01 Nov 09
4 edits
Originally posted by epiphinehasYes, Plantinga is alluding to the possibility that God, even being omnipotent, could not create a free creature who is also incapable of choosing a certain behavior (in this case, evil). In the same way God, even being omnipotent, could not create a square that is also a circle.
[b]Hmmmm, basically you have an "omnipotent" God that is not powerful enough to create a world with "free creatures who never choose evil". Seems like such a God isn't fully omnipotent.
Again, I will note your use of "seems". Yes, Plantinga is alluding to the possibility that God, even being omnipotent, could not create a free creature who tures have both free will and the capacity of not sinning.[/b]
Yikes, you should really read Plantinga's actual argument itself, instead of relying on the "truncated form" of Meister. The problem is that Meister's "truncated form" of P's argument doesn't actually preserve any of the real substance of P's argument. It more or less just restates a conclusion that P works up to. If you had actually read P's argument, you would know that P's saying that it is possible that God could not have created a world containing moral good but no moral evil is not at all like P's saying that God could not create a square circle. This really exposes your ignorance over P's argument and the fact that, for example, his argument starts with arguing that there are POSSIBLE worlds that God, even being omnipotent, cannot create (when he addresses Leibniz's lapse). In clear contrast to this, God could not create a square circle because it is simply a logically impossible entity. The two are really nothing like each other. Geez, at least do your homework and read P's actual argument before you endorse it.
Here's some things you should know about P's actual argument. He starts with disposing of Leibniz's lapse and argues that there are possible worlds that God, even being omnipotent, could not create. You should also know here that his entire defense presumes some libertarian, incompatibilist, notion of freedom. (For someone like me who is compatibilist and thinks P's notion of freedom is utterly incoherent, his argument is just a non-starter.) After that, P introduces a notion called 'transworld depravity' which relies on talk of possible worlds and individual essences. Further, P argues for the possibility of universalized transworld depravity. If you want to get into the specifics, I think P's argument doesn't succeed. Have you read Mackie's objections to P's argument? Have you read the objections toward P's argument that deal with epistemic amendments and a symmetric notion of 'transworld sanctity'?
And by the way, in the opening post, you didn't even bother to state what Meister takes the "logical problem of evil" to be. As I understand it, the basic logical problem of evil would contend that a logical contradiction follows from the conjunction of the propositions that God exists (where 'God' refers to some omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being) and that evil exists. That sounds like an insanely strong thing to want to show, and yes the argument fails. Why would one need P's argument to see the logical problem of evil fails? Doesn't the logical problem of evil fail to persuade just in virtue of consideration that it sure seems broadly possible (surely logically possible) that, for instance, certain evil(s) are necessary for greater or higher-order good(s)? I see no reason not to concede that mere possibility. I think in his "defense", P tried to put a face on this general consideration, and I think he failed; and I also think his entire defense is predicated on a totally incoherent view of what freedom is. However, supposing we were to accept his view of freedom, I think P's argument could be reworked to succeed (and, further, in their 'transworld sanctity' paper, Howard-Snyder and O'Leary-Hawthorne present a reworked "bare Plantinga-style epistemic defense" that I think shows that the basic intuition -- that it is broadly possible that God has a justifying reason to permit evil that we are not in position to understand -- is correct; and they actually do it in a way that doesn't commit one to a particular view of free will). So, I would grant you that the logical problem of evil fails (but that's irrespective of P's defense as P himself formulated it).
Try to understand this too: that the logical problem of evil fails is cold comfort and should be about the least of your concerns with the problem of evil. All this failure basically grants you is the mere logical consistency of your view. Of course, some of the most insanely ridiculous or evidentially challenged views that you could ever think up also enjoy mere logical consistency (in that they don't entail a formal contradiction). You'll have much tougher times with well presented evidential formulations of the problem of evil. These won't contend that you are committed to a logical contradiction; but rather basically that you are committed to some very mysterious doctrine of the good that even you don't understand. For instance, if we say that there are any number of reasons evident to us why one should alleviate human suffering if one had the power and knowledge and opportunity to do so; you can always say that, well you know, it's broadly possible that there are reasons beyond our attention (but within the attention of some omniscient being) that would justify allowing the suffering to play out. I think that's a reasonable defense to the logical problem of evil, but not a very good defense to the evidential problem of evil (even though it seems to be about the best defense available, along with "I don't know" why God would allow such things). Which is to say, I think you have no good defense against the evidential formulation.
02 Nov 09
1 edit
Originally posted by Lord SharkYes, but not necessarily in public.
Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]If it were possible for a being other than God to possess all of God's attributes, then, yes, it would be possible for God to create human beings incapable of doing evil.
Why does it need to be all of god's attributes? Why is it not possible for god just to create other gods to solve the loneliness problem? the future,[/b]
Please spare me recycled Plantinga without citation and you've got a deal.[/b]
I wouldn't call the faceless and nameless anonymity of these forums "public". 🙂
Please spare me recycled Plantinga without citation and you've got a deal.
It's a mystery to me why it bothers you so much that I (attempt to) defend Plantinga's arguments, with or without citation. Many atheists here offer arguments straight from the mouths of famous scientists and philosophers and I couldn't care less where they originated. I guess I see this forum as a more informal social network than you do. To each their own.
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02 Nov 09
Originally posted by epiphinehasI wouldn't call the faceless and nameless anonymity of these forums "public". 🙂
[b]Yes, but not necessarily in public.
I wouldn't call the faceless and nameless anonymity of these forums "public". 🙂
Please spare me recycled Plantinga without citation and you've got a deal.
It's a mystery to me why it bothers you so much that I (attempt to) defend Plantinga's arguments, with or without citation. Many atheists he ...[text shortened]... guess I see this forum as a more informal social network than you do. To each their own.[/b]
Fair point, but nor is it exactly private.
It's a mystery to me why it bothers you so much that I (attempt to) defend Plantinga's arguments, with or without citation. Many atheists here offer arguments straight from the mouths of famous scientists and philosophers and I couldn't care less where they originated. I guess I see this forum as a more informal social network than you do. To each their own.
It doesn't bother me that much, otherwise i wouldn't have offered a deal 🙂
As it is, being an informal social network but with nameless anonymity, why do disparaging remarks bother you so much? After all, it's nothing personal 🙂
Anyway, goodnight, I wish you well.
02 Nov 09
1 edit
Originally posted by Lord SharkFair point, but nor is it exactly private.
I wouldn't call the faceless and nameless anonymity of these forums "public". 🙂
Fair point, but nor is it exactly private.
It's a mystery to me why it bothers you so much that I (attempt to) defend Plantinga's arguments, with or without citation. Many atheists here offer arguments straight from the mouths of famous scientists and philosoph you so much? After all, it's nothing personal 🙂
Anyway, goodnight, I wish you well.
Neither is a college philosophy class.
As it is, being an informal social network but with nameless anonymity, why do disparaging remarks bother you so much? After all, it's nothing personal
Too true.
Anyway, goodnight, I wish you well.
Likewise.
02 Nov 09
3 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloThe two are really nothing like each other. Geez, at least do your homework and read P's actual argument before you endorse it.
[b]Yes, Plantinga is alluding to the possibility that God, even being omnipotent, could not create a free creature who is also incapable of choosing a certain behavior (in this case, evil). In the same way God, even being omnipotent, could not create a square that is also a circle.
Yikes, you should really read Plantinga's actual argument i fense against the evidential formulation.[/b]
Geez, I'm not allowed to wing it? 🙂
So, I would grant you that the logical problem of evil fails (but that's irrespective of P's defense as P himself formulated it).
Understood.
Which is to say, I think you have no good defense against the evidential formulation.
I don't have a good defense, or Plantinga doesn't have a good defense? Warranted Christian Belief, pp. 465-481, addresses the evidential formulation quite successfully as far as I can tell. Perhaps you disagree?
02 Nov 09
After reading through most of this thread, I begin to understand Sextus Empiricus’ recommendation for acquiring ataraxia. 😉
It is not logically impossible that one less brutal torture/rape, or one less neonate suffering horribly and then dying from some congenital ailment—or one less such event in all of history—would undermine some mysterious and undefined “greater good”… Agreed… And this can become a sufficient apology for “faith” in response to the PoE??!!
The “Job Defense” degenerates to the “Pangloss Defense”? (Well, maybe it really always did.)
Don’t get me wrong: Plantinga is an intellect to be reckoned with (so have people such as Tillich and Nyssa and… ). But that it takes such an intellect to brew such small beer…
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ASIDE: While I recognize the distinction between PoE and PoS, I just want to point out that such a distinction is necessitated only by modern changes in the meaning of English words. In the 17th century, for example (when the KJV was written), the word “evil” was not exclusively—or even primarily—a moral term: an “evil” meal was just a “bad” meal. Having your child burnt up in a fire caused by lightning was just as evil as having your child burnt up in a fire caused by an arsonist.
02 Nov 09
1 edit
Originally posted by epiphinehasI don't have a good defense, or Plantinga doesn't have a good defense? Warranted Christian Belief, pp. 465-481, addresses the evidential formulation quite successfully as far as I can tell. Perhaps you disagree?
The two are really nothing like each other. Geez, at least do your homework and read P's actual argument before you endorse it.
Geez, I'm not allowed to wing it? 🙂
So, I would grant you that the logical problem of evil fails (but that's irrespective of P's defense as P himself formulated it).
Understood.
Which is to say, I the evidential formulation quite successfully as far as I can tell. Perhaps you disagree?
I was thinking more of you in particular, since we have already had discussions on these boards over the evidential problem of evil. But, yes I would disagree that Plantinga has presented a good defense either. I don't have on hand the exact passages you cite (though I am familiar with that text and could get hold of another copy if you want to discuss it in particular); but, for instance, I have on hand Plantinga's defense against Paul Draper's formulation of the evidential problem. Draper's argument and Plantinga's counter would make for a very good discussion (maybe in another thread, if you want to leave this one devoted to the logical problem of evil; also there you could discuss why you find P's arguments you have on hand against the evidential problem so successful, and we could discuss the pages you cite in particular). As a heads up though, I know I won't have time for such a discussion this week upcoming.
Maybe the following week if you're up for it.
At any rate, I think Plantinga is a very good philosopher -- and definitely worth our study.
02 Nov 09
Originally posted by vistesdI am not convinced that when dealing with an OOO God, the lightening is any less evil even by todays usage ie it is a result of a moral choice of some entity - ultimately God. The only way out is a reduction on the O's or a 'greater good' argument that leads to the 'best of all possible worlds' claim.
Having your child burnt up in a fire caused by lightning was just as evil as having your child burnt up in a fire caused by an arsonist.
Notice that earlier in the thread Kelly started out with the 'random lightening' idea then essentially retracted it and blamed it on 'our sins'. He said:
God cursed the planet due to our sins, it was done with cause.
02 Nov 09
Originally posted by vistesdBut that it takes such an intellect to brew such small beer…
After reading through most of this thread, I begin to understand Sextus Empiricus’ recommendation for acquiring ataraxia. 😉
It is not logically impossible that one less brutal torture/rape, or one less neonate suffering horribly and then dying from some congenital ailment—or one less such event in all of history—would undermine some mysterious an ...[text shortened]... sed by lightning was just as evil as having your child burnt up in a fire caused by an arsonist.
It seems like most of Plantinga's effort goes into undoing defeaters for Christian belief.
02 Nov 09
Originally posted by LemonJelloAs a heads up though, I know I won't have time for such a discussion this week upcoming. Maybe the following week if you're up for it.
[b]I don't have a good defense, or Plantinga doesn't have a good defense? Warranted Christian Belief, pp. 465-481, addresses the evidential formulation quite successfully as far as I can tell. Perhaps you disagree?
I was thinking more of you in particular, since we have already had discussions on these boards over the evidential problem of ...[text shortened]... rate, I think Plantinga is a very good philosopher -- and definitely worth our study.[/b]
Let's do it. The week after next it is.
04 Nov 09
Originally posted by twhiteheadYou seem to under the impression it is all about me just thinking about what I do
I am just not clear what you mean by 'on faith'. Do you mean you made an arbitrary decision to believe something, do you mean you believe it because it suits you, or do you mean you believe the evidence warrants the belief even though it is not conclusive proof?
I just cant understand your attitude. If your faith is based on evidence and reasoning then w ...[text shortened]... t is not, do you realize that your belief is arbitrary? Why would you accept that of yourself?
and do not accept as truth. As I have pointed out to you before Christianity isn't
about us, it is about God, it isn't what we settle on and do, it is what God has
done and is doing. If God can make Himself known to us, and that is the only way
He can be found, under His conditions, do you think I can with argument show you
God?
Kelly
04 Nov 09
Originally posted by KellyJayI think you should be able to explain in what ways God has made Himself known to you - or at a minimum state that God has made himself known to you. Instead you stated that it was all 'on faith'. That is what I was querying.
If God can make Himself known to us, and that is the only way
He can be found, under His conditions, do you think I can with argument show you
God?
Kelly
Are you now saying that you are unable to explain how God has made Himself known to you, or are you saying that any such explanation will be necessarily unconvincing?
04 Nov 09
Originally posted by twhiteheadI call it faith because I cannot prove it, and yet that is all you ask me for. There
I think you should be able to explain in what ways God has made Himself known to you - or at a minimum state that God has made himself known to you. Instead you stated that it was all 'on faith'. That is what I was querying.
Are you now saying that you are unable to explain how God has made Himself known to you, or are you saying that any such explanation will be necessarily unconvincing?
are things in your life you believe are true but you cannot prove. I've pointed out
to you and others before that sometimes you have to experience something to
grasp its meaning, like the color red, you may be able to get readings from a
machine to gather information about red, but unless you have eyes to see that
is all you will ever get just some read out. The thing that separates Christianity
from all other beliefs in my opinion isn't what we do or say, it is what God has
done and is doing. If you get a right relationship with God in Christ that is not
a group of facts you agree too, it is something that happens to you.
Kelly
05 Nov 09
Originally posted by epiphinehasNo doubt, but it still seems pretty small beer in light of what Christians have to be committed to in order to maintain the 3-O god in light of the PoE/PoS.
[b]But that it takes such an intellect to brew such small beer…
It seems like most of Plantinga's effort goes into undoing defeaters for Christian belief.[/b]