LemonJello plum line, second hand

Originally posted by KellyJay
If you are suggesting that the discussion is really not about morals but our abilities to
understand them, I see the distinctions, but don't believe it presents a difference between
what is right and wrong and our abilities to grasp it. If morals are a reality and our ability
to grasp them reside in our physical makeup, than does that mean our limitation ...[text shortened]... e sight is as bad as mine is now and now get
winded moving from the couch to the kitchen table?

Since you see the distinction at issue, then I presume you can see the difference between (a) a mental faculty that provides us with moral views that purport to pick out the moral facts and (b) moral facts themselves. If Joyce's account explicitly deals with evolution of (a), then why exactly would that thereby commit him to a non-static view (or any particular view) regarding the nature of (b)?

And what exactly is special about morality in this respect? To continue with the example Twhitehead introduced, if I claim that our ability to enumerate and do basic math evolved, are you going to counter that I am thus committed to some non-static view of addition tables?

If morals are a reality and our ability
to grasp them reside in our physical makeup, than does that mean our limitations and
morals are true if we have the ability to see 20/20 and run a mile in under 4 minutes, but
they would be different if everyone's eye sight is as bad as mine is now and now get
winded moving from the couch to the kitchen table?

It certainly is reasonable to think that moral reality depends in many ways on our physical makeup. Perhaps it would be morally wrong of a human to sucker punch another in the gut for no good reason. But, if down the road humans evolve to have some sort of exoskeleton that makes them impervious to strikes in the midsection, then maybe the moral reality will change. Regardless, one could argue that there is an underlying general moral principle that does all the work here and which remains invariant, such as that one ought not bring gratuitous harm on another.

Generally, though, the answer to your question is no, since the idea that our ability to grasp moral reality depends on our physical makeup does not imply that morality reality is simply determined by our physical makeup, let alone by just any old aspects of our physical makeup. You claim that you understand the distinction I brought up, but these sorts of questions don't really back you up on that. Again, one can hold both that our mental capacity with respect to some realm depends on our physical makeup and that our physical makeup is subject to evolution -- all without being thereby committed to some meta-view on the specific nature of that realm.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Since you see the distinction at issue, then I presume you can see the difference between (a) a mental faculty that provides us with moral views that purport to pick out the moral facts and (b) moral facts themselves. If Joyce's account explicitly deals with evolution of (a), then why exactly would that thereby commit him to a non-static view (or any par ...[text shortened]... n -- all without being thereby committed to some meta-view on the specific nature of that realm.

I believe I see your point and will concede I've been mixing (a) and (b) without thinking it
through. Our thoughts could be blinding us due to (a) and since we will always suffer the
housing of our bodies it seems quite unlikely that will ever change. We also run the risk of
moving back as we do forward if you believe evolution is all about change, so we could be
getting more complex or getting less there isn't a goal or drive one way or another.

So moral facts themselves can reside outside of the human experience, and this is not
causing some a level of angst?

I don't think anyone can be held to a moral fact that they are not aware, and if made
aware is it something they have to agree with too? Lewis pointed out that people argue
because they believe the other person is aware of the same standard of right and wrong
they are, they just don't accept another's views when it confronted with what they want.

I'm starting to see a lot of wisdom in God allowing us to be witnesses, we are going to
burn ourselves with our own actions, justifications, condemnations, and so on. It isn't
going to be pretty.

Originally posted by KellyJay
I believe I see your point and will concede I've been mixing (a) and (b) without thinking it
through. Our thoughts could be blinding us due to (a) and since we will always suffer the
housing of our bodies it seems quite unlikely that will ever change. We also run the risk of
moving back as we do forward if you believe evolution is all about change, so we ...[text shortened]... es with our own actions, justifications, condemnations, and so on. It isn't
going to be pretty.

So moral facts themselves can reside outside of the human experience, and this is not
causing some a level of angst?

I don't know, you tell me. Rate your own level of angst about it: according to your own meta-ethical view moral facts reside in the subjectivity of God, not humans.

At any rate, the point is that no such commitments (or their denial) follow in tow from an evolutionary account of the human moral faculty. The onus would be on you here to show that in virtue of such an account, one would be handcuffed to some particular meta-ethical claims, and I think it is dubious that you could accomplish this. Certainly, just responding with some loaded rhetoric like "Oh, so they would be okay with moral facts having x,y,z property?" does not accomplish this.

I don't think anyone can be held to a moral fact that they are not aware, and if made
aware is it something they have to agree with too? Lewis pointed out that people argue
because they believe the other person is aware of the same standard of right and wrong
they are, they just don't accept another's views when it confronted with what they want.

People can disagree because of some fundamental conflict in values. Probably more common, though, is when people share fundamental values but cannot agree on what things best exemplify them and how best to achieve and prioritize them. It's a perennial problem, I guess, where there are so many competing views on how to secure the good life and where there is motivation or need to legislate particular paths to the exclusions of others.

I'm starting to see a lot of wisdom in God allowing us to be witnesses, we are going to
burn ourselves with our own actions, justifications, condemnations, and so on. It isn't
going to be pretty.

Given up hope already?

It's one thing to say one reaps what one sows, insofar as the consequences one is stuck with reflect the wisdom (or lack thereof) of the choices one has made. It's another thing to try to rationalize the sanctioning of cruel and unusual punishment as the offender imposing it on himself or herself. The former makes some sense, the latter doesn't.

Originally posted by LemonJello

So moral facts themselves can reside outside of the human experience, and this is not
causing some a level of angst?

I don't know, you tell me. Rate your own level of angst about it: according to your own meta-ethical view moral facts reside in the subjectivity of God, not humans.

At any rate, the point is that no such commitment ...[text shortened]... he offender imposing it on himself or herself. The former makes some sense, the latter doesn't.

"I don't know, you tell me. Rate your own level of angst about it: according to your own meta-ethical view moral facts reside in the subjectivity of God, not humans.

At any rate, the point is that no such commitments (or their denial) follow in tow from an evolutionary account of the human moral faculty. The onus would be on you here to show that in virtue of such an account, one would be handcuffed to some particular meta-ethical claims, and I think it is dubious that you could accomplish this. Certainly, just responding with some loaded rhetoric like "Oh, so they would be okay with moral facts having x,y,z property?" does not accomplish this."

I believe morals are based upon something outside of human intellect which sort of
shocked me when I understood the A,B piece of our conversation. With evolution where
would the morals standards come from if they did reside outside of human intellect?

If we have to find them they were there before we started looking for them, unlike our
grasp of mathematics if morals reside outside of human intellect does it mean our
personal taste doesn't change what is and is not moral. We can have opinion about 1+1
but our personal tastes cannot change the answer to 5 regardless how we benefit from 5
being the answer for a short time.

If morals standards are real and valid outside of human standards and personal taste
what does that mean with respect to human behavior? Are we bound to live by them, or
free to reject them if they go against our personal tastes? What good is a moral standard
that is meaningless to us if we are free to reject it and get free ice cream or spoons by
stealing them if we want too?

Originally posted by LemonJello

So moral facts themselves can reside outside of the human experience, and this is not
causing some a level of angst?

I don't know, you tell me. Rate your own level of angst about it: according to your own meta-ethical view moral facts reside in the subjectivity of God, not humans.

At any rate, the point is that no such commitment ...[text shortened]... he offender imposing it on himself or herself. The former makes some sense, the latter doesn't.

More later I cannot give your post the level of thought it deserves right now.

Originally posted by KellyJay
"I don't know, you tell me. Rate your own level of angst about it: according to your own meta-ethical view moral facts reside in the subjectivity of God, not humans.

At any rate, the point is that no such commitments (or their denial) follow in tow from an evolutionary account of the human moral faculty. The onus would be on you here to show that in vir ...[text shortened]... s if we are free to reject it and get free ice cream or spoons by
stealing them if we want too?

I believe morals are based upon something outside of human intellect which sort of
shocked me when I understood the A,B piece of our conversation. With evolution where
would the morals standards come from if they did reside outside of human intellect?

The point, again, is that no specific commitments regarding the nature of (b) follow just in virtue of some evolutionary explanation regarding (a). Go speak to ten different proponents of the evolutionary explanation for (a), and you may well get 10 substantively different accounts for (b), though I suspect that the majority of them would still ground moral standards in objective facts one way or another.

if morals reside outside of human intellect does it mean our
personal taste doesn't change what is and is not moral.

If moral facts turn out to be objective, then yes. That's simply in part what 'objective' means in this context when predicated unto the moral facts: that their obtaining does not depend on whatever moral attitudes any observers may take up.

If morals standards are real and valid outside of human standards and personal taste
what does that mean with respect to human behavior? Are we bound to live by them, or
free to reject them if they go against our personal tastes? What good is a moral standard
that is meaningless to us if we are free to reject it and get free ice cream or spoons by
stealing them if we want too?

That there is a standard in itself entails nothing regarding how well that standard will be lived up to in practice. Of course, you already know we would be free to reject it. One could even do so without ultimate negative ramifications to him or her, since there's no reason to think all transgressions would ultimately be punished or balanced out. What's interesting here is how you move from there to the idea that such a standard would be meaningless. You started with the premise that there is a "real and valid" moral standard and yet end up with conclusion that this standard is "meaningless". Is this argument of yours supposed to be a reductio; or are you just being incoherent? (Of course, I'm inferring here what your argument would be if you had an argument, since a bunch of loaded questions do not really constitute an argument.)

It constantly amazes me how incredibly fixated you theists can be at times on the subject of retributive justice. For instance, sonship has tried to argue that if an instance of injustice occurs and yet there is no subsequent fitting punishment for the offender, then the injustice never actually existed in the first place. Here, you're arguing (again, I suppose this is what you mean to argue) something eerily similar: that if there is a "real and valid" moral standard and yet one is free to transgress without guarantee of punishment, then said moral standard is "meaningless". Problem is, both of those are self-contradictory on the face of it. There's a real head-scratcher here in your lines of reasoning: that on one hand the obtaining of retributive justice is so vitally important; and that, on the other hand, its failing to obtain has apparently no significant ramification (it just means there was no problem or transgression to begin with, so what's the big deal?).

Sorry, your take on it makes no sense to me. What would make sense to me -- what would seem to be internally consistent -- is that the lack of retributive justice (supposing it is sooooooo important and all) would really make for a very unfortunate state of affairs and would thus not be "meaningless" at all.

Originally posted by vivify
It would appear that the idea is to never think we've got it 'figured out" regarding morality, but to continually strive toward a better morality than we currently have. This is a good idea, given the horrendous choices human beings make in how they treat each other.

If we don't have it figured out, zand will never have it figured out, why pretend we understand it?