Spirituality
07 May 12
08 May 12
To go further with my argument that a being can not exist in all possible worlds, lets suppose that a being exists in one possible world. Suppose it knows a fact about the world it lives in. Suppose that fact is not true in another possible world. That being can therefore not exist in the other possible world. Essentially I am saying that a being in one possible world may be similar, but never identical to, a being in another possible world because the world you reside in affects who you are.
08 May 12
2 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloHi. I was hoping you'd show up. 🙂
If we hold to S5 modal logic, then I think Premise 3 just follows trivially from P's own definitions of his world-indexed properties and thus cannot be reasonably rejected. For instance, P states "The property has maximal greatness entails the property has maximal excellence in every possible world". Based on P's formulation, I think it sh m[/i] that deals specifically with P's argument. Mackie thrashes P's argument.
Sounds like I need to read up on S5 modal logic.
The objection to Premise 1 is sinking in. Maybe an example will help you decide if I'm getting it. Take two possible worlds, A and B. The geometry of A is a curved space-time. The geometry of B is a flat, infinite space-time. So, the god of A can send a photon on a certain trajectory and it will eventually return to its starting point if the trajectory remains unaltered, but the god of B can't do that. This means they are not really the same entity and the possibility of one god that exists in all possible worlds crumbles to the ground.
This sounds like the argument twhitehead is making on the next page. Perhaps things are coming together?!
Edit: Damn. That didn't work. 😞
I will look into getting a copy of Mackie's book.
08 May 12
1 edit
Originally posted by twhiteheadSuppose you had being B1 in world W1 and being B2 in world W2. Suppose it is a fact, F1, that the Mets lost yesterday in W1; suppose it is a fact, F2, that the Mets did not lose yesterday in W2. Suppose B1 and B2 are specified exactly the same, except that B1 knows F1 whereas B2 knows F2 instead. According to your argument, B1 and B2 cannot be considered the same being because they are not identically specified in all respects (for example, they are not identically specified in their knowledge states). But, one could simply object that not all facts or specified states are relevant to the constitution of a being. Presumably, your argument would lead to problematic implications for the notions of personal identity and persistence. Presumably, you are not identically specified in all respects to the you of one day ago, and yet you are the same person you were one day ago, which is what it means for you to persist. So, being identically specified in all respects should not be considered necessary for saying that twhitehead is the same person he was a day ago. Why should it be considered necessary for saying B1 and B2 are the same being?
To go further with my argument that a being can not exist in all possible worlds, lets suppose that a being exists in one possible world. Suppose it knows a fact about the world it lives in. Suppose that fact is not true in another possible world. That being can therefore not exist in the other possible world. Essentially I am saying that a being in one p ...[text shortened]... tical to, a being in another possible world because the world you reside in affects who you are.
Regardless, I am sure Plantinga would have to agree that a maximally great being cannot be identically specified in all such respects in all possible worlds. For, by definition, a maximally great being is maximally excellent in every possible world; and being maximally excellent entails omniscience; and omniscience entails picking out the facts; and yet the facts can differ between possible worlds; so, to the extent that W1 and W2 feature different facts, an omniscient being in W1 will have different knowledge states than an omniscient being in W2.
However, I do not think this objection has any actual force against Plantinga's argument. His argument does not hinge on a being who is identically specified in all possible respects in all possible worlds; it hinges on a being who is maximally great in all possible worlds. And, if Plantinga gets that maximal greatness is exemplified in even a single possible world, then he also gets that maximal greatness is exemplified in every possible world. Again, I think that just follows trivially from (1) Plantinga's insistence on S5 and (2) Plantinga's definitions of his world-indexed properties. I see no problems with any of Premises 2-5. Premise 1 is the crux.
The atheist has no reason to accept Premise 1. Plantinga wants to act like one ought to infer to Premise 1 on the basis that the property of maximal greatness does not entail a contradiction and is thus broadly logically possible. However, if that inference were indeed warranted, then one presumably could also justifiably infer, on a structurally identical basis, that no-maximality is possible. So, now we would have this person inferring to two statements: (1) that maximal greatness is possible or exemplified in some possible world and (2) that no-maximality is possible or exemplified in some possible world. Unfortunately, though, these two entail contradiction: the first directly entails that maximal greatness is possible; the second entails that maximal greatness is impossible. Since one cannot take on the general inference from non-contradiction to possibility for these world-indexed properties that Plantinga defined and introduced without resorting to incoherence, such an inference pattern cannot be warranted. So, we would need others reasons to accept Premise 1.
08 May 12
2 edits
Originally posted by SwissGambitI posted another reply to Twhitehead before I saw your post here, so that may already address it somewhat.
Hi. I was hoping you'd show up. 🙂
Sounds like I need to read up on S5 modal logic.
The objection to Premise 1 is sinking in. Maybe an example will help you decide if I'm getting it. Take two possible worlds, A and B. The geometry of A is a curved space-time. The geometry of B is a flat, infinite space-time. So, the god of A can send a photon on a e. Perhaps things are coming together?!
I will look into getting a copy of Mackie's book.
As I have stated, I definitely think Premise 1 is the crux of the argument. At first glance Premise 1 looks harmless and acceptable. That is probably because we are conditioned to naturally infer from non-contradiciton of a property to the mere possibility that such a property is instantiated. This is typically a harmless inference. After all, mere logical possibility is a pretty low bar: even outrageously implausible things are typically at least logically possible in that they do not entail a logical contradiciton. So, typically it is safe to make this inference. However, note that most properties we can think about do not entail, upon their instantiation in a possible world, the instantiation of other properties in other possible worlds! Plantinga's 'maximal greatness' is decidedly different in this respect. Note that the exemplification of maximal greatness in a possible world actually entails that maximal excellence is exemplified in every possible world. And that is a very big difference that invalidates the general inference here.
As I mentioned, if the general inference from non-contradicition to possibility were valid for Plantinga's world-indexed properties, then one could presumably justifiably infer both (1) maximal greatness is possible, or is exemplified in some possible world and (2) no-maximality is possible, or is exemplified in some possible world. But this is incoherent, since (1) entails that maximal greatness is possible and (2) entails that maximal greatness is not exemplified in any possible world and is thus impossible (because, again, these particular properties are all or nothing: they are either exemplified in all possible worlds, or not at all).
Hopefully, this makes it more clear why I reject Premise 1.
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08 May 12
Originally posted by LemonJello"Note that the exemplification of maximal greatness in a possible world actually entails that maximal excellence is exemplified in every possible world. And that is a very big difference that invalidates the general inference here. "
I posted another reply to Twhitehead before I saw your post here, so that may already address it somewhat.
As I have stated, I definitely think Premise 1 is the crux of the argument. At first glance Premise 1 looks harmless and acceptable. That is probably because we are conditioned to naturally infer from non-contradiciton of a property to the mere ...[text shortened]... rld and is thus impossible.
Hopefully, this makes it more clear why I reject Premise 1.
I think the argument goes further and requires that a single maximally great entity is a participant (not merely is exemplified or instantiated) in every possible world. There is thus a "superworld" which is comprised of all the possible worlds, and this one entity is present in each world that is a member of this superworld.
Presumably too, if this entity is the creator of worlds and possesses maximal freedom of will, it would exist before, or without, the existence of any world it created. So there is some kind of plane or space or uberworld at which it is existent. Where this uberworld came from is a question.
I believe this stretches PW theory past its usual limits. It can be asked, is it really possible for this being to be fully instantiated at any world it creates?
Originally posted by SwissGambitThanks. I enjoyed following this debate and the background available on Wikipedia was more than helpful.
def. [b]God: a being which is "maximally excellent" in every possible world. Maximal Excellence includes such properties as omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection. A being which has maximal excellence in every possible world would have "maximal greatness."
Premises:
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2. If it is pos accept the argument entirely. For my atheist brethren: which premise(s) would you reject?[/b]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument
To my litle mind what is interesting is to challenge those who are, in other situations, prepared to rely on the type of argument captured in premises 2 and 3 and ask them to explain why they would not accept the same reasoning in this case. It seems a fair thing to ask.
In my simple language, people can invoke many possible worlds when there is a scenario with at least two possible outcomes, such as I will win a chess game or I will lose the same game. The many worlds argument allows me to insist that there is a possible world in which I have indeed won but sadly another possible world in which I lost, with scope for a world too in which the outcome was a draw and another where I threw the board in anger and despair.
When we are told that there may be a God or there may not be a God, I have trouble seeing this as a comparable kind of scenario. By that I mean that I do not see a road with a fork in it, one leading to God and one to there being no God. Hence I see no reason for the division of reality into two worlds in order to accommodate the two possible outcomes.
Phrased differently, I do not see the existence or non-existence of God as the outcome of a choice. Either there always was a God or there never was a God. So I see no reason to invoke the concept of two worlds.
If the concept of many worlds is actually to be employed at all, it surely can only be used if we decide that there is a possible world in which there is a God and another possible world in which there is not a God. If the logic used forces us to conclude that there is not only a God but a God in every possible world, then that implies to me an inconsistency which arises from a misuse of the many worlds argument. Either the argument can lead to a god in one world and not a god in another, or otherwise the argument is being misused for the wrong type of question. It cannot be used to have the result desired here.
I have considered an argument that says it is possible that God was the creator of all possible worlds and it is possible that he was not, so there is one multiverse containing all possible worlds that God created, but this leaves another possible multiverse also containing all possible worlds that God did not create. Interesting to compare and contrast these multiverses perhaps but this still does not leave us with the result desired by theists as both multiverses contain all possible worlds which is nonsensical.
[Edit - para inserted here] Of course the notion that there is a world with a God and a world without a God is probably also a paradox. You cannot travel through a world that has no God to arrive (after a decision or choice) in a world where there is not a God after all. The concept "there is a God" and the concept "there is no God" are mutually incompatible and each would extinguish the other totally. It may appear that the concept "I win a chess game" extinguishes or is extinguished by the concept "I lost that chess game" but in the many worlds picture this is not the case. The whole point of many worlds is that if two outcomes are possible they both happen. I can travel through a world which is at it is until the chess game, at which point it divides. However, in the case of God's existence this is simply not an option. If God created the world prior to the choice regarding his existence, then he created both the later world in which he exists and the later world in which he not only does not exist but never had existed and that is nonsensical. (Just to repeat my point, many worlds are invoked when there is a choice of alternative outcomes).
An argument that leads to paradox is not coherent and has to be wrong. The question then is why it is wrong. It is wrong in my view because the many worlds argument is not applicable at all to questions of this type. It has its uses when it is applied correctly but this is a failure to understand the tool of many worlds.
Incidentally, my argument fits very well with those critics (see Wikipedia) who point out that Plantinga's argument can be used to demonstrate that there is no God, or that there is or is not a supremely evil being, or many other absurd and mutually exclusive propositions.
There may be a God in every possible world but one cannot use the many worlds argument to demonstrate this.
I'd enjoy your criticism of this argument. I certainly enjoyed working it out (with the added bonus that Hinds is not reading this thread any more). Thanks.
😀
08 May 12
Originally posted by JS357I think the argument goes further and requires that a single maximally great entity is a participant (not merely is exemplified or instantiated) in every possible world. There is thus a "superworld" which is comprised of all the possible worlds, and this one entity is present in each world that is a member of this superworld.
"Note that the exemplification of maximal greatness in a possible world actually entails that maximal excellence is exemplified in every possible world. And that is a very big difference that invalidates the general inference here. "
I think the argument goes further and requires that a single maximally great entity is a participant (not merely is exemplifi ...[text shortened]... sked, is it really possible for this being to be fully instantiated at any world it creates?
I agree that Plantinga's definition of 'maximal greatness' commits him to the stance that any maximally great entity that exists, exists as a maximally excellent entity in any and every possible world. I am skeptical, though, that this commits him to the "superworld" structure, since it seems to me that his argument proceeds okay under typical possible world semantics within S5 without such structure.
Presumably too, if this entity is the creator of worlds and possesses maximal freedom of will, it would exist before, or without, the existence of any world it created. So there is some kind of plane or space or uberworld at which it is existent. Where this uberworld came from is a question.
I believe this stretches PW theory past its usual limits. It can be asked, is it really possible for this being to be fully instantiated at any world it creates?
Yes, this is an interesting line of thought. Of course, in the bare argument as it is presented, it is not claimed that this entity is also the creator of worlds, it does not explicitly speak to the issue of its freedom, etc. But, nevertheless, supposing Plantinga's argument here were to succeed, it is a further question of how it is supposed to be related or melded with a common theistic conception of God and the other attributes thereof, and what all that would require.
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08 May 12
Originally posted by LemonJelloI suppose it's OK,so long as "exists as a maximally excellent entity in any and [sic? -- at?] every possible world" allows it to be one entity participating in n worlds, as I could belong to n clubs) or the theistic fans of the argument are OK with it being multiple maximal entities, as a kind of polytheism with one god per world.
[b]I think the argument goes further and requires that a single maximally great entity is a participant (not merely is exemplified or instantiated) in every possible world. There is thus a "superworld" which is comprised of all the possible worlds, and this one entity is present in each world that is a member of this superworld.
I agree that Plant ...[text shortened]... tic conception of God and the other attributes thereof, and what all that would require.[/b]
On your second comment, the claims about the entity await teasing out, by questions such as, "Would an entity that can create worlds be greater than one that can't?"
09 May 12
Originally posted by SwissGambityes, i noticed that later in another of your postings, though it has little bearing on the weakness of plantinga's argument. i don't see any reasonable defense of p's argument posted by anyone, so i think we can bury that dead horse.
We are pretty much in agreement. Note that I did offer some possible definitions of omnipotent [ability to do anything logically possible], omniscient [knows all true propositions], and morally perfect [always prefers the most good state of affairs].
09 May 12
3 edits
Originally posted by SwissGambitBy the way, you can take a quick look at this section:
Hi. I was hoping you'd show up. 🙂
Sounds like I need to read up on S5 modal logic.
The objection to Premise 1 is sinking in. Maybe an example will help you decide if I'm getting it. Take two possible worlds, A and B. The geometry of A is a curved space-time. The geometry of B is a flat, infinite space-time. So, the god of A can send a photon on a
Edit: Damn. That didn't work. 😞
I will look into getting a copy of Mackie's book.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/#PlaOntArg
It has an appropriate objection which amounts to saying that since the argument can simply be run in reverse (such as what I presented in the no-maximality argument), the atheist can have no real reason to accept Premise 1 over Premise 1*. And under S5 and the definitions in play, these two premises lead to contradictory conclusions.
09 May 12
4 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloOK, I read up on the S5 system, but I'm afraid it was rather technical for a philosophical n00b like me to understand. [And I read the Ontological Argument page you linked, but when they gave "either God exists, or 2+2=5" as an example, I wanted to scream "false dichotomy!!" without going any further.] Nevertheless, I'll give it a shot.
By the way, you can take a quick look at this section:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/#PlaOntArg
It has an appropriate objection which amounts to saying that since the argument can simply be run in reverse (such as what I presented in the no-maximality argument), the atheist can have no real reason to accept Premise 1 over P ...[text shortened]... And under S5 and the definitions in play, these two premises lead to contradictory conclusions.
Let ME = Maximally Excellent Being exists and MG = Maximally Great Being exists.
The crux of the problem seems to be:
1. It is possible that MG.
But MG by definition means that it is necessary that ME. So we can substitute.
1'. It is possibly necessary that ME.
And here's where the S5 trick comes in.
1'. It is possibly necessary that ME -> it is necessary that ME.
This is apparently allowed by the general axiom that if it is possibly necessary that P, then it is necessary that P. The 'possibility' part just goes POOF under S5.
It seems like rejecting this axiom of S5 would be so much easier than the gymnastics that everyone has to do to preserve S5 and yet reject Plantinga's argument. It seems like the source of our misery is this very axiom. But I assume that people would not do the gymnastics if there wasn't some reason for wanting to affirm the axiom. But for the life of me, I can't see it.
09 May 12
Originally posted by SwissGambitBingo. Yes, you've got it right.
OK, I read up on the S5 system, but I'm afraid it was rather technical for a philosophical n00b like me to understand. Nevertheless, I'll give it a shot.
Let ME = Maximally Excellent Being exists and MG = Maximally Great Being exists.
The crux of the problem seems to be:
1. It is possible that MG.
But MG by definition means that it is necessary tha ...[text shortened]... mplified in every possible world.[/quote]I think I'll stick to my electronics job. 😞
I would add that the preservation of S5 here is actually at Plantinga's demand. Indeed, S5 seems critical to the validity of his argument. I would also add that I have no problems generally with S5, and I think it is the natural default system that we should be working within. However, when it comes to world-indexed properties, of which 'maximal greatness' is a good example, it could be argued that S5 is not apt. Still, as I said, it is basically at Plantinga's demand that we work within S5 here.
I guess what I was trying to say before is this: even if we grant Plantinga that S5 is the appropriate system here, his argument, though logically valid, does not fly. As the stanford encyclopedia article suggests, his argument is a non-starter, since an atheist has no reason to accept his main premise, which is the premise that it is possible that MG.
09 May 12
Originally posted by LemonJelloI am not disputing any of your post. However, I do think I have a problem with notions of personal identity and persistence. One of my favourite questions for people who believe in an after life, is "if your five year old self, is what gets to heaven, would you care?" Although I identify with my five year old self, I am never the less not my five year old self.
Presumably, your argument would lead to problematic implications for the notions of personal identity and persistence.
Although we traditionally say that I am the same person as yesterday, we simultaneously admit to change. I am much more uncomfortable when it comes to different worlds. In any story about time travel or magical duplication of people where a person meets and interacts with them selves, you fairly quickly separate the two identities and take them to be two individual entities.
My problem with treating an entity as existing in multiple worlds is that there is a tendency to start thinking of it as consisting of all instances (as is suggested in the definition of maximally great) and this causes us to make logical errors or make invalid conclusions.
So, could a being be maximally great today, but not tomorrow? Or does the definition require maximal greatness for eternity?
09 May 12
Originally posted by twhiteheadAlthough I identify with my five year old self, I am never the less not my five year old self.
I am not disputing any of your post. However, I do think I have a problem with notions of personal identity and persistence. One of my favourite questions for people who believe in an after life, is "if your five year old self, is what gets to heaven, would you care?" Although I identify with my five year old self, I am never the less not my five year old ...[text shortened]... great today, but not tomorrow? Or does the definition require maximal greatness for eternity?
There is a distinction between what is sometimes called numerical identity on one hand and qualitative identity on the other hand. Roughly, for X and Y to be numerically identical is for X and Y to be one and the same thing; whereas for X and Y to be qualitatively identical is for X and Y to be exactly similar in all relevant respects. The question of persistence has to do with numerical identity, not qualitative identity. The you of right now is numerically identical with the you of 5 years old in that they are one and the same person, and that relates to your persistence. But, as you mention, the you of right now is not qualitatively identical with the you of 5 years old, because you have changed and acquired different properties over time. I guess the question here would be what makes a past being, such as the 5 year old you mention, numerically identical with the you of today. I think, roughly, that it has to do with overlapping chains of strong psychological connectedness that links, through time, that 5 year old and the you of today. But, of course, I readily agree that you have changed and are not qualitatively identical with this 5 year old, even though you are one and the same person.
Probably, going back to Plantinga's argument and your objection that the same being cannot be in multiple worlds, there is some distinction in play like the numerical/qualitative identity distinction as described. I agree that it can be rather confusing when one talks about world-indexed properties, such as maximal greatness, where X's having such a property entails that X has such-and-such properties in this-and-that possible worlds.
So, could a being be maximally great today, but not tomorrow? Or does the definition require maximal greatness for eternity?
This is an interesting question. According to Plantinga's definition, X is maximally great iff X is maximally excellent (and thus omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect) in every possible world. So, for X to be maximally great one day and not the next, I guess it would require X's being collectively omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect one day but not the next in at least some possible world. I guess this could happen if we allow so-called "accidental" omnipotence or accidental omniscience or accidental moral perfection. According to this, if X is for example only accidentally omnipotent (instead of "essentially" omnipotent), then X could be omnipotent at one time but not at another. I do not think Plantinga has such accidental properties in mind, though.
09 May 12
Originally posted by LemonJelloSo, can we say that the me of today is in any way identical to the five year old you? (since we are both human beings). If not, then the connection surely has more to do with continuity with this universe (possible world). So how can I be said to be connected to a being in another possible world that is very similar but not identical? Based on what properties? If, in another possible world there are two beings that each differ from me by 1%. Are they both me? Is neither of them me?
The you of right now is numerically identical with the you of 5 years old in that they are one and the same person, and that relates to your persistence. But, as you mention, the you of right now is not qualitatively identical with the you of 5 years old, because you have changed and acquired different properties over time. I guess the question here wou ...[text shortened]... rong psychological connectedness that links, through time, that 5 year old and the you of today.
Would there be a connection between the five year old me in this world and the five year old me in another world even if they are very dissimilar although at 40 we are now near identical?
Plantinga's argument concludes that a being exists with certain properties that it has in all possible worlds at all possible times, does this also mean that other properties it has are also identical in all possible worlds at all possible times? Or can the 'God' of one possible world be totally different from the 'God' of another possible world in all respects except the key defined properties?