God's Freedom?

Originally posted by googlefudge
If I go to the Sahara and observe 100 days without clouds or rain then the weather will have been
perfectly sunny.

However it is not perfectly sunny by definition, because there is nothing inherent about the Sahara
that guarantees that there will never be any rain. In fact given long enough rain is certain.

Perfect sunniness is not an inherent ...[text shortened]... robability of 1.
Yours will be perfectly rational with a probability of 0+e as e tends to zero.

So if god is infinite, then the probability of god always being perfectly rational in your scheme is infinitesimal.

Fascinating.

This is the definition of "always" that I was using in my "scheme":

al·ways
adverb \ˈȯl-wēz, -wəz, -(&#716😉wāz also ˈȯ-\
1:  at all times :  invariably

Pasted from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/always>

What definition did you have in mind?

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]So if god is infinite, then the probability of god always being perfectly rational in your scheme is infinitesimal.

Fascinating.

This is the definition of "always" that I was using in my "scheme":

al·ways
adverb \&#712;o&#775;l-w&#275;z, -w&#601;z, -(&#716😉w&#257;z also &#712;o&#775;-\
1:  at all times :  invariably

Past ...[text shortened]... //www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/always>

What definition did you have in mind?[/b]

Presumably, he has the same definition in mind, or something identical for all intents and purposes.

Your (2) only claims that "God always chooses to be perfectly rational". So, thanks, but I think we are all already clear that this translates to something like "God invariably, or at all times, chooses to be perfectly rational". But this, taken at face value and coupled with your (1), does not entail that God is always perfectly rational. In fact, as it regards the sort of freedom at issue and with the further supposition of long enough time scale, googlefudge's argument appears at first glance correct to me. Your (1) and (2) would seem to entail that the probability that such a God actually is always perfectly rational is vanishingly small. Try actually addressing the argument.

I think you can maybe get out of this conclusion upon deeper scrutiny...perhaps by showing that although the conception of freedom at issue entails that, for any given choice, there is some possibility that God does otherwise, that does not translate into "there must be a non-zero probability that any given choice god makes will not be perfectly rational" as googlefudge claims. However, this does not yet seem too promising to me...perhaps you would need to import in the additional assumption that God is omnipotent, such that there may be zero probability that He would fail to successfully bring about the object of His intention, whenever He acts.

Originally posted by Agerg
Damn I enjoyed reading that... nicely done googlefudge :]

Thankyou.

My posts infrequently have the clarity I intend, and it's nice when one
actually comes together the way it sounds in my head.

The problem with the argument is set out in the second premise of the first part, rendering all that follows moot.
Namely:

(2) God is, by definition, perfectly rational.

"Rational" infers a conformity to something; in order to be considered rational one must submit one's thoughts and actions to a standard which is outside one's self and not be found wanting.

This is a poor and unsupported description of God, a claim more like a castle in the air than anything substantive.
It sounds good: who would dare call God irrational--- other than God Himself, of course?

When God is described in the Bible, He is called Truth.
Love.
Righteousness.
Faithful.
Light.

He is love.
It isn't that He loves (which He does), but He actually embodies it--- and the same with the rest of the attributes: He doesn't conform to a measure or standard of a characteristic, He is that characteristic.

Put another way, if you were to conjecture that God is reasonable without saying He is Reason, the subjectivity of the author's reasonable mightily sways the statement.

The rest of the argument also fails on the following grounds.
It imagines that God could be something other that what He is.
Unlike man--- who is subject to the vagaries of heat, cold and deprivation--- God is subject to but one thing: His own integrity of character.

He cannot choose to deviate from His own character like man can and does.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
The problem with the argument is set out in the second premise of the first part, rendering all that follows moot.
Namely:

(2) God is, by definition, perfectly rational.

"Rational" infers a conformity to something; in order to be considered rational one must submit one's thoughts and actions to a standard which is outside ...[text shortened]... grity of character.

He cannot choose to deviate from His own character like man can and does.

If you reject premise (2) on those grounds, then fine. But, I think we have already discussed that if you deny that there is anything external to God that constrains His mental issuances and attitudes, etc, then you will be left facing some Euthyphro-like dilemma. If you're cool with that, then so be it.

The rest of the argument also fails on the following grounds.
It imagines that God could be something other that what He is.

I do not understand this objection.

He cannot choose to deviate from His own character like man can and does.

These kinds of considerations only go toward supporting the argument.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
This was the premise provided:
God is, by definition, perfectly rational.

This is what I wrote:

As an example consider the following conception of God:
1) God has free will.
2) God [b]always chooses to be "perfectly rational".

A person with this conception of God could rightly define God as "perfectly rational".

Are you ...[text shortened]... that a person with that conception of God could not rightly define God as "perfectly rational"?[/b]

No, I am claiming that definitions given in argument must be taken as they are. What you are doing is writing in your own premises instead of working with the ones in the argument.

Also, restating the conclusion of an argument as a premise is out-of-bounds.

Originally posted by LemonJello
If you reject premise (2) on those grounds, then fine. But, I think we have already discussed that if you deny that there is anything external to God that constrains His mental issuances and attitudes, etc, then you will be left facing some Euthyphro-like dilemma. If you're cool with that, then so be it.

The rest of the argument also fails on ...[text shortened]... n can and does.

These kinds of considerations only go toward supporting the argument.

If you're cool with that, then so be it.
As stated, I see God's attributes as the only thing which "contains" His behavior.

I do not understand this objection.
God cannot be not God.
According to your scenario, He must be able to both God as well as be not God: able to choose to (for instance) lie and not lie.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]If you're cool with that, then so be it.
As stated, I see God's attributes as the only thing which "contains" His behavior.

I do not understand this objection.
God cannot be not God.
According to your scenario, He must be able to both God as well as be not God: able to choose to (for instance) lie and not lie.[/b]

That was why I complained, you cannot take away every choice than talk about
a choice that isn't there.
Kelly

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]If you're cool with that, then so be it.
As stated, I see God's attributes as the only thing which "contains" His behavior.

I do not understand this objection.
God cannot be not God.
According to your scenario, He must be able to both God as well as be not God: able to choose to (for instance) lie and not lie.[/b]

According to your scenario, He must be able to both God as well as be not God

Sorry, but I do not see any place where this is implied by the argument, even upon careful reading. You'll need to flesh it out a bit further if you want me to take this seriously.

Originally posted by KellyJay
That was why I complained, you cannot take away every choice than talk about
a choice that isn't there.
Kelly

I have already addressed your complaints and objections, as I understood them, in some detail. Please feel free to respond in substance to those points of mine.

If your complaint here is the same as what Freaky just made, then as I already told him above, I do not understand the complaint. You guys will need to elaborate.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I have already addressed your complaints and objections, as I understood them, in some detail. Please feel free to respond in substance to those points of mine.

If your complaint here is the same as what Freaky just made, then as I already told him above, I do not understand the complaint. You guys will need to elaborate.

I don't see how you can miss it, but okay. God is God, He is true to His nature.
He does not change, He is the same yesterday, today, and forever.
If the right thing to do is pick A and its wrong to pick B, than it isn't a choice
for God A will be picked, that does not mean He isn't free, it means He is true.
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
I don't see how you can miss it, but okay. God is God, He is true to His nature.
He does not change, He is the same yesterday, today, and forever.
If the right thing to do is pick A and its wrong to pick B, than it isn't a choice
for God A will be picked, that does not mean He isn't free, it means He is true.
Kelly

Actually what you have said does in fact mean that god is not free in the
libertarian, incompatibilist sense.

If god is fixed by his nature, and that dictates his actions such that he is
forced to pick a particular option in a given set of circumstances then god
could not have chosen other and thus is not free.

It doesn't matter what is causing god not to be able to chose other, as long
as something prevents the choice other then god is not free.

Originally posted by googlefudge
Actually what you have said does in fact mean that god is not free in the
libertarian, incompatibilist sense.

If god is fixed by his nature, and that dictates his actions such that he is
forced to pick a particular option in a given set of circumstances then god
could not have chosen other and thus is not free.

It doesn't matter what is causi ...[text shortened]... o be able to chose other, as long
as something prevents the choice other then god is not free.

I see no issue with that, an honest man will be honest and will not steal even
if he can get away with it. He is free to steal, but being honest he will not.
He is what he is. You cannot have an honest man who steals.
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
I see no issue with that, an honest man will be honest and will not steal even
if he can get away with it. He is free to steal, but being honest he will not.
He is what he is. You cannot have an honest man who steals.
Kelly

Ok, so you agree that god cannot be perfectly rational and have libertarian free will.

Also, you believe god is bound by his unchanging essential nature which means that
the god you believe in cannot have libertarian free will.

Originally posted by googlefudge
Ok, so you agree that god cannot be perfectly rational and have libertarian free will.

Also, you believe god is bound by his unchanging essential nature which means that
the god you believe in cannot have libertarian free will.

I believe God is who He is, and will always remain that way.
Perfectly rational, with a libertarian free will are not two ways I have ever
described God, or seen in scripture. I don't think of Him as tall or short either.
Kelly