10 Feb 11
Originally posted by Bosse de NageWell, that's a bit misleading. Why can't I see the whole brain as the 'real me' and thus the agent is not just in the brain, it is the brain?
Dennett describes the notion of a 'real you' as the Cartesian theatre -- the notion that somewhere in the brain there is a centralised agent (res cogitans) that has thoughts. But there isn't, apparently.
11 Feb 11
Originally posted by PalynkaWhy not extend that agency to the entire body? It seems self-evident that you and your body are one. In that case, I would happily concede that 'Palynka' refers to that body -- that when I address you, I am addressing that body.
Well, that's a bit misleading. Why can't I see the whole brain as the 'real me' and thus the agent is not just in the brain, it is the brain?
At the same time, imagine you developed without language: words, including 'I', are not available to you. Would you have the same brain or a different brain? Would agency still be applicable in your case?
11 Feb 11
Originally posted by Bosse de NageGiven the uniqueness of each brain and the uniqueness of each body (by this I mean excluding the brain, the rest of the body), we have a one-for-one correspondence and we may think that there is no difference but we can still conceive of thought experiments that show these are not the same.
Why not extend that agency to the entire body? It seems self-evident that you and your body are one. In that case, I would happily concede that 'Palynka' refers to that body -- that when I address you, I am addressing that body.
At the same time, imagine you developed without language: words, including 'I', are not available to you. Would you have the same brain or a different brain? Would agency still be applicable in your case?
We can argue by what we mean by "self" but I think the brain is what is closest to a traditional definition of self. Take my brain and switch my body and I wouldn't say there's necessarily a discontinuity in the self. Of course, the brain (and therefore the self) is affected by stimuli and through them alters itself to create memories, thoughts, etc. so it's indeed a very dynamic 'self' that I'm talking about here. Note that I'm not saying the medium is irrelevant. The rest of the body is require to interpret and code the inputs the brain receives so plays pretty much a part in the development of the brain. But a change of body would mean a change of the inputs going forward but not the 'state' of the brain which I find convenient to think of as the self. In your example, changing the past stimuli of the brain, you can see now that in a dynamic view of the self then I would indeed by a different 'self'. But my brain would also be different (different neural synapses, etc).
Also I'd say you address my brain. Even here on the internet my body is not the relevant part when you address me apart from the fact that I need it to type. But had my body been substantially different but my brain the same (difficult due to the dynamic nature of the brain as I mentioned, but let's imagine it for the sake of argument) then I would imagine that would make very little difference in our communication. But if I had Very Rusty's brain and my body the same as now then you would address someone else entirely.
Anyway, these are just my fast assembled thoughts on this. I also think language keeps assigning round labels to square pegs but these round labels serve a function and I imagine the notion of the self can be particularly useful when dealing with psychiatric or psychological conditions even if it's good to keep I'm mind of its dynamic nature and not a monolithic static 'self'.
11 Feb 11
Originally posted by PalynkaI was uncharacteristicly trying to avoid speaking in absolutes. There is likely no 'real' self, but if there is one, or if there is something that closely approximates one, it is probably unknowable.
Previously you said that the doppelganger obscured the 'real' you and now you deny the existence of a 'real you'.
Or is the argument that the 'real you' is a dynamic concept? That wouldn't make it unknowable, though.
11 Feb 11
Originally posted by rwingettI need to be a bit pedantic here, sorry, what do you mean by unknowable? We cannot know with certainty and exactitude what it is? Or that there is nothing we can learn about it?
I was uncharacteristicly trying to avoid speaking in absolutes. There is likely no 'real' self, but if there is one, or if there is something that closely approximates one, it is probably unknowable.
That we try to learn something about a changing self doesn't mean we cannot learn anything, right? The self changes continually but (relatively) slowly.
11 Feb 11
Originally posted by PalynkaOK. So we can discard the traditional notion of self as some sort of essence of Palynka where all the mental activities cohere. That does not exist. Or do you maintain that there is a centralised point in your brain where all the inputs fit together to form your 'self'?
Given the uniqueness of each brain and the uniqueness of each body (by this I mean excluding the brain, the rest of the body), we have a one-for-one correspondence and we may think that there is no difference but we can still conceive of thought experiments that show these are not the same.
We can argue by what we mean by "self" but I think the brain is w ...[text shortened]... d to keep I'm mind of its dynamic nature and not a monolithic static 'self'.
What does it mean to say 'a discontinuity in the self'? In the brain? Then why not say the brain? What does 'self' mean that 'brain' does not?
You are to others what you represent yourself to be. In addition to the existence of your brain, you are an artefact of signs. Your consciousness is the centre of narrative gravity of the body of Palynka.
11 Feb 11
Originally posted by Bosse de NageIf you have a point, make it. I don't want to chase loaded questions.
OK. So we can discard the traditional notion of self as some sort of essence of Palynka where all the mental activities cohere. That does not exist. Or do you maintain that there is a centralised point in your brain where all the inputs fit together to form your 'self'?
What does it mean to say 'a discontinuity in the self'? In the brain? Then why ...[text shortened]... of signs. Your consciousness is the centre of narrative gravity of the body of Palynka.
11 Feb 11
Originally posted by PalynkaThis is a casual conversation; if there's nothing of interest in my comments, don't feel obliged to respond!
If you have a point, make it. I don't want to chase loaded questions.
I think this question is clear, though: Is there a centralised point in your brain where all the inputs fit together to form your 'self'?
I'm asking because something you wrote -- 'the rest of the body is require to interpret and code the inputs the brain receives so plays pretty much a part in the development of the brain' -- suggests that the answer is Yes. If the answer is No, then we agree.
11 Feb 11
One's brain is a resultant of many experiences, some very physical.
If one places the brain in another 'body', then how can those physical experiences, such as pain, remembering being burnt on a particular occasion, experiencing physical fear, attach themeselves to that new 'body' with any relevance?
The physical state of a brain must include the physical body experiences which amount to both simultaneous mind and body recognition, that makes us unique.
-m.
11 Feb 11
Originally posted by twhiteheadNo! Because your brain can relate to having had a transplant, and a new part fitted.
If you loose your arms and legs in an accident then later have a heart transplant, kidney and lung transplants etc do you cease to be 'you'? Do you loose some of your identity? Do you gain some of the identity of the donors?
To move the brain to an alien body, it has not concept of previous knowledge with that said body, nor the experiences such as that body having experiencing being burned etc., as I stated in my last post. The fundamental instinct of fear would be lost.
Wouldn't it?
-m.
11 Feb 11
1 edit
Originally posted by twhiteheadDefine 'identity'.
If you loose your arms and legs in an accident then later have a heart transplant, kidney and lung transplants etc do you cease to be 'you'? Do you loose some of your identity? Do you gain some of the identity of the donors?
Alternatively: How would you test for lost identity?
11 Feb 11
Originally posted by mikelomI am not really sure what you are suggesting. Are you saying there is some subconscious memory held in the body external to the brain? Or that 'instinct' or 'fear' are held external to the brain? If so, then I disagree.
To move the brain to an alien body, it has not concept of previous knowledge with that said body, nor the experiences such as that body having experiencing being burned etc., as I stated in my last post. The fundamental instinct of fear would be lost.
Wouldn't it?
11 Feb 11
Originally posted by Bosse de NageMy answer would be no. I'm sorry if I sounded aggressive but I thought I was clear about that so I was expected some sort of trick question. The 'self' is the brain, the whole thing. Our mental image of the self is simply then an abstract view of how one's brain works. Not the physiology of it, but more correctly what outputs we expect from some given inputs.
This is a casual conversation; if there's nothing of interest in my comments, don't feel obliged to respond!
I think this question is clear, though: Is there a centralised point in your brain where all the inputs fit together to form your 'self'?
I'm asking because something you wrote -- 'the rest of the body is require to interpret and code th ...[text shortened]... ent of the brain' -- suggests that the answer is Yes. If the answer is No, then we agree.
But I still don't know if I understand the last sentence. But why would you say that my wording suggests that? My point was that the brain responds to impulses but to reach the brain these impulses require eyes, nervous system, ears, etc. But these impulses also change the brain over time (, so for example the way the brain develops will depend if you have eyes or not. But if my eyes suddenly disappeared and my self would not change in that instant (same inputs, same outputs) but still the absence of eyes will have an effect of how my brain changes going into the future. In that sense, there's no discontinuity. On the other hand, give me an instant lobotomy and my self changes immediately (different outputs even with same inputs) and in that sense there is a 'discontinuity'.