11 Apr 08
1 edit
Originally posted by ZahlanziRe free-will: see my post to twhitehead on why I don’t think there is necessarily a free-will issue here.
oh yeah sorry.
i am a theist and i don't think that 1-5 are absolutely correct.
1 is tricky. how does god being omniscient affect my free will? well if there is only one possible timeline then god cannot possibly be omniscient and we retain free will. so there is either one possible timeline and god is not omniscient and we make our future one second n every moment. our responsibility. our merit if it goes well, our fault if it goes bad
Re omnipotence: your counter says that God cannot act in ways that are logically contradictory. I would ask if God’s omnipotence is limited in any other ways. But, yes, if God is not omnipotent with regard to the ability to create any (logically consistent) worlds, then the conclusion (6) does not necessarily follow. (This inference is really just another variation of Euthyphro’s dilemma.)
The argument was not about fault, but capability. However, if humanity is able to upset God’s intentions (will), the God is clearly not omnipotent.
simple. god decided that free will is more important than to make us mindless drones capable of only a finite amount of actions.
(a) God did create us with only a finite amount of actions, and a finite consciousness. These facts limit our range of choices, even if we freely choose from among the available options. If murder were simply not an option in our choice-set, that would no more violate our free-will than does my inability (as a male) to become pregnant.
(b) I think you risk walking into the same trap here that you saw me walking into: Is a world with free-will and child torture a better world than one without free-will but no child torture? How many children can one contemplate being tortured while still holding such a view?
Nevertheless, my position is that the inference is not about free-will at all, but what existential constraints would be included in some “best of all possible worlds”.
Once again, if you are willing to relax God’s omnipotence, I will not argue. (That was the choice made by rabbi Harold Kushner in his book When Bad Things Happen To Good People, exploring Euthyphro’s dilemma in the context of the Book of Job.
11 Apr 08
Originally posted by Starrman3) Being an omni-good god is not a sufficient condition for world creation.
I dispute 3 and 5, and consequently 6 is wrong.
3) Being an omni-good god is not a sufficient condition for world creation.
as such
5) God may not have created the world. It could have been me, despite being told by god I was doing it wrong.
Understood; however, premise (5) specifies that God is creator. I think that being omni-good would entail the attempt to create the best possible world, given that one is going to create any world at all.
Re your objection to (5): Of course, if God is not the creator of the world, the inference collapses. Theists are unlikely to reject that particular premise, however—even though you and I are quite willing to.
11 Apr 08
2 edits
The argument is nearly valid.
To be valid, it needs an additional premise that there exists only one world, namely this one. Alternatively, premise (3) could be strengthened to assert that an omnibenevolent God will create only the best of all possible worlds.
Without such modification, the premises can all be true while the conclusion is false. The counterexample is that we inhabit one of many worlds, with a world other than this being the best world denoted by premise (3).
Additionally, I believe premise (1) is superfluous given premise (2), and that premises (1) and (2) are superfluous given premise (3).
11 Apr 08
2 edits
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesAh! I see that. Thank you. Consider the inference so corrected, strengthening (3) by adding the word “only.” (I think multiple created worlds of which only one is the best would create more problems for the 3-O theist.)
The argument is nearly valid.
To be valid, it needs an additional premise that there exists only one world, namely this one. Alternatively, premise (3) could be strengthened to assert that an omnibenevolent God will create only the best of all possible worlds.
Without such modification, the premises can all be true while the conclusion ...[text shortened]... superfluous given premise (2), and that premises (1) and (2) are superfluous given premise (3).
EDIT: Just saw your edit—
Well, I don’t see how omni-good entails that one infallibly knows the highest good, or how it entails the capability to bring it off. I don’t see why any one of the “omnis” should entail either of the others. I suppose one could collapse (1), (2) and (3) into a single premise, viz: “An omni-good God who knows infallibly what is the highest good, and who can create any possible world, would only create the best one.”
If the inference were only addressing God’s intention, I’d agree.
EDIT^2: By "omni-good," I still mean morally good, not, say, skillfully good.
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I’ve got to go for a few days; will drop back in as I can. I look forward to reading your further comments.
11 Apr 08
1 edit
Originally posted by twhiteheadHowever, I am yet to hear anyone give a good reason why anyone would, with full knowledge of the consequences actually choose to go to hell. ---whitey----
Many people would argue that freedom is better than slavery even if the actual living conditions are significantly worse when free, or life is considerably shorter.
Some people use a similar argument to claim that free will with the attendant likelihood of bad choices is better than forced good choices.
In other words some bad decisions are a necessary e if they knew which choice was best? So God must keep us ignorant to preserve our free will.
A lot of people do many self destructive things with full knowledge of the consequences and continue to choose to do so. Look around you , the evidence for men making incredibly self destructive choices with full knowledge of their consequences is clear. As to why they/we do this , one can only guess , the fact that men do behave in this way is obvious.
11 Apr 08
6 edits
Originally posted by vistesdIt doesn't. Additionally, being omni-good does not entail that God is green. Nonetheless, had you included "God is green" as a premise, I would have called it superfluous as well.
Just saw your edit—
Well, I don’t see how omni-good entails that one infallibly knows the highest good, or how it entails the capability to bring it off.
By calling a premise superfluous, I mean that the argument is valid even after discarding the premise. In this case specifically, you assert in premise (3) that an omni-good God will create only the best world. Whether he does that merely by accident or by virtue of his other traits specified in (1) and (2) or by a super-benevolent meta-God smiling down upon his benevolent efforts despite his limited knowledge and power or whatever else has no bearing on the truth of the conclusion. The only pertinent fact is that an omni-good God will create the best world, and this is sufficiently asserted by (3) alone.
Sure, (1) and (2) assert additional things about properties of God, just like asserting that he is green does, but those premises do not affect the validity of the argument. If you think they are not superfluous, you should be able to construct a scenario in which premises (3), (4), and (5) are true, and in which the conclusion is false, such scenario also violating premise (1) or (2).
11 Apr 08
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesBy calling a premise superfluous, I mean that the argument is valid even after discarding the premise. In this case specifically, you assert in premise (3) that an omni-good God will create only the best world. Whether he does that merely by accident or by virtue of his other traits specified in (1) and (2) has no bearing on the truth of the conclusion.
It doesn't. Additionally, being omni-good does not entail that God is green. Nonetheless, had you included "God is green" as a premise, I would have called it superfluous as well.
By calling a premise superfluous, I mean that the argument is valid even after discarding the premise. In this case specifically, you assert in premise (3) that an om ...[text shortened]... true, and in which the conclusion is false, such scenario also violating premise (1) or (2).
Ooops. My bad. Thanks.
12 Apr 08
1 edit
Originally posted by vistesdif god is not able to act in logical contradictory ways, then it is safe to assume that he is not omnipotent because there is at least a single thing he cannot do. unless god has another view of the notion of infinite (the paradox Can god create a rock so heavy that not event God can lift).
Re free-will: see my post to twhitehead on why I don’t think there is necessarily a free-will issue here.
Re omnipotence: your counter says that God cannot act in ways that are logically contradictory. I would ask if God’s omnipotence is limited in any other ways. But, yes, if God is not omnipotent with regard to the ability to create any (logically ...[text shortened]... ings Happen To Good People[/i], exploring Euthyphro’s dilemma in the context of the Book of Job.
Is a world with free-will and child torture a better world than one without free-will but no child torture?
if you had no free will then you can't have hope to improve your current situation
so i guess that even a world with despicable things and free will can be better than a world governed by a single entity, even a benevolent one. in a free will universe one could strive to improve the current state of affairs ad infinitum. but when you have no free will you are at the whim of the entity that governs your actions. no progrees could be achieved. it could be argued that not even conscience can exist if there is no free will. and no happiness. if you cannot picture another state of affairs, how can you be happy, because you cannot compare with anything
13 Apr 08
Originally posted by ZahlanziFirst, if you’re willing to bite the bullet on omnipotence (including nomological omnipotence), then the dilemma no longer holds.
if god is not able to act in logical contradictory ways, then it is safe to assume that he is not omnipotent because there is at least a single thing he cannot do. unless god has another view of the notion of infinite (the paradox Can god create a rock so heavy that not event God can lift).
Is a world with free-will and child torture a better world ...[text shortened]... icture another state of affairs, how can you be happy, because you cannot compare with anything
Second, I have already said that free will is not the issue. However, the question I intended is whether God prefers that humans have free will if that means such atrocities as child rape, or if God would prefer a world in which humans did not have free will and no child ever suffered such atrocities? Nevertheless, as I stated, it seems that a God who could create a world in which my free will is constrained (but not violated) by gravity could create a world in which my free will is constrained (but not violated) by a total absence of either the urge or the ability to commit such atrocities.
13 Apr 08
Originally posted by vistesdby constrained free will i understand violated free will. if the ability to commit atrocities is removed then how can you still have free will? don't you view free will as the ability to commit any possible act?(any normal act, i dont mean magical acts like shooting lightning out of one's back end)
First, if you’re willing to bite the bullet on omnipotence (including nomological omnipotence), then the dilemma no longer holds.
Second, I have already said that free will is not the issue. However, the question I intended is whether God prefers that humans have free will if that means such atrocities as child rape, or if God would prefer a world ...[text shortened]... ut not violated) by a total absence of either the urge or the ability to commit such atrocities.
are you asking if the world in which god directs every action of man or a world where he made some unbreakable rules would be better, i already said(with the risk of sounding cruel) that it wouldn't, at least for me. would you like someone cutting your options short? when extreme evil (let's say child rape and genocide) is removed, then extreme evil becomes stealing and alcohol abuse. then that is removed leaving extreme evil to be jaywalking and picking flowers from the public garden. then that is removed too. what would you call that life? slavery? well it is more and less than slavery at the same time. it is more because slaves realize their situation and hope for improvement and it is less because not realizing your situation means you have nothing to compare it with and you are happy in your ignorance. However having a choice between this world and that, i would choose this.
And please think that a world characterized by "a total absence of either the urge or the ability to commit such atrocities" isn't necessarily atrocity free. a guy could still run someone over with a car by mistake. or a guy would fall asleep and hit the auto destruct button at a nuclear plant. Unless you consider that ability to commit harm means owning a car or having nuclear plants because then you further reduce mankind to drone status
14 Apr 08
3 edits
Originally posted by Zahlanziby constrained free will i understand violated free will.
by constrained free will i understand violated free will. if the ability to commit atrocities is removed then how can you still have free will? don't you view free will as the ability to commit any possible act?(any normal act, i dont mean magical acts like shooting lightning out of one's back end)
are you asking if the world in which god directs every a ng a car or having nuclear plants because then you further reduce mankind to drone status
But if this is true, then our free will is already violated under any conditions in which we are not faced with an infinite choice-set (note that I referred to constrained choice, and a finite choice-set). As I noted, I cannot fly by simply flapping my arms no matter how much I will to do so. I am constrained by gravity. This is not a case of facing consequences for my choice; I literally cannot get off the ground.
Or, imagine a world in which one cannot make white wine. All grapes yield red wine, even if the skins are removed. I can choose among many varieties of red wine; I can choose not to drink wine at all. I cannot choose white wine (in fact, in such a world, the thought has likely never occurred to me.
Or, let us say that I do not like beef liver—under any circumstances, no matter how it is prepared. I will not, under any circumstances choose to eat beef liver, because my choice is constrained by my tastes and preferences. I did not decide not like beef liver; it simply offends my taste buds. (This is true, by the way.) Does the simple fact that we have tastes and preferences violate our free will. Do you know anyone who does not have such tastes and preferences? Why would a world in which torture is simply something that everyone finds sufficiently distasteful that they will not engage in it violate their free will?
Or, as a male, I am unable to become pregnant. Does this existential fact violate my free will?
Or, the level and nature of my intelligence preclude my mastering, or even understanding, certain concepts that someone else can handle easily. Does that constraint violate my free will?
Yes, I am existentially constrained according to what acts are possible—as you note. Those that are not possible (I have used some here) are not part of my available choice-set. I have not argued that that fact violates my free will. Quite the contrary: if God’s creating a world in which certain choices (e.g., your magic example) are not available to me does not already violate my free will, then I fail to see how God’s creating a world in which murder is not a choice that is available to me would violate my free will.
EDIT: What do accidents—or earthquakes, for that matter—have to do with free will?
14 Apr 08
2 edits
Originally posted by vistesdyou make a valid point. free will only applies to a finite set of choices. if you restrict that set, free will is not violated because you were never able to do that choice in the first place. you were right, it is not a matter of free will as long as you don't realize that you are being limited.
[b]by constrained free will i understand violated free will.
But if this is true, then our free will is already violated under any conditions in which we are not faced with an infinite choice-set (note that I referred to constrained choice, and a finite choice-set). As I noted, I cannot fly by simply flapping my arms no matter how much I will to do s ...[text shortened]... e will.
EDIT: What do accidents—or earthquakes, for that matter—have to do with free will?[/b]
we claim we have free will but we ignore our inability to eat concentrated sulphuric acid or teleport because we assume they contradict the universal laws. but how free willed a person living in the world which you describe consider him or herself if by some means they would glimpse our world?
14 Apr 08
Originally posted by ZahlanziI am shocked that you even considered killing the old lady.
edit. oh perhaps you said that i am a mindless drone because i chose the moral high ground? because i don't agree. i simply decided the benefits of killing the old lady are not worth the risks and the pain i would cause another human being. but i did considered the possibilities and chose between them. in my view a mindless drone would not have options to c ...[text shortened]... from, they would only be able to choose one or maybe be limited to a smaller amount of options.
So, if every time I choose not to kill someone I meet, I am making a free will choice, and in fact the 'good' choice, then why cant God make a world where all free will choices are as clear cut and easy to make, and where everyone except murderers will make the right choices? Then he can simply avoid making murderers.
You implied earlier that it was important for free will to exist that you did not actually know which of the set of choices were the evil ones. (ignorance)
15 Apr 08
Originally posted by twhiteheadif he can avoid making murderers maybe he can avoid making thieves as well. or jaywalkers or people who wear pink. and then you would have a very very boring world.
I am shocked that you even considered killing the old lady.
So, if every time I choose not to kill someone I meet, I am making a free will choice, and in fact the 'good' choice, then why cant God make a world where all free will choices are as clear cut and easy to make, and where everyone except murderers will make the right choices? Then he can simpl ...[text shortened]... ist that you did not actually know which of the set of choices were the evil ones. (ignorance)