Calling out chinking58!

Originally posted by no1marauder
It's unfortunate you don't read my posts carefully; I've never disputed that the random result explanation was a "possible" one. I just find it an unlikely one given the facts as I understand them. Look, in the "billion to one" coin flipping experiment, if it came up heads, you'd probably say flip it again to test the randomness. If it aga ...[text shortened]... way to "flip" the universe again so we can't test the hypothesis that it was a random result.

Marauder's argument seems solid to me. Given the premises 1) there is only one universe and 2) the chance that intelligent life could exist in any particular random universe is small then it's highly unlikely that our universe is both undirected and contains intelligent life. However it does contain intelligent life.

As the random chance argument is highly unlikely to be accurate given these premises, some non random mechanism must have been involved, or the premises are wrong. Such a mechanism might be God; or it might be meta-laws.

This variation of ID theory is actually not ID theory - ID means "intelligent design" whereas this argument only claims design is likely; intelligence doesn't have to be behind it. Unthinking meta-laws could have been the "designer".

The lottery analogy seems weak because it seems unclear what "buying a ticket" is supposed to represent. Marauder seems to imply that "buying a ticket" would be analogous to a universe coming into being, and "winning the lottery" analogous to that universe containing intelligent life. These two occurences happen on a background of the lottery mechanism or the mechanism of universe formation which defines probabilities. This analogy holds only for the multiple universe theory which means one of marauder's argument's premises is false, which he has admitted is a possibility. If there's only one universe (a premise open to challenge), then it's as if only one guy bought the lottery ticket.

What is "buying a ticket" to you bbarr?

Anyway, I don't think there's any rule that says anyone has to win the lottery. It depends on the system you're using I guess.

Originally posted by AThousandYoung
Marauder's argument seems solid to me. Given the premises 1) there is only one universe and 2) the chance that intelligent life could exist in any particular random universe is small then it's highly unlikely that our universe is both undirected and contains intelligent life. However it does contain intelligent life.

As the random chance argum ...[text shortened]... y rule that says anyone has to win the lottery. It depends on the system you're using I guess.

I refer you back to my explanation of the argument by analogy I have been pushing in this thread:

The creationist assumes that it was possible the universe could have had other physical constants. Let us grant this assumption. Analogously, it was possible that the lottery could have had other outcomes (i.e., that person W might have lost).

The creationist argues that given the vast range of possible constants, it is very unlikely that the universe would have ended up with constants that support life like ours. I will grant this as well. Analogously, I argue that given the vast range of possible outcomes of the lottery drawing, it is very unlikely that the drawing would have ended up with person W winning.

The creationist then infers from the fact that it was extremely unlikely that the universe would have had these particular constants, to the conclusion that the best explanation for there being these constants is that the universe was geared towards supporting life like ours. Analogously, I can employ a similar inference from the fact that it was extremely unlikely that the lottery would have had this particular outcome to the conclusion that the best explanation for this outcome is that the lottery was geared towards bringing it about that person W won (i.e., that it was actually not a random drawing).

However, the inference that I employ in the lottery case is unjustified, because it could be employed for any possible winner of the lottery (e.g., for person X if he had won, or person Z, if she had won). So, by parity of reasoning, the same inference type the creationist uses in the universe case is also unjustified. It could be employed for any possible set of constants (e.g., the set of constants that allow for radically different forms of life, or the set of constants that allow for large crystalline structures).

This is an argument by analogy. If the reasoning in the lottery case is flawed, then the creationist's reasoning is simiilarly flawed because the forms of reasoning are precisely the same.

Originally posted by bbarr
I refer you back to my explanation of the argument by analogy I have been pushing in this thread:

[b]The creationist assumes that it was possible the universe could have had other physical constants. Let us grant this assumption. Analogously, it was possible that the lottery could have had other outcomes (i.e., that person W might have lost).

The creati ...[text shortened]... reasoning is simiilarly flawed because the forms of reasoning are precisely the same.


[/b]

I'd hate to see ya as a game Mod; let us say that there is a one in a billion chance that JamesWoodley's moves in 10 games would exactly match those which would be suggested by ChessMaster 9000. Then, they do. By your logic this proves nothing, since 1 in a billion is still a "possible" outcome, it is therefore "possible" that this is a random result and we can make no inferences from it. If this is valid "formal" logic, you can keep it.

PS And don't go 9 days without making a move again; you had me sweating!😠

Originally posted by no1marauder
I'd hate to see ya as a game Mod; let us say that there is a one in a billion chance that JamesWoodley's moves in 10 games would exactly match those which would be suggested by ChessMaster 9000. Then, they do. By your logic thi ...[text shortened]... n't go 9 days without making a move again; you had me sweating!😠

No, this is not an accurate representation of the reasoning I'm employing above. You have simply failed to grasp the point of the argument by analogy I'm employing. Luckily, I can present a variation of your jameswoodley example that is analogous.

Suppose that at the conclusion of 10 games, jameswoodley has opted for a set of move sequences M1. Suppose that there are n number of distinct possible move sequences (M2, M3,...Mn) that jameswoodley could have opted for. Suppose that a one-to-one correspondence exists between the elements of the set of move sequence sets (M1, M2,...Mn) and different computer programs such that given some M there is a C such that C would have suggested M. Now, at the end of the 10 games, regardless of which set of move sequences jameswoodley opted for, there would be a computer program that suggested just that set of move sequences. In such a case, would you accuse jameswoodley of cheating? Of course not, because no matter which set of move sequences he had opted for, there would be some program or other that would turn up a match.

Similarly, there is a correspondence between values the physical constants might have had and ways the world could have been. Similarly, there is a correspondence between possible outcomes of the lottery drawing and possible lottery winners.

The world had to have been some way or other; the lottery had to have some winner or other (in my argument by analogy); the set of move sequences jameswoodley opted for had to match some computer or other (in my example above). The fact that the world would support like ours was improbable on the assumption that the physical constants could have had different values; the fact that person W would win the lottery was improbable prior to the drawing; the fact that the jameswoodley's set of move sequences would match C1 was improbable prior to his opting for the set of move sequences M1.

Just as you would not infer after the fact of person W's winning the lottery that the lottery was fixed in W's favor ('cause somebody or other had to win); just as you would not infer after the fact of jameswoodley's set of move sequences matching C1 that he had cheated ('cause he had to match some computer or other), so you should not infer after the fact of the world having the physical contant values that it has that these values were selected so as to make life possible ('cause the world had to be some way or other).

The forms of inference in these three cases are flawed in exactly the same way.

Note: Sorry for you giving you a scare, oh captain my captain, my connection to the internets has been down.

Originally posted by bbarr
No, this is not an accurate representation of the reasoning I'm employing above. You have simply failed to grasp the point of the argument by analogy I'm employing. Luckily, I can present a variation of your jameswoodley example that is analogous.

Suppose that at the conclusion of 10 games, jameswoodley has opted for a set of move sequences M1. S ...[text shortened]... giving you a scare, [b]oh captain my captain, my connection to the internets has been down.[/b]

You have failed to grasp the point of my objection to your argument by analogy. I have not denied the possibility that the result is random, but your argument is not good EVIDENCE that the result WAS random. It is merely an assertion that anything is possible; true enough, but pretty thin gruel. I don't doubt that your argument is formally valid; I simply don't believe that in and of itself it is a likely explanation for a life hospitable universe if the premises I set up - there is only one universe and the likelihood that it would be life hospitable is small - are true. Unless those premises are shown to likely be false, I think experiential (my word) logic suggests some kind of "design" even if formal logic says the result COULD be random.

PS And make a damn move in the Zumdahl games!😠

Originally posted by no1marauder
You have failed to grasp the point of my objection to your argument by analogy. I have not denied the possibility that the result is random, but your argument is not good EVIDENCE that the result WAS random. It is merely an assertion that anything is possible; true enough, but pretty thin gruel. I don't doubt that your argument is formally valid ...[text shortened]... formal logic says the result COULD be random.

PS And make a damn move in the Zumdahl games!😠

I am not presenting the argument by analogy as evidence that the universe's property of being hospitable to life like ours is random. This should be clear from the conclusion of the argument. The conclusion of the argument is not the claim "the universe's property of being hospitable to life like ours is random". The conclusion of the argument is the claim "the inference employed by the fine-tuning argument is fallacious". The argument by analogy is not intended to show that the universe was not created. The argument by analogy is intended to show that the fine-tuning argument is flawed. I hope you can grasp the difference between these two things.

Go back and re-read my post above. Both the lottery example and the jameswoodley example employ inferences of exactly the same sort as that employed in the fine-tuning argument. If you think that the inference employed by the fine-tuning argument suffices to make likely the truth of the claim that the universe was designed for life like ours, then you are thereby committed to the claim that it is likely that lotteries are fixed and that jameswoodley had to have been cheating. If you don't accept these latter claims, then you shouldn't find the fine-tuning argument persuasive.

The world had to have been some way or other. The lottery had to have some winner or other. Jameswoodley had to match some computer or other. What follows from this? Answer: nothing at all.

Originally posted by bbarr
I am not presenting the argument by analogy as evidence that the universe's property of being hospitable to life like ours is random. This should be clear from the conclusion of the argument. The conclusion of the argument [b] is not the claim "the universe's property of being hospitable to life like ours is random". The conclusion of the arg ...[text shortened]... y had to match some computer or other. What follows from this? Answer: nothing at all.[/b]

I'm not really interested in going over and over and over again your claim that the argument is "fallacious" in some way: I'm more interested in whether the conclusion is likely or not. No matter how internally logical you think your position is, it flies in the face of objective reality where extraordinary occurrences are usually greeted with attempts to explain them, not "Oh, well; s**t happens".The whole point of the matter is to determine the probability whether the occurrance was random or not, not rehash your Ivory Tower claims regarding how a certain argument is structured. I regard the beating of this dead horse as a complete waste of time that could be more fruitfully employed in your defeating the evil minions of Satan in 2005 MEGACHALLENGES III & IV.

Originally posted by no1marauder
I'm not really interested in going over and over and over again your claim that the argument is "fallacious" in some way: I'm more interested in whether the conclusion is likely or not. No matter how internally logical you ...[text shortened]... feating the evil minions of Satan in 2005 MEGACHALLENGES III & IV.

Suppose that we find some region of the universe where the values of the physical 'constants' differ slightly from our local values. Suppose we find that in this region, the values of these physical 'constants' are ideally suited for the existence of large deposits of mineral X (where, by 'ideally suited' I mean that if the values of the physical 'constants' were slightly different, mineral X could not possible collect in large deposits). Do you think that in such a case we would be licensed to infer that it is likely that this region of the universe was designed so as to allow for large deposits of mineral X?

O.K., back to chess.

All glory to the people (and, vicariously, to the people's champions)!

Originally posted by bbarr
Suppose that we find some region of the universe where the values of the physical 'constants' differ slightly from our local values. Suppose we find that in this region, the values of these physical 'constants' are ideally suited for the existence of large deposits of mineral X (where, by 'ideally suited' I mean that if the values of the physical 'cons ...[text shortened]... ack to chess.

[b]All glory to the people (and, vicariously, to the people's champions)![/b]

If some region of space had values for the strong nuclear force then were different from the rest of the universe we would want to try to explain it. IF ALL the values of the four basic forces varied by an exact amount significant enough to allow for large deposits of the precious mineral Ivanhoeium AND they varied ONLY in this particular area, we would find that quite remarkable. Certainly a reasonable hypothesis, to be checked against what facts could be discovered, would be that this particular area of space was "designed" in some way. I don't see that hypothesis as "fallacious"; we might go poking around to see if there was evidence of variations in other areas of space leading to large deposits of Pradium or deadly Pcaspianium and see if we ran into any superintelligent aliens who owned mining companies.

If you are merely saying that the creationist attempt to say the facts I'm discussing "prove" the existence of ID they I certainly agree with that. I'm merely postulating that if the facts as I understand them are shown to be true, the possibility of "design" becomes a more likely hypothesis but certainly not the only reasonable one.

Originally posted by no1marauder
If some region of space had values for the strong nuclear force then were different from the rest of the universe we would want to try to explain it. IF ALL the values of the four basic forces varied by an exact amount signifi ...[text shortened]... more likely hypothesis but certainly not the only reasonable one.

I don't see how you derive your hypothesis, mainly because there is only one known set of gauge fields.
To say 'what if' there were other possible sets only gets you to 'what if' there were other possible universes: it doesn't increase or decrease the probability of an ID.
That leads to an entirlely different argument , that of: 'What if' there were other possible ID'ers.

An ID'er would need means to effect designing with, by postulating the properties of the gauge fields needed : one might be able to work up a rational hypothesis for the existence of an ID'er. Maybe even work up a theoretical basis for the associated exchange particles and bring the IDer's existence into the realm of experimental particle physics.