31 Jul 08
Originally posted by epiphinehasDespite it being fashionable to think that the mystery of phenomenal consciousness and libertarianism about freedom can be illuminated by reference to quantum mechanics, nothing I've ever read has made good on the promise. This includes the article you cite repeatedly. There is a strange relationship between choice and observation in quantum mechanics. The choice of one experimental protocol will yield certain observed results, while the choice of a different experimental protocol will yield other results, where these sets of results together indicate that certain physical states or systems run counter to our realist metaphysical intuitions. Here I am thinking in particular of the famous two-slit experiments. There is also a strange relationship between conscious observation and quantum systems. The observation of a quantum system that exists in a superposition of states yields the measurement of a determinate eigenvalue.
[b]"Free Choice" is just mumbo-jumbo. Quantum effects aren't chosen, and they don't allow for choice.
On the contrary, the articles I've read suggest that quantum theory is unique precisely because it does allow for free choice:
"The agent’s choice about how to act has been introduced into the scientific description at a basic level, and ...[text shortened]... primary vehicle for the assertion of the non-physical agent's will.[/b]
There is absolutely no sense in which quantum mechanics posits free choices, or entails that choices are free. Quantum mechanics is perfectly consistent with compatibilism about freedom, and with choices being the result of causal determination at the classical level. I have absolutely no idea why anybody would think that the uncertainty principle entails anything about determining the cause of choices, except in the trivial sense that it prevents us from simultaneously measuring complementary properties of certain quantum systems (e.g., position and momentum).
31 Jul 08
Originally posted by bbarrI take it you've studied this stuff before?
Despite it being fashionable to think that the mystery of phenomenal consciousness and libertarianism about freedom can be illuminated by reference to quantum mechanics, nothing I've ever read has made good on the promise. This includes the article you cite repeatedly. There is a strange relationship between choice and observation in quantum mechanics ...[text shortened]... ly measuring complementary properties of certain quantum systems (e.g., position and momentum).
31 Jul 08
2 edits
Originally posted by Bosse de NageIf you reformat this, you have a very elegant argument:
I think you're bright enough to catch up with him. Me, sadly, no.
I think you're bright enough to catch up with him.
Hence, me, sadly, no.
Epiphinehas is not that bright. Being among the ten most intelligent people on this site, I would know.
31 Jul 08
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesIt certainly wasn't very bright of me to bring up quantum physics in the first place.
If you reformat this, you have a very elegant argument:
I think you're bright enough to catch up with him.
Hence, me, sadly, no.
Epiphinehas is not that bright. Being among the ten most intelligent people on this site, I would know.
31 Jul 08
Originally posted by twhitehead1 and 2. 2 is called intuition.
But when you finally make a move, to what can we attribute that particular move?
1. Your experience, combined with processing in your brain.
2. A physical process in your brain that worked it out without any prior input (how could that work?).
3. God.
4. A non-physical entity that makes random moves.
5. Other?
01 Aug 08
Originally posted by epiphinehasI'm not sure it is correct to say the H's uncertainty principle "lies at the base of quantum mechanics". If anything lies at the base of quantum mechanics, it is S's wave equation. But the uncertainty principle certainly does constitute a substantial constraint on our investigations into the quantum realm. There are some properties that are complementarily related such that precise measurement of one precludes precise measurement of the other. Whether this is an epistemological fact or also an ontological fact about certain properties is still an issue of contention among those that attempt to provide metaphysical interpretations of the formalism of quantum mechanics. If Bohm's hidden variable account of quantum mechanics is right, for instance, then the uncertainty principle may be simply a constraint on investigation. If Bell's experiments in fact show that no hidden variable account of quantum mechanics is tenable, and if S's wave equation provides a complete description of the evolution of quantum systems, then perhaps the uncertainty principle tracks something interesting about the metaphysical nature of quantum systems.
It would seem that treating an agent's “free choices” as the input variables of experimental protocols isn't simply a matter of pragmatism, but a fundamental assertion about reality itself, e.g., "...one is faced not merely with a practical unknowability of the causal origin of the “free choices,” but with an unknowability in principle that stems from the u ...[text shortened]... examples of the over-extension of quantum theory to phenomena it wasn't meant to describe?[/b]
But, in any case, suppose the authors are correct that the causal origins or willing, or the physical basis in which willing is instantiated, include quantum states. Suppose that this entails that, in fact and principle, it is impossible for anybody to derive via observation a complete physical description of instances of willing. Does anything important follow from this about the intrinsic nature of the will? If so, what? I fail to see how any of this provides room for freedom in a libertarian sense, because I see no reason to think that proposition that instances of willing are indeterminable (not necessarily indeterminate) entails or even supports the claim that instances of willing are lack causally sufficient antecedents. But, even if it did entail this, what justifies the inference from this conclusion to the further claim that instances of willing are free? This is just an implication of the bizarre position libertarians hold; that free choices are both causally unnecessitated and yet attributable to agents.
01 Aug 08
Originally posted by epiphinehasWell, it is not my specialty, but I have studied this with Arthur Fine and Marc Lange. I do not want to come across here as completely dismissive of the possibility that quantum mechanics may have important implications concerning phenomenal consciousness and the will. A couple decades ago a book by Penrose called "The Emperor's New Mind" caused quite a stir in the laity for suggesting (among other things) that quantum mechanics held the key to understanding phenomenal consciousness. If you're interested in these topics you might want to read the responses to this book by some leading philosophers of mind.
I take it you've studied this stuff before?
01 Aug 08
Originally posted by epiphinehasI think that is only true if the agent relies on quantum processes as input.
According to quantum physics the cause of an agent's choice is fundamentally unknowable.
But if you are right, then an agents choices are indistinguishable from random. I disagree. When you make a Chess move, I can tell whether or not you have played chess before. Your past experience most definitely is part of the cause of your choice.
01 Aug 08
This is my current understanding of quantum mechanics and the uncertainty principle:
1. Using our knowledge of the laws of physics, we can 'predict' the past. eg if we know the velocity of a particle, we can work out where it was in the past.
2. However, there are situations in which more than one possible past could have resulted in the current state. When this is the case, we can not infact ever know which past actually took place.
3. However, if we look at the set of all possible pasts that could have resulted in the present, we find some are more likely than others. We can even draw a sort of graph showing that probability.
4. Sometimes we get interesting phenomena such as when there are two possible pasts, but further back along both lines, there is only one possible past (think two slit experiment).
5. The universe behaves as if all possible pasts actually took place. This may be simply an effect of the complex mathematics going on. But it sure looks like something more than that.
6. Interestingly all the same points can be applied to the future, but due to increasing entropy over time, the possible futures diverge very fast and so there are almost always an infinite number of possible futures even over small time scales.
01 Aug 08
Originally posted by twhiteheadWait, isn't (1) above just a denial of one entailment of H's uncertainty principle? Since position and momentum are complementary properties for particles like electrons, if we decide to measure the momentum of these particles we are thereby precluded from determining their position.
This is my current understanding of quantum mechanics and the uncertainty principle:
1. Using our knowledge of the laws of physics, we can 'predict' the past. eg if we know the velocity of a particle, we can work out where it was in the past.
2. However, there are situations in which more than one possible past could have resulted in the current state. ...[text shortened]... so there are almost always an infinite number of possible futures even over small time scales.
What does (2) have to do with quantum mechanics at all? Even classical systems are such that, possibly, a complete specification of their states at a particular time does not entail respectively unique past states. Further, this does not entail that we cannot know which past states gave rise to the current states. It merely entails that we cannot know with certainty the complete specification of the past states. You acknowledge as much in (3).
What does (4) have to do with two-slit experiments? These experiments purport to show that our choice of experimental methodology determines whether light behaves as we would expect either a particle or a wave to behave (e.g., we observe diffraction in some experimental setups, but not others).
How is (5) not trivial? If the total state of the universe at a particular time is consistent with any number of possible pasts, then of course the universe will behave as though any of those pasts actually took place.
I don't understand (6). In particular, I don't understand what it means for possible futures to diverge very fast. Could you explain?
01 Aug 08
Originally posted by black beetleUm, that's not helpful and it doesn't address the point.
edit: "How is (5) not trivial? If the total state of the universe at a particular time is consistent with any number of possible pasts, then of course the universe will behave as though any of those pasts actually took place."
Point here is the probability of multiple universes;
01 Aug 08
I don't try to interfere in your discussion regarding quantum mechanics because it is not my field and for sure I don't know whether this is helpful or not. You clearly know by far more than me over here. But -5-, as discribed by twhitehead, is a probability accepted in full by Tibetan Buddhism (The Tibetan Book of the Dead);
01 Aug 08
Originally posted by black beetleAre you sure you're not talking about (6)? (5) doesn't seem to have anything to do with multiple or parallel universes, but rather with a universe progressing as though its present state resulted from any number of possible pasts. There are interpretations of quantum mechanics, in particular interpretations of the metaphysics of the collapse of superposition of states, that commit themselves to the existence of multiple universes. The Many-Worlds hypothesis and the Many-Minds hypothesis both have this entailment.
I don't try to interfere in your discussion regarding quantum mechanics because it is not my field and for sure I don't know whether this is helpful or not. You clearly know by far more than me over here. But -5-, as discribed by twhitehead, is a probability accepted in full by Tibetan Buddhism (The Tibetan Book of the Dead);