12 Mar 14
1 edit
Originally posted by black beetleVery clear clarifications, thanks.
We agree;
Edit: "This employs some equivocation. Of course every view is "subjective" in the sense that it belongs to a subject. That's trivial and has nothing to do with whether or not some subject's moral view is, in a meta-ethical sense, subjectivist or not."
In this discussion I keep myself out of Metaethics and all kinds of ethical formal ...[text shortened]... t objectivity but a result of a consensus as regards fractals of our collective subjectivity
😵
Yes, I would have to say that our views are quite different in this respect. Perhaps a good way for me to express the salient differences would be in reference to the analysis of knowledge. On my view, it is necessary that P is true for S to know that P. But, also on my view, this is an external condition with respect to the subject S. It is not a condition that makes any demands on S and it is not a condition that can be satisfied by appeal to any internal states belonging to S; rather, it just makes a demand on P. Or, I guess, it makes a demand regarding how P relates to the world apart from S because, yes, my view of what it is for P to be true is some version of correspondence theory. But the main point is that I take the truth condition to be something external to S. Your view, on the other hand, is quite different in this regard, since you are claiming that what makes P true is that S has sufficient justification in asserting P. That makes a demand on S, since it makes a demand on S's having justification that satisfies certain conditions. In my analysis of knowledge, I also take it to be criterial that S is justified in believing P, but I explicitly do not tie this to the truth of P; whereas your view claims that this is what makes P true. On my view, the truth of P and S's justification for asserting P are different animals; whereas on your view, they are fundamentally related. So, yes, I would say our views are quite different. I am committed to a metaphysics of mind-independent, objective facts for the truth conditions of statements; whereas you are committed to a view that ties those truth conditions to subjective justificatory possession. Let me know if you disagree with this synopsis.
I am sure we could spend multiple threads debating the relative merits of our different views. In particular, since you tie truth conditions to justification conditions, I would need more clarification on what satisfies your justificatory conditions in order to better understand your view. However, in the context of the current thread, I think we may agree that the theist in question has put forth a subjective foundation for morals and proceeds to make a notional error in thinking that this view qualifies as "objective" because, in part, it satisfies some universality clause. The part I still do not really understand is what more they require of objectivity here, since they will often deny that other views qualify as "objective" even though they will satisfy the same universality conditions. That's why I am thinking, perhaps, it is some comeuppance clause that only an agent such as God could fulfill.
12 Mar 14
Originally posted by sonshipThanks in advance for your thoughtful replies. It appears to me that you have put quite a bit of effort into trying to understand what I mean and in accommodating my terminology, and I am very appreciative for that. I will try to give the same degree of effort in response to your comments.
Attempting to catch up, I will start here:
I did not say that I think the idea of God's existence is bizarre. What I take to be bizarre here are (1) the idea that your particular conception of morality (and some closely related ones) is an objective one and (2) the idea that God's existence is required for there to be objective morality....[text shortened]... exactly? [/quote]
I hear your question. Still examining your alternative answers to that.
On any given Tuesday afternoon, how different are we, on a day by day behavioral basis? I say, we're probably the same.
Going beyond this into a philosophy of why we think we have these characteristics, some differences arise.
I'm sure we probably exhibit some differences in moral behavior, but probably not radically so. It's not like I would spend the afternoon mugging and raping random persons I encounter while you would spend it churning out random acts of kindness, or vice versa. However, this would not imply that our patterns of moralistic deliberation are not substantially different in some ways. Similarity in behavior is not a guarantee for similarity in underlying deliberative patterns or motivations. It would not be hard to think of examples, for instance, where two persons perform the same act but for radically different underlying reasons or motivations.
Your dilemma argues that either:
I think you have the gist correct. I do not think you have outlined here any reasonable resolution of the dilemma. Rather, I think you have just chosen the first horn of the dilemma, with the ensuing consequence that your view of morality will suffer from arbitrarity. So I am unclear why you think what you have outlined is a satisfactory resolution for you. Here is something I wrote back in Thread 152268 which I think outlines the remaining problem for you (and, of course, what I write here could easily be revised slightly to reflect that you think that morals are grounded in God's essential nature, not in His commands per se: just replace God's commanding/forbidding act A with God's nature being reflective/non-reflective of act A, etc and so forth, as appropriate):
Since you have said that you think God determines the components of morality and that morality origination is solely dependent on God, I presume you would agree with the following premise: If God forbids (commands) act A, then act A is morally wrong (right). Now, there are couple ways in which this could hold. For one, it could be that God forbids act A because act A is wrong; that is, there could be reasons, independent of God, that explain the wrongness of act A and it would be in virtue of those reasons that God issues his judgment thusly on act A. But that is not available to you because then it would be those reasons that ultimately explain the moral status of act A and morality would not be dependent on God; God would be inessential to morality in this case. On the other hand, you could hold that act A is wrong because God forbids act A; that is, you could hold that God's forbidding act A is explanatorily prior to the wrongness of act A. Again, since the former interpretation is not available to you (unless you jettison your claim that morality depends constititutively on God), this will be the interpretation you are stuck with. In this case, morality indeed seems dependent on God. But, now, here comes the real dilemma. Either it is the case that God has reasons in virtue of which He forbids act A; or not. If not, then all you have is a purely arbitrary account of morals. And, if there are no reasons in virtue of which God forbids act A, then He may as well never have issued such a judgment in the first place. On the other hand, if there are reasons in virtue of which God forbids act A, then it will be those reasons that ultimately explain the moral status of act A, which again will contradict your claim that morality is dependent on God. So, neither horn of the dilemma seems to work for you: either you have a purely arbitrary account of morals; or morals do not depend constitutively on God.
But I want to flesh out a bit more whether your Objectivist Theory leans to Naturalist or Nonnaturalist ? theory.
It leans toward non-naturalism.
And I will probably attempt to show you that though you may have explanations for where and what bestowed moral value on objective moral entities which you think exist out there quite not needing God, I think the necessariness of God's existence is a more satisfactory answer to me.
Yes, this is what I am after: please explain why you think God's existence is necessary for "objective" moral foundations.
But in your objection there, someone or some board higher up DOES define what you are to do on the grounds of that corporation and what is your meaning TO it.
Am I right ?
More or less, yes, to my job there is an associated job description written by some person(s) other than me. Just like the words would seem to suggest, the job description describes my work position.
Granted. But go up high enough and you get some kind of mission statement of that enterprise. You are just saying that someone is higher in the company structure than your supervisor.
No, that is not what I was saying. I think I misunderstood before. I thought you were talking about rules of workplace engagement, in the sense of what sorts of interpersonal engagement behaviors and commitment conduce to a good workplace. My comments were specific to those. If, on the other hand, you are just talking about the contents of a job description, then I have no idea what point you are trying to make.
The same authority by which God holds every single atomic structure together in the entire universe, or HOWEVER, He maintains the physical laws of creation, that authority is manifested in His oversight of our moral acts.
You know that Einstein showed a kind of conversion principle between energy and matter. They were two sides of one thing really. There can be a conversion of one side to the other.
I believe that there is a creation side of the universe which has a principle of conversion (not mathematically) but in authority. The creative power and authority responsible for holding the cosmos together is another side of the moral, spiritual, ethical power and authority which governs our human living.
Both attributes flow out of God's nature. He's the source of being and the source of life.
I read this several times, but I do not understand what you are saying here; nor do I understand how any of this follows from your thought experiment about job description.
12 Mar 14
Originally posted by sonship
LemmonJello:
why is God required for there to be "objective" morals? His existence is required for "objective" morals…why exactly?
According to a Naturalist theory of Cognitive, Objectivst evalustion of metaethics what is "right" would be ie.
what is approved by most people or
what most people desire or
what is approved b ...[text shortened]... s and furniture of the universe.
I'll stop here and speak to that latter for space's sake.
According to a Naturalist theory of Cognitive, Objectivst evalustion of metaethics what is "right" would be ie.
what is approved by most people or
what most people desire or
what is approved by an impartial, ideal observer or
what maximizes desire or interest or
what further human survival, etc.
None of these are relevant to my view. Again, mine would lean toward non-naturalism. Based on your study, I take it you understand that by this I mean that on my view, objective moral properties exist and are non-reducible to natural properties; or that generally, moral philosophy is an objective affair and yet is a fundamentally different enterprise than the natural sciences.
Perhaps you would further argue that such things can be scientifically measured. The can be tied to biological or psychological or anthropological
facts. You might argue that measurements can be scientifically obtained about this things. The "rightness" can be reduced, in this view, to some natural property which can be measured.
No, I would not argue along such lines. Your ensuing points here against the ethical naturalist do not apply to me.
The non-naturalist school of Cognitive - Objectivism in evaluating metaethics would argue differently. That school would say that moral facts and properties really exist as part of the furniture of the universe. These moral properties to them are irreducible, unanalyzable into scientific measurements as the previous ethical naturalist does.
Right, but I think you have forgotten to include that ethical non-naturalism is standardly construed as a form of moral realism, in its commitment to a metaphysics of mind-independent moral facts or properties.
I guess you could say I am a non-naturalistic ethicist as a Christian theist. In short I think the existence of God is less problematic as the ground for such moral properties then otherwise.
No, I doubt we should say that because, more properly, you are not a non-naturalistic ethicist. Just because you think that moral properties and moral philosophy do not reduce to natural properties and the natural sciences (because you happen to think they are all grounded in a supernatural agent) does not make you a non-naturalistic ethicist. As I mention and emphasis above in italics, ethical non-naturalism is standardly classified under moral realism with associated involvement in mind-independent moral facts. On the other hand, your view recognizes moral facts but no mind-independent moral facts, since all moral facts depend constitutively on God; so your view is more properly categorized under ethical subjectivism.
I'm glad you think ethical non-naturalism is such a viable account and less problematic than others, since my own account is some version of ethical non-naturalism. So, thanks for the compliment. But, sorry, I do not agree that your own account also qualifies under ethical non-naturalism.
12 Mar 14
1 edit
Originally posted by sonshipI have no idea what you are trying to say with all this. Surely, "rightness of" whatever-have-you at moral issue should be "according to" the moral facts of the matter, not according to anything else, per se.
LemmonJello,
I wrote above something I suspect you will object to.
I said:
If something really ought not to have been done the rightness of conformity should be according to SOMEONE.
But why to SOMEONE ? I hear you ask.
But why not it really ought not to be done to s SOME THING ?
I think I would answer that ...[text shortened]... the facts and ALL the circumstances would be best qualified to inform on ultimate moral values.
By the way, since you had so many good things to say about my ethical non-naturalism (indeed, to the point that you tried to apply the label to your own view, although I think inappropriately), does that mean I can take it that you think my account would suffice for "objective" moral foundations?
If you answer yes, then you have to jettison your claim that God is necessary for "objective" morality. If you answer no, then what exactly more is necessary for "objective" morality? Again, why is God necessary for "objective" morality? This remains the question you have not really addressed yet.
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12 Mar 14
3 edits
None of these are relevant to my view. Again, mine would lean toward non-naturalism. Based on your study, I take it you understand that by this I mean that on my view, objective moral properties exist and are non-reducible to natural properties; or that generally, moral philosophy is an objective affair and yet is a fundamentally different enterprise than the natural sciences.
I understand and was coming to the non-naturalistic viewpoint.
Perhaps you would further argue that such things can be scientifically measured ...
No, I would not argue along such lines. Your ensuing points here against the ethical naturalist do not apply to me.
Okay. That is why I used the word "perhaps."
sonship:
The non-naturalist school of Cognitive - Objectivism in evaluating metaethics would argue differently. That school would say that moral facts and properties really exist as part of the furniture of the universe. These moral properties to them are irreducible, unanalyzable into scientific measurements as the previous ethical naturalist does.
LJ:
Right, but I think you have forgotten to include that ethical non-naturalism is standardly construed as a form of moral realism, in its commitment to a metaphysics of mind-independent moral facts or properties.
I am working up to that.
sonship:
I guess you could say I am a non-naturalistic ethicist as a Christian theist. In short I think the existence of God is less problematic as the ground for such moral properties then otherwise.
LJ:
No, I doubt we should say that because, more properly, you are not a non-naturalistic ethicist. Just because you think that moral properties and moral philosophy do not reduce to natural properties and the natural sciences (because you happen to think they are all grounded in a supernatural agent) does not make you a non-naturalistic ethicist. As I mention and emphasis above in italics, ethical non-naturalism is standardly classified under moral realism with associated involvement in mind-independent moral facts. On the other hand, your view recognizes moral facts but no mind-independent moral facts, since all moral facts depend constitutively on God; so your view is more properly categorized under ethical subjectivism.
This I will be examine with more time.
I am not sure I agree. However, I can see that you strongly want to define moral facts based on God's nature as "subjective".
I'm glad you think ethical non-naturalism is such a viable account and less problematic than others, since my own account is some version of ethical non-naturalism. So, thanks for the compliment. But, sorry, I do not agree that your own account also qualifies under ethical non-naturalism.
When I say man in created in the image of morally perfect God and therefore reflect His moral nature - echoing it with our moral sense, this goes for ALL created men.
Men who believe in theism would have that sense.
Men who do NOT believe in theism would still have that sense.
I don't think there is any compliment specifically except that I believe you, like me, and me like you are both created in the image of God.
To your objection to me saying Christian theism would be a form of non-naturalistic ethicism, I will at this time, simply quote one of my sources:
" Most Christian theists have been some form of ethical nonnaturalists since they hold that God himself has moral properties (goodness, holiness, and so forth), persons made in his image have worth and dignity (as he does), since some acts have the property of moral rightness." J.P. Moreland
I may take your critque directly to Dr. Moreland for a reply.
Ie. Should Christian theism be classified under Subjectivist theories. At present I only see two branches of metaethical analysis under Subjectivist branch of Cognivist Theory:
1.) Private Subjectivism
2.) Cultural Subjectivism
Which of these two do you suppose apply the Christian theism ?
Maybe this doesn't exactly hit your compliment point as you meant it. But the study I am doing treats non-naturalistic ethics branch of Cognitive - Objectivism as viable. But at least what I am reading does not treat it as free from its own problems to which I hope to show are better dealt with in a Christian theistic approach.
But not in this post.
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12 Mar 14
2 edits
LemmonJello:
I have no idea what you are trying to say with all this. Surely, "rightness of" whatever-have-you at moral issue should be "according to" the moral facts of the matter, not according to anything else, per se.
For you was this "rightness" in existence before man evolved ?
Or did this "rightness" only come into existence after the arrival of the moral being of humans ?
By the way, since you had so many good things to say about my ethical non-naturalism (indeed, to the point that you tried to apply the label to your own view, although I think inappropriately), does that mean I can take it that you think my account would suffice for "objective" moral foundations?
No.
If you answer yes, ...
But I didn't. So we'll continue from there.
This remains the question you have not really addressed yet.
I think this is going to end of as a "evidence is not persuasion" situation.
I don't promise to be able to persuade you.
And your statements that I have not proved that God's existence grounds moral value, I will take as your continued atheist approach (though you also had so-called "complimentary" admissions that you do not think the concept of God's existence is bizzare.)
12 Mar 14
Originally posted by LemonJelloI think it is difficult, if not impossible for you to support your claim. At best, I think you will simply assert that they are true, but surely such assertions are therefore relative as I could simply assert that they are not true.
However, you seem to be saying that you guess you are not committed to there being any such conditions in the first place (for instance, where you say you guess you are not committed to there being true statements regarding how one ought to behave in various contexts).
For two, your definition of 'morality' as you have clarified it may be much narrower than ours.
I gave a very narrow definition of morality for brevity, and stated that that is what I was doing.
However, I still think this discussion will not work well if it is not clear what each of you means by 'morality'. I strongly suspect that you only make claims of objectivity with regards to the morality dealing with suffering and how you treat others, but not with respect to the morality that deals with obeying an authority, or societal norm. Am I correct? Would you for example say that 'obey your parents' is morally good, and objectively true?
I also think it is important not to confuse 'my set of rules of what is right and wrong' with 'my reasons and motivations for doing what is right and wrong'.
12 Mar 14
Originally posted by sonship
LemmonJello:
I have no idea what you are trying to say with all this. Surely, "rightness of" whatever-have-you at moral issue should be "according to" the moral facts of the matter, not according to anything else, per se.
For you was this "rightness" in existence before man evolved ?
Or did this "rightness" only come into existenc ...[text shortened]... led "complimentary" admissions that you do not think the concept of God's existence is bizzare.)
I can see that you strongly want to define moral facts based on God's nature as "subjective"
No, it's just that I strongly think the term 'subjective' properly applies to them, based on how the term commonly functions. Broadly, subjectivity refers to mind-dependence. On your view all moral facts are mind-dependent because as you keep insisting, they are grounded in the mind of God. So, moral facts on your view are subjective, and this also relates to why your view is a form of subjectivism.
" Most Christian theists have been some form of ethical nonnaturalists since they hold that God himself has moral properties (goodness, holiness, and so forth), persons made in his image have worth and dignity (as he does), since some acts have the property of moral rightness." J.P. Moreland
Exactly how do these observations cited by Moreland show that "most Christian theists have been some form of ethical nonnaturalists"? Taken just as they are, I think they are broadly consistent with ethical non-naturalism. But I do not see how they would indicate, specifically, ethical non-naturalism. So, I think Moreland is inferentially challenged here.
Ie. Should Christian theism be classified under Subjectivist theories. At present I only see two branches of metaethical analysis under Subjectivist branch of Cognivist Theory:
1.) Private Subjectivism
2.) Cultural Subjectivism
Which of these two do you suppose apply the Christian theism ?
Your view would fall under a universalist form of subjectivism. It is universalist because on your view moral norms apply universally to all moral agents; it is subjectivist because those norms are mind-dependent, in the sense already described.
For you was this "rightness" in existence before man evolved ?
Or did this "rightness" only come into existence after the arrival of the moral being of humans ?
On my view, moral properties like "rightness" cannot exist if no minds exist. I'm pretty confident you're committed to something similar or identical. In fact, the only sensible reason why you could think differently from me on this (that is, that you could think that "rightness" was in existence before any earthly minds came about) is that you are committed to the idea that at least one mind was still in existence then, in the form of God.
This raises the point of another subjective/objective distinction that marks a different sense than what we have been discussing heretofore. I do not want to get sidetracked here, but the main point would be that both of our views would be subjective in the sense that they hold that the existence of moral properties depends on the existence of minds. But your view is subjective in the further sense that we have been discussing, in the sense that the truth values of rightness claims are also mind-dependent. My view is not subjective in this further sense.
I think this is going to end of as a "evidence is not persuasion" situation.
I don't promise to be able to persuade you.
And your statements that I have not proved that God's existence grounds moral value, I will take as your continued atheist approach (though you also had so-called "complimentary" admissions that you do not think the concept of God's existence is bizzare.)
My approach is different, since I am not just going to presuppose that this discussion ends a certain way. I think you should just offer up your reasons for thinking that God's existence is necessary for "objective" morality, and the we can go from there.
Also, what I had said is "I did not say that I think the idea of God's existence is bizarre. What I take to be bizarre here are (1) the idea that your particular conception of morality (and some closely related ones) is an objective one and (2) the idea that God's existence is required for there to be objective morality." This does not entail that I do not think the idea of God's existence is bizarre; only that I am not saying that here.
12 Mar 14
Originally posted by twhitehead
I think it is difficult, if not impossible for you to support your claim. At best, I think you will simply assert that they are true, but surely such assertions are therefore relative as I could simply assert that they are not true.
[b]For two, your definition of 'morality' as you have clarified it may be much narrower than ours.
I gave a very nar ...[text shortened]... of what is right and wrong' with 'my reasons and motivations for doing what is right and wrong'.[/b]
I think it is difficult, if not impossible for you to support your claim.
Which claim? The claim that there are true statements regarding how one ought to behave? If so, this is not a claim at issue in this discussion, and I would have no intention of addressing your skepticism in this thread. I ushered in this discussion to try to understand what a theist like sonship means when, for example, he claims that God's existence is necessary for "objective" morality. So, a responder like sonship will basically presuppose that there are true moral statements as a given feature of his view; and what is it at issue are further questions like what is the nature of the associated truth conditions; what makes a true moral statement true; what is required for this being objective; etc. Your skepticism, on the other hand, is directed toward the presupposition that there are true moral statements to begin with, or toward the prospect of justifying such a thing. That's fine, and a valid concern; but it is a concern that should be addressed in a different discussion where it would be made clear that presupposing that there are true moral statements would amount to question-begging.
At best, I think you will simply assert that they are true, but surely such assertions are therefore relative as I could simply assert that they are not true
Why would I simply assert that they are true if the challenge is to support the claim that they are true? At any rate, just because two persons can assert contradictory things, that in no way indicates that it is "difficult, if not impossible for [one] to support [one's] claim" in that area of discourse; nor does it mean that truth conditions of claims in that area of discourse are somehow relativistic. Of course, there is a sense in which beliefs about what is true will be relative to those holding the beliefs; but that entails nothing regarding the actual nature of truth itself. Even on a view like black beetle's, it seems that he ties truth to further justificatory or assertability conditions.
Anyway, two persons can simply assert contradictory things on some scientific or mathematical matter, too, right? Do you thereby think it is difficult if not impossible for one to support scientific or mathematical claims? Do you thereby think that scientific truth and mathematical truth are relativistic matters? If not, then it seems your skepticism is applied inconsistently.
However, I still think this discussion will not work well if it is not clear what each of you means by 'morality'.
That's probably true, but the discussion seems to be going well: sonship and I are on the same page and, I think, getting somewhere. We already had a mutual understanding of what is meant by 'morality'. We both think moral facts would encompass facts regarding what one ought to do; what sort of person one should strive to be; what sorts of things one ought to value; etc. These considerations will naturally envelop the subject of harm to sentient beings because it is morally relevant, but will also envelop other subjects.
I strongly suspect that you only make claims of objectivity with regards to the morality dealing with suffering and how you treat others, but not with respect to the morality that deals with obeying an authority, or societal norm. Am I correct?
Not at all. My claims of objectivity would extend to all the various aspects of morality as briefly touched on above, which outstrip considerations of suffering and treatment of others. In fact, my claims of objectivity as it involves truth as an objective matter would extend to any area of discourse where statements are truth-apt. I think it is somewhat bizarre how some think that the nature of truth is one way in some particular area of discourse and yet must morph into something else in another area of discourse.
Would you for example say that 'obey your parents' is morally good, and objectively true?
"Obey your parents" is a command or exhortation, not a proposition. I guess what you are asking is if the proposition "One ought to obey one's parents" is objectively true. Whether or not the proposition is true is a contextual matter, depending on the specifics. Perhaps one ought not obey her parents if her parents are moral idiots; perhaps one ought to if her parents are morally excellent. But if it turns out based on the specifics that one ought to obey his parents, then yes it is objectively so. Again, that is just how I think truth works. The question of objectivity here has to do with the nature of the truth conditions. Supposing it is true that one ought to obey his parents, what makes that true? Does it depend on the content of observer attitudes? Does the truth of the proposition depend on what anyone thinks about the proposition? These would be some relevant questions.
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13 Mar 14
3 edits
LemmonJello:
No, it's just that I strongly think the term 'subjective' properly applies to them, based on how the term commonly functions. Broadly, subjectivity refers to mind-dependence. On your view all moral facts are mind-dependent because as you keep insisting, they are grounded in the mind of God. So, moral facts on your view are subjective, and this also relates to why your view is a form of subjectivism.
I would have to point out again that God, and the Mind of God is not just any mind. From God time, space, the universe came forth.
Things visible and invisible were created by God -
"Because in Him all things were created, in the heavens and on the earth, the visible and the invisible .... all things have been created through Him and unto Him." (Col. 1:16)
I would count "the invisible" to include the laws of logic, abstract objects, numbers, and objective moral value. Somehow they issue out of His being and He upholds all things - "He is before all things and all things cohere in Him."
My quoation was:
" Most Christian theists have been some form of ethical nonnaturalists since they hold that God himself has moral properties (goodness, holiness, and so forth), persons made in his image have worth and dignity (as he does), since some acts have the property of moral rightness." J.P. Moreland
It makes sense to me because Objectivist Theories has two subclassifications under it in this text -
Ethical naturalism
Ethical nonnaturalism
Moreland says that Subjectivist theories hold that moral statements covey information about the speaker of the moral statement. It seems to me that the proper understanding of this is that the speaker is a human with a philosophical viewpoint.
For you to say that you regard my saying moralilty is based in God seems to me to be your attempt to make God Himself an adherent of a certain human philosophy. It sounds like your saying "God is of the Subjectivist theory of Cognitivist theory, for God's mind is subjective to Him and he is joining us in analyzing metaethics."
Leading up to Morelands assertion that most "most Christian theists have been some form of ethical nonnaturalists ..." which he lists under Objectivist Theories, he has explains as follows:
Ethical nonnaturalism (under Objectivist Theories) holds that irreducible moral facts and properties really exist as part of the furniture of the universe.
"The apple is red" is a statement about the natural property (redness).
In addition to natural properties the ethical nonnaturalist as an Objectivist would make similar statements about moral propoerties such as rightness, goodness, and worth. These properties he says persons have or acts have. Moral properties are ascribed to persons and/or acts.
The statement "X is good" ascribes an irreducible moral property to X.
Just as the statement "the apple is red" ascribes a natural property (redness) to the apple, the unanalyzable, irreducible moral property of "good" is ascribed to X.
Since I as a theist ascribe moral properties to God - ie. God is good, God is holy, God is righteous, God is just, God is loving, etc. I hold the God has these moral properties attached to Him.
So he says many Christian theists have been ethical nonnaturalists a subclass under Objectivist Theory.
What I think you are attempting to do is argue that because of God's mind when He says "This or that is good" He is as the private (or universal) speaker is stating something only like a psychological fact such as "I like this" or "I don't like that."
One school of Subjectivism says that this is emotive - an expression feelings. Ie. Moral statements merely express feelings.
Another school of Subjectivism say that moral statements simply describe the psychological state of the speaker.
I think you want to describe Christian Theism as Subjectivst because you think moral pronouncements from God are just His emoting or expressing His like or dislike or just describing how He may feel.
Morality is kind of God's subjective opinion perhaps fraught with His own fickle mood at the moment.
I don't see this that way. God has moral properties which we recognize (some of us anyway) and value because we are made in the image of God. God Himself embodies goodness, holiness, and so forth) and created in the image of this uncreated Source have worth and dignity (as God does) because of that. Furthermore we can have some acts that also have moral rightness
Your view would fall under a universalist form of subjectivism. It is universalist because on your view moral norms apply universally to all moral agents; it is subjectivist because those norms are mind-dependent, in the sense already described.
I have no come across that classification yet. But it seems kind of self contradictory. Universality suggests something very finally objective.
I suppose I can go along with saying God's Mind is subjective to God. But there is no higher Mind, no Mind beyond, no Mind more powerful or more wise or knowledgeable or able to produce the universe from nothing including space, time, energy, motion, as with abstract things like the laws of logic, moral truth. I think He is bringing into being somehow out of what He is in His non-material, transcendent, eternal, timeless, and spaceless Being.
This is the ultimate Mind a greater than cannot exist. So this "subjectivity" is as universal and objective as it can possibly be.
sonship:
For you was this "rightness" in existence before man evolved ?
Or did this "rightness" only come into existence after the arrival of the moral being of humans ?
Further comments in another post.
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13 Mar 14
LemmonJello"
On my view, moral properties like "rightness" cannot exist if no minds exist.
I don't think the Mind of God ever did NOT exist.
That's one difference we have, I think.
There was never "not" God's existence.
I'm pretty confident you're committed to something similar or identical. In fact, the only sensible reason why you could think differently from me on this (that is, that you could think that "rightness" was in existence before any earthly minds came about) is that you are committed to the idea that at least one mind was still in existence then, in the form of God.
The universe seems to have had a beginning.
It could not create itself. To do that it would have to exist before it existed. And that makes no sense.
Since it could not create itself something transcendent to it created it. Now two candidates I can think of :
1. Some THING abstract and eternal
2.) Some Being abstract and eternal.
The former like numbers are indeed abstract and perhaps eternal. But they don't DO anything.
The latter could have WILL and MIND to DECIDE to act and cause creation to occur. So I believe God as unembodied, eternal, exceedingly powerful Mind and choosing will, created it.
In this Creator as moral properties that existed as long as God existed, which is from eternity.
This raises the point of another subjective/objective distinction that marks a different sense than what we have been discussing heretofore. I do not want to get sidetracked here, but the main point would be that both of our views would be subjective in the sense that they hold that the existence of moral properties depends on the existence of minds. But your view is subjective in the further sense that we have been discussing, in the sense that the truth values of rightness claims are also mind-dependent. My view is not subjective in this further sense.
Continued latter.
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My approach is different, since I am not just going to presuppose that this discussion ends a certain way. I think you should just offer up your reasons for thinking that God's existence is necessary for "objective" morality, and the we can go from there.
I think God's existence is necessary for anything else to exist.
I think an Uncaused Cause is necessary for the existence of all other things besides.
Would the phrase Immanent Purpose be one you would use to describe your view of the meaning of life ?
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13 Mar 14
4 edits
LemmonJello,
I think what we have is moral truths existing as the furniture of the universe:
A.) Because of God
B.) Quite unrelated to the existence of God.
Isn't that where we are now? I think I understand you that Moral truths do not exist where there is no mind/s to contemplate them.
I have granted that I suppose but with the explanation that the Mind of God of course always was.
So let me now express some thoughts on your view. The first question I would have for you is not about knowing but being. Let's say the human mind is not yet around to know moral truths, which you insist do not exist unless a mind is there to analyze or contemplate them.
When and how did human beings gain rights-bearing and valuable persons so that "wrong" could be done TO them, ie violating such rights and devaluing such value. My question is not concerning their knowing but of their being.
Both theist and atheist can agree that rape is wrong because it violates the value and dignity of the woman. But if we arose from valueless and impersonal slime by evolution how did this process bestow value and dignity upon that evolved ?
You seem to make a huge leap of faith that slime somewhere along the line acquired moral value, rights, and dignity that could be violated. Somewhere dignity was arrived and duties eventually produced. That is duties of behavior from knowing with the mind, the worth of being.
Ie, I see in your view:
Being of worth
preceeding
Knowing of worth.
That is knowing of worth with its related duties to act appropriately.
How did humans come to be rights-bearing and valuable entities ? Where then do dignity and rights come from in a world without mind but only electrons and selfish genes (ie. Richard Dawkins style) ?
For me the Christian theist, I would say that value, dignity, and rights-bearing nature was bestowed by virtue of the fact we are created in the image of the God with good moral properties.
I think I hear you saying moral truths are the brute given furniture of the universe which somehow comes about when a mind is there to contemplate them. I am not sure whether you regard these "brute given" moral entities as benigh until mind comes along or completely non-existent until so.
But I think God's existence, eternal and uncreated, with His creation of humans in the image of God makes better sense of the connection between genuine, universal moral standards ( which existed from eternity in God's nature) and human dignity, value, worth, and rights-bearing nature.
14 Mar 14
Originally posted by SwissGambitOf the Ten Commandments, and of the other Two that Jesus states, none of these say you must have knowledge of Jesus. In fact Jesus Himself says, no one can go to the Father, but through me.
Very well. "Perfect" justice was a concept I heard from jaywill. However, I still fail to see how people can rightly be held accountable for a failure to believe, when 'believing' is not a choice you can make, and I fail to see how the one-size-fits-all punishment of hell is even remotely 'just'.
Going through Jesus is not the same as having knowledge of who he is. Paul states our treasure is in our hearts. Knowing who Jesus is will not save you. Having love in your heart will.
14 Mar 14
Pudgenik,
The amount of "our" love is not how Christ saves anyone. Chris Himself is the Savior while we put faith in Him. Our abilities to have enough love or faith is not the issue. Christ is the focus of how we are saved.
Christ sacrificed Himself and took the punishment of God for our sins so that we can be saved in Him. We cannot deserve eternal life. Christ deserved it for our sakes. Christ makes people joint heirs of God, not love.
Paul wrote on the importance of charity in I Corinthians 13, but he told a prison keeper how to be saved which was to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ,
King James Version
=================
Acts 16: 30, 31
And brought them out, and said, Sirs, what must I do to be saved?
And they said, Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved, and thy house.