01 Aug 05
Originally posted by Bosse de NageIt's been awhile since I've read it, I was actually hoping for someone else to pick up on it... 🙂
Can you offer a Kantian perspective on cogito ergo sum?
Kant: profound philosopher, appallingly bad writer. That's why I've never finished one of his books...He doesn't seduce me.
01 Aug 05
Originally posted by SerendipityI think one of the best arguments against the cogito is that concerning the contradictory nature of Descartes' skepticism. His starting point is a state of global skepticism, or a position where all knowledge can be doubted. This outlook can be grossly simplified with statements like:
"Cogito ergo sum" (Descartes 1637 Discourse on method/The meditations)
"I think therfore I am" do you agree with this statemenent or its inversion "I am therefore I think"
All knowledge is uncertain.
All knowledge is capable of being doubted.
etc.
The contradictory nature of these statements lies in the fact that they must be accepted as certain truths themselves. In other words, its is assumed that one cannot doubt that all knowledge can be doubted. This is a not-so-subtle violation of the global skepticism they are designed to support.
01 Aug 05
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Lucifershammer: Thinking assumes a thinker. "I am" assumes an "I".
As Bosse de Nage points out, that could just be a linguistic construct, based the subject-predicate structure of our grammar.
Are you assuming an “I” that is “am-ing”? How could there be an “I” that does not “am”? (Anybody remember that old joke about “I can am?&rdquo😉
Can you find ”your” “I” that precedes the mind-makings, like thoughts—an “I” that’s not another (complex of) thought? How do you find it; how do you know it; how do you describe it? If you cannot, what sense does it make to speak of an “I” that thinks, feels, senses, etc.?
Bosse de Nage: I find Nietzsche compatible with Zen, not least in his use of humour.
I would rather say that they might be in a sense complementary: there’s a lot more “heroic” striving in Nietzsche. Nietzsche would’ve viewed much of Buddhism as nihilistic, but Zen is a different animal. I read somewhere of the notion of a kind of Zorba-Buddha (referring to Kazantzakis’ Zorba the Greek; Kazantzakis did his dissertation on Nietzsche, I believe) as a kind of “fusion” of the two.
02 Aug 05
Originally posted by vistesd
Lucifershammer: [b]Thinking assumes a thinker. "I am" assumes an "I".
As Bosse de Nage points out, that could just be a linguistic construct, based the subject-predicate structure of our grammar.
Are you assuming an “I” that is “am-ing”? How could there be an “I” that does not “am”? (Anybody remember that old joke about “I can am?&rdquo😉[/b]
BdN does have a point about linguistic constructs. The term "am" can be used as the copula to link "I" to a predicate (e.g. "I am hungry" or "I am LH"😉. Or it could be a predicate in itself (as with "I am"😉.
However, I would disagree that it is merely a grammatical construct. Human language reflects human thought. We cannot conceive of reality in any other manner but a subject-predicate form. We may talk, think or discuss predicates in themselves (as philosophers or psychologists may talk of "Thought"😉, but a subject would always be implied.
Can there be an "I" that cannot "am"? In a way, it's possible. The hero of a Bronte novel might say "I am", but he isn't real and, therefore, "isn't".
Can you find ”your” “I” that precedes the mind-makings, like thoughts—an “I” that’s not another (complex of) thought? How do you find it; how do you know it; how do you describe it? If you cannot, what sense does it make to speak of an “I” that thinks, feels, senses, etc.?
Why should an "I" be sensible only if it can be found outside thought? The fact that something thinks, feels, senses etc. tells me that there is an "I" there.
02 Aug 05
[/b]Is the "I" continuous or discontinuous? What happens to your "I" when you orgasm? Are multiple "I"'s more consistent with experience than a single immutable nexus of thought? How many "I"'s do the peacock-ego's feathers contain?
Why should an "I" be sensible only if it can be found outside thought? The fact that something thinks, feels, senses etc. tells me that there is an "I" there.[/b]
02 Aug 05
Originally posted by Bosse de NageIndeed, what does happen to one's "I" when one orgasms? 😉
Is the "I" continuous or discontinuous? What happens to your "I" when you orgasm? Are multiple "I"'s more consistent with experience than a single immutable nexus of thought? How many "I"'s do the peacock-ego's feathers contain?
One only has to look around to see that multiple "I"'s are consistent with experience. When you reply to my post, you are aware that your "I" is not the same as the "I" of the author you are responding to; your actions are not the actions of LucifersHammer.
It's all fine and dandy to philosophise that we're really the same person, the same "I" - but at the end of the day, what I have for dinner will not satiate your hunger, nor will your dinner satiate mine. You will still go to the local supermarket to buy your groceries, as I will go to mine. My thoughts will not drive your actions unless mediated through your own being.
02 Aug 05
Originally posted by lucifershammerI was referring to the possibility of multiple "I"'s within the same individual mind (not in the sense of multiple personalities). A dominant "I" may mask other "I"s all the way down to the abyss.
Indeed, what does happen to one's "I" when one orgasms? 😉
One only has to look around to see that multiple "I"'s are consistent with experience. When you reply to my post, you are aware that your "I" is not the same as the "I" of the author you are responding to; your actions are not the actions of LucifersHammer.
For example, a married man is latently homosexual; this conflicts with his beliefs, so he says to himself, "I am not homosexual; these desire are wrong, I will stand firm". Subsequently, he accepts his desires and modifies his viewpoint: he says, "I am homosexual and my desire is perfectly healthy". One "I" (laden with fear and loathing) has been supplanted by another, with, more than likely, attendant physiological changes (increased well-being--perhaps he even looks more handsome).
Perhaps this is completely off topic.
Anyway, my belief is that the "I" floats on the abyss. We are not the same people from day to day, nor should we be (within limits, to be negotiated with those whose lives are linked with ours).
While I was writing this, I remembered this poem:
That civilisation may not sink,
Its great battle lost,
Quiet the dog, tether the pony
To a distant post;
Our master Caesar is in the tent
Where the maps are spread,
His eyes fixed upon nothing,
A hand under his head.
(Like a long-legged fly upon the stream
His mind moves upon silence.)
That the topless towers be burnt
And men recall that face,
Move most gently if move you must
In this lonely place.
She thinks, part woman, three parts a child,
That nobody looks; her feet
Practise a tinker shuffle
Picked up on a street.
(Like a long-legged fly upon the stream
Her mind moves upon silence.)
That girls at puberty may find
The first Adam in their thought,
Shut the door of the Pope's chapel,
Keep those children out.
There on that scaffolding reclines
Michael Angelo.
With no more sound than the mice make
His hand moves to and fro.
(Like a long-leggedfly upon the stream
His mind moves upon silence.)
W.B. Yeats
02 Aug 05
Originally posted by Bosse de NageWe will still need to distinguish between the subject and the predicate here.
I was referring to the possibility of multiple "I"'s within the same individual mind (not in the sense of multiple personalities). A dominant "I" may mask other "I"s all the way down to the abyss.
For example, a married man is latently homosexual; this conflicts with his beliefs, so he says to himself, "I am not homosexual; these desire are ...[text shortened]... attendant physiological changes (increased well-being--perhaps he even looks more handsome).
In your example, the husband is the subject. His homosexuality/absence of homosexuality is a predicate. The fact that he has conflicting desires, or new views of himself does not mean he has suddenly become a new "I".
02 Aug 05
Originally posted by lucifershammerDescartes said "I think therefore I am"; my liberated man could well say, "I am a new person". Not being bound to his previous beliefs, he acts like a different person than he was and may well be a different person (his newfound happiness overflowing into every aspect of his life).
We will still need to distinguish between the subject and the predicate here.
In your example, the husband is the subject. His homosexuality/absence of homosexuality is a predicate. The fact that he has conflicting desires, or new views of himself does not mean he has suddenly become a new "I".
02 Aug 05
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Originally posted by Bosse de NageAnd so we come full circle to the topic of this thread. 🙂
Descartes said "I think therefore I am"; my liberated man could well say, "I am a new person". Not being bound to his previous beliefs, he acts like a different person than he was and may well be a different person (his newfound happiness overflowing into every aspect of his life).
As I pointed out earlier, Descartes did not say that the fact of his existence followed from the fact of his thought; but rather that his certitude of his existence followed from his certitude of his thought. I know I think, therefore I know I am.
Your "liberated" man cannot say "I am a new person" without saying "I was once an old person". In saying that he has changed (a change in attributes), he has also asserted that something has not changed - viz; his being or his "I". EDIT: If he didn't, there is no way for him to use the words "new" or "change" with respect to his person.
Cheers,
LH
03 Aug 05
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Originally posted by lucifershammer[/b]Thanks for the helpful responses; they are guiding my reading for the remainder of this week (I probably won’t be back on here now till next week). Just a few brief comments:
Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Lucifershammer: [b]Thinking assumes a thinker. "I am" assumes an "I".
As Bosse de Nage points out, that could just be a linguistic construct, based the subject-predicate stru ...[text shortened]... thinks, feels, senses etc. tells me that there is an "I" there.[/b]
We cannot conceive of reality in any other manner but a subject-predicate form.
I’m not sure this is entirely true: 1) I’m not sure that all languages take that form; 2) Buddhists, for example, tend to conceive of reality in terms of “mutually arising” happenings….
Can there be an "I" that cannot "am"? In a way, it's possible. The hero of a Bronte novel might say "I am", but he isn't real and, therefore, "isn't".
As a fictional character, however, in the fictional space of the novel, the question still holds. I’m still not convinced that that kind of separation between subject and predicate isn’t somewhat artificial.
Why should an "I" be sensible only if it can be found outside thought? The fact that something thinks, feels, senses etc. tells me that there is an "I" there.
Good point. However, the “something” that thinks, feels, senses, etc. may be no more than the organism as a whole as it thinks, feels and so on. Even subjective self-reference may be only (note that I am avoiding the word merely here) a fundamentally neurological process that generates the self-referential thought-feeling-sensing complex called “I,” no different, in one sense, than the thought “tree.”
It is different in another sense, which Antonio Damasio calls “the second problem” of consciousness. This quote from Damasio’s book The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness: “In the very least, then, the neurobiology of consciousness faces two problems: the problem of how the movie-in-the-brain is generated, and the problem of how the brain also generates the sense that there is an owner and observer for that movie. The two problems are so intimately related that the latter is nested within the former. In effect, the second problem is that of generating the appearance of an owner and observer for the movie within the movie….” I am still reading this book.
At bottom, is there any reason to presume a “ghost in the machine,” so to speak? An “I” that is in some way prior to and separable from the activities of the body/brain-mind? You may have a sense of self—but can you identify anything other than that sense as sense?
Someone once told me that we are either like artichokes or onions. Peel away the leaves of an artichoke (read: thoughts, feelings, senses, actions, etc.) and you are left with some core that seems different from and prior to the leaves. Peel away the leaves of the onion, however… I admit, I have become an onion kind of guy…. 🙂
03 Aug 05
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Originally posted by vistesdTo expand what I said before : "I think therefore , I think I am.", doesn't require an "am":but "I am therefore , I am I think." does indeed require a "think"
Thanks for the helpful responses; they are guiding my reading for the remainder of this week (I probably won’t be back on here now till next week). Just a few brief comments:
We cannot conceive of reality in any other manner but ...[text shortened]... onion, however… I admit, I have become an onion kind of guy…. 🙂