14 Jan 06
Originally posted by Conrau KI disagree.
Given that our consciousness is the product of chemicals and their interactions and influences from the environment, and that our thoughts are dictated by predispositions (as the result of inheritance). Then it is impossible that we can truly make a free decision. Hence, we have no free will.
This also has implications for law. Is a person truly accountab ...[text shortened]... ably all other theists) have been lied to in some way as a consequence.
Anyone disagree?
Your theroy is a classical one it doesn't take quantum physics into account. Also if you say we can not make a decision you are implying there is more then chemicals and impulses. The chemicals are what you are they react diffrently in diffrent situations these are decisions.
I will still maintain that is you can predict someones behaviour in a situation 100% every movment they make every thought they make then they will not have free will but I don't think this is possible.
14 Jan 06
Originally posted by Conrau KWe come to this world a tabla rasa with free will...this free will is then taken awy from us by psychological indocrination, social structures and cultural forms such as 'habitus'.....
Given that our consciousness is the product of chemicals and their interactions and influences from the environment, and that our thoughts are dictated by predispositions (as the result of inheritance). Then it is impossible that we can truly make a free decision. Hence, we have no free will.
This also has implications for law. Is a person truly accountab ...[text shortened]... ably all other theists) have been lied to in some way as a consequence.
Anyone disagree?
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14 Jan 06
Originally posted by Will EverittI am sick of people attempting to expound QM as proof of free will. It isn't. I used "classical theories" because they are easier to understand. Applying QM doesn't collapse my arguments. The poblem with QM is that causality diminshes which is initself difficult to understand. I will admit to the fact that i am a determinist, in the sense that the future is determined. Now don't go crazy, OK, I understand Quntum physics. Instead of a strictly determined future from the inception of the universe, I recognize that their are exteremly large number of possible futures. However the future is resigned to one of these possible futures. Hence, you can't predict the future 100% (because there are so many possible futures). That assertion (that i need to "predict 100% every movment they make, every thout they make"😉 is a classical notion and demonstrates your complete ignorance to QM.
I disagree.
Your theroy is a classical one it doesn't take quantum physics into account. Also if you say we can not make a decision you are implying there is more then chemicals and impulses. The chemicals are what you are they react diffrently in diffrent situations these are decisions.
I will still maintain that is you can predict someones beha ...[text shortened]... every thought they make then they will not have free will but I don't think this is possible.
Now to attribute QM to freewill is vacuous. You might as well assert that the electron has free will (which it manifestly does not). Consider the other-worlds theory which has developed a good reputation equivalrnt to the copenhagen interpretation. According to the other-world theory theory every possible reality occurs in superspace (the superposition of all possible realities). At a juncture (where an electron can go left or right) two universes trasnpire accordingly. This is infact a plausible theory. Its implications are however that for every action you have committed, every other action possible has occured in its own reality. How can you argue free will then, if another you is in a completely different reality (also under the delusion of free) will but in correspondingly different condition (they could be living on the streets instead of playing chess)?
Ok its slightly extreme but surely you can apreciate where i am coming from.
14 Jan 06
Originally posted by Conrau KCan we step back a second? I follow what you are saying so far, but I am a little confused
I am sick of people attempting to expound QM as proof of free will. It isn't. I used "classical theories" because they are easier to understand. Applying QM doesn't collapse my arguments. The poblem with QM is that causality diminshes which is initself difficult to understand. I will admit to the fact that i am a determinist, in the sense that the future is ...[text shortened]... g chess)?
Ok its slightly extreme but surely you can apreciate where i am coming from.
about definitions.
How precisely are you defining 'Free Will' here?
Nemesio
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15 Jan 06
Originally posted by NemesioBut thats it, i dont believe that it is logically possible unless one assumes that there is something independent of the physical universe (which has been demonstrated to be invalid).
What would be an example of free will, even imaginary, but logically possible?
Nemesio
Assuming that something is truly a free agent (its actions are not dictated by anything else) then any of its actions are testament to free will, because it has chosen to perform that action and hence, is accountable for it.
15 Jan 06
Originally posted by Conrau KCK. Your missing the simple question to give to these people.
But thats it, i dont believe that it is logically possible unless one assumes that there is something independent of the physical universe (which has been demonstrated to be invalid).
Assuming that something is truly a free agent (its actions are not dictated by anything else) then any of its actions are testament to free will, because it has chosen to perform that action and hence, is accountable for it.
If someone hits you on the head, hard, and you become unconcious, does this mean you stop existing?
15 Jan 06
3 edits
Originally posted by Conrau KI’ve been following this with some interest. Like ATY, I tend to find the phrase “free will” ambiguous, since all our “choices” seem clearly conditioned by many factors. This, in itself, however, does not rule out the idea of constrained choice. Nor, for example, does Nietzsche’s argument that the influencing/constraining conditions are so multivariate and complex that it may be impossible to say why a certain decision is made.
Free will- the ability or capacity to make choices, insofar that one is accountable for them.
Let me ask a mundane question to make sure that I’m not confused:
I go to a restaurant. It seems to me (self-observant beast that I am) that I deliberate over choices on the menu. Sometimes I seem to have difficulty making up my mind about what to select. Under your argument, is this “deliberation process” that seems to be going on in my consciousness in reality simply my brain performing some sort of iterative function to arrive at the pre-determined result? (As was my “decision” to eat at this restaurant, at this time, etc.?)
Or, for another example, not only the exact content of this post, but the manner in which I backtracked, changed my wording, etc…. Again, does this simply reflect some iterative process toward a pre-determined result (at least in this world)?
EDIT: My comment about "at least in this world" is intended to take account of the other-worlds theory, under which, if I understand it correctly, a similar, simultaneous iteration would yield different results in different worlds.
15 Jan 06
Originally posted by Conrau KBut could you choice differently than you did. If the options are A or B, and you chose B, could you have chosen A? Did not your history, knowledge, desires, physical and mental heath, lead you to choosing B. And if any of these prior things be different, you might have chosen otherwise.
Free will- the ability or capacity to make choices, insofar that one is accountable for them.
The main issue of free will is accountability. We are accountable for our actions. Free will says we are only accountable for our actions if we were "free" to chose other than we did. That is, between a good and an evil, we were "free" to go either way. But how can we say we could have chosen other than what we did chose.
On what precedence? Have we ever done something else? We did what we did, and nothing else. The only way we could make our choice free of any outside influences is if we flipped a coin. And even then, we must assume a flip of a coin is perfectly random.
Do robots have free will? They do if they are allowed to make decisions. And indeed they do make decision all the time. There is a computer in my car the decided when to use anti-locking breaks. Why do we not hold computers accountable? We say it is because they could not have chosen otherwise due to their programming. But that is not true - computers are capable of making random decisions using a random number generator. They really could have chosen otherwise. Can we say that about people? Nope.
Free will is a psychological illusion. We claim it because we can not always tell what we are going to chose to do in the future, and we like to imagine what might have happened if we had chosen differently in the past. But the evidence is conclusive - we have only taken one path through time. We can not say we could have done differently because we never have.
15 Jan 06
Originally posted by ColettiTwo questions, Col:
But could you choice differently than you did. If the options are A or B, and you chose B, could you have chosen A? Did not your history, knowledge, desires, physical and mental heath, lead you to choosing B. And if any of these prior things be different, you might have chosen otherwise.
The main issue of free will is accountability. We are accountable ...[text shortened]... one path through time. We can not say we could have done differently because we never have.
(1) In your first paragraph you included desires. Desires would seem to be necessary to form and adjust any preference rankings at all. Are you arguing that the fact that we have desires and preferences means that we can make no choices among them? Or that those desires and preferences are themselves pre-determined? Unless all of our desires and preferences are themselves predetermined, I don’t see how their existence precludes making choices—though their make-up would certainly constrain our range of choices.
(2) With regard to your statement, “We can not say we could have done differently because we never have”—are you saying we cannot have done differently or that we cannot know that we might have done differently? The fact that I cannot return to the past does not itself seem to have any bearing on the kind of “decision deliberation” I seem to do now (whether that deliberation is a psychological illusion or not).
And that is the question that interests me: Whether or not the decision-deliberation that I seem to be doing as I select the words I am typing here is a psychological illusion.
15 Jan 06
Originally posted by vistesd(1) My view is that desires and cognitive capacity and prior knowledge, as well as external influences all combine in such a way that if we were able to, we could predict exactly what "decision" one would make in the future under any set of given circumstances. The decision making process is just one of the elements that goes into determining what choices we make - the outcome is still going to be the same.
Two questions, Col:
(1) In your first paragraph you included desires. Desires would seem to be necessary to form and adjust any preference rankings at all. Are you arguing that the fact that we have desires and preferences means that we can make no choices among them? Or that those desires and preferences are themselves pre-determined? Unless all of o ...[text shortened]... tion that I seem to be doing as I select the words I am typing here is a psychological illusion.
(2) I believe theoretically, if we could go back in time, and do it again with the same internal and external conditions (including the same knowledge) we would always make the same choices. However, I can not prove this. But if I am wrong, and another outcome is possible, it would be because there would have to be some external influence that transcends those conditions - that is - only God could change the outcome. However, as far as the preponderance of evidence goes, we have not a single observation that could prove that we could have freely chosen anything but what we did chose. All of our observations are this a series of events and never parallels events.
Basically, we are computers, programed by our environments and genes and past experiences and observations. This is the case whether there is a God who programs us, or if we are programed by evolution and environment. Either way, ever choice we make is dictated and theoretically predictable. Although it may be that only God has the capacity and capability to predicate what we will decided.
The decision making process is nothing less than the computer running. Deliberation simply gives us a sense of control or atonomy.
15 Jan 06
3 edits
Originally posted by ColettiThe decision making process is just one of the elements that goes into determining what choices we make - the outcome is still going to be the same.
(1) My view is that desires and cognitive capacity and prior knowledge, as well as external influences all combine in such a way that if we were able to, we could predict exactly what "decision" one would make in the future under any set of given circumstances. The decision making process is just one of the elements that goes into determining what choices w ...[text shortened]... g less than the computer running. Deliberation simply gives us a sense of control or atonomy.
That, I think, would answer my question to Conrau as well.
Deliberation simply gives us a sense of control or autonomy.
Let me see if I can re-word that slightly: “The sense of deliberation is part of the psychological illusion that seems to give us a sense of control or autonomy.” Does that get it?
If the sense of deliberation is part of the psychological illusion, then it seems to me not only pervasive and powerful but inescapable—that is, it is inescapable that we go through that sense of deliberating and choosing. It also means that the psychological illusion is itself part of the architecture of our consciousness, and again inescapable. It pervades most, if not all, of the thoughts, feelings and actions that we cherish most in our existence—love, passion, art, joy….
It adds a whole other dimension to the eastern concept of “maya.” Not only is the world illusive—in the sense of appearing to us other than it is (and that we cannot get beyond the phenomenal appearances to know the thing-in-itself), but our very sense of how we think, feel and act in that world is also illusive.
However, I can not prove this. But if I am wrong, and another outcome is possible, it would be because there would have to be some external influence that transcends those conditions - that is - only God could change the outcome.
I may be misunderstanding you, but I think I would disagree in part: If you are right (and Conrau is right as well) that we have no autonomy of choice in the natural order, then an alternative outcome would have to be because of some external influence that transcends the natural conditions.
Further, if the psychological illusion is part of the architecture of our consciousness, there is no way to prove or disprove it—it is like Kant’s transcendentals in that sense.
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It seems to me there are three possibilities:
(1) We have sufficiently unconstrained (though perhaps not perfectly “free” ) choice, so that we can be generally held accountable for our actions.
(2) Our actions (and thoughts and emotions) are totally and strictly determined, and there is no question of accountability.
(3) Within very strict constraints and conditions, we still nevertheless have some ability to choose; but because the ability to choose is so constrained, and because the conditions of constraint are so complex, the question of accountability is a best a thorny one and difficult to determine.
This last possibility seems the most interesting to me. I may be missing something, but I don’t see that Conrau or you have made a “slam dunk” against this one—yet.*
*Although I sense the ball spinning more and more slowly around the rim...
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15 Jan 06
Originally posted by vistesdI think Coltti is largely correct in his explanations, except that i might correct him on one minor detail, that if we went back in time and repeated the process you would behave exactly the same (not an exact verbatim but i want to avoid the word "choice"😉. I believe that in going back in time you may experience alternative deliberation and behave differently, according to
Let me ask a mundane question to make sure that I’m not confused:
I go to a restaurant. It seems to me (self-observant beast that I am) that I deliberate over choices on the menu. Sometimes I seem to have difficulty making up my mind about what to select. Under your argument, is this “deliberation process” that seems to be going on in my consc ...[text shortened]... pre-determined result? (As was my “decision” to eat at this restaurant, at this time, etc.?)
the other world theory (which incidentally I dont believe for some other trivial reasons, however that wont stultify my argument). So i shoud think that you are making one of several iterative functions which arrive at one of several possibilities yet still a predetermined result.