post natal depression.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
No. There, more sound and substantial refutations were called for, as positions to be refuted regularly had a modicum of merit.

The idea that probability does not apply to matters of choice is simply laughable and lacks no merit at all.

If it's so laughable, surely a refutation would not be hard? I mean, both of us could save quite a bit of time typing out meaningless pot-shots.

Suppose you had infinite stamina, mental strength and time. Now, you decide to keep tossing a coin for all eternity. Instead of letting it fall how it does, however, you decide to catch it in mid-air and put it down heads each time.

Is it logically possible that you will put it down tails any time? Yes.
Is it necessary? No.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Which view are you adopting when you challenge the validity of my deduction?

Left your glasses at home?

Originally posted by lucifershammer

Is it logically possible that you will put it down tails any time? Yes.
Is it necessary? No.

These two positions are inconsistent. Each entails that the other is false in the scenario of infinite repetitions.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Left your glasses at home?

No, I just don't feel like playing the equivocation game today. Just tell me which view you are relying on to dispute the validity of my argument so that I can rebut appropriately without having to chase a moving target.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
No, I just don't feel like playing the equivocation game today. Just tell me which view you are relying on to dispute the validity of my argument so that I can rebut appropriately without having to chase a moving target.

I already did. That's why I asked you whether you left your glasses at home.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
I already did. That's why I asked you whether you left your glasses at home.

Can't you just give me a straight, unqualified answer?

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
These two positions are inconsistent. Each entails that the other is false in the scenario of infinite repetitions.

Only if you make the mistake of treating logical possibility and probability as equivalent concepts.

Probability 101 question - If you can pick any real number between 0 and 1, what is the probability that it is 0.5? Is it logically possible/impossible that 0.5 is picked?

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Can't you just give me a straight, unqualified answer?

Not in this case. I don't want my endorsement of the Thomistic view of causation to be treated like a blanket endorsement of Thomism.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Only if you make the mistake of treating logical possibility and probability as equivalent concepts.

Probability 101 question - If you can pick any real number between 0 and 1, what is the probability that it is 0.5?

Those statements are always inconsistent given consistent notions of possibility and probability.

The probability in question is 0. This does not entail that it is impossible to pick .5. It does entail that given an infinite number of picks, you do not have a guarantee of picking .5. This is in constrast to any outcome of the experiment that has a positive probability, for which you do have a guarantee of eventually picking it.

You are making the fallacy of concluding Not-B from [(A implies B) AND (Not-A)], since we are discussing sinning which has a positive probability.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Not in this case. I don't want my endorsement of the Thomistic view of causation to be treated like a blanket endorsement of Thomism.

Of course not, because you rely on having the best of both inconsistent worlds. I don't know why I waste my time with you.

Let me know when you get your story straight.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Those statements are always inconsistent given consistent notions of possibility and probability.

The probability in question is 0. This does not entail that it is impossible to pick .5. It does entail that given an infinite number of picks, you do not have a guarantee of picking .5. This is in constrast to any outcome of the experiment that ha ...[text shortened]... m [(A implies B) AND (Not-A)], since we are discussing sinning which has a positive probability.

You're putting the cart before the horse. Sinning is not logically possible because it has a positive probability; you assigned it a positive probability because it is logically possible, remember? You said:

"It is possible for him to choose evil, which is to say, the probability that he sins at each opportunity to do so is greater than 0."

In other words, you are the one who asserted

Logical Possibility => p>0

However, we now have a case where the precedent is true but the antecedent is false.

Would I be wrong in saying that you've just contradicted yourself?

Originally posted by lucifershammer


You said:

"It is possible for him to choose evil, which is to say, the probability that he sins at each opportunity to do so is greater than 0."

In other words, you are the one who asserted

Logical Possibility => p>0

This is an incorrect translation of my statement. In your preferred cryptic rendering, it would be

Possibility < = > p>0

The phrase "which is to say" corresponds to logical equivalence, not logical implication.

I have not contradicted myself. We have no counterexample.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Of course not, because you rely on having the best of both inconsistent worlds. I don't know why I waste my time with you.

Let me know when you get your story straight.

Are you compiling your own book of "Scribbles's Standard Retorts"? What "both inconsistent worlds" are you talking about? We've not even spoken about one inconsistent world, let alone two.

If you can't deal with the qualified answer, that's your problem. I've said I'm using the Thomistic view of causality in this discussion - that should be sufficient for us to go forward with our discussion.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
This is an incorrect translation of my statement. In your preferred cryptic rendering, it would be

Possibility < = > p>0

The phrase "which is to say" corresponds to logical equivalence, not logical implication.

I have not contradicted myself.

Er, didn't you just say:

"The probability in question is 0. This does not entail that it is impossible to pick .5."

Simple question, Doctor - is it possible or impossible to pick 0.5?

Since you're a fan of straight answers, perhaps you can put your money where your mouth is and give me one.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Er, didn't you just say:

"The probability in question is 0. This does not entail that it is impossible to pick .5."

I said that, after saying that the very formulation of the question is inconsistent.

Your premise ("If you can pick..." ) asserts that picking a real number from a set of them is possible. It's not. For any experiment in which you think you have, you have actually conducted a different experiment than the one described.

Suppose you try to do it by chopping a string with a knife. Is the knife picking a single real number? No. Because of its width, it is picking a range of real numbers.

Suppose you try to do it algorithmically. Every algorithmic RNG picks numbers from a finite set of possibilities.

Is is impossible to get the result you describe from the experiment you describe, and its probability is correspondingly 0.

But when I'm forced to accept your false premise ("If you can pick..." ), of course it's true that it's possible - merely by supposition. But I'm only drawing conclusions about your hypothetical world there, not the real world. Further, I was very clear that your hypothetical world is an inconsistent one, relying on inconsistent notions of possibility and probability.

I want to discuss the real world, the one in which Adam sinned with probability greater than 0.