12 Sep 06
Originally posted by lucifershammerI personally have a very big problem with the whole 'map-territory' discussion. The problem is somewhat difficult to describe, but I can put it into simple terms with your ethics analogy. If you say that relativism and objectivism together cover the whole space of possibility, you are making a big assumption: you are assuming moral cognitivism. You are essentially delineating differing characterizations of moral truth, which assumes that moral claims are truth-apt to begin with. My point is that the moral noncognitivist will have a problem with your discussion. In much the same way, I have a big problem with this discussion. A main premise of cartography relies on a metaphysics of facts that can be imparted about the 'territory'. This discussion would seem to assume that there are such facts, but I think that assumption is a bad one. I don't think I'll have much to add to the discussion.
[b]Basic 'Cartographic' Positions
Given the description of map and territory above, there are two basic positions one can assume about them:
1. Relativism: Each person has a fundamentally different territory from every other person's; each person has a different destination and, hence, each person will need his own map to traverse the ...[text shortened]... tarting point is.
---
* My term - essentially the Catholic (Gk. 'Universal'😉 position.[/b]
12 Sep 06
Originally posted by vistesdLOL!
EDIT: Can I make a plea that this discussion not "devolve," as so many on here seem to do, into a debate purely over morality?
I wasn't trying to do that above. It's just that my noncognitivism extends not just to morality, but also to the "territory". Plus, I was just trying to work with LH's analogy.
Sorry, old man. 😞
13 Sep 06
Originally posted by LemonJelloOnly if you assume the discussion has the purpose of determining which position is correct. Your input can still be helpful if it helps clarifying and correctly identifying the cognitivists' positions in LH's metaphor.
I don't think I'll have much to add to the discussion.
13 Sep 06
Originally posted by LemonJelloCould you say a little about how you extend noncognitivism from the ethical and value realms to metaphysical statements? All I have found so far on the web are discussions of moral and theological noncognitivism. Is your claim that I can say nothing meaningful about “reality” or existence? If so, is it because the experience is ultimately ineffable, or that we cannot know the “thing-in-itself” because phenomenal experience is “entangled” with our brain/mind’s construction of it, or something of both—or something else? Are all statements about our existence nonmeaningful—except natural (e.g., scientific) descriptions?
I personally have a very big problem with the whole 'map-territory' discussion. The problem is somewhat difficult to describe, but I can put it into simple terms with your ethics analogy. If you say that relativism and objectivism together cover the whole space of possibility, you are making a big assumption: you are assuming moral cognitivism. You are ...[text shortened]... hink that assumption is a bad one. I don't think I'll have much to add to the discussion.
My claim, as it stands, would be that: (1) we can articulate maps, but with severely limited accuracy (what I would call the effability problem); (2) that maps always reflect a distinct perspective (there is no “view from elsewhere” ), and are, hence, partial; (3) that maps can be “effective” without being “accurate” (I think of a Zen koan that can shake loose one’s conceptual lenses, so as to evoke a direct perceptual/sensual experience of phenomenal reality, though not of any “thing-in-itself,” because of the subject/object entanglement*—in fact, that statement itself may be a form of “map.” )
Are such things as Chiyono’s poem, or Zen koans, or Hafiz’s poetry cognitive or noncognitive (or a Ravi Shankar raga, for that matter)? Or do they operate to short-circuit cognition (which in the dictionary, at least, has a broader definition than “cognitive” )? The answer to that would probably clear it up for me a lot. I may just be having trouble getting a handle on the terminology.
I agree with Palynka: I think you have a lot to offer to this discussion—at least to my understanding.
* My preferred, and hopefully more cautious, term for what others might call a “unitary” or non-dualistic perceptual state; and, for me, that state defines “seeing the territory”—and that’s as far as it goes (or at least as far as I have gotten).
16 Sep 06
1 edit
Originally posted by vistesdMy position would be, I guess, that all claims about our existence are lacking in truth-aptness, and are to that extent "nonmeaningful", with the exception of purely descriptive claims. And even there, meaningful talk may be limited exclusively to the "phenomenal world" -- contained within the subject-ive confines of mental representations. I'm not sure if there is such a thing as knowledge of thing-in-itself. All other sorts of claims (e.g., normative) I view as merely (noncognitive, or volitional) expressions of feelings, desires, approval/disapproval, etc. But only in their descriptive aspects (if any) may they convey anything "real" about the world. Ultima facie, I certainly don't consider the normative aspects meaningless; but I also don't think they convey anything real about the territory.
Could you say a little about how you extend noncognitivism from the ethical and value realms to metaphysical statements? All I have found so far on the web are discussions of moral and theological noncognitivism. Is your claim that I can say nothing meaningful about “reality” or existence? If so, is it because the experience is ultimately ineffable, or th ...[text shortened]... fines “seeing the territory”—and that’s as far as it goes (or at least as far as I have gotten).
So I guess my set of claims about this sort of cartography would certainly include the following at the top of the list: the "territory" itself contains absolutely no normative information. Therefore, any normative aspects belonging to the map are the result of artistic license on the part of the cartographer.
I have more thoughts, but maybe I should first ask if you agree with the following characterization by LH, since it does not really align with my own interpretation (?):
LH: "the 'territory' represents the range of spiritual paths a person can take and the landmarks he will encounter on his journey."
16 Sep 06
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloI tend to agree about access to any "thing-in-itself." I suspect that what I might call satori is a noncognitive experience of phenomenal existence--as long as the brain is still engaged in "translating" sensory data into phenomenal appearances (sights, sounds, etc.), then one is not beyond phenomenon.
My position would be, I guess, that all claims about our existence are lacking in truth-aptness, and are to that extent "nonmeaningful", with the exception of purely descriptive claims. And even there, meaningful talk may be limited exclusively to the "phenomenal world" -- contained within the subject-ive confines of mental representations. tual paths a person can take and the landmarks he will encounter on his journey."
As per LH's definition, I see the point, in that the "range of paths" might be better desrcibed as a range of maps to choose from.
16 Sep 06
1 edit
Originally posted by vistesdI see the point, in that the "range of paths" might be better desrcibed as a range of maps to choose from.
I tend to agree about access to any "thing-in-itself." I suspect that what I might call satori is a noncognitive experience of phenomenal existence--as long as the brain is still engaged in "translating" sensory data into phenomenal appearances (sights, sounds, etc.), then one is not beyond phenomenon.
As per LH's definition, I see the point, in that the "range of paths" might be better desrcibed as a range of maps to choose from.
Exactly! That is probably a main reason why I am confused. The normal philosophical usage of "map-territory" does not fit with the discussion here, as expounded by LH. On the contrary, it seems to me that here we are taking the 'territory' to be comprised of the set of all conceivable maps. And then it becomes incoherent to ask which map is a true representation of the 'territory'; or which maps better represent the 'territory' than others.
My other problem is that if we try to employ "map-territory" in the established way, then we are saying that there exists some sort of real spiritual territory. And that's another reason why I am confused, since, to me, "spiritual territory" only makes sense as a set of subjective and noncognitive artistic expressions -- essentially, cartography with perspective. I don't think there is anything "real" about spiritual territory. In other words, I don't see how you can separate spiritual territory from spiritual mapmaking.
17 Sep 06
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloI’ve been forgetting my Camus in these discussions lately! 🙁
[b]I see the point, in that the "range of paths" might be better desrcibed as a range of maps to choose from.
Exactly! That is probably a main reason why I am confused. The normal philosophical usage of "map-territory" does not fit with the discussion here, as expounded by LH. On the contrary, it seems to me that here we are taking the 'territor don't see how you can separate spiritual territory from spiritual mapmaking.[/b]
Again, I’m not sure we can get to the territory, if the territory is the “thing-in-itself” (I’m keeping Schopenhauer in the back of my mind though). And, if we can get to it, that it’s effable.
Are we in agreement about a noncognitive experience of the phenomenal in terms of the “mutual arising” of that experience in terms of our consciousness and whatever is there? I’m also losing my ability to communicate lately...
EDIT: re a "real spiritual territory"--I would submit that there may be such, but that we cannot access it, unless we are including our consciousness as part of it--that is the inescapable "entanglement" that I sometimes speak of...
17 Sep 06
Originally posted by vistesdYes -- I would consider that a pretty good characterization. It might be difficult to go beyond that right there.
Are we in agreement about a noncognitive experience of the phenomenal in terms of the “mutual arising” of that experience in terms of our consciousness and whatever is there?