe you should ask yourself whether there is something wrong with your abilities in communicating with people you consider to be of a lower rank. I forgot to mention that your thinking, not necessarily your formal "Philosophical" thinking, is elitist.
As far as your last sentences are concerned: You should beware of talking down to people. You like to treat people as if they were your pupils and as a punishment you like to give them a verbal slap in the face in the form of an "advice". Be carefull bigboy bbarr, your arrogance is beginning to show and as you've probably noticed on earlier occasions I'm not particularly fond of such an attitude. Don't make me refresh the "Little Feud" thread .......
.
11 Nov 03
2 edits
Originally posted by ivanhoeNo, the use of reason to settle disputes is not dogmatic. To be dogmatic, it would have to be held without adequate grounds, as a mere tenet of faith. To establish that reason was dogmatic, you would have to argue against its use. To argue against its use you would have to use reason. In other words, in order to show that reason is dogmatic you would have to adopt its use. Thus, reason is immune to the charge of dogmatism. This is just a variation on the familiar claim that skepticism about reason is self-refuting.
Relative: because you pretend not having any dogma's. Anything goes, as long as it is reasonable and what ever is reasonable is what you and your "Logical Thinking Machine" decide. Anything else is dismissed as being dogmatic religious ...[text shortened]... on't make me refresh the "Little Feud" thread .......
.
I only brought up Kant because the moral theory I advocate is broadly similar to his, and those who have read Kant will notice the similarites. It is also similar to the social-contract theories that derive from Kant, as opposed to those that derive from Hobbes. This was not an attempt to obfuscate my view, but to indicate the the historical theory to which my view is indebted. I do not think that the moral worth of an action depends in any way on its consequences. I think that our obligations derive from rules of rationality, not contingencies like whether our actions maximize utility. Because I think that the moral law derives from rules of rationality, and because rules of rationality don't change from situation to situation, it follows that I think that the moral law doesn't change from situation to situation. So, your claim that my view is pragmatic because it differs from case to case is simply false. This is something you would recognize had you read Kant. The whole idea of a categorical imperative is that it is something we must do regardless of circumstances. Let me clarify: "Categorical" means something like "without exception" or "in all cases". "Imperative" means something like "something that ought to be done". When you put these together to form "Categorical Imperative", you get "something that ought always be done". For instance, one of Kant's formulations of the categorical imperative, called the formula of humanity, asserts that we ought always act so as to treat all persons as ends in and of themselves, and never solely as means. This means that it is never acceptable to treat someone merely as an instrument or tool for the satisfaction of your own ends. I take this to be a moral law, and it rules out things like deception and coercion in all cases. Hence, the moral theory I espouse does not, in any way, differ from case to case. Again, to the extent you think it does is the extent to which you misunderstand my view.
I've already answered your "bag of just cases" question in the other thread. You can say my reasoning is faulty, but that is not the same as providing an argument. It is not enough to just say that someone's reasoning is faulty, you need to show how it is faulty, and you have not begun to do this. If by empasizing the primacy of rules of rationality, and of reason itself, I meet your criterion for a view's being bureaucratic., then so be it. But recognize that your view will be in the same boat, for it has its own procedures. I emphasize the procedure of reasoning about the case, of reasoning about value, and what we ought to do. You look up in an old book the right thing to do, or you talk to people in positions of authority about what the right thing to do may be. Your procedures are certainly different than mine, but they are also procedures and they also require the use of reason (after all, you have to reason about the case at hand to determine which commandment applies). So your view is just as committed to the use of reason as my view, and to the extent that my view is bureaucratic for being so committed, yours is as well. But, there are also reasons to think that your view is, in fact, much more bureaucratic than my own. For instance, my view recognizes the autonomy of all rational creatures, and extends moral consideration to all creatures. Your view also respects all creatures, but does it not as the result of any reasonable argument, but rather as a tenet of faith. The moral legislator on my view is the rational being, we are all legislators in the Kingdom of Ends. The moral legislator on your view is God. Now, on any normal definition of the term "bureaucratic", your view seems to fit the bill better than mine, as yours is committed to there being an external hierarchy of authority that determines how things are to get done.
The categorical imperative has nothing to do with religion. The existence of God is completely immaterial to the validity of the categorical imperative. Yes, Kant came up with the idea of the categorical imperative, this is one of the reasons he is considered a great in philosophical ethics. Others have thought that all persons are deserving of respect, but it was Kant who thought that our moral obligations arose directly from what it is to be a rational creature.
Yes, as I said before, you're right that this view is objective in that it arises naturally from our nature as rational creatures. If I act immorally, then I am responsible. When I'm inclined to act contrary to the moral law, and I choose to do so, I am making an exception of myself. I'm being irrational in that I'm failing to see my victim as valuable in and of himself, even though my victim has the same qualities in virtue of which I conceive of myself as valuable. This inconsistency is irrational, and it is the form of irrationality at the heart of immoral actions. When I'm acting in this way, I'm responsible for what I've done. I'm responsible for treating my victim merely as a means to satisfaction of my own ends.
If you want to have a clear discussion, then pay attention to what I say and what I don't say. Don't make groundless accusations like "your view is relative, bureaucratic, etc." without at least trying to make an argument. You systematically fail to respond to what people actually post, and prefer to put words in their mouths, lump people together into groups regardless of their protestations, and slander people with claims like "you think people should have a right to kill". In short, your just completely awful to debate with. If you want to be taken seriously, and if you want your ideas to be taken seriously, then at least try to stay on track in a discussion, without resorting to groundless accusations. How on earth can you expect to be taken seriously about, for instance, the categorical imperative when it is so clear that you have no idea what it is? Just like in the other thread, where you try to lump Kant together with the Nazi's (??) by bringing up Heidegger. Now, this doesn't mean that Kant wasn't a racist. His personal views about Jews, africans, native-americans, etc. were obscene. As a matter of historical fact, Kant thought that the white man was something like a paradigm of humankind. But this doesn't mean that any Kantian moral theory is committed to the particular views Kant had about what he took to be the world's races. It certainly isn't the case that the actual arguments that support Kant's moral theory have racist presuppositions. I like Kant's arguments, and I like the structure of his moral theory. But Kant's own racism disgusts me.
Now, I'll check back here periodically to see if you have succeeded in coming up with an actual argument. When I see one, I'll respond.
11 Nov 03
1 edit
Originally posted by PyrrhoPyrrho,
Ivanhoe,
I've been a bit too occupied for the last few days to comment, but here goes:
First, you say:
[quote]Your words Pyrrho, are witnesses to me that you look at these very complicated processes from a very theoretical point of v ...[text shortened]... r or not - not at least if we don't choose to grant it.
-Jarno
You claim, as a Freethinker, to hold logical thoughts based on reason. You think that what you assume about religion is true. Your views are the right views and you start reasoning from there. I often said there is not much wrong with the Freethinkers "Logical Thinking Machine" except maybe that it reached almost untouchable divine status.
There are a lot of things that I cannot agree with in your post, but I want to look at one thing that is essential in your ( and the Freethinkers) flawed perception of what the Christian religion is all about
Pyrrho :"What I find so distasteful about most religions is that they promote values which have no reasonable basis without the specific metaphysical beliefs that they hold. This often is at the expence of compassion, and what reason would tell us to be good." Pyrrho
Let's discuss the prejudices (yes, I'm sorry) you and bbarr and a lot of Freethinkers hold about religion.
You assume that God wants us to suffer.
Is that really true ? On what grounds dou you assume that ?
My claim: God does not want us to suffer. On the contrary, His plan is to deliver us from suffering.
11 Nov 03
Originally posted by bbarr
No, the use of reason to settle disputes is not dogmatic. To be dogmatic, it would have to be held without adequate grounds, as a mere tenet of faith. To establish that reason was dogmatic, you would have to argue against its use. To argue against its use you would have to use reason. In other words, in order to show that reason is dogmatic you would have ...[text shortened]... if you have succeeded in coming up with an actual argument. When I see one, I'll respond.
Bbarr,
Thanks for your post and for answering me in detail. What I want to make you clear, is not that simple, on the other hand it is.
Let me try:
You allready explained that Mr. Kant has created his philosophy, his way of thinking. That philosophy was and is majestic. His views on Jews and other races were not that majestic. If I was to meet Mr. Kant I wanted to discuss his racial views. Question: Do you think that he would have been able to defend his racial views as being rational and reasonable using his own philosophy ?
11 Nov 03
Hi Ivanhoe,
replying point by point here is best I think.
Ivanhoe: " You claim, as a Freethinker, to hold logical thoughts based on reason."
Not exactly correct - I claim, as a freethinker, to do my best at assuring that all beliefs are firmly founded in reason, and that they are logically coherent. I do not claim to be fully successful - I'm sure there are things that I currently believe in that I am wrong about. I even concede to the possibility that there may just be major errors in my views. But what I do claim is that if those flaws in my thinking are pointed out, and it is explained why my reasoning is in error, I'll change my mind. I won't change my mind just because someone says I'm wrong, or someone points to an authority that says I'm wrong, but I'm quite willing to do so if that someone qualifies that claim with reason, and refutes my objections. This, I think, is the essense and ideal of freethougth - to be able to admit to one's own fallibility, even when it comes to our most cherished beliefs.
Ivanhoe: "I often said there is not much wrong with the Freethinkers "Logical Thinking Machine" except maybe that it reached almost untouchable divine status. "
And I don't quite understand this objection. Do you not believe that all true things are reasonable, and that no true thing can violate logic? Nobody has a monopoly on reason, and everybody is welcome to apply it to defend their views. If some people are highly succesful in defending their views with reason, then that should give reason to at least consider that their points may indeed be reasonable. And if their points are wrong, then they won't have reason on their sides - if you are right, then reason is your ally.
Ivanhoe: "Let's discuss the prejudices (yes, I'm sorry) you and bbarr and a lot of Freethinkers hold about religion.
You assume that God wants us to suffer.
Is that really true ? On what grounds dou you assume that ?"
First a bit nitpicking, forgive me: Of course I don't believe that there is such a thing as God, so I don't assume anything about him either.
But I do claim that the logical consequence of an omnipotent beeing existing in a world with suffering in it implies that that omnipotent beeing either wants that suffering, or is indifferent to it. This I think is quite self evident.
The usual answer I get from the theist has to do with God wanting to grant us free will. This answer is flawed first because an all-knowing beeing and free will of agents other than that beeing are mutually exclusive properties; they lead to a logical contradiction, as I remember was discussed in an earlier thread some time ago. Secondly, even if we ignore that logical contradiction, the answer is inadequate; it fails to explain suffering that is not the consequence of conscious human choises.
If there is a god that doesn't want suffering then why does he allow it?
-Jarno
12 Nov 03
Originally posted by Pyrrho
Hi Ivanhoe,
replying point by point here is best I think.
Ivanhoe: " You claim, as a Freethinker, to hold logical thoughts based on reason."
Not exactly correct - I claim, as a freethinker, to do my best at assuring that all beliefs are firmly founded in reason, and that they are logically coherent. I do not claim to be fully successful - I ...[text shortened]... hoises.
If there is a god that doesn't want suffering then why does he allow it?
-Jarno
If there is a god that doesn't want suffering then why does he allow it?
What do you think is the essential (crucial) meaning of Jesus Christ suffering and dying on the cross ?
12 Nov 03
Originally posted by Pyrrho
Hi Ivanhoe,
replying point by point here is best I think.
Ivanhoe: " You claim, as a Freethinker, to hold logical thoughts based on reason."
Not exactly correct - I claim, as a freethinker, to do my best at assuring that all beliefs are firmly founded in reason, and that they are logically coherent. I do not claim to be fully successful - I ...[text shortened]... hoises.
If there is a god that doesn't want suffering then why does he allow it?
-Jarno
Pyrrho: "If there is a god that doesn't want suffering then why does he allow it?"
Allow me to invite you to enter the reasoning of the Christian faith:
What is in your opinion the essential meaning of Jesus Christs suffering and dying on the cross ?
12 Nov 03
Originally posted by ivanhoeI hope this has something to do with an attempt at an explanation as to the reason for the existence of suffering. So with that in mind, I'll answer your question:
Pyrrho: "If there is a god that doesn't want suffering then why does he allow it?"
Allow me to invite you to enter the reasoning of the Christian faith:
What is in your opinion the essential meaning of Jesus Christs suffering and dying on the cross ?
Not believing that there is God, or that Jeesus was nothing but a leader of a religious group, I don't think there was any "essential meaning" in his death.
But I assume that you mean to ask is whether I know the Christian view on the matter. From a Christian point of view, Christ's suffering and death was an atonement for the sins of mankind, with the purpose of granting people the option of being forgiven for their sins and thus "saved". Being saved presumably involves some sort of reward after death, while dying without being saved presumably leads to some degree of peril (Ranging from eternal torment in the fires of Hell all the way to the vague "separation from God" depending on your particular interpretation of the Bible.)
I'll hold my my critisism of the logical failings of that scenario till later, so that you may complete whatever point you have behind this question, and correct me in any inaccuracy that may exist in that explantion.
-Jarno
12 Nov 03
Originally posted by ivanhoeHis moral philosophy is quite distinct from his anthropological views. It is these later views that erroneously lead him to the conclusion that other races are essentially different in terms of their capacity for autonomy and rationality. Since it is rationality on which morality is based, on Kant's view, he concludes that other races can't clearly perceive the moral law (though he believes they can be trained to follow it). I do not think that Kant's philosophy can be used to support his racism. The racism comes first, and then gets "plugged into" the moral theory. He would have to support his racist views on other grounds. But this is all completely irrelevant to the point we were discussing.
Bbarr,
Thanks for your post and for answering me in detail. What I want to make you clear, is not that simple, on the other hand it is.
Let me try:
You allready explained that Mr. Kant has created his philosophy, his way of thinking. That philosophy was and is majestic. His views on Jews and other races were not that majestic. If I was to meet ...[text shortened]... ble to defend his racial views as being rational and reasonable using his own philosophy ?