Molinism

Originally posted by LemonJello
I guess it may be able to resolve some tension for them, but it may create other problems for them too. An implication would be that their God is forgetful, but maybe they would be okay with that? As I mentioned, another way to potentially achieve the same effect is to say that God, say, chooses to not exercise some of His capacities to the fullest. Bu ...[text shortened]... That's why I wanted to know if there were any here who consider themselves Molinists.

i don't think you will find anyone here who cares to face up to the intellectual challenge, even if they are capable.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I guess it may be able to resolve some tension for them, but it may create other problems for them too. An implication would be that their God is forgetful, but maybe they would be okay with that? As I mentioned, another way to potentially achieve the same effect is to say that God, say, chooses to not exercise some of His capacities to the fullest. Bu ...[text shortened]... That's why I wanted to know if there were any here who consider themselves Molinists.

It does seem as though Molinists are jumping through hoops that aren't there, and never will be. If I understand this correctly, God knows what someone would do in a particular situation even though he knows that particular situation won't occur. I don't doubt an omniscient God would be able to do that (because he's omniscient) but it would be strange if he occupied himself with thoughts of things he knows won't happen. I wonder what God thinks of Molinists who waste their time contemplating this?

Originally posted by JS357
i don't think you will find anyone here who cares to face up to the intellectual challenge, even if they are capable.

Intellectual challenge? Is that what this is supposed to be?

Originally posted by LemonJello
I guess it may be able to resolve some tension for them, but it may create other problems for them too. An implication would be that their God is forgetful, but maybe they would be okay with that? As I mentioned, another way to potentially achieve the same effect is to say that God, say, chooses to not exercise some of His capacities to the fullest. Bu ...[text shortened]... That's why I wanted to know if there were any here who consider themselves Molinists.

Actually, no not really as some of the discussion above shows, God if He
can forget what He wants to, and He can know all the ends and outs of
every action He takes as well as those that belong to Him. He can make
the best possible choice in setting up a universe where all things end at
some point, and another unspoiled one will begin and last forever. I don't
see how any tension would come into play, except with those that do not
have their crimes/sins against Him forgotten or forgiven, to those that He
holds all things against His never forgetting could be one of the most scary
things ever beheld.
Kelly

Originally posted by LemonJello
Is there any theist here who considers himself/herself a Molinist?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molinism

I have another twist to this, I'll ask this as a question.

God if He is everywhere, knows everything, and is all powerful, is there any
spot large or small where God isn't all powerful and all knowing? Does that
mean that God is everywhere in His completeness since God isn't limited
anywhere at any time. That would be quite unique in all time and space in
my opinion from anything or anyone else.
Kelly

Originally posted by lemon lime
It does seem as though Molinists are jumping through hoops that aren't there, and never will be. If I understand this correctly, God knows what someone would do in a particular situation even though he knows that particular situation won't occur. I don't doubt an omniscient God would be able to do that (because he's omniscient) but it would be strange if ...[text shortened]... ppen. I wonder what God thinks of Molinists who waste their time contemplating this?

I was hoping a self-professed Molinist would join the discussion to defend against these types of charges, but it seems there are no takers as of yet. Presumably a Molinist would counter that it is not strange that God occupies himself with thoughts of the counterfactuals, since the Molinist holds that this is a critical precursor to his creative process.

Originally posted by KellyJay
Actually, no not really as some of the discussion above shows, God if He
can forget what He wants to, and He can know all the ends and outs of
every action He takes as well as those that belong to Him. He can make
the best possible choice in setting up a universe where all things end at
some point, and another unspoiled one will begin and last forever. things against His never forgetting could be one of the most scary
things ever beheld.
Kelly

So you seem to think Molinism is all peaches and cream, but it seems to me that Molinists would have a near impossible task when it comes to the subject of theodicy. As I understand it, Molinists claim that God uses the knowledge of all those counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in order to determine which creation to actualize. So, for example, if God knows what some hypothetical creature, KellyJay, would freely do in all conceivable hypothetical circumstances that KellyJay could be in, then in order to achieve a desired result, God could simply actualize one of these. For example, if God knows that KellyJay will freely do A if KellyJay is in circumstances C, then to bring about KellyJay's freely doing A (supposing this accords with the divine will) God just needs to actualize KellyJay in C. So, in this way Molinists claim, God can actualize a world that best accords with his will and yet still provide for creaturely freedom.

But, of course, in the actual world persons freely do all sorts of heinous things, like rape and murder and everything else under the sun. Under a Molinist view, it seems to me that God is a willing accomplice in all these. It seems that in all these cases, there are two responsible parties: (1) the creature who freely perpetrated the heinous act and (2) God who freely chose to actualize that creature in those circumstances, knowing full well that it would precipitate the heinous act (and while at the same time presumably knowing full well that actualization of some other creature/circumstance combination would not).

It's like you say that the divine middle knowledge should allow God to set up the "best possible choice" of what to create and actualize. So now take a look at what is actual. So this is the "best possible choice"?

Originally posted by LemonJello
So you seem to think Molinism is all peaches and cream, but it seems to me that Molinists would have a near impossible task when it comes to the subject of theodicy. As I understand it, Molinists claim that God uses the knowledge of all those counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in order to determine which creation to actualize. So, for example, if God actualize. So now take a look at what is actual. So this is the "best possible choice"?

It seems to me that this line of reasoning reduces the Molinist dilemma to the problem of evil. Not that there's anything wrong with that.

Some thoughts in an effort to salvage God's reputation:

It must be the case that the goodness of the existence of free will in at least some worlds, exceeds the evil that occurs in those worlds, and exceeds the goodness of any world that lacks free will.

It must be the case that the world that God chooses to actualize, has the greatest net amount of goodness that any world can have after the evil is accounted for.

It must be the case that there are many worlds having free will, that have the same maximal net amount of goodness, and God limits our free will. such that one of those maximally good worlds is actualized by our free choices.

Thus: this may not be the one and only best of all possible worlds, but there is no possible world that is better, and God's goodness in giving us freedom to do evil is intact.

This does create a problem in that no matter what moral choices we make, the net goodness of the world we create will be maximal. Why bother?

Originally posted by LemonJello
I was hoping a self-professed Molinist would join the discussion to defend against these types of charges, but it seems there are no takers as of yet. Presumably a Molinist would counter that it is not strange that God occupies himself with thoughts of the counterfactuals, since the Molinist holds that this is a critical precursor to his creative process.

Reviewing scenarios before taking action (something humans do) is different than foreknowledge of an action (Godlike). It would only make sense for God to review all possible scenarios before setting his creation in motion. However, for an omniscient God this would not be necessary. His evaluation would be as quick as omniscience and omnipotence allows... in other words, it would be instantaneous. Anthropomorphism, or assuming God has humanistic qualities and/or limitations, is a mistake theists and critics of theism are both prone to make. I've listened to critics who accuse theists of creating God in their own image and then claim theists believe in a bearded white haired old man, which is something I've never heard or seen theists claim. I don't know how someone can formulate an argument against anthropomorphism but within that same argument employ the anthropic principle. On the surface this appears to be unintentionally self contradictory, although I'm fairly certain no one goes into an argument intending to contradict himself, so I'm more inclined to believe it simply goes unnoticed. To be fair, theists are just as prone at doing this as are the critics. Neither have a legitimate excuse other than claiming ignorance, however theists are in a better position to know what their own religion says about their God, so IMO theists have less of an excuse than the critics for making this mistake. Theists have no legitimate position from which to claim ignorance, and critics of theism do not believe they are ignorant so there is no point in trying to tell them otherwise. Theists are usually wiser when it comes to self correction, or when it's pointed out by someone else, but not wiser by much. Man has proven himself to be as foolish (if not more so) as he is inclined to believe he is wise.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I was hoping a self-professed Molinist would join the discussion to defend against these types of charges, but it seems there are no takers as of yet. Presumably a Molinist would counter that it is not strange that God occupies himself with thoughts of the counterfactuals, since the Molinist holds that this is a critical precursor to his creative process.

There probably aren't enough Molinists in the entire world to insure seeing one here at this site/forum/thread. It's a safe bet there aren't any here, or if there are they might only number into the onesies or twosies. One or two at the most ImNsHo* Or maybe three, who** knows?


* in my not so humble opinion

** God

Originally posted by lemon lime
Reviewing scenarios before taking action (something humans do) is different than foreknowledge of an action (Godlike). It would only make sense for God to review all possible scenarios before setting his creation in motion. However, for an omniscient God this would not be necessary. His evaluation would be as quick as omniscience and omnipotence al proven himself to be as foolish (if not more so) as he is inclined to believe he is wise.

I didn't catch this in time to correct it, but I used the wrong terminology when I said:

"I don't know how someone can formulate an argument against anthropomorphism but within that same argument employ the anthropic principle."

The anthropic principle has nothing to do with anthropomorphism. I don't know why I said that, but it's probably because I try to avoid using long words like anthropomorphic. Anthropomorphicalogically speaking I'm only human, and making the occasional boo boo is actually the anthropomorphicalogical thing to do these a days... everyone is doing it, so you should do it too!


By the way, how do any of you feel about the resurgence of anthropomorphicalifragilisticexpialidocious utilitarianism? Is it still relevant in todays modern society?

Originally posted by LemonJello
So you seem to think Molinism is all peaches and cream, but it seems to me that Molinists would have a near impossible task when it comes to the subject of theodicy. As I understand it, Molinists claim that God uses the knowledge of all those counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in order to determine which creation to actualize. So, for example, if God actualize. So now take a look at what is actual. So this is the "best possible choice"?

Well, I actually think that God allows many things that we want to happen
to happen, good and bad. The difference between the *not impossible*
task would be to do all this *with justice* which puts another spin on it all.
For example, if a way was made for everyone to be saved, yet only those
that want to be are, then God has to allow a free choice to be saved and
a free choice to reject that salvation. To do anything else would be very
unjust, it would be like going for a job interview and see some treated
better than others, if the job is given to those that are favored than the
job was never open to all now was it? If the job interview was a level
playing field and those that applied were all treated the same, then the
one picked was do so justly.

If God gives us the freedom to choose than our choices are our own and
we will live and die with them.
Kelly

Originally posted by JS357
It seems to me that this line of reasoning reduces the Molinist dilemma to the problem of evil. Not that there's anything wrong with that.

Some thoughts in an effort to salvage God's reputation:

It must be the case that the goodness of the existence of free will in at least some worlds, exceeds the evil that occurs in those worlds, and exceeds the goodne ...[text shortened]... t moral choices we make, the net goodness of the world we create will be maximal. Why bother?

It seems to me that this line of reasoning reduces the Molinist dilemma to the problem of evil.

I am not sure what the "Molinist dilemma" refers to, but yes my point relates to the evidential problem of evil. It seems to me that the Molinist, on the basis of his commitments to divine middle knowledge and how it relates to divine creative process, would be in a particularly bad spot when it comes to formulating a theodicy in response to the problem of evil. Of course, the problem of evil concerns a god with all the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection; and, for all I know, perhaps this does not generally apply to a Molinist. But even disregarding that, it still seems like salvaging the Molinist's God's reputation looks like a bleak prospect to me.

It must be the case that the goodness of the existence of free will in at least some worlds, exceeds the evil that occurs in those worlds, and exceeds the goodness of any world that lacks free will.

It must be the case that the world that God chooses to actualize, has the greatest net amount of goodness that any world can have after the evil is accounted for.

It must be the case that there are many worlds having free will, that have the same maximal net amount of goodness, and God limits our free will. such that one of those maximally good worlds is actualized by our free choices.

I'm not sure I understand. Why must any of these be the case?

Originally posted by lemon lime
Reviewing scenarios before taking action (something humans do) is different than foreknowledge of an action (Godlike). It would only make sense for God to review all possible scenarios before setting his creation in motion. However, for an omniscient God this would not be necessary. His evaluation would be as quick as omniscience and omnipotence al ...[text shortened]... proven himself to be as foolish (if not more so) as he is inclined to believe he is wise.

I really don't understand the problem here with respect to Molinism. Under Molinism, God is a personal creator; he's a cognizer and an agent, etc. So, in keeping, they attribute unto him doxastic states like beliefs and knowledge, etc, and they attribute unto him agency and intentionality, etc. That's all coherent. And what's anthropmorphic about it? Nothing as far as I can tell. And all that goes generally for traditional theistic views and has nothing specifically to do with Molinism.

And regarding your concern about the Molinist imposing the limitation you mention about God taking time to deliberate and whatnot, that concern may as well be imaginary too. On what basis do you claim that a Molinist is committed to this sort of limitation? Just on the basis that I used the word 'precursor'? Heck, for all I know a Molinist is not even committed to the idea that God is subject to temporal relations. Other theists claim he is not; why not a Molinist? Of course, these kinds of claims may court other problems.

Originally posted by KellyJay
Well, I actually think that God allows many things that we want to happen
to happen, good and bad. The difference between the *not impossible*
task would be to do all this *with justice* which puts another spin on it all.
For example, if a way was made for everyone to be saved, yet only those
that want to be are, then God has to allow a free choice to b ...[text shortened]... s the freedom to choose than our choices are our own and
we will live and die with them.
Kelly

Yeah, according to Molinism, God provides for our freedom. But he does so selectively, based on his rolodex of counterfactual knowledge of creaturely freedom. If God knows that KellyJay would freely do A1 in circumstances C1; and yet KellyJay's freely doing A1 does not align with the divine will; then God won't actualize KellyJay in C1. He'll instead actualize, say, KellyJay in C2 which he knows will result in KellyJay's freely doing A2, which (suppose) does align with the divine will. So, upon your doing A2, why is not God just as much responsible for that as KellyJay? Is he not a willing accomplice in your doing A2?