@Soothfast saidDifficult to be interested in pages of over-academic waffle which even you can’t explain in simple words.
Yes, I think you are simply not interested in these lines of inquiry, so will let you do your thing. Cheers.
@divegeester saidThis thread I knew was going to be rough going to start. I'm still organizing the ideas in my own head, and the purpose of this thread is to help me do so while getting input from others. So, it's kind of a chaotic "brain storming session." I'm not sure how else to start, though!
Difficult to be interested in pages of over-academic waffle which even you can’t explain in simple words.
When I'm done with this thread, maybe in a month or two (or three), I hope to start a new one with a more organized and polished presentation. 😉
@KellyJay saidAll things "physical" are the extrinsic appearance, to our senses and instrumentation, of an underlying reality that is essentially mental in nature. What we perceive as a chemical, therefore, is a representation of something intrinsic to mind-at-large (MAL).
I'm not sure anything is being said in your post that doesn't simply take a huge leap from pure chemicals into something much higher without a cause being given. A chemical reaction is one thing, but being aware of a chemical reaction is another on a level far higher than simple chemistry. It isn't much different than defining information in a book, you can look at the phy ...[text shortened]... even there to grasp that send and receive mechanisms are required for perception and understanding.
Being dissociated alters of MAL, which encompasses all reality, we do not have direct access to all aspects of reality as it really is "in and of itself." This is entirely analogous to how an alter in the mind of someone with dissociative identity disorder may not have access to the egoic self's thoughts, memories, emotions, and so on; and it goes the other way around: the egoic self (by which I mean the "primary personality") may not have access to the private inner life of a dissociated alter "living" in the same mind.
Kastrup uses the analogy of an instrument panel in the cockpit of a plane. That instrument panel gives a representation of the "real world" outside the plane: altitude, wind velocity, temperature, and so on. Our senses create for us an instrument panel that is a representation of reality, and this instrumentation is what allows us to navigate the "real world" and live our lives.
Experiments have demonstrated how we actually do not see reality as it really is. We see a representation of reality that best enables us to survive. Cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman has a TED talk on this subject that is about 20 minutes long:
@Soothfast saidThe problem with this thesis is that once you make a distinction between "reality as it really is" (in Kantian terminology, the noumenon) and "reality as we perceive it" (phenomena), is that the noumenon walks away from us and becomes unknowable. Which is to say, we not only do not know what its essence is, we cannot know that it even exists as a thing-in-itself apart from our perceptions. So it looses sense to say anything at all about it or even name it.
Kastrup uses the analogy of an instrument panel in the cockpit of a plane. That instrument panel gives a representation of the "real world" outside the plane: altitude, wind velocity, temperature, and so on. Our senses create for us an instrument panel that is a representation of reality, and this instrumentation is what allows us to navigate the "real world" and liv ...[text shortened]... reality as it really is. We see a representation of reality that best enables us to survive.
Why should we say that "experiments show us reality as it really is"?? What experiments? We merely perceive experimental results anyway, so we are pitched back into pure phenomenalism.
@moonbus saidExperiments cannot show that reality is mental. At least, no kind of experiment we can conceive of today will do that. Kastrup acknowledges this, but then, that is why analytic idealism is, after all, a metaphysical model as opposed to a scientifically verifiable hypothesis.
The problem with this thesis is that once you make a distinction between "reality as it really is" (in Kantian terminology, the noumenon) and "reality as we perceive it" (phenomena), is that the noumenon walks away from us and becomes unknowable. Which is to say, we not only do not know what its essence is, we cannot know that it even exists as a thing-in-itself apart from ou ...[text shortened]... nts? We merely perceive experimental results anyway, so we are pitched back into pure phenomenalism.
What I'm referring to are two different things. There is "reality as it really is at its most fundamental level," and the "everyday reality of life in a physical world" (i.e. the world we perceive with our senses).
All biological organisms evolved to survive in a commonly shared world with other organisms. They generally have sense organs, or ways of "perceiving" (in a broad sense) their environment, and environmental conditions. But, this does not mean they see things exactly as they are.
Ted Hoffman cites one empirical observation about a kind of beetle in the Australian Outback that almost went extinct because it could not tell that the discarded brown beer bottles discarded by humans were not, in fact, the female of the species. Thus the beetle tried to mate with the bottles, naturally to no avail. The Australian government introduced a regulation to change the color of bottles to mitigate the situation. So, this is discussed in the aforementioned TED talk as an easy demonstration of how reality (in this case everyday reality in the physical world) is not perceived as it really is. Other examples are given in the talk.
While Kastrup addresses issues in biology, psychology, and neuroscience to support the thesis that reality is mental, the most powerful case is made in the realm of quantum mechanics, touching on topics such as quantum entanglement and Bell's inequality. Quantum mechanics predicts a contextual universe. That the non-contextuality doctrine of physicalism continues on, largely unchallenged, in the face of this prediction, known for almost a century and corroborated by experiment, is a true testament to the power of physicalism's strong appeal to human intuition.
Non-contextuality is the idea that, basically, physical quantities are absolute. That is, independent of who is perceiving or measuring them. I quote from an article by Kastrup, who characterizes the idea thus: "The outcome of an observation should not depend on the way other, separate but simultaneous observations are performed." Well, this breaks down at the quantum level, which means it doesn't hold at the macroscopic (classical) level either, but it is invisible to our perception.
The relational interpretation of quantum mechanics holds, foremost, that all physical quantities are relative to the observer. All of them. This goes well beyond the relativism of Einstein's relativity theory, which pertains to space, time, mass, and such.
This is where my time crunch gets me, alas, and I must stop here. I do want to tackle the quantum mechanics aspect of all this as a first thing, I hope next week, because it is the most damning for physicalism.
Analytic idealism cannot be proven in a scientific sense, but then, neither can physicalism. They are both philosophical models, and the question is: which is the more explanatorily powerful and parsimonious (i.e. has the fewest moving parts, in accord with Occam's Razor) model?
@Soothfast saidGod is Holy, meaning He stands apart from creation and we were made in His image so we also stand apart even while we share our physical attributes in the world too. But we transcend the world in ways which have meaning apart of the physical world, we understand symbolism we have the ability to send and receive meaning so we have a foot in two worlds so to speak.
Experiments cannot show that reality is mental. At least, no kind of experiment we can conceive of today will do that. Kastrup acknowledges this, but then, that is why analytic idealism is, after all, a metaphysical model as opposed to a scientifically verifiable hypothesis.
What I'm referring to are two different things. There is "reality as it really is at its most ...[text shortened]... ly powerful and parsimonious (i.e. has the fewest moving parts, in accord with Occam's Razor) model?
@Soothfast saidFail to prepare, prepare to fail.
This thread I knew was going to be rough going to start. I'm still organizing the ideas in my own head, and the purpose of this thread is to help me do so while getting input from others. So, it's kind of a chaotic "brain storming session." I'm not sure how else to start, though!
When I'm done with this thread, maybe in a month or two (or three), I hope to start a new one with a more organized and polished presentation. 😉
Let me know if you need some help understanding this.
@Soothfast
Non-contextuality is the idea that, basically, physical quantities are absolute. That is, independent of who is perceiving or measuring them. I quote from an article by Kastrup, who characterizes the idea thus: "The outcome of an observation should not depend on the way other, separate but simultaneous observations are performed." Well, this breaks down at the quantum level, which means it doesn't hold at the macroscopic (classical) level either, but it is invisible to our perception.
The relational interpretation of quantum mechanics holds, foremost, that all physical quantities are relative to the observer. All of them. This goes well beyond the relativism of Einstein's relativity theory, which pertains to space, time, mass, and such.
This is where my time crunch gets me, alas, and I must stop here. I do want to tackle the quantum mechanics aspect of all this as a first thing, I hope next week, because it is the most damning for physicalism.
Analytic idealism cannot be proven in a scientific sense, but then, neither can physicalism. They are both philosophical models, and the question is: which is the more explanatorily powerful and parsimonious (i.e. has the fewest moving parts, in accord with Occam's Razor) model?
This still does not answer my question, what reason we have to believe that experimental evidence of physics (at the nano- or quantum-level) is more real than perceptible evidence (or sense data) at the macro-level. Moreover, perspectivism, which is what I think he is really talking about, at one level does not necessarily imply perspectivism at any other level. This is an elementary logical blunder. It's like saying that because every part of an engine weighs less than 10kgs, therefore the entire engine weighs less than 10kgs. It's like saying that because sodium and chlorine are poisonous, therefore sodium chloride must be poisonous too.
Non-contextuality is the idea that, basically, physical quantities are absolute. This is what classical philosophers, going back to Aristotle, called substances and attributes. "The apple is red," and it's still an apple and it's still red inside a shopping bag even if no one is in the bag with it. If Kastrup is denying this, then he's crawled down a rabbit hole.
What the data of subatomic particle physics show is that atoms are not little solar systems with hard, round electrons orbiting big massive 'suns'. That was just a metaphor. The fundamental discovery of modern particle physics has been the realization that tables are not made of littler and littler tables inside, that redness is not made of littler and littler reds, and so on. But there is no good reason to say that the atomic 'world' is the real one, whereas the perceived world is imaginary.
As for a beetle mistaking a bottle for a mate, this is amusing, but hardly shows that all creatures mistake everything all the time for something that is really something else. There are plenty of examples of mistakes in perception, ancient Greek skeptics compiled lists of them. Nonetheless, perceptual errors are the exception; once you make perceptual error the rule, it makes no sense, because, if errors are happening all the time everywhere to everyone, then the word "reality" makes no sense any more and neither does the word "error". Reality becomes totally unknowable (both macro- and micro-, perceived and quantum), and we've crawled down a rabbit hole.
As Wittgenstein said, the refutation of "maybe we're just dreaming all this" is that, if this is all just a dream, then you're dreaming that these words mean anything.
Yes, quite obviously, Kastrup's thesis is not empirically verifiable and is therefore not a scientific thesis. That's what makes it philosophy instead, an imaginary 'world' he has created for himself. He's wildly over-thinking and drawing faulty conclusions from a) the wrong 'levels', and b) making exceptional cases 'the rule.'
I appreciate any new angle offered to readers of this forum.
I am not a fan of philosophy as a field of study, it mostly baffles me, except as it interfaces with psychology, which, as a student of Jung, I can get a grip on his handling of some of the basic ideas, such as his ideas about the unconscious mind. Jung thought that Freud's idea of a "personal unconscious" was too limited and that man has developed a "collective unconscious" that is shared and inherited. This forms the basis of human mythology with its accompanying "archetypes".
Philosophy as an art tends to confuse me with its intimate details. I guess my mind needs some kind of anchor to come back to after all these mind experiments.
I do enjoy listening to others far more conversant than me on the subject, though. Looking at things from another direction serves to "loosen" the mind and helps maintain flexibility, which some here are badly in need of.
@Suzianne saidKastrup’s thesis is, in my view, a restatement of the anthropic principle, with some fluff added to make it more confusing. It’s impressive as an intellectual exercise, but hardly convincing.
I appreciate any new angle offered to readers of this forum.
I am not a fan of philosophy as a field of study, it mostly baffles me, except as it interfaces with psychology, which, as a student of Jung, I can get a grip on his handling of some of the basic ideas, such as his ideas about the unconscious mind. Jung thought that Freud's idea of a "personal unconscious" was ...[text shortened]... on serves to "loosen" the mind and helps maintain flexibility, which some here are badly in need of.
@moonbus saidI assume you have not read about Kastrup's ideas aside from what I've written here, so there is much ground to cover.
As for a beetle mistaking a bottle for a mate, this is amusing, but hardly shows that all creatures mistake everything all the time for something that is really something else. There are plenty of examples of mistakes in perception, ancient Greek skeptics compiled lists of them. Nonetheless, perceptual errors are the exception; once you make perceptual error the rule, it ma ...[text shortened]... d drawing faulty conclusions from a) the wrong 'levels', and b) making exceptional cases 'the rule.'
The book I mentioned earlier, The Idea of the World, is a collection of 15 articles he has written that, put together in the order that they are in the book, weaves together a strong case for the mental nature of reality. Several of the articles appeared earlier in Scientific American magazine.
I think it rather careless to wave off the weirdness of the quantum world as being somehow irrelevant to the classical, or macroscopic, world. The phenomenon known as "quantum decoherence" is what gives rise to the classical world we live our ordinary lives in. Very loosely speaking, the quantum weirdness "cancels out" at larger scales, when more and more particles are included in a physical system. At the level of tables and cats, the weirdness cannot be perceived by our senses at all. But it is there, nonetheless. As I said, contextuality is a prediction of quantum mechanics, since corroborated in laboratories many times.
Contextuality is understood by physicists to be what I believe philosophers would call an ontological phenomenon, and not just an epistemological one. For instance, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is not merely some theoretical limit reality imposes on our scientific instrumentation's ability to simultaneously determine the position and momentum of an electron. The principle is a reflection of something true about physical reality itself. What that truth is, exactly, remains a matter of speculation.
Contextuality (or quantum contextuality), is what may appear on the surface to be the perspectivism you mention. But, rightly, Kastrup does not use the term perspectivism, since again that is more an epistemological principle, whereas contextuality is about something that speaks to the nature of physical reality iself.
The standard formulation of quantum mechanics is non-contextual and non-realistic. "Non-contextual" basically meaning physical quantities are absolute in the sense of not being dependent on the observer; and "non-realistic" meaning that when a quantum state is given, not all observables (i.e. physical properties that can be measured) are defined.
But quantum mechanics is actually contextual. In Kastrup's words: "The outcome of an observation can depend on the way another, separate but simultaneous observation is performed." Quantum entanglement experiments have verified this.
The way out would seem to be to suppose that there are localized observation-independent hidden variables we do not know about that are pulling the strings of quantum particles. However, back in 1964, John Bell proved mathematically that the bizarre correlations observed between two entangled particles cannot be accounted for by local observation-independent hidden properties. This shoots down most of the "hidden variables" theories that have been proposed over the decades.
To save non-contextuality (the idea that physical quantities are observer-independent) within a physicalist framework, then, the only way out seems to be to cook up some kind of non-local hidden properties: observation-independent hidden properties that are smeared out over large swaths of spacetime somehow, omnipresent yet invisible, which orchestrate the correlations of quantum entanglement.
In the words of Kastrup, who in turn quotes the physicist Carlo Rovelli: "The problem, of course, is that non-local hidden properties are arbitrary: they produce no predictions beyond those already made by standard quantum theory. As such, it could be argued that they represent an effort 'to modify quantum mechanics to make it consistent with one's view of the world,' so to avoid the need to 'modify one's view of the world to make it consistent with quantum mechanics.'"
And yet, already, large classes of non-local hidden properties have been found to be incompatible with existing quantum theory. This is where the rubber hits the road and even the mainstream press starts to notice. The only way forward to reconcile quantum mechanics with physicalism is to adopt "a profoundly counterintuitive redefinition of what we call 'objectivity.' And since our contemporary cultural mindset has come to associate objectivity with [physical] reality itself, the science press felt compelled to report on some of these results by pronouncing, 'Quantum physics says goodbye to reality.'"
Now that is funny: "Quantum physics says goodbye to reality." It's an unfortunate headline, but not so much wrong as imprecise. What quantum physics is saying (or must learn to say) goodbye to is the notion that the representation of the physical world that we each perceive with our senses is something that is observer-independent. There is a reality underlying the varying physical representations that we each, as individuals, perceive with our senses, but it is not comprised of "stuff" in the way we conceive of it in everyday life. Idealism posits that it is not "stuff" in any sense of the word, but subjective experience. Experience is the fundamental bedrock of reality.
What I hope to do later this week is outline the tenets of, and case for, analytical idealism in as simple a fashion as I can manage without sacrificing the substance of the model.
@Soothfast
Non-local omnipresent hidden something-I-know-not-whats are the stuff of superstition. You might as well be appealing to fairies who live at the bottom of the garden.
I know, there is a huge temptation to say that what physics tells us about ordinary macroscopic objects, tables and chairs and steam boats, is „fundamental“ or that telling us what ordinary things are made of is „fundamental.“ That simply means that we are very impressed by this, but not that being „fundamental“ is any more real or true. Somebody once figured out you could pull a bucket of water out of a river and chemically analyze the silt which collects at the bottom of the bucket. And then somebody else discovered that there are smaller and smaller buckets. But you can‘t float a Mississippi steam boat in a bucket, and the single particle of silt at the bottom of the smallestestest bucket is not more real than the steam boat.
@Soothfast saidIn other words we can't accept our observations alone as reality, observations must studied to ensure our conclusions about them are as accurate as possible.
The mistake of physicalism is to take the particles detected by our senses (augmented by instrumentation) as being the make-up of reality, and, by extension, of consciousness itself. (An analogous mistake: to see the image of a person on a computer screen, and then say that the pixels that make up the image is the person itself.) Let me say this another way: our ...[text shortened]... ow those particles we observe must somehow comprise or give rise to our consciousness.
In other words, employ the scientific method.
@moonbus saidAh, so, as something of an aside, what are your thoughts on so-called "dark matter"?
@Soothfast
Non-local omnipresent hidden something-I-know-not-whats are the stuff of superstition. You might as well be appealing to fairies who live at the bottom of the garden.
(This is just a quick drive-by, since I haven't yet gathered up the gumption to create another long post.)
@Soothfast saidAn omnipresent undetectable something I know not what. When the existing theory no longer explains all the observable phenomenon, people start to imagine all sorts of things. I will suspend judgment on dark matter and dark energy until I’ve seen some concrete evidence.
Ah, so, as something of an aside, what are your thoughts on so-called "dark matter"?
(This is just a quick drive-by, since I haven't yet gathered up the gumption to create another long post.)