The "Horrific God" Charge

Originally posted by AThousandYoung
People are not property.

Originally posted by JS357
This may be a case of mistaken identity.

http://www.shsu.edu/~eng_wpf/authors/Twain/Mysterious-Stranger.htm
...
"He went on chatting as simply and unaffectedly as ever; and while he talked he made a crowd of little men and women the size of your finger, and they went diligently to work and cleared and leveled off a space a couple of yards square in the gr ...[text shortened]... , and of feeling the ecstasy that thrilled along our veins from the touch of his hand."

Originally posted by rwingett
God committed genocide in the great flood. Therefore, if god exists, he is horrific.

Originally posted by jaywill
This thread I have opened for a continuation of the discussion between jaywill and bbarr on his charge of God being horrific.

It started on a thread called "The Bible Accepts Homosexuality".

Before I begin my defense of premise (2), I'd like everybody to think carefully about what (2) claims. All (2) is claiming that there has occurred, at least once, an instance of suffering that was not logically necessary for the greater good.

Recall that by 'greater good' here, I'm not adopting any particular ethical theory. I am presuming that moral nihilism (metaphysical moral skepticism) is false, but other than that, the theists to whom the argument is directed are free to construe 'greater good' in accord with their Divine Command (DC) theories, Natural Law theories (these are the most common theistic ethical theories), or any other ethical theory they may happen to endorse. So, if a theist is a DC theorist, for instance, then he may take the term 'good' to refer to the manifestation of compassion, generosity, etc., or in people's being saved, or in the doing of God's will, or whatever. Minimally, the DC theorist is committed to the claim that X is good if and only if God wills that X, but there will be room for disagreement amongst DC theorists as to the content of God's will (e.g., conservative interpreters of the bible may disagree with liberal interpretations of the bible). Nothing in my original argument, nor in my defense of (2) will presuppose a position on such “in-house' disputes.

Traditionally, theists rarely will want to reject premise (5) that God, in virtue of being morally perfect, would want to prevent any suffering logically unnecessary for the greater good. So, I presume henceforth that theists are, by and large, committed to the following principle:

BUS (Badness of unnecessary suffering): God takes it to be morally preferable that creatures do not unnecessarily suffer, and acts accordingly.

If any theists are tempted to demur, and reject BUS (and, hence, premise (5)), I would ask them to think about that to which they will thereby be committed. If BUS is rejected, then the theist will be committed to the following claim:

COG (Callousness of God): Given two possible states of affairs, A and B, if A involves more suffering than B, and A and B are equivalent in regards to the goodness they instantiate and/or bring about, God does not take the extra suffering involved in A to weigh in favor of B.

I take it that most theists will think COG runs contrary to God's general beneficence, so I will not pursue this much further. In any case, the endorsement of COG entails that if God exists, he is both morally perfect (by definition) and unmoved by unnecessary suffering.

But it is overwhelmingly plausible (if not strictly analytic) that if it is in one's power to effortlessly prevent suffering that is absolutely unnecessary, then one has a moral obligation to prevent such suffering. To fail to do so would be callous by definition, and callousness is ordinarily understood to be incompatible with moral perfection. We ordinary think that if one is callous one is thereby morally defective. Hence, the theist who rejects COG will have to maintain that God is morally perfect in a sense of 'moral' wholly dissimilar to any ordinary sense of 'moral', and this leads one to wonder just what the theist who rejects COG means by the claim that God is morally perfect. Of course, the theist may respond that since the content of morality is determined by what God wills, God cannot fail to be morally perfect.

But this claim would mean nothing more than that God wills what he wills, which is tautologous and thereby empty. On such a view, it would be consistent with God's being morally perfect that he fail to abide by his covenants, or engage in indiscriminant torture, or… Such entailments, however, are so antithetical to any plausible sense of 'moral' that to accept them is to be, in a very real way, speaking a different language. Such a view is certainly inconsistent with the general theistic view of God being as a loving father (for what father would fail to prevent suffering unnecessary for the well-being of his children?). Further, such a view would preclude the theist being able to offer to non-believers reasons to believe based upon God's moral perfection (for what non-believer will be swayed by the claim that God is morally perfect albeit unconcerned about unnecessary suffering, unbound by obligations of fidelity, etc.).

Note: Readers familiar with Euthyphro's dilemma will recognize in the foregoing paragraph a form of the argument against the view that God's willing that X is explanatorily prior to the moral rightness of X (or, in common parlance, that God imbues or bestows upon certain acts their moral status).

I will intersperse comments among the steps of the following argument in favor of (2). The comments are meant for purposes of clarification and illustration. The steps of the argument follow from previous steps; they do not depend on the contents of the comments.

So, here we go:

a) Suppose (2) is false.
b) If so, then every instance of suffering is logically necessary for the greater good.
c) Hence, had any instance of suffering not occurred, the world would have thereby been less good than it could have been.

As before, 'less good' here just means 'less morally preferable'. So, a world that is less good would be less morally preferable to God. Since God is morally perfect by definition, it follows that God would prefer a world that is maximally morally preferable and act accordingly. Hence, the actual world is maximally morally preferable; it is the world that is the most good. In short, the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. Astute and bookish readers will recognize that this is the position endorsed by Leibniz and famously lampooned by Voltaire in “Candide” and Mark Twain in “Letters from Earth”.

At this point we should distinguish between suffering brought about by the intentional acts of agents and those brought about by natural forces. The former I will refer to as 'moral evil' and the latter as 'natural evil'. These are the terms commonly used in presentations of the problem of evil, and are used here to facilitate the research of interested parties. As before, the use of these terms is intended to be neutral between non-skeptical ethical theories.

d) Hence, had any instance of moral evil (e.g., murder, rape, theft, deception, etc.) not occurred, the world would thereby have been worse.
e) Further, had any instance of natural evil (e.g., disease, natural disaster, etc.) not occurred, the world would thereby have been worse.

Now, in many cases of moral evil and natural evil there are numerous victims. During Stalin's reign, for instance, some twenty million people were murdered (and that is a conservative estimate). During the 1918 influenza epidemic, some eighteen million people died. I encourage the reader to research the manner in which people were murdered under Stalin, and the manner in which people died during the influenza epidemic, in order to get a sense of the amount of suffering involved.

f) Hence, had any single person who suffered under Stalin's regime (or during the Holocaust, or Rwanda, or currently in Sudan, or any war in history) not suffered, the world would have been worse.
g) Hence, had even one fewer infant had its brains dashed against walls by Nazis; had even one fewer infant been tossed in the air and caught on the point of a bayonet by Cossacks; had even one fewer person been hacked apart by machetes in Rwanda; had even one fewer adolescent girl been raped by paramilitary squads in Darfur, the world would thereby have been worse.
h) Further, had any single person who suffered as a result of the 1918 influenza epidemic (or smallpox, or AIDS, or the recent tsunami or any other natural disaster in history) not suffered, the world would have been worse.
i) Hence, had one fewer child been orphaned by influenza; had one fewer infant been born with AIDS; had one fewer person been battered and broken by the recent tsunami; had one fewer person been buried alive by the earthquakes in Turkey and Iran, the world would have thereby been worse.

I hope this is sufficient to get across the magnitude of the suffering the theist is committed to claiming is logically necessary for the greater good. It is not enough to say, for instance, that the brutality of Stalin's regime, or Hitler's, was logically necessary for some good to obtain. Each instance of suffering under those regimes would have to be individually logically necessary for some greater good to obtain. In short, it is insufficient for the theist to attempt to explain away the suffering in, say, the Holocaust, by claiming that the Holocaust was instrumental in awakening the world to anti-Semitism, or the horrors of genocide, or whatever. Such a claim could only be maintained if there are good reasons to believe that had even one fewer person fell victim to the Nazis then whatever greater good the Holocaust engendered would have been, of logical necessity, precluded.

It is good to keep in mind just what is meant by 'logically necessary' herein. To say that A is logically necessary for B is to claim that had A not been the case, it would have logically impossible for B to be the case. That is, to claim that A is logically necessary for B is to be committed to the claim that a logical contradiction follows from the conjunction of the claims “It is not the case that A” and “It is the case that B”.

To say that A is logically necessary for B is not to claim that A is merely causally responsible for bringing about B. This is important, so I will say it again: logical necessity is not the same as causal efficacy.

Here's an example:

Suppose I fall victim to a ravaging disease in virtue of which I suffer physical pain that is both constant and excruciating. Suppose that this pain is causes me to seek comfort in scripture, and I am thereby led to sincerely embrace Jesus Christ as both God and Savior. Now, this situation is one wherein the suffering I experience causes something that all Christian theists will agree is a very good thing. It does not follow from this example that the suffering I experienced was logically necessary for bringing about my conversion. It would only follow that the suffering was logically necessary if it was logically impossible that my conversion be brought about by anything other than this suffering. In other words, in order for this suffering to be logically necessary for my conversion, it has to also be the case that I could not possibly have been converted by experiencing slightly less suffering, or by honest reflection on the available evidence, or by having God himself appear to me and tell me about the sacrifice of his only begotten Son, or…

Now, the theist who rejects premise (2) cannot merely claim that each instance of suffering is causally efficacious in bringing about some good or other. For instance, they cannot merely claim that some instance of suffering, as a matter of fact, brought about some good. They are committed to the much stronger claim that the good brought about by the instance of suffering in question could not have possibly been brought about in any way that involved even slightly less suffering without there being some tradeoff in goods such that the world would be thereby less good, and hence less morally preferable to God. Think carefully about this stronger claim. It entails that given some instance of suffering, the good brought about thereby could not possibly have been brought about, even by the direct intercession of an entity (God) that is both omnipotent and omniscient, without the world thereby being worse. In short, the theist is committed to the claim that every instance of suffering is such that God finds it morally preferable that that suffering occur.

This claim faces two serious objections:

CFW (Conflict with free will): Suppose S tortures, rapes and murders his neighbor. Many theists will claim that since S has free will, he could have chosen to do otherwise. But if the theist rejects premise (2), then it follows that S's torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor was logically necessary for the greater good. Hence, it follows that God finds it morally preferable that S torture, rape and murder his neighbor (else God would have prevented it because he is morally perfect). Hence, God would prevent it from being the case that S not torture, rape and murder his neighbor. Hence, it is logically impossible that S could choose to refrain from torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor. Hence, S cannot choose to refrain from torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor. Hence, S's torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor is the only logically possible option available to S. Hence, in regards to his torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor, S's will is not free.

NOTE: CFW presumes that the sort of freedom of the will that the majority of theists endorse is of the libertarian sort. Those who endorse a compatibilist view of free will are not faced with this consequence of rejecting premise (2). Of course, endorsing a compatibilist version of free will has its own costs (e.g., being committed to the claim that one can be morally responsible for acts that one could not have done otherwise than).

NPG (No Plausible Goods): There are no plausible goods logically necessitated by the diversity and severity of suffering evident in the actual world. Consider the three basic sorts of goods commonly presented by theists to explain the presence of suffering in the world:

I) Freedom of the Will
II) Virtue or Moral Uprightness
III) Salvation

Let's take these by turn:

Free will is often cited by theists in their explanations of evil. Free will, it is claimed, is itself a substantial good and logically necessary for the presence of other goods (e.g., love, kindness, etc. which are plausibly of more value if chosen freely). But along with having free will comes the capacity to choose between being virtuous and being vicious. So, the moral evil in the world is explained by humans' being free, and the goodness of free will and that which it allows is sufficient to justify the moral evil in the world, that is, to explain why God finds it morally preferable that there be free will even though this brings about things like murder, rape, theft, deception, and so on. It is often claimed that if God were to prevent these sorts of moral evil, then humans would not have free wills.

But this is surely mistaken. First, there is no reason to think that we have free will if God exists and premise (2) is false (see CFW, above). Second, it is not contradictory to suppose that God could have created human beings with slightly more benevolent characters, and thereby be less predisposed towards violence. After all, my sister has a substantially more benevolent character than I, but nobody would suggest that this entails that her will is not free. Third, preventing someone from harming another is not a violation of their free will, but merely the prevention of the successful pursuit of that which they will. For instance, if I come across an attempted rape in progress, and I stop the aggressor, I am not thereby preventing him from willing that he rape, nor am I preventing him from attempting to act in accord with his will. I am merely preventing him from being successful in his pursuit, but this is consistent with his will being free. Being prevented from X-ing by the actions of another agent is equivalent to being prevented from X-ing by virtue of natural laws, as far as the will of the actor is concerned. The actor may freely will that he X (say, that he rape, or levitate), and then fail despite his free choice. But if I can prevent a rapist from being successful at raping without thereby violating the freedom of his will, then God can do the same. Hence, God could have intervened in at least one case of moral evil without violating the freedom of our wills. Hence, explanations of evil the rely on the freedom of the will fail.

Note: As if this weren't bad enough, most Christian theists are committed to the claim that God has intervened to prevent instances of moral evil, as even a cursory examination of the bible will make clear.

Theists also often claim that the suffering brought about by moral and natural evil is necessary in order for there to be occasions for virtues such as compassion, generosity, and so on (so-called “second-order goods&rdquo😉. However, such an explanation for evil can only be partial, as these second-order goods will not be able to explain the presence in the world of the variety of second-order evils (e.g., callousness, cruelty, miserliness, jealousy, etc.). Perhaps the theist could posit some third-order good (perhaps being saved, or being fit for the bestowal of grace) to explain these second-order evils. But, of course, there will be third-order evils as well (being damned, unfit for grace), and it is doubtful that the theist will find any higher-order good without an evil analogue. Since no infinite regress of symmetrical higher-order goods and evils will suffice to explain and justify those evils, this response to the problem of evil fails. Further, even if this objection could be overcome, it still is radically implausible that these second-order goods could justify instances of moral or natural evil where the victims are unknown and undiscovered. For instance, there were victims of the recent tsunami (not to mention the historical Chinese flood which killed roughly three million people) that will never be known because either they were not known well enough at the time to be remembered by survivors, or because those who would have remembered them were also victims. Such victims cannot serve as the objects of virtuous states like compassion, of generosity, or even sympathy in any real sense (although we may experience sympathy for 'all the victims', but we would experience this anyway had one unknown victim not been killled, correct?). Hence, their suffering and death cannot be justified by virtue of these second-order goods. The theist may respond that such victims may themselves have an opportunity to manifest some second-order good by virtue of their own suffering, but this overlooks three obvious objections. First, some suffering is of such intensity that victims are completely consumed by it. Second, infants and young children will not, in general, have the emotional or even the conceptual resources necessary for manifesting these second order goods. Third, the suffering of animals (via forest fire, for example) often both leaves no trace (the bodies are consumed or hidden), thus providing no opportunity for anybody to manifest a second-order good, and brings about no manifestation of second-order goods among the victims themselves ('cause they lack the intellectual hardware).

Finally, theists often claim that the suffering experienced in the world is more than made up for by the joy experienced during the afterlife. First, such a response seems to misconstrue the argument, as the problem facing the theist is not to show that suffering gets made up for by future joy, but to show that suffering is logically necessary to bring about the greater good. After all, if God gets to decide who goes to heaven, then it will be logically possible that God could decide, for any person at all, that that person goes to heaven. But if this is logically possible, then whatever suffering they endured was not logically necessary for their salvation, because regardless of what suffering they had endured, God could choose to save them. Second, unless animals also go to heaven, such a response will be unable to deal with the prevalence of animal suffering. Further, this response would only apply to those who, as a matter of fact, get saved, but presumably the suffering of those who will not be saved is also of concern to God ('cause he loves us all). Hence, this response fails.

So, the three major sorts of good theists commonly employ in their explanations of moral and natural evil all fail. But then what candidate goods are left? Without an account of these justificatory goods, the theist's explanation for moral and natural evil amounts to nothing more than “something(s) or other is(are) such that it(they) is(are) both good and logically necessitated by moral and natural evil”. But, of course, this is not an explanation, but a mere promissory note.

In summary, rejection of premise (2) commits the theist to the claim that this is the best of all possible worlds, and that every instance of suffering, no matter how horrendous, is logically necessary (not just causally responsible) for the greater good. But this entails that libertarian freedom of the will is impossible. Further, when pressed concerning just what the greater good is that is necessitated by all the moral and natural evil in the world, the theist's three most plausible answers fail.

Bennett

Originally posted by RJHinds
I don't understand your question. Maybe it would help if you rephrased
it with words defining what you mean.

Originally posted by KellyJay
What creator doesn't do with what they make whatever they want? What
creator doesn't set standards on what they make as good or bad?
Kelly

Originally posted by rwingett
God committed genocide in the great flood. Therefore, if god exists, he is horrific.

God committed genocide in the great flood. Therefore, if god exists, he is horrific.

Originally posted by bbarr
So, the three major sorts of good theists commonly employ in their explanations of moral and natural evil all fail. But then what candidate goods are left? Without an account of these justificatory goods, the theist's explanation for moral and natural evil amounts to nothing more than “something(s) or other is(are) such that it(they) is(are) both good and logi ...[text shortened]... and natural evil in the world, the theist's three most plausible answers fail.

Bennett[/b]

Originally posted by RJHinds
I have no problem with what Satan does with his own property. If he made
it he has the right to destroy it. Satan does not have the right to destroy
God's property unless it is approved by God.

Originally posted by RJHinds
If a potter fashions some type of pottery from clay and he does not like
how it is turning out, doesn't he have the right to squash it and start
all over until he makes something that he likes?

Originally posted by RJHinds
Everything in the universe is the property of God because He made it.
Satan however did not make anything, but yet he is trying to steal it
all away from God.