Originally posted by no1marauderWell, can't say as I'm surprised that you failed to address the fact that the "Yahtzee" parody of the following leaves you without a leg to stand on:
Lottery Argument blah blah blah blah.
Already discussed, already debunked.
if that's the sum total of what you and TW have, then I think I've dealt with it enough.
In the case we are discussing there are only two possibilities:
A) The universe was designed;
B) The universe was a result of random forces.
Either one has to be more probable than the other or they can be equally probable. In point of fact given the evidence submitted, A is enormously more probable unless one can submit evidence that there were more "throws". No such evidence has been submitted so essentially what TW is insisting is that we should believe something highly improbable as compared to something highly probable (at least based on the information we have).
Seems you've once again gone into full "evasive maneuvers" mode. Seems likely you understand the absurdity of what I've quoted above. It simply doesn't make sense, so instead of addressing it, you've opted to throw a little hissy fit.
If you disagree then, by all means, actually address it.
Originally posted by twhiteheadConsider the following. T is the candidate Theory of Everything, W is the world we see around us. P is the subspace of the parameters which gives us a universe we can exist in. Suppose that the candidate Theory of Everything has not been directly tested and requires ultra-fine tuning to get the world as we know it.
I totally disagree. And in fact, I would argue that you yourself disagree, you just won't admit it so you deliberately smudge the the definition of 'what we see around us'.
[b]The standard in physics is to look for natural theories where the probability of getting a universe like ours is not ridiculously small.
Why? Who made such a ridiculous stan ...[text shortened]... as a whole. You can't go half way without a really good explanation as to why you are doing so.[/b]
(T&W) -> P
this basically says that we have a theory and some observations, we deduce the parameter set from this.
1) ¬P - this is justified on a priori probability grounds, P is so unlikely it can't have happened.
2) W - we know what the world is like
3) T - Physics theories are always true
4) (T&W) -> P - explained above
5) T&W - & insertion from 2,3
6) P - modus ponens depends on 2 and 3
7) P&¬P - & insertion from 1, 2, 3
8) ¬T - reductio ad absurdum 1, 2
This is the only conclusion we can possibly draw. We have good reason to think W is true. The theory T is assumed to be otherwise untested so it is speculative. You might argue that P is only astronomically unlikely to be true, but that only changes the conclusion to the theory is astronomically unlikely to be true. This is all that can be obtained using only that information. If you insist on the truth of T then you have to have a reason that ¬[]¬P is true (it is not the case that it is overwhelmingly likely that P is not true).
It's a different matter if the theory has independent verification then we have empirical justification for thinking it's true and are forced to start looking for reasons that P is not as unlikely as we think. We are then justified in adding another axiom to override the statistical evidence for ¬P, candidates are:
G, G->P god exists and if god exists then the parameter set allows life
M, M->P there are many universes and if there are many universes then all parameter sets exist elsewhere.
C, C->P there is a constraint on the parameter space not derivable from T and if there is such a constraint then P is true. i.e. T is not complete.
and we change the probability of P. But until there is some hard evidence for T that's better than "we don't have any other ideas" then we have no justification for doing this. Our only justification for G, M or C is the a priori unlikeliness of P.
The current status of string theory is that is not completely understood, so statements about the probability of P are premature. This argument is like Occam's razor in that it assumes that T has not been tested (in other words there have been no experiments which have confirmed it's predictions that are not also predicted by the Standard Model). So my statement that T is either incomplete or just plain wrong is justified.
Originally posted by ThinkOfOneLottery Argument blah blah blah.
Well, can't say as I'm surprised that you failed to address the fact that the "Yahtzee" parody of the following leaves you without a leg to stand on:
[b]In the case we are discussing there are only two possibilities:
A) The universe was designed;
B) The universe was a result of random forces.
Either one has to be more probable than the othe ...[text shortened]... e opted to throw a little hissy fit.
If you disagree then, by all means, actually address it.
Discussed for about 20 pages. Nothing needed to add. You and TW's "holding your breath until you turn blue" claims don't add up to anything new.
Originally posted by no1marauderThe assumption is that the theory has no empirical evidence for it other than reproducing the Standard Model at low energies. The tuning problem amounts to empirical evidence against the theory.
What you seem to be saying that if a physical theory lead to a conclusion that the universe is fine tuned, you will reject it out of hand even if it accurately describes all other aspects of reality. How is that a reasonable position? As mortal humans all we can do is take the evidence we can obtain and evaluate that evidence to reach conclusions as to t ...[text shortened]... instead insist that Result B will eventually be proven seems to be a rejection of Reason itself.
Originally posted by DeepThoughtI do not think that a physical theory should assume that a designed universe is an impossibility and thus do not believe the "tuning problem" is evidence against any type of theory. The "tuning problem" arises from calculations that really have nothing to do with the issue of fine tuning as I understand them, but is instead the result of measurements and experiments of certain features of physical reality. That these results lead inexorably to a certain ultimate conclusion to those willing to not ignore them because of pre-existing conceptions indicates a problem with the pre-existing conceptions rather than the theories that explain the results and measurements.
The assumption is that the theory has no empirical evidence for it other than reproducing the Standard Model at low energies. The tuning problem amounts to empirical evidence against the theory.
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quote:
Defenders of theistic explanations assert that it might be the case that there is a god who made the universe and tuned its parameters so that we could exist. It might. Similarly, defenders of anthropic multiverse scenarios assert that it might just be the case that our universe is one of a vast collection of worlds with random laws and parameters. This also might be true. But science is not about what might be true, it is about what can convincingly be argued for by rational argument from public evidence. If we weaken this standard to admit the anthropic multiverse, we open the door to equally unscientific theistic explanations. The proponents of each can (and do) argue with each other, but they will never convince each other, for they have given up the method and criteria that are necessary to make a convincing case for a claim in science. Meanwhile, the fine-tuning observation is a challenge that requires a scientific explanation.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/blogs/physics/2012/12/scientific-approaches-to-the-fine-tuning-problem/
Originally posted by no1marauderClassic. You wrote the following which is laughably flawed:
Lottery Argument blah blah blah.
Discussed for about 20 pages. Nothing needed to add. You and TW's "holding your breath until you turn blue" claims don't add up to anything new.
In the case we are discussing there are only two possibilities:
A) The universe was designed;
B) The universe was a result of random forces.
Either one has to be more probable than the other or they can be equally probable. In point of fact given the evidence submitted, A is enormously more probable unless one can submit evidence that there were more "throws". No such evidence has been submitted so essentially what TW is insisting is that we should believe something highly improbable as compared to something highly probable (at least based on the information we have).
The Yahtzee parody on page 21 clearly demonstrates the absurdity of the above.
Given your behavior on this thread, it comes as no surprise that YOU REFUSE TO ACTUALLY ADDRESS IT. Evidently it's what you do when you have no answer. In a way I understand, because the above must be really embarrassing for you.
But all things considered: You're like a little kid.
Originally posted by no1marauderWere not at the stage where you're scientifically justified in adding another assumption to explain the improbability. The tunable parameters in the Standard model are particle masses and so forth. These may be related to each other in the Theory of Everything which would decrease the size of the parameter space. There are three possibilities for the future, String theory, or some other theory, may predict life with a high enough probability that the outcome we have is not wildly atypical and further explanation isn't required. The second possibility is that String Theory (or a rival theory) requires ultra-fine tuning but positive empirical evidence means it displaces the Standard Model and General Relativity as the paradigm. Possibility three is that String Theory is experimentally invalidated. To assert an extra property (God, a multiverse, blind luck,...) to make the universe work you first need to show it is necessary. This can either be done by showing that all theories of everything have fine tuning problems or by finding empirical verification for one of the theories of everything which has a fine tuning problem. Since the various ideas for fixing the fine tuning problem if it exists are neither confirmable or falsifiable there's no justification for regarding them as true or false or having any particular priority relative to each other. Unfalsifiable explanations can't be invalidated so all else being equal a falsifiable explanation should be given priority as if it's wrong it can be falsified. This means that "there's a problem with the theory" is the top candidate as it requires fewest assumptions and it is the only one that can be falsified. The other possibilities aren't ruled out, but the explanation that it's an artifact of our state of knowledge is something that can't be ignored. The other possibilities can't really be distinguished in any empiric way, it's a matter of philosophical preference.
I do not think that a physical theory should assume that a designed universe is an impossibility and thus do not believe the "tuning problem" is evidence against any type of theory. The "tuning problem" arises from calculations that really have nothing to do with the issue of fine tuning as I understand them, but is instead the result of measurements and ...[text shortened]... the pre-existing conceptions rather than the theories that explain the results and measurements.
Originally posted by DeepThoughtOK, stop right there. Who are 'we' and how do you define 'we'? Does it include me? Exactly as I am, with every atom where it is? Does it include my memory of the fact that no1marauder won't tell us the probability of throwing a given combination with 5 rolls of a die? If not, why not?
P is the subspace of the parameters which gives us a universe we can exist in.
Originally posted by ThinkOfOneThe Yahtzee argument is just a restatement of the Lottery Fallacy Fallacy which has been discussed to the point of exhaustion. Please just review my numerous posts showing why the Lottery Fallacy Fallacy is just that. Coming up with different analogies that simply repeat the same fallacious arguments doesn't make them less fallacious.
Classic. You wrote the following which is laughably flawed:
[b]In the case we are discussing there are only two possibilities:
A) The universe was designed;
B) The universe was a result of random forces.
Either one has to be more probable than the other or they can be equally probable. In point of fact given the evidence submitted, A is enorm ...[text shortened]... ve must be really embarrassing for you.
But all things considered: You're like a little kid.
Originally posted by twhiteheadNo, P is a universe which is life habitable.
OK, stop right there. Who are 'we' and how do you define 'we'? Does it include me? Exactly as I am, with every atom where it is? Does it include my memory of the fact that no1marauder won't tell us the probability of throwing a given combination with 5 rolls of a die? If not, why not?
From Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind:
Let us try to understand just how much of a constraint a condition such as WEYL
= 0 at the big bang was. For simplicity (as with the above discussion) we shall
suppose that the universe is closed. In order to be able to work out some clear-cut
figures, we shall assume, furthermore, that the number B of baryons-that is, the
number of protons and neutrons, taken together-in the universe is roughly given by
B = 10^80.
(There is no particular reason for this figure, apart from the fact that,
observationally B must be at least as large as this; Eddington once claimed to have
calculated B exactly, obtaining a figure which was close to the above value!
No-one seems to believe this particular calculation any more, but the value 10^80
appears to have stuck.) If B were taken to be larger than this (and perhaps, in actual
fact, B = infinity) then the figures that we would obtain would be even more
striking than the extraordinary figures that we shall be arriving at in a minute!
Try to imagine the phase space (cf. p. 177) of the entire universe! Each point in
this phase space represents a different possible way that the universe might have
started off. We are to picture the Creator, armed with a `pin' which is to be placed
at some point in the phase space (Fig. 7.19 not shown). Each different positioning of
the pin provides a different universe. Now the accuracy that is needed for the Creator's
aim depends upon the entropy of the universe that is thereby created. It would be
relatively `easy' to produce a high entropy universe, since then there would be a
large volume of the phase space available for the pin to hit. (Recall that the entropy
is proportional to the logarithm of the volume of the phase space concerned.) But
in order to start off the universe in state of low entropy-so that there will indeed be
a second law of thermodynamics-the Creator must aim for a much tinier volume of
the phase space. How tiny would this region be, in order that a universe closely
resembling the one in which we actually live would be the result?
http://www.ws5.com/Penrose/
Using estimates of the total number of baryons in the universe, the Bekenstein-Hawking formula for the amount of entropy per baryon and some reasonable assumptions regarding the number of stars and black holes he calculates:
This now tells us how precise the Creator's aim must have been: namely to an
accuracy of one part in 10^10^123.
This is an extraordinary figure. One could not possibly even write the number
down in full, in the ordinary denary notation: it would be `1' followed by 10^123
successive `0 's! Even if we were to write a `0' on each separate proton and on each
separate neutron in the entire universe-and we could throw in all the other particles
as well for good measure-we should fall far short of writing down the figure
needed.
In an earlier post I erroneously referred to Penrose as one of the discoverers of the background radiation from the Big Bang; this was in error that was Penzias. I apologize for the error. Roger Penrose, the author of the link provided, biography showing his scientific bonafides is here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Penrose