Absurd Escapism

Originally posted by LemonJello
No. Do you have some argument in favor of this claim?

As I have been saying, pretty much all the arguments I have ever seen for claims of this nature are grossly inadequate. Perhaps you are privy to a good argument for it that I have not considered before?

So would I be correct in assuming that you believe that no moral absolutes exist?

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
So would I be correct in assuming that you believe that no moral absolutes exist?

Probably not, but depends on what you mean by a "moral absolute". From the literature, there are different ways I understand 'absolutism' as it regards morality. In one sense, moral absolutism holds that there are morally relevant actions that are right or wrong inherently, or in and of themselves, and this is diametric to views that hold that moral rightness or wrongness cannot be divorced from contextual, circumstantial, or consequential considerations. In another sense, moral absolutism holds first that there are moral facts (thereby differentiating it from nihilism) and second that these facts do not depend on any observer attitudes, such as the perspectives, opinions, or cultural standards of any persons or groups (thereby further differentiating it from subjectivist/relativist views). In yet another sense, I have seen cases where "absolute" is conflated with something like "universal", and in those cases I guess moral absolutism holds that the same ethical principles apply equally to all moral agents, or some such. So I have cursorily outlined three different senses of "moral absolute" above. My view is not absolutist in the first sense, but would be absolutist in the other two senses.

If you intend "moral absolute" in some other way, you’ll need to clarify.

What I can tell you, though, is that theistic views that hold God to be the source of morality do not just automatically qualify as "absolutist". On the contrary, under scrutiny they rarely qualify as such. For instance, suppose a person holds that there are moral facts and that these moral facts depend constitutively on God. For example, perhaps this person thinks that God determines morality either through executive fiat or divine command or simply by acting as the definitive standard of morality. Then, this person's view does not qualify as absolutist in the first sense mentioned above, since on their account the moral status of an action is not something inherent but rather dependent on its relation to something else, such as the divine will. Additionally, this person's view does not qualify as absolutist in the second sense mentioned above either, since on their account moral facts depend on God and are thus mind-dependent, making it a form of subjectivism. Additionally, it may or may not qualify as absolutist in the third sense above, depending on further specifics.

Now, I do not know the content of your particular view. However, your first question in this thread was the following:

“Do you agree that without God there are no moral absolutes?”

That tends to imply that you think that without God there are no moral absolutes (assuming that you are asking if I agree with you ). And that tends to imply that you think moral absolutes are somehow contingent on God. But, per above, theistic views such as theological voluntarism generally do not qualify as "absolutist" in the first couple senses of the term. At best, they qualify as "absolutist" in the third sense related to universality (again, maybe not though, depending on specifics). But there are any number of secular views to be taken seriously that also qualify in that respect. So, the idea that moral absolutes depend on God is at best a head-scratcher. So, if that is your view, you ought to abandon that notion. Actually, I would also abandon the use of 'absolute', since it is far from univocal in the literature.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Probably not, but depends on what you mean by a "moral absolute". From the literature, there are different ways I understand 'absolutism' as it regards morality. In one sense, moral absolutism holds that there are morally relevant actions that are right or wrong inherently, or in and of themselves, and this is diametric to views that hold that moral rig ...[text shortened]... ly, I would also abandon the use of 'absolute', since it is far from univocal in the literature.

By 'moral absolutes' I mean 'universal moral truths'.

Do you believe they exist? Yes or No?

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
By 'moral absolutes' I mean 'universal moral truths'.

Do you believe they exist? Yes or No?

Sorry, but I don't know what you mean by a 'universal moral truth'. That seems even more equivocal than 'moral absolute'. This is what passes as clarification in your book?

I have already taken some time to respond in detail, offering multiple different interpretations of 'moral absolute' based on my studies in normative ethics and meta-ethics. Did any of those hit close to home? If so, I've already told you if my view is "absolutist" with respect to such interpretations. If not, then you need to provide some actual clarification.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Sorry, but I don't know what you mean by a 'universal moral truth'. That seems even more equivocal than 'moral absolute'. This is what passes as clarification in your book?

I have already taken some time to respond in detail, offering multiple different interpretations of 'moral absolute' based on my studies in normative ethics and meta-ethics. Did ...[text shortened]... th respect to such interpretations. If not, then you need to provide some actual clarification.

By absolute moral truth I mean any action which can be considered either moral (good), regardless of any conceivable circumstance, or, any action which can be considered immoral (evil), regardless of any conceivable circumstance.

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
By absolute moral truth I mean any action which can be considered either moral (good), regardless of any conceivable circumstance, or, any action which can be considered immoral (evil), regardless of any conceivable circumstance.

Like dilemma's like you see a car careening into a crowd and you can deflect it one way or the other, one way is into a crowd of 100 and the other way is into a crowd of 3.

Which way do you steer the car? It's either or, no middle ground.

What would a god do? Is it going to be anything different than what a human would do?

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
By absolute moral truth I mean any action which can be considered either moral (good), regardless of any conceivable circumstance, or, any action which can be considered immoral (evil), regardless of any conceivable circumstance.

That's strange that you call it a "truth" and yet are referring to an action. Sounds like a bunch of notional confusion to me.

At any rate, what you describe is more or less what I already outlined above in my first interpretation of moral absolutism (I provided three different interpretations, and this matches the first I provided). And I already said that my view is not "absolutist" in this sense. So, there were some dots there that you apparently failed to connect.

At any rate, I'm still not sure why you think this sort of moral absolutism is contingent on God (if that's what you think). Like I already said, theological voluntarist views I have seen would fail to qualify as absolutist in this sense.

Originally posted by LemonJello
That's strange that you call it a "truth" and yet are referring to an action. Sounds like a bunch of notional confusion to me.

At any rate, what you describe is more or less what I already outlined above in my first interpretation of moral absolutism (I provided three different interpretations, and this matches the first I provided). And I already sa ...[text shortened]... id, theological voluntarist views I have seen would fail to qualify as absolutist in this sense.

If there are no such things as universally moral truths, then all morals decided upon by people are necessarily subjective. But, if moral values are subjective, then everyone is "right" from his own perspective. The problem is that it cannot be true that all people are right morally when they contradict each other. Therefore, this is self-refuting.

Theists view God as unchanging and hence the moral lawgiver for all moral absolutes. Without an unchanging moral lawgiver there would be no moral absolutes.

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
If there are no such things as universally moral truths, then all morals decided upon by people are necessarily subjective. But, if moral values are subjective, then everyone is "right" from his own perspective. The problem is that it cannot be true that all people are right morally when they contradict each other. Therefore, this is self-refuting.
...[text shortened]... for all moral absolutes. Without an unchanging moral lawgiver there would be no moral absolutes.

If there are no such things as universally moral truths, then all morals decided upon by people are necessarily subjective.

You just finished saying that by a “universal moral truth” you are referring to an action that can be considered good (or evil) regardless of conceivable circumstances. So, the only thing that follows from the nonexistence of such a thing is that there are no actions with such a property. That just follows from your very own analysis. In no way would that entail anything regarding subjectivism. There may very well be objective truth conditions for moral claims and, in short, objective moral facts, regardless if the type of action you outlined fails to exist. So this claim of yours just makes no sense.

But, if moral values are subjective, then everyone is "right" from his own perspective. The problem is that it cannot be true that all people are right morally when they contradict each other. Therefore, this is self-refuting.

This is based on a misrepresentation of what subjectivism holds. Regardless, your whole argument is predicated on the idea that some form of subjectivism follows from the falsity of moral absolutism as you have outlined it. And, sorry, but that is false.

Theists view God as unchanging and hence the moral lawgiver for all moral absolutes. Without an unchanging moral lawgiver there would be no moral absolutes.

Just because theists view God as an unchanging moral lawgiver does not mean that the existence of God would indicate the existence of moral absolutes. By your own lights, moral absolutes refer to actions that are good or evil irrespective of conceivable circumstances. And, sorry, but the existence of actions with this property does not follow just from the idea that there is some unchanging moral sourcer. And it is certainly conceivable that such actions could exist without any unchanging moral lawgiver. So your argument is wrong every which way. It's a total mess.

Originally posted by LemonJello

If there are no such things as universally moral truths, then all morals decided upon by people are necessarily subjective.

You just finished saying that by a “universal moral truth” you are referring to an action that can be considered good (or evil) regardless of conceivable circumstances. So, the only thing that follows from the none ...[text shortened]... t any unchanging moral lawgiver. So your argument is wrong every which way. It's a total mess.

So do you or don't you believe all moral laws are simply the subjective opinions of men?

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
So do you or don't you believe all moral laws are simply the subjective opinions of men?

Do you pay attention at all in these kinds of discussions, or do you just throw out questions just for the sake of throwing out questions? If you had been paying attention, I already implied that my view affirms the following:

"...first that there are moral facts (thereby differentiating it from nihilism) and second that these facts do not depend on any observer attitudes, such as the perspectives, opinions, or cultural standards of any persons or groups (thereby further differentiating it from subjectivist/relativist views) ."

Does that sound like a view where I think "all moral laws are simply the subjective opinions of men" to you?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Do you pay attention at all in these kinds of discussions, or do you just throw out questions just for the sake of throwing out questions? If you had been paying attention, I already implied that my view affirms the following:

[quote]"...first that there are moral facts (thereby differentiating it from nihilism) and second that these facts do not depe ...[text shortened]... und like a view where I think "all moral laws are simply the subjective opinions of men" to you?

So how are these moral facts established if not by the subjective opinions of men?

If there is no absolute unchanging moral lawgiver or authority then no morals are absolute, and in this case by 'absolute' I mean unchanging according to circumstance or setting.

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
So how are these moral facts established if not by the subjective opinions of men?

If there is no absolute unchanging moral lawgiver or authority then no morals are absolute, and in this case by 'absolute' I mean unchanging according to circumstance or setting.

I don't think moral facts get "established" at all in the sense you mean, just like I don't think facts in any other realm of discourse get "established". I think facts as entities are rather sui generis. However, I don't make any special pleading for the case of moral facts, as opposed to any other sorts of facts. On my view, facts deal with ways in which objects exemplify various properties and stand together in various relations. And let me be clear, since you just don't seem to be getting it: on my view, the constitutive nature of facts (moral or otherwise) does not have anything to do with the mental activity of God or humans or any other agents, real or imagined. At least not in the relevant sense you are targeting, in the sense of what makes something a fact.

At any rate, I see the main problem here. For some strange reason, you enter these sorts of discussions under the presupposition that morals constitutively issue from mental activity. That's why you keep laboring under this dichotomy that either morals issue from the mental activity of God; or else they issue from the mental activity of humans. And, so your story goes, the latter does not make sense because then we run into the problem of relativism whereby morals get indexed either to individuals or to groups. We run into the question of whether "stealing is wrong" stands in for "John thinks stealing is wrong" or perhaps "Sally thinks stealing is wrong" or perhaps "Billy's tribe disapproves of stealing" or perhaps…. Or perhaps we run into the problem that when John asserts that stealing is wrong he is uttering a truth, whereas when Sally asserts it she is not. It makes more sense, so your story continues, that the wrongness of stealing owes to God's unchanging disapproval of it, thus avoiding the relativist indexing to other agents. In philosophical terms, this is sometimes called a "relation-designating" account of morality. It is "absolutist" in the sense that it avoids relativism in this way, and it can also be universalist for similar reasons.

But guess what? I think both your account and the relativist’s account are crazy, totally implausible, and explanatorily bankrupt. Neither one has anything going for it as far as I can tell. Both these accounts of morals are thoroughly subjectivist: the relativist places morality in the subjectivity of humans, whereas you place morality in the subjectivity of God. Sorry, but neither of those accounts make any sense to me. I don't see any reasons to take them seriously. If anything, yours somehow seems even worse, since not only do you retain the subjectivity but you also tie it some mysterious agent that we have no good reasons to think exists in the first place. And, at bottom, I simply deny the presupposition that you bring to the table, that morals depend on mental activity. It causes you to labor under a false dichotomy. There's a whole other world of objective accounts of morals that I frankly believe are much closer to plausibility and much deeper in explanative substance than a subjectivist views like yours.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I don't think moral facts get "established" at all in the sense you mean, just like I don't think facts in any other realm of discourse get "established". I think facts as entities are rather sui generis. However, I don't make any special pleading for the case of moral facts, as opposed to any other sorts of facts. On my view, facts deal with wa ...[text shortened]... r to plausibility and much deeper in explanative substance than a subjectivist views like yours.

So what are these objective accounts of morals that you are referring to?

Also, what makes you think that moral absolutes are subjective? Surely they are viewed as true regardless of circumstances or opinions?

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
So what are these objective accounts of morals that you are referring to?

Also, what makes you think that moral absolutes are subjective? Surely they are viewed as true regardless of circumstances or opinions?

So what are these objective accounts of morals that you are referring to?

There are several competing accounts. Just as you subjectivists cannot agree amongst yourselves and proffer various accounts, so too do objectivists. There's nothing mysterious about any of this, and it's beyond the scope of this thread. I would urge you to undertake some study on the topic. One would have thought you would already have done some homework on this, seeing as how you like to declaim on morality and whatnot.

Also, what makes you think that moral absolutes are subjective? Surely they are viewed as true regardless of circumstances or opinions?

I never said that moral absolutes are subjective. The absolute/relative distinction I mentioned before is a different animal from the subjective/objective distinction. There are views that are subjective and absolutist, but there are also views that are objective and absolutist. The one you seem to espouse, however, happens to belong to the former category: it is subjective and absolutist. And, no, it doesn't follow that moral absolutes are true regardless of opinion. That only follows on an objective account, not a subjective one. Again, if one has, for example, a relation-designating account where the truth of moral claims issues back to a divine will, then that can qualify as absolutist; but it's still clearly a subjective account where morals depend on divine opinion.