03 May 06
1 edit
Originally posted by RaindearSee above. The idea is that to say that something exists is to say that some concept has an extension; that it is actually instantiated in the world. To say that God exists is just to say that there is something in the world that instantiates all the properties included in the content of the concept 'God'. You and Aquinas want to claim that existence forms part of the content of the concept 'God'. But that sort of move; the move that Anselm and others use as the core premise in their ontological arguments, falls prey to Kant's objections and Guanilo's 'perfect island' counterexample. What you could argue is that God is a necessary being (not that God, by definition, exists). But I'd need to see an argument for that claim, and I haven't found any.
It looks to me as though you are applying an arbitrary distinction, but I am not sure I've understand you correctly.
What does this mean?
"Existence is some property an entity can have or fail to have; it is not a property at all."
03 May 06
Originally posted by bbarrNow I see...that is a valid objection and in college one of my philosophy professors spent a long time addressing it. The problem is, I have horrible memory and, as we've already seen, this matter requires some precision. I do remember that when we analyzed St. Anselm's argument it was flawed, but not for the reason I assumed at first. Maybe I can find my old notes, but I don't want to make a stab at it and confuse matters unnecessarily.
See above. The idea is that to say that something exists is to say that some concept has an extension; that it is actually instantiated in the world. To say that God exists is just to say that there is something in the world that instantiates all the properties included in the content of the concept 'God'. You and Aquinas want to claim that existence forms ...[text shortened]... on, exists). But I'd need to see an argument for that claim, and I haven't found any.
03 May 06
2 edits
Originally posted by RaindearBut it's been explained to you by BBarr.
Now I see...that is a valid objection and in college one of my philosophy professors spent a long time addressing it. The problem is, I have horrible memory and, as we've already seen, this matter requires some precision. I do remember that when we analyzed St. Anselm's argument it was flawed, but not for the reason I assumed at first. Maybe I can find my old notes, but I don't want to make a stab at it and confuse matters unnecessarily.
To say that Jesus (or God) exists is just to say: "There is a being, that has all the properties of Jesus (or God)." Not: "There is a being, that has all the properties of Jesus (or God), including the property of existing."
EDIT: Do a websearch for the "perfect island" counterexample.
04 May 06
Originally posted by knightmeisterYour problem with this statement is that you are questioning faith. You can have faith in whatever you want. It does not have to be proved. People are allowed to believe whatever they want. Mathematics really has no place in this argument because a proof is shown to be true via direct, indirect, contradiction of induction, while an axiom is assumed to be true. Do you question the validity of an axiom?
Let's face it guys , if there was some way that someone could construct an argument that could 'prove' (or disprove)God then it would have been done by now. Do we really think (Xstians or atheists) that someone on this forum or somehwere in the world is going to suddenly stumble across a 'proof' and we are all going to go.....ahhhh! of course! Why didn ...[text shortened]... sible. Without it God is just a preposterous mathematical nonsensical concept.
04 May 06
Originally posted by dottewellBut what if Jesus's mother's name was really Elizabeth and not Mary? According to your view, "Jesus existed" would be a false statement.
But it's been explained to you by BBarr.
To say that Jesus (or God) exists is just to say: "There is a being, that has all the properties of Jesus (or God)." Not: "There is a being, that has all the properties of Jesus (or God), including the property of existing."
EDIT: Do a websearch for the "perfect island" counterexample.
For reference, this is Kripke's criticism of Frege.
04 May 06
1 edit
Originally posted by lucifershammerNo, since not all relational properties of Jesus enter essentially into the content of my concept 'Jesus' (and wasn't Kripke responsible for distinguishing between the accidental and essential properties of things?). I don't take concepts to be definitions (and neither should you). Further, even if I did take these properties to be part of the content of the concept 'Jesus', all that Kripke's argument would show is that the statement 'Jesus existed' would be false when uttered by somebody whose concept of Jesus had the same content as mine (because the propositions expressed by utterances would be a function of the content of the concepts possessed by the utterer).
But what if Jesus's mother's name was really Elizabeth and not Mary? According to your view, "Jesus existed" would be a false statement.
For reference, this is Kripke's criticism of Frege.
04 May 06
Originally posted by lucifershammerI don't understand why this objection should present any problems at all. If your concept of 'Jesus' is historically or factually or otherwise inaccurate relative to actual events or occurrence, then that concept was never fully 'instantiated', and the claim "Jesus existed" would be false. What exactly is the problem here? Further, if my concept of 'Jesus' treats his mother's name as an irrelevant detail, then how would his mother's actual name have any bearing on whether or not that concept of 'Jesus' was instantiated?
But what if Jesus's mother's name was really Elizabeth and not Mary? According to your view, "Jesus existed" would be a false statement.
For reference, this is Kripke's criticism of Frege.
04 May 06
Originally posted by lucifershammerPerhaps slightly lazy phrasing on my part. I did not mean to suggest that the statement "Jesus existed" (uttered, say, by me) was a claim that something existed with these exact properties.
But what if Jesus's mother's name was really Elizabeth and not Mary? According to your view, "Jesus existed" would be a false statement.
For reference, this is Kripke's criticism of Frege.
Nonetheless, if the proposition "Jesus existed" is true, then something existed with a set of properties - the question of existence being separate from the question of what properties that extant being had.
04 May 06
Originally posted by dottewellAnd what does it mean to say there "is" a being, if not to say that the said being exists?
But it's been explained to you by BBarr.
To say that Jesus (or God) exists is just to say: "There is a being, that has all the properties of Jesus (or God)." Not: "There is a being, that has all the properties of Jesus (or God), including the property of existing."
EDIT: Do a websearch for the "perfect island" counterexample.
Btw, I did not mean that I failed to remember the object. LOL Sorry, I guess I didn't express myself very clearly. I meant, rather, that I cannot remember the response to that objection.
04 May 06
Originally posted by bbarrAquinas actually criticized Anselm's argument, but for a different reason. He said that Anselm's argument is not actually a proof for the existence of God, but that God's existence is self-evident by analyzing the definition of God. However, Aquinas says it doesn't work because Anselm cannot determine whether his definition is a good one without knowing the essence of God.
See above. The idea is that to say that something exists is to say that some concept has an extension; that it is actually instantiated in the world. To say that God exists is just to say that there is something in the world that instantiates all the properties included in the content of the concept 'God'. You and Aquinas want to claim that existence forms ...[text shortened]... on, exists). But I'd need to see an argument for that claim, and I haven't found any.