many-worlds fail

Originally posted by apathist
No. Say again: no. Events are caused.

You now contradict what you said earlier as determinism not "making sense" (at least in the context of mind, for some reason I cannot fathom).

Are you absolutely addicted to the idea that at the start of our universe, your very next actions are predicated?

No, I don't and never have believe every event is predictable.
I never said nor implied anything about predictability. There is very clear evidence of unpredictability in our universe.
You seem to confuse determinism with predictability; we can have total determinism (i.e. each and every outcome determined by causes to make it inevitable the outcome was what it was and not some other outcome) but still have huge unpredictability ( i.e. lack of ability to reliably predict many outcomes). There is no contradiction of an unpredictable event being determined thus no contradiction between determinism and unpredictability.

Originally posted by apathist
probabilistic causation

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/

This is new shiite. Lots of issues. We're ready to wean off of the stupid deterministic teat. I mean yeah it was wonderful and tasty, but let us grow up soon alright?

I will look at that link later but the usual logical error every link I have ever seen that gives a said definition of 'cause', of equivocation of what we mean by something with how we might come to know that that something is the case. The problem here is not with the meaning of X caused Y, which does makes sense; the problem here is the usual definition fails to state what we can rationally actually mean by it because, instead, it states how we might come to know X caused Y, which isn't the same thing at all and is not what we rationally can mean by X caused Y.

(I admit I haven't yet come around to formulating a proper formal definition of causation that doesn't make that logical error but, only on specific request, I will try my best to do so here)

Originally posted by humy
I have just looked at that link and I take it it makes the usual logical error, as does every other link I have ever seen that gives a said definition of 'cause', of equivocation of what we mean by something with how we might come to know that that something is the case. The problem here is not with the meaning of X caused Y, which [i]does[ ...[text shortened]... doesn't make that logical error but, only on specific request, I will try my best to do so here)

Sorry this is a bit garbled. You have this sentence:

The problem here is not with the meaning of X caused Y, which does makes sense; the problem here is the usual definition fails to state what we can rationally actually mean by it because, instead, it states how we might come to know X caused Y, which isn't the same thing at all and is not what we rationally can mean by X caused Y."

You are saying that the sentence "X caused Y." is meaningful. But you then go on to say that there is a problem with what we can "rationally actually mean by X caused Y" which is the same sentence.

Are you saying that the sentence: "X caused Y" is meaningful but a sentence like: "We know that X caused Y" is problematic? So that an ontological statement is being confounded with an epistemological one.

Originally posted by DeepThought
Sorry this is a bit garbled. You have this sentence:[quote]The problem here is not with the meaning of X caused Y, which does makes sense; the problem here is the usual definition fails to state what we can rationally actually mean by it because, instead, it states how we might come to know X caused Y, which isn't the same th ...[text shortened]... problematic? So that an ontological statement is being confounded with an epistemological one.

Are you saying that the sentence: "X caused Y" is meaningful but a sentence like: "We know that X caused Y" is problematic?

depends in what context you mean "problematic"; "We know that X caused Y" IS, at least generically and intrinsically, perfectly meaningful and just as meaningful as just "X caused Y". But it would still be erroneous to define what we mean by "X caused Y" in terms of how we might come to know "X caused Y" so, in other words, purely in the narrow context of the definition of "X caused Y", "We know that X caused Y" is sidetracking to irrelevancy because how we know it has nothing to do with it; that is what I am saying.

So that an ontological statement is being confounded with an epistemological one.

I am not sure why you say "ontological statement" above or how ontology exactly relates to what I mean here although I admit that may be because I have very poor understanding of that branch of philosophy because I have never got around to study any of it so you may validly see some valid relationship with it that I don't.
I would prefer to say this is a case of epistemological statements being misidentified as definitional statements.

Originally posted by humy

Are you saying that the sentence: "X caused Y" is meaningful but a sentence like: "We know that X caused Y" is problematic?

depends in what context you mean "problematic"; "We know that X caused Y" IS, at least generically and intrinsically, perfectly meaningful and just as meaningful as just "X caused Y". But it would still be erroneous ...[text shortened]... say this is a case of epistemological statements being misidentified as definitional statements.

Ontology is about what is: "X caused Y".
Epistemology is about how and what we can know: "How we know X caused Y."

So I think you are complaining of a blurring of ontology with epistemology. I see what you're getting at now. Hume's good on this stuff.

Originally posted by DeepThought
No, this seems to be your basic misunderstanding. Both entities have continuity. We don't provide a template for them and they don't for us. To get this you need to look at the mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics, it's a matter of how the wavefunction is partitioned, it's not a physical copying in the way you seem to think it is.

Edit: T ...[text shortened]... e seeing the up state and one the down state (or whatever the quantum number being measured is).

Both entities do not have continuity. Only one already existed. MWI is so weak and stupid that toddler logic kills it!

And we all die an infinity of times every micro-micro moment? Sure we do. You clearly understand continuity.

Originally posted by humy
You now contradict what you said earlier as determinism not "making sense" (at least in the context of mind, for some reason I cannot fathom).

Are you absolutely addicted to the idea that at the start of our universe, your very next actions are predicated?

No, I don't and never have believe every event is predictable.
I never said nor ...[text shortened]... edictable event being determined thus no contradiction between determinism and unpredictability.

Actually we're on the same page, except you haven't researched the terms enough. Determinism says that if we have access to all relevant information, then the future is exactly predictable with no exceptions. This is why, as I said, I'd rather use "probabilistic" than "random". Random events do not contradict determinism. Probabilistic events do contradict determinism.

Determinism is dead, but there are acolytes all kicking it, trying to resuscitate it, inventing infinities of universes or killing everyone over and over again. And they think they are using logic, reason, and critical thinking. They are not. They are abusing those notions as they try to force reality to conform to their expectations.

Originally posted by apathist
Both entities do not have continuity. [b]Only one already existed. MWI is so weak and stupid that toddler logic kills it!

And we all die an infinity of times every micro-micro moment? Sure we do. You clearly understand continuity.[/b]

Asserting that both entities do not have continuity does not make it so. That you won't accept the concept doesn't make it invalid. Your argument against MWI is unsound.

Originally posted by DeepThought
Asserting that both entities do not have continuity does not make it so. That you won't accept the concept doesn't make it invalid. Your argument against MWI is unsound.

I'm still not clear as to whether or not MWI is supposed to be literal, or if it's only meant to be a conceptual construct that appears to work within the realm of quantum formulas/equations.

I almost hate to ask this, but is it one or the other... or perhaps both?

Originally posted by lemon lime
I'm still not clear as to whether or not MWI is supposed to be literal, or if it's only meant to be a conceptual construct that appears to work within the realm of quantum formulas/equations.

I almost hate to ask this, but is it one or the other... or perhaps both?

For now I think it represents a way of explaining some aspects of quantum mechanics, collapse of wavefunctions and so forth, so for now it is just in the realm of supposition.

Just like string theory, a theory without predictions.

Originally posted by lemon lime
I'm still not clear as to whether or not MWI is supposed to be literal, or if it's only meant to be a conceptual construct that appears to work within the realm of quantum formulas/equations.

I almost hate to ask this, but is it one or the other... or perhaps both?

Literal, Everett clearly intended that. Take a look at his Wikipedia page and the bit about his death, and quantum immortality.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hugh_Everett_III

Originally posted by sonhouse
... a theory without predictions.

Yes. MWI isn't even a theory, it is just bad philosophy.

It's interesting to compare the two main apologetics for it in this thread. tw says we go down all the branches. DT says we don't go down any of the branches.

Confirming that the idea of our world having only one particular future must be fatal to MWI.

Originally posted by apathist
Yes. MWI isn't even a theory, it is just bad philosophy.

It's interesting to compare the two main apologetics for it in this thread. tw says we go down all the branches. DT says we don't go down any of the branches.

Confirming that the idea of our world having only one particular future must be fatal to MWI.

I did not say that at all. In each universe which has a person in it who was once identical to me, in the language of possible world semantics from modal logic this would be an accessibility criterion, I have a counterpart. My consciousness is to all practical purposes restricted to the one universe but my counterparts are between similar and identical to me. In MWI the universe has more than one future, I agree that if it were the case that there is only one possible future MWI could not be true, but you haven't shown that there is only one possible future. Again borrowing the possible worlds language, you haven't shown that there is only one actual world.

There's a trap for you to fall into if you reply to this post. I'm curious to see if you do.

Originally posted by DeepThought
I did not say that at all. In each universe which has a person in it who was once identical to me, in the language of possible world semantics from modal logic this would be an accessibility criterion, I have a counterpart. My consciousness is to all practical purposes restricted to the one universe but my counterparts are between similar and identical ...[text shortened]...

There's a trap for you to fall into if you reply to this post. I'm curious to see if you do.

uh oh...

Is there a trap he could fall into if he doesn't reply, or does the trap only exist if he does reply?

Originally posted by lemon lime
uh oh...

Is there a trap he could fall into if he doesn't reply, or does the trap only exist if he does reply?

Only in so far as he might look as if he's worried about the trap.