19 Apr 09
Originally posted by Palynkawell, I seem to have fallen into the same pit
Since "math" is just a language, you're argument is circular.
Of course it "ain't" the only valid perspective. But it's enough to show that my argument before is not necessarily contradictory.
Do you want to try again?
Of course, you are right that math is a language -- not sure it is "only" a language.
for example, in the realm of ordinary arithmetic using integers, 2 + 2 = a sum certain every time.
in the English language, that is not so certain a result when making declarative statements or statements of equivalence.
We do not exchange meaningless symbols in a algebraic notation here, we are using words -- language. Language usage, not definitions, is what I'm trying to get at.
Everything that we can communicate depends not only on the ostensible definition of words but more particularly on the accepted usage for those words.
The distinction is important, for it can draw a line between the Kantian idea of essence vs. the more modern idea that there is no objective reality, only the present consensus as expressed through a mutual understanding of language.
19 Apr 09
Originally posted by ScriabinYou broach (at least) two different, but both very interesting points.
well, I seem to have fallen into the same pit
Of course, you are right that math is a language -- not sure it is "only" a language.
for example, in the realm of ordinary arithmetic using integers, 2 + 2 = a sum certain every time.
in the English language, that is not so certain a result when making declarative statements or statements of equivalen ...[text shortened]... reality, only the present consensus as expressed through a mutual understanding of language.
The first one is the question whether mathematics is more than a language. In a correspondence (to keep the same term as before) view of language, then mathematics could be more if mathematical objects were real. This is a very interesting (and very non-consensual) argument. Personally, I have a Formalist view of mathematics. In this perspective, it seems to me that mathematics would indeed be only a language.
The second one is regarding the role of the accepted usage of those words. Although this is also a very interesting discussion, I think it's less relevant here. If we define them beforehand (or during), then the standard accepted usage loses relevance and any argument based on it can only be a fallacy of equivocation.
What's your view on the truth of mathematical statements?
19 Apr 09
4 edits
Originally posted by ScriabinSo now your theological noncognitivism reduces to the claim that God talk fails to be meaningful because of non-verifiability and ill-definition of the term 'God'. Before it was that God talk failed to serve pragmatic purpose or to have "relevance" to human life. These are not the same claims, so make up your mind already. The first one you outlined, like I already told you, wouldn't pass for noncognitivism. The second would.
You can't blame me for the limits of your experience or education.
As one who is consistent about theological noncognitivism, I await a coherent definition of the word God (or of any other metaphysical utterance purported to be discussable) before being able to engage in arguments for or against God's existence.
In the meantime, I just don't think G ...[text shortened]... the term "God", no meaningful attributes, only negatively defined or relational attributes.
Anyway, I think your theological noncognitivism (as you have revised it) is almost certainly false in general. Many theists have God conceptions that are certainly cognitively meaningful. When they make claims about God, for instance, these claims do in general express propositions. These propositions may be outrageously false, or even contradictory in certain cases, but they are still propositions. Within theology, certainly there is no convergence upon one single conception of God, and there are surely many different conceptions in play that contradict each other, etc; further, there may well be many more esoteric conceptions that fail to be cognitively meaningful. However, none of those considerations demonstrate your view to be correct.
I understand why people bring the issue of verifiability in here. I think it really should focus more directly on the issue of falsification, but whatever. Yes, if there are no conditons, even in principle, that would serve to falsify a statement, then from a practical standpoint the statment really cannot be asserting anything meaningful. But I simply don't understand why you think a significant portion of God-talk is not verifiable (or falsifiable) at least in principle. I really think you do not understand the real nature of noncognitivism -- which is funny because you keep calling yourself a noncognitivist. That you are confused can be seen, for example, in an earlier reply of yours (where I directly asked you about your noncognitivism). You replied by saying, "People can believe the moon is made of green cheese, the Earth is flat, and electricity is the Devil's work...." Now, I don't care what you think: "The moon is made of green cheese" is a cognitively meaningful statement, and it is also one that is subject to verifiability or falsification. It expresses a proposition, and just because this proposition happens to be outrageously false, that doesn't support a stance of noncognitivism. Maybe you just don't understand this?
I await a coherent definition of the word God
There are many out there in play. The article that I linked earlier (my third post on page 2) goes through several relatively common theistic definitions (something like ten or more). So you're telling me that they all fail to be cognitively meaningful? Why is that?
19 Apr 09
Originally posted by LemonJellowhat I said earlier was, in my view, consistent with what I said later. Your objections are noted, but I find them rather precious.
[b]You can't blame me for the limits of your experience or education.
I don't blame you for anything regarding my own experience or education. I blame you for your own education because you never seem to know what the hell you're talking about with this philosophical stuff except when you are just lifting off of sites like the Stanford one or wiki ...[text shortened]... u're telling me that they all fail to be cognitively meaningful? Why is that?[/b]
those were the same claims expressed differently. there is no pragmatic, relevant purpose in discussing beliefs that are false from the get-go. And such ideas are certainly irrelevant to anything meaningful in life, except perhaps to those with not much useful to do in their lives.
In an increasingly pragmatic political environment, where effects on real lives can be measured and tracked, the constant God talk simply constitutes a form of noise pollution. Nothing can be solved or gained and spurious conflicts wasting a lot of time are the product of God talk. It leads nowhere.
As for using other sites to save time, fine, perhaps you are the exception to the rule around here and have read a book or two.
Not so most others, hence the need for some exposition, for which I've not sufficient time.
When I offer a quote about, say, the correspondence theory of truth, I'm looking for a discussion, not a debate. None of this can be said to be settled -- the only issue for me is whether it is worth the time talking about it.
19 Apr 09
2 edits
Originally posted by Scriabinthose were the same claims expressed differently. there is no pragmatic, relevant purpose in discussing beliefs that are false from the get-go. And such ideas are certainly irrelevant to anything meaningful in life, except perhaps to those with not much useful to do in their lives.
what I said earlier was, in my view, consistent with what I said later. Your objections are noted, but I find them rather precious.
those were the same claims expressed differently. there is no pragmatic, relevant purpose in discussing beliefs that are false from the get-go. And such ideas are certainly irrelevant to anything meaningful in life, except said to be settled -- the only issue for me is whether it is worth the time talking about it.
No, they are not the same claims. Look, if you think all God talk beliefs are FALSE from the get-go, then you are not a noncognitivist. The two views are not even compatible. If you were true to your second revised stance (which entails that there is no meaningful concept to be attached to 'God'😉, then you would not be in a position to say God statements, or doxastic states or attitudes that embrace them, are false (or true) because they would be cognitively meaningless and would not even express propositions. You would be committed to the view that the God talk is not truth-apt, which contradicts this other claim of yours that God talk consists of false claims. You would be committed to the idea that such talk is cognitively meaningless; not that such talk is false from the get-go.
I just deny that your view as expressed here constitutes a form of noncognitivism, and I also deny that this view here is consistent with your second revised view that you stated previously (which did constitute some form of noncognitivism).
Anyway, I doubt it will be useful for me to belabor this point further, so I think I'll take leave.
19 Apr 09
Originally posted by PalynkaI don't have a view on the truth of mathematical statements in general. Perhaps that's because I'm a lawyer and when you ask me how much 2 + 2 = my answer may be "How much do you want it to be?"
You broach (at least) two different, but both very interesting points.
The first one is the question whether mathematics is more than a language. In a correspondence (to keep the same term as before) view of language, then mathematics could be more if mathematical objects were real. This is a very interesting (and very non-consensual) argument. Personall ...[text shortened]... nly be a fallacy of equivocation.
What's your view on the truth of mathematical statements?
I think your point on usage is flat out wrong.
definitions are like Wittgenstein's handles game. I think it false, because it is my experience in law practice involving policy and legislation, that there must be a single definition of a word, an essence. This is not what happens in practice.
Rather, in my work words operate as tools, and meaning correlates most of the time with the usage of words in contexts. Wittgenstein said in his 1958 work Philosophical Investigations: “Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails, and screws.—The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.”
Dictionary definitions are certainly useful, but they fall far short in teaching us how words are used, which is to say what they really mean. Meaning in my view depends on the context of usage within what Wittgenstein called language games and what I would call everyday life.
Here's an example: did you learn to play chess merely by reading the rules? That is not how I learned. I was taught how the pieces move, then I was taught some basic opening theory, I watched other people play. I read chess books to gain understanding of both strategy and tactics. Now I simply play games, and receive training that way.
While I learned enough chemistry to ace college chem 101, it wasn't through memorizing formulae or picturing things that corresponded to various meanings, such as definitions. I learned through much the same process as with chess -- my father was a research chemist.
19 Apr 09
3 edits
Originally posted by ScriabinYour legalist view is a constraint because you limit yourself to that type of language. It's a pity, though. I thought this could have been interesting, but like this we hit a barrier that you can't or won't cross.
I don't have a view on the truth of mathematical statements in general. Perhaps that's because I'm a lawyer and when you ask me how much 2 + 2 = my answer may be "How much do you want it to be?"
I think your point on usage is flat out wrong.
definitions are like Wittgenstein's handles game. I think it false, because it is my experience in law practice learned through much the same process as with chess -- my father was a research chemist.
no1 falls under the same mistake of being severely constrained by his Law education. I wonder how common a phenomenon that is...
19 Apr 09
1 edit
Originally posted by PalynkaI do not understand how a legal education is a constraint. I am not the captive of legal jargon -- I recognize legal gibberish when I see it. For example, the standard form mortgage in most states in the USA appears to be in outline form. It isn't. I once converted such a form into a word processing document and attempted to reformat it in proper outline form. I discovered the various headings, roman numerals, etc. were entirely arbitrary. The mortgage form, like a lot of things, developed over time by accretion. It was custom and usage that made it so.
Your legalist view is a constraint because you limit yourself to that type of language. It's a pity, though. I thought this could have been interesting, but like this we hit a barrier that you can't or won't cross.
no1 falls under the same mistake of being severely constrained by his Law education. I wonder how common a phenomenon that is...
I don't have a "legalist" view -- that is a truly silly assumption on your part. The nature of training for the bar is to learn how to analyze words and their uses within the context in which they appear. Only then can one formulate arguments in favor or against them. It is a constant that one must discern what the issues are. The questions presented must be identified before one can formulate an answer. Some of this concerns matters of fact -- and things are either the case or they are not. Some of this, however, concerns matters of law -- and that is a far more complicated thing derived from different sources that, together, can be advanced as authority to support one's propositions.
The language of law is language, not jargon, not legal terminology. Even when legal terminology comes into play, there is still the need to reach consensus or agreement with the other side in a dispute on what the terms mean in the context of the dispute itself. Just because one ordinarily uses a Force Majeure clause does not give rise to an inflexible definition that provides a universal and always applicable definition for that term of Art. It can be fashioned to address only the facts presented, or the matter at hand.
To assume from some law dictionary or any dictionary what the terms of a contract mean, for example, is to commit malpractice. You have to know that what you mean by a word, a term, or a provision in a contract, is the same thing that the other side understands these things to mean. Else serious adverse consequences can follow.
For example, I have participated in a dispute with another government agency that has lasted at least 14 years over what a particular statutory provision means. The upshot of that determines who decides how hundreds of millions of dollars will be spent and under whose direction and control.
As the subject of that spending is a scientific and technical matter as well as a legal one, matters of fact, mathematical models, risk analyzes, health assessments, and many other technical issues come into play.
To assume, blithely, that a "legalist" view constrains one, disabling one from dealing with these technical, scientific and factual matters, is the very height of foolishness and naivete.
19 Apr 09
1 edit
Originally posted by ScriabinI recognized its status as a language, not simply jargon. It's limiting because it's exactly just that. One language.
I do not understand how a legal education is a constraint. I am not the captive of legal jargon -- I recognize legal gibberish when I see it. For example, the standard form mortgage in most states in the USA appears to be in outline form. It isn't. I once converted such a form into a word processing document and attempted to reformat it in proper outline f technical, scientific and factual matters, is the very height of foolishness and naivete.
When you take it as a barometer for establishing what is the scope of languages themselves, you are then constraining yourself to a particular spectrum of the discussion that I, personally, don't find interesting. In fact, I find it extremely sterile.
20 Apr 09
Originally posted by Palynkayou are rife with false assumptions.
I recognized its status as a language, not simply jargon. It's limiting because it's exactly just that. One language.
When you take it as a barometer for establishing what is the scope of languages themselves, you are then constraining yourself to a particular spectrum of the discussion that I, personally, don't find interesting. In fact, I find it extremely sterile.
you assume I believe all God talk is based on false assumptions. I didn't say that -- you did. You accused me of failing to note that some statements, even false ones, can be cognitive.
you assume that the practice of law occurs within the bounds of a unique language?
amazing.
the only language unique to my legal practice is the English language.
20 Apr 09
Originally posted by ScriabinScriabin has become Fabian.
you are rife with false assumptions.
you assume I believe all God talk is based on false assumptions. I didn't say that -- you did. You accused me of failing to note that some statements, even false ones, can be cognitive.
you assume that the practice of law occurs within the bounds of a unique language?
amazing.
the only language unique to my legal practice is the English language.
you assume I believe all God talk is based on false assumptions. I didn't say that -- you did.
Where did I even broach the subject of God talk?
I didn't say that -- you did.
Can you quote where I did? If not, I'll assume your delusional.
[b}you assume that the practice of law occurs within the bounds of a unique language?[/b]
Again, nowhere did I say that "the practice of law occurs within the bounds of a unique language". In that sentence "language" is defined too narrowly for the purpose of this discussion (i.e. as English). I see you aren't actually following. I was saying that judicial dealings are done in a language of its own...within English. Of course, a narrow view of what a language is cannot make this distinction which, to me, is clear as day.
20 Apr 09
Originally posted by PalynkaWhere did I even broach the subject of God talk?
Scriabin has become Fabian.
[b]you assume I believe all God talk is based on false assumptions. I didn't say that -- you did.
Where did I even broach the subject of God talk?
I didn't say that -- you did.
Can you quote where I did? If not, I'll assume your delusional.
[b}you assume that the practice of law occurs within the bounds ...[text shortened]... w view of what a language is cannot make this distinction which, to me, is clear as day.[/b]
I think Scriabin is there confusing you for me. He seems to be confused a good chunk of the time. 🙄
20 Apr 09
Originally posted by Palynka--I was saying that judicial dealings are done in a language of its own...within English. Of course, a narrow view of what a language is cannot make this distinction which, to me, is clear as day.--
Scriabin has become Fabian.
[b]you assume I believe all God talk is based on false assumptions. I didn't say that -- you did.
Where did I even broach the subject of God talk?
I didn't say that -- you did.
Can you quote where I did? If not, I'll assume your delusional.
[b}you assume that the practice of law occurs within the bounds ...[text shortened]... w view of what a language is cannot make this distinction which, to me, is clear as day.[/b]
well, I'll waste no more time on you, then.
it is most amusing to note that I don't deal with "judicial dealings" at all. Most "judicial dealings" involve no such language of its own -- that's pure crap and is intellectually dishonest on your part. that you cannot apparently understand this make further discourse with you meaningless -- no pragmatic use at all.
but your assumption that legal practice is limited to "judicial dealings" illustrates very well both your problem with false assumptions as well as your underlying insecurity in that you can't give an inch and resort to outright fiction to defend the indefensible.
20 Apr 09
Originally posted by ScriabinFunny how you keep encroaching yourself in your little world and grasping at the straws. Is your ego that fragile?
--I was saying that judicial dealings are done in a language of its own...within English. Of course, a narrow view of what a language is cannot make this distinction which, to me, is clear as day.--
well, I'll waste no more time on you, then.
it is most amusing to note that I don't deal with "judicial dealings" at all. Most "judicial dealings" involv ...[text shortened]... that you can't give an inch and resort to outright fiction to defend the indefensible.
Sad, really.