Originally posted by lucifershammerNo, that would be like saying that someone is malevolent for pointing out that if you don't drink [water], you get thirsty, after having made the universe in which that rule held, when he could have made a universe without thirst in the first place.
No. That would be like saying that someone is malevolent for pointing out that if you don't drink [water], you get thirsty.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesExcept, of course, in the situation where worship of that God is the only possible conclusion. Meaning, not by threat of censure (or worse), but because anything less would be a lie.
Or like saying that a God who forces everyone to choose between worshipping him and suffering eternal torment is a benevolent one.
11 Nov 06
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesWagner’s mistakes are legion, and I don’t have time to address them all, but I’ll take the major ones in order:
First, are Wagner's characterizations of the four theories of truth factually accurate, or does he mischaracterize them?
Additionally, is his analysis of the four theories correct or flawed? In particular, ought we reject subjectivisim and deflationary theory out of hand as he suggests?
In your professional opinion as an epistemologist, does W ...[text shortened]... ner know what the hell he is talking about? Would you allow him to guest lecture your classes?
First, subjectivism, deconstructionism, postmodernism, and multiculturalism are not epistemic terms at all (at least they are not offered in the literature as either theories of truth, or of knowledge, or of justification). There are pragmatist epistemic theories (e.g., P is true iff P would be assented to by an ideally rational agent under ideal epistemic conditions), but these are marginal positions in analytic philosophy and are absent from scientific practice or theories of scientific theory confirmation. The closest thing one finds to a “subjectivist” theory of truth is some pragmatist theory, but no pragmatist theory I’ve ever encountered has entailed that whether some P is true ends up a matter of taste opinion, because of the common inclusion of some variant of the two criteria mentioned above.
I’m unsure just what Wagner thinks deconstruction, postmodernism, and multiculturalism are, but even a cursory examination of the epistemology literature would disabuse him of the notion that these are endemic in the philosophical community, or are considered rival views of truth, knowledge or justification. Deconstructionism is, at bottom, a pluralistic view of textual interpretation; roughly that there are no privileged interpretations of texts. I guess if one takes this to entail that there is no true interpretation of a text, then one could take deconstructionism to entail skepticism within the domain of textual interpretation. Postmodernism is more a loose affiliation of sympathies and criticisms of the notion of objectivity (an orientation, really) then it is a philosophical view. That said, one could take postmodernism to entail that the correspondence theory of truth is incorrect (or, minimally, that we are never justified in claiming that our beliefs correspond to the world in the manner necessary for them to be true). Presumably, though, even the postmodernist would claim that consistency is a necessary condition for truth (whatever the term ‘true’ means according to postmodern theories). I have no idea why Wagner lumps multiculturalism together with these other views. Perhaps Wagner thinks that a commitment to the value of multiculturalism involves a commitment to the view that different cultural beliefs are all “equally true”. But this is a nonstandard view both among those in the academic community that value multicultural education and completely absent from the philosophical community.
It’s just plain false that pragmatism or skepticism has infected science.
Second, in addition to there being no “subjectivist” theory of truth, Wagner also seriously mischaracterizes deflationary theories of truth. Deflationary theories come in many varieties (e.g., disquotational theories, minimalist theories, no-theory theories, etc.). What these views have in common is not that they don’t think truth is a property, but that they don’t think that predicating ‘true’ of a proposition adds anything substantive to the proposition. Roughly, on these theories, ‘P’ is true iff P (e.g., ‘snow is white’ is true iff snow is white, to take Tarski’s famous example). Why Wagner thinks that this entails nihilism is beyond me. Normative claims are completely compatible with deflationary theories of truth (e.g., ‘We ought be compassionate’ is true iff we ought to be compassionate). Wagner seems to think that deflationary theories entail nihilism because they entail that no propositions are actually true. But this is false. Propositions are true, on the deflationary theory, if their propositional contents are the case. What the deflationary theory denies is that there is some mysterious sort of correspondence (or representation, or isomorphism, or description) that some propositions have to parts of the world and that secures the truth of those propositions. Wagner thinks that this entails nihilism because he is presupposing the truth of the correspondence theory.
I’ll write more later, but I have other work to do right now.
Originally posted by bbarrIt’s just plain false that pragmatism or skepticism has infected science.
Wagner’s mistakes are legion, and I don’t have time to address them all, but I’ll take the major ones in order:
First, subjectivism, deconstructionism, postmodernism, and multiculturalism are not epistemic terms at all (at least they are not offered in the literature as either theories of truth, or of knowledge, or of justification). There are pragmatist ...[text shortened]... of the correspondence theory.
I’ll write more later, but I have other work to do right now.
Unless you are using definitions of the two terms other than the philosophical definitions, I am curious to hear your justification for this one. With more rule than exception, science prefaces its findings in terms found on skepticisms' walls.
Originally posted by FreakyKBHDescribe your notion of skepticism. I imagine it means something quite different to you than it does to bbarr.
[b]It’s just plain false that pragmatism or skepticism has infected science.
Unless you are using definitions of the two terms other than the philosophical definitions, I am curious to hear your justification for this one. With more rule than exception, science prefaces its findings in terms found on skepticisms' walls.[/b]
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesAs stated, I assume from the position of philosophy, as that is the frame of his picture.
Describe your notion of skepticism. I imagine it means something quite different to you than it does to bbarr.
"In philosophy, skepticism refers more specifically to any one of several propositions. These include propositions about
1. the limitations of knowledge,
2. a method of obtaining knowledge through systematic doubt and continual testing,
3. the arbitrariness, relativity, or subjectivity of moral values,
4. a method of intellectual caution and suspended judgment..."
Originally posted by FreakyKBHI guarantee you that what bbarr denotes by the term skepticism is not the disjunction of (1) through (4), or anything resembling that. I can't imagine how (3) even made the list.
As stated, I assume from the position of philosophy, as that is the frame of his picture.
"In philosophy, skepticism refers more specifically to any one of several propositions. These include propositions about
1. the limitations of knowledge,
2. a method of obtaining knowledge through systematic doubt and continual testing,
3. the arbitrariness, ...[text shortened]... subjectivity of moral values,
4. a method of intellectual caution and suspended judgment..."