Does might make right?

Originally posted by whodey
But you use an example of your wife having her free will possibly taken away if it were not for your intervention to help preserve her free will, thus, your example does not fly.

In a nut shell, deep down we agree with God's morality of free will. However, what we cannot agree with, or at least, when the morals of the situation becomes cloudy, is when o ...[text shortened]... law because they can become so convoluted. You ask for objective morality, for me this is it!!

I hate to even ask this, but what could possibly comprise your conception of 'free will' such that in the following event I both breach the free will of X and prevent my wife's free will from being breached: the event is I succeed in physically restraining X, who is attempting to stab my wife? (EDIT: Based on my own conception of free will, I don't agree that I would be achieving either of those results in the course of physically restraining X.)

You asked me if what you take to be 'violations of free will' are fundamentally immoral or undesirable, where what you take to be violations of free will basically amount to either failing to treat another in the ways you would like to be treated or successfully preventing another from bringing about a change that they desire. My answer, again, is no. Anyway, I don't know why you are talking about anything being fundamentally, or essentially, immoral because nothing is as such under your view, remember? Things under your view are not fundamentally right or wrong because their worth depends on what some external agent, God, thinks about them.

I don't know what you take to be 'free will', but given what you've written I would have to think your conception of free will is pretty wacky. I certainly don't know what you mean when you refer to God's "morality of free will". Regardless, do you think free will is espoused by God because it is good, or do you think it is good because it is espoused by God? I was under the impression that you thought the latter, but now I'm confused because you talk like you think free will is essentially good, which seems to deny the latter.

Originally posted by whodey
It is very important realizing when these "evils" came into the world. The natural evils entered the world when sin entered the world.

It might interest you to know that at one time men in the OT lived to be close to 1000 years old. Now some dispute this and say that their time table was diffferent than ours, however, it appears to me that after the flo ...[text shortened]... tler could bring about. The man only lived about 50 years yet he had the entire world at war.

This discussion is getting nutty. Do you mind just answering my previous question? Things that are devastating to us, such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, cancers, exist; your God knows about them and has the power to prevent them. My question is simply why do you think He doesn't prevent them? Before, with your example about the two-year old, you seem to be saying that God is right to allow them but that we lack the ability to understand why He is right. If it were true that we lack the ability to understand why He is right, how is it that you could be warranted in asserting that He is right?

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]I hate to even ask this, but what could possibly comprise your conception of 'free will' such that in the following event I both breach the free will of X and prevent my wife's free will from being breached: the event is I succeed in physically restraining X, who is attempting to stab my wife? (EDIT: Based on my own conception of free will, I don't agree that I would be achieving either of those results in the course of physically restraining X.)

I am not sure exactly what you are asking here. You ask what would possible comprimise my conception of free will. Could you elaborate?

So you prevent X from harming your wife and thereby prevent her free will from being breached. You then say that based upon your conception of free will you would not really be violating the attacker free will by preventing him from attacking your wife nor would you be preserving your wifes free will by protecting her from being violated. But is not the attackers will to assault your wife? Are you not preventing him from doing so? Is this not then a violation of his free will? Also, is not your wife's will to not be assaulted? Are you not then preserveing her will not to be assaulted?

Originally posted by LemonJello
You asked me if what you take to be 'violations of free will' are fundamentally immoral or undesirable, where what you take to be violations of free will basically amount to either failing to treat another in the ways you would like to be treated or successfully preventing another from bringing about a change that they desire. My answer, again, is no. Anyw ] right or wrong because their worth depends on what some external agent, God, thinks about them.

So the moral of treating others in the way that you would not be treated is not moral to you? Ok, but for me and most people I talk to it is a moral way in which to live ones life. For me respecting ones free will is simply treating others in a way that you would like to be treated. However, when others then violate the free will of the individual who has violated anothers free will because that person has treated them in a fashion in which they themselves would not like to be treated, it is then that the morality of "correcting" the free will of such an individual becomes increasingly justifiable.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Regardless, do you think free will is espoused by God because it is good, or do you think it is good because it is espoused by God?

Yes to both. If God is good then goodness comes from God. Also, we should have some sense of this goodness having come from him.

Originally posted by LemonJello
This discussion is getting nutty. Do you mind just answering my previous question? Things that are devastating to us, such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, cancers, exist; your God knows about them and has the power to prevent them. My question is simply why do you think He doesn't prevent them? Before, with your example about the two-year old, you ...[text shortened]... nderstand why He is right, how is it that you could be warranted in asserting that He is right?

It all stems from the fall of man when God forwarned Adam and Eve that if they partook of the fruit they would surely die and not to do it. Once they then partook of the fruit the rest of the details in how they would meet their demise are then somewhat trivial in nature. Would they live another day? Whould they live a year? Would they live a 100 years? Would they die from cancer? Would they die from a hurricane etc? The real question, however, is was God justifiable in allowing them to die or experience suffering in the first place after they had transgressed against him? They then were kicked out of the garden and seperated from him. Was this a moral act? This is at the heart of your question. Should choosing to sin necessitate suffering and death?

Originally posted by whodey
I am not sure exactly what you are asking here. You ask what would possible comprimise my conception of free will. Could you elaborate?

So you prevent X from harming your wife and thereby prevent her free will from being breached. You then say that based upon your conception of free will you would not really be violating the attacker free will by prev ...[text shortened]... ur wife's will to not be assaulted? Are you not then preserveing her will not to be assaulted?

I'm asking how you define 'free will' such that under this definition I would be tampering with X's free will and somehow preserving or enabling my wife's free will (in the example I gave)?

Me, I think an agent is acting freely whenever she acts autonomously; and she acts autonomously whenever the intention to act is formed, at least proximately, by the agent's integral and abiding character traits and by her evaluative commitments. That would be a first pass, I guess. Basically, I think one is acting freely when she endorses the underlying principle of the action, and the endorsement is proximately caused by those traits that make her who she is and represents an implicit claim concerning motives that have the support of her reason.

So, in the example where I physically restrain X from stabbing my wife, I am not somehow "violating" X's free will. Rather, I am just preventing him from being successful in the pursuit of that which he freely wills. Somewhere on this forum, can't remember exactly where or when, bbarr had a good idea along these lines: that physically restraining one in this manner is, as far as the will is concerned, equivalent to being restrained by the physical laws of nature. That is, X could freely will to stab my wife and fail, just as he could freely will to levitate above the earth's surface and fail. And I certainly don't think my actions in the example have any bearing on the status of my wife's free will.

Originally posted by whodey
So the moral of treating others in the way that you would not be treated is not moral to you? Ok, but for me and most people I talk to it is a moral way in which to live ones life. For me respecting ones free will is simply treating others in a way that you would like to be treated. However, when others then violate the free will of the individual who has ...[text shortened]... morality of "correcting" the free will of such an individual becomes increasingly justifiable.

The golden rule is fine at appealing to our intuitions about fairness, equal treatment and reciprocity, etc., but only when it is applied in certain ways. As a rule, it is not fundamentally correct because it leads to obvious absurdities when applied to certain personal eccentricities.

Originally posted by whodey
Yes to both. If God is good then goodness comes from God. Also, we should have some sense of this goodness having come from him.

Yes to both? Saying yes to both leads to contradiction because the former implies that the goodness of free will exists independently of God, whereas the latter implies just the opposite.

Originally posted by whodey
It all stems from the fall of man when God forwarned Adam and Eve that if they partook of the fruit they would surely die and not to do it. Once they then partook of the fruit the rest of the details in how they would meet their demise are then somewhat trivial in nature. Would they live another day? Whould they live a year? Would they live a 100 years? ...[text shortened]... This is at the heart of your question. Should choosing to sin necessitate suffering and death?

This is at the heart of your question. Should choosing to sin necessitate suffering and death?

No, that's not at the heart of my question. But, You really think that natural evils are God's way of making us suffer for our sins? You really think natural evils exist because of God's response to the sins of man? Natural evils cause suffering in young babies who are not old enough to sin, as one example. So, you think God is right to bring this sort of suffering on an entity that is not even yet capable of sinning?

Originally posted by LemonJello
And I certainly don't think my actions in the example have any bearing on the status of my wife's free will.[/b]

Even if she dies? I think that might be tampering with her free will just a tad.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]This is at the heart of your question. Should choosing to sin necessitate suffering and death?

No, that's not at the heart of my question. But, You really think that natural evils are God's way of making us suffer for our sins? You really think natural evils exist because of God's response to the sins of man? Natural evils cause suffering in ...[text shortened]... s right to bring this sort of suffering on an entity that is not even yet capable of sinning?[/b]

Like it or not our offspring are an extension of ourselves. For example, they inherit things genetically as a well as picking up on our good and bad habits as well as our sin nature. Is it fair? You tell me. It simply is the way it is. As far as the innocent suffering, what of Christ? According to scripture he was "innocent" yet he suffered greatly. Is it fair? No, rather, sin is simply destructive and inflicts both innocent and guilty. For example, is it fair that a drunk driver may kill a car full of children?

Originally posted by LemonJello
So, you think God is right to bring this sort of suffering on an entity that is not even yet capable of sinning?[/b]

A better question is, is it fair that God allows sinners to continue to sin thus ensuring that innocent people will suffer in some form or another?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Yes to both? Saying yes to both leads to contradiction because the former implies that the goodness of free will exists independently of God, whereas the latter implies just the opposite.

Here is my reasoning once again. God is love. A loving relationship demands free will thus we have free will. So using such reasoning is free will existing independently of God? I don't think so.

Originally posted by whodey
Like it or not our offspring are an extension of ourselves. For example, they inherit things genetically as a well as picking up on our good and bad habits as well as our sin nature. Is it fair? You tell me. It simply is the way it is. As far as the innocent suffering, what of Christ? According to scripture he was "innocent" yet he suffered greatly. Is ...[text shortened]... cent and guilty. For example, is it fair that a drunk driver may kill a car full of children?

Suppose you steal my wallet. Suppose, 50 years later I track down your grandson and beat the hell out of him because you stole my wallet. Have I acted justly? No. If it is not just for me to visit "the sins of the father..." to future generations, then it is not just for God to do it either.